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INTRODUCTION 
During the first half century of 
American independence, Baltimore's population multiplied to make 
it the nation's third largest city. Within a single life span the mid-
eighteenth-century village at the mouth of Jones' Falls Creek swelled to 
a city of eighty thousand souls, spreading northeastward from the 
Patapsco River to Fells' Point in a crescent-shaped swarm of houses, 
shops, mills, and shipyards. In this vibrant and tumultuous environ-
ment, with spurts of virtually volcanic growth punctuated by short but 
prostrating slumps, workers of all statuses, whether free, apprenticed, 
indentured, or enslaved, were sought out by merchants, manufacturers, 
and craftsmen. Until the prolonged hard times of the 1820s, entrepre-
neurs regarded bound workers as key assets in seeking steady produc-
tion and profits from Baltimore's first flowering. 
Maryland's blacks played a vital part in making both Baltimore's 
fortunes and their own. Arriving as slaves either purchased from or 
migrating with masters leaving the Eastern and lower Western Shores 
of Maryland, they soon seized opportunities to earn money for them-
selves as well as their masters. For many, hard labor and its earnings 
became tools with which to carve out autonomy within slavery and, 
ultimately, to propel themselves out of slavery through self-purchase or 
manumission granted after a further term of service. So widespread 
were such manumissions that by 1830 four-fifths of Baltimore's blacks 
were legally free, the largest group of free people of color in any U.S. city. 
Meanwhile, blacks elsewhere in Maryland achieved freedom much 
more slowly, though still in impressive numbers. Nearly three-quarters 
of the state's rural blacks were still slaves in 1830. Before 1850 free 
persons of color outnumbered slaves only in Cecil and Caroline Coun-
ties, the former abutting on free Pennsylvania and the latter on north-
ern Delaware, where slavery had become moribund. Thus, Baltimore's 
hinterlands remained strongly committed to slave labor even as blacks 
transformed the city into an island of freedom. 
1 
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Understanding Maryland's and Baltimore's experience with slavery 
and emancipation requires locating Maryland and Baltimore in con-
text, both spatially and temporally. On the eve of the American Revo-
lution every colony of British North America had slaves, and as Jack 
Greene has noted, their numbers were everywhere on the increase, even 
in such unlikely milieus as New Hampshire. 1 But something happened 
over the next fifty years. By the 1820s slavery had become almost en-
tirely southern, as states from Pennsylvania northward gradually abol-
ished it. Accounting for this dramatic change in American society has 
generated a torrent of historical analysis and controversy. 
One broad band of thinking, perhaps best exemplified by the work 
of David Brion Davis, stresses the development of antislavery sensibili-
ties in seeking to explain the geographic contraction of slavery: in the 
late eighteenth century, large numbers of people first began to think 
and write that slavery was wrong, even indefensibly wrong, in a moral 
or religious sense. 2 These sensibilities, reinforced by republicanism in 
post-Revolutionary America, generated powerful social and political 
forces that swept slavery away in the North and excluded it from the 
Northwest. Even in the plantation South, where its vital economic im-
portance sustained it, and where the ideology of republicanism could 
be invoked to defend the property rights of slaveholders against the 
intrusion of state power in the name of antislavery sentiment, slavery 
was challenged strongly enough to compel slaveholders to modify the 
exercise of patriarchal power over their chattels. By the early nine-
teenth century, masters developed paternalistic policies stressing mutual 
obligations between master and slave, as a reform of slavery designed 
to ameliorate its harshest aspects and improve its image. So, in broad 
outline, might we describe the impact of the rise of humanitarianism 
on slavery in America for the period of the 1770s to the 1820s. 
But other historians have been far from satisfied with explana-
tions invoking so strongly the power of ideas to change the world. Eric 
Williams and various continuators and modifiers of his work have cen-
tered their attention on a supposed transformation to capitalism ren-
dering slavery anachronistic, as it became a less profitable form of 
exploitation than waged labor. According to this view slaveholders free-
ing chattels are not humanitarians, but rather entrepreneurs liquidat-
ing a devalued investment, and antislaveryites can become little more 
than visible hands working to adjust the world to its new master, the 
market. 3 
Still other historians have tried to deconstruct what they see as a 
false dichotomy between humanitarian and self-interested motivations 
as explanations for the regionalization of slavery in the early national 
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United States. Thomas Haskell has speculated that the habits and modes 
of action acquired by capitalistic entrepreneurs predisposed them to-
ward a more humanitarian outlook, by engendering in them a greater 
sense of responsibility for the consequences of their actions and hence a 
greater sense of guilt for slave trading and slaveholding.4 Alternatively, 
Joyce Chaplin has demonstrated that, at least in the deep South, plant-
ers could embrace humanitarian values without relinquishing their 
slaves; indeed, they came to believe that their role as masters was criti-
cal to civilizing and Christianizing their slaves.5 
Yet another line of inquiry has refocused attention on how the 
American Revolution reshaped slavery where it survived, in the southern 
states. Sylvia Frey has shown compellingly how the chaos engendered 
by the war in the South battered slavery, providing African Americans 
with opportunities to escape from or strike back at their oppressors.6 
For Frey, the movement toward ameliorating slavery from the 1780s to 
the 1820s can be understood only as part of a strategy by slaveholders 
to regain control of black workers. According to this interpretation, 
although black agency could not destroy slavery, it did force numerous 
short-term concessions from masters, regarding maintenance, preser-
vation of families, and access to organized religion. 
Private, voluntary manumission has generally been understood as 
a midrange response to the rise of antislavery sentiment. Northern states 
abolished slavery by gradual emancipation, and the deep South pre-
served slavery in its full vigor, but in the Chesapeake relatively liberal 
manumission laws facilitated partial and halting efforts by portions of 
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia to work their way out of slavery. 7 
There is much to be said for seeing private manumission as slaveholders 
gradually weaning themselves from reliance on lifelong bound labor. 
Manumitters were presumably originally inspired by republican or re-
ligious antislavery ideas, for if their motive had been purely economic, 
they could have simply sold their chattels to dealers on their way to 
Kentucky or New Orleans. Also, granting immediate freedom to all of 
one's slaves might bring economic ruin for oneself. The compromise 
solution would be the gradual freeing of the slaves over as much as 
thirty years, while one sought new ways of creating and accumulating 
wealth. 
If we go looking for such patterns of manumission in Maryland, 
we find them readily enough, notably among Quaker planters and 
merchants of the Eastern Shore, where many blacks gained freedom as 
early as the 1770s and 1780s. 8 The Quakers may be said to have de-
signed a model informing later manumissions: Both dealing in and hold-
ing slaves for life were moral wrongs; the slaveholder's duty to God 
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and the care of his own soul required him to free himself of this taint. 
At the same time, the responsibility to maintain his family argued against 
immediate emancipation, as did the obligation to prepare slaves for the 
challenges of free life. Gradual manumission could achieve all of these 
aims. A model, but not the only one. 
Characterizing manumission primarily as an exit from slavery, as 
an attempt to maximize spiritual or ideological gains while minimizing 
economic losses associated with one's divorce from slaveholding, fails 
to explain two significant features of Maryland's social and economic 
geography in the early national period. First, manumission enjoyed great 
prominence at the same time that slavery also grew and flourished, 
especially in Baltimore. Second, many slaveholders acquired more slaves 
after manumitting slaves. To understand these developments we must 
go beyond models that focus solely on slaveholders' motivations. Weigh-
ing the complexities of slaveholders' actions is indeed critical. But it is 
equally necessary to appreciate the actions and behavior of the blacks 
who were seeking to become free. Only by mapping both the economic 
and ideological consequences of black-white interaction can we gain a 
more complete sense of the processes that resulted in Maryland's un-
usual mixture of free and enslaved African Americans. 
Early national Maryland's slaves wrested freedom from their mas-
ters in a bewildering variety of unequal power struggles. These were 
balanced by momentary harmonies of interest, mixtures of exploita-
tion and kindness, and long, patient bargaining interspersed with vio-
lent episodes. The fascinating and often inspiring processes by which 
slaves won liberty could and did operate both in Baltimore and in rural 
Maryland and indeed can be found in virtually any slaveholding soci-
ety: even in the heyday of the Cotton Kingdom, a few blacks in the 
deep South managed to become free. But far more blacks did so in 
Baltimore and some of Maryland's rural counties than in any other 
slave state, Quaker-dominated Delaware excepted. This book exam-
ines the ties between Baltimore's growth and the economic stagnation 
in southern and eastern Maryland, in order to understand how blacks 
could work their way out of slavery. 
The story begins with the spread of slavery in Baltimore roughly 
between 1770 and 1815 and flows into its supplanting by free black 
labor, from about 1800 to 1830. The first two chapters, dealing with 
slaves and their work in shipyards, craft shops, and an early chemical 
factory in Baltimore, show how masters' need to secure reliable labor 
led to the spread of slavery in the city and how that very process cre-
ated opportunities for blacks to seek manumission. They also speak to 
the question of how the presence of slaves and bound white laborers 
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contributed to the growth of urban manufacturing in the early national 
period. The next three chapters, depicting master-slave interactions and 
the resulting reshaping of slavery in Maryland, portray manumission's 
ambiguous role in preserving, modifying, and destabilizing both the 
relations of masters and slaves and slavery itself. In these pages I ana-
lyze the strategies of masters for perpetuating control and the corre-
sponding efforts by blacks to gain autonomy: blacks both negotiated 
over manumission, acknowledging the legitimacy of slavery, and re-
sisted overtly through flight. I also seek to show how the workings of 
manumission helped generate new forms of dependency in which former 
slaves became enmeshed. 
The concluding chapter grapples with the role of antislavery and 
republican ideology in shaping white attitudes in Baltimore, not only 
toward slaves and slavery, but also toward the community of freed 
African Americans who eventually replaced slaves as a prime compo-
nent of the city's wage labor force. Here the aim is to achieve a fuller 
understanding of how and why manumission could not propel a more 
complete liberation of Maryland's slaves and to see how a partial tran-
sition from bound to free black labor fed into an emerging free labor 
ideology in the 1820s, with a heightened emphasis on race-based ideas 
of political economy. 
In summary, the story of early-nineteenth-century Maryland sug-
gests not only that the spread of slavery, industrial and urban growth, 
and selective manumission were able to coexist but also that they might 
have temporarily reinforced one another. These factors, and the shifts 
that destroyed the fragile balance among them, resulting in the waning 
of slavery in the city, further inform ( 1) the differing responses of South 
and North to possible industrialization, (2) the causes of slavery's weak-
ness in many southern cities, and ( 3) the function of manumission dur-
ing and after the First Emancipation in the upper South. 
Most work on manumission itself, as opposed to the larger studies 
of antislavery discussed above, has proceeded from one of two vantage 
points. Those interested in the slaveholder's perspective have assessed 
manumitters' religious, humanitarian, or economic motivation. Alter-
natively, scholars interested in African American history have often 
treated manumission as a kind of prologue or springboard from which 
to delve into a study of life in free black communities. The best recent 
work, studies by Shane White and by Gary Nash and Jean Soderlund, 
has departed from this pattern and affords excellent in-depth analyses 
of manumission in states legislating post-nati emancipation, New York 
and Pennsylvania, respectively. 9 But understanding the transmutations 
of slavery in Baltimore and rural Maryland before 1830, by focusing 
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on manumission in a slave state, can also help in recasting our under-
standing of how blacks came to be free, or at least in framing more 
contingent evaluations of that process. 
This work also departs from two common focal points of exami-
nations of slavery: the plantation and the antebellum period. Much of 
the best historical writing of the past two generations has developed 
subtle understandings of agricultural slave labor and its impact on re-
gional growth and development, or of the many-sided nature of master-
slave relations, to mention only two prominent topics, but slavery in 
urban settings has received less attention. Discussions of American ur-
ban or industrial slavery have tended to categorize it as exotic, anoma-
lous, and marginal. The most common approach has been to take the 
"failure" of urban or industrial slavery as a given and to look for ex-
planations of the phenomenon. That maintaining masterly control over 
slaves, or keeping them constantly employed and hence maximally prof-
itable, was more difficult in towns than on plantations is no longer in 
doubt. It has proved easy to move from such distinctions to conclu-
sions that urban slavery was foredoomed or performed fundamentally 
different functions in society, such as status display for the wealthy, 
rather than that of a wealth-generating system of labor. 
In delving into the causes underlying Baltimore's early move to-
ward a greater use of slave labor, with its subsequent evolution into an 
almost entirely free labor city, accounting for the city's place in its re-
gional economy and polity is important. The expansion of slavery in 
Baltimore was fueled in part by shifts in the labor regime of the sur-
rounding counties. Mono-cropping of tobacco began to give way to a 
mixed agriculture relying more strongly on wheat; the result was less 
need for year-round field laborers and increased availability of bound 
workers to employers in Baltimore. These changes flowed in part from 
interruptions in trade patterns caused by European wars of the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These disruptions in trade 
stimulated urban manufacturing of import substitutes while depress-
ing the export of tobacco. Both Baltimore's interactive role with its 
hinterland and its somewhat dependent status vis-a-vis modifications 
in the transatlantic economy helped drive internal shifts in the city's 
patterns of labor usage. 
This book thus attempts to gauge both macro- and microeconomic 
forces affecting slavery and manumission in Maryland. Such an ap-
proach, although it can be extremely valuable in sketching a multicausal 
explanation for slavery's eventual marginalization in Baltimore, is not 
without pitfalls. For example, one must avoid the temptation to as-
sume too much congruence between the impulses of large economic 
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forces and the actions of individual slaveholders. Such an assumption 
would be overly reductive, ignoring the many noneconomic factors that 
inform human decisions, and would also tend to depict African Ameri-
cans, enslaved or free, as passive victims or beneficiaries of white ac-
tion-a wildly inaccurate portrayal. 
Moreover, even within the idealized world in which rational eco-
nomic calculation determines action, there are, and were in early na-
tional Baltimore, conflicts between economic theory and practice. Even 
people who are relatively unaffected by motives of humanity, religion, 
or republicanism may fail to engage in maximally effective economic 
behavior. The final chapter on the political economy of slavery, antisla-
very, and free black workers attempts to come to grips with this phe-
nomenon. 
1 
SLAVERY IN EARLY NATIONAL 
BALTIMORE AND RURAL MARYLAND 
The story of blacks gaining free-
dom in Baltimore begins with the arrival of slaves from the countryside 
and their employment in craft work and manufacturing. Those slaves, 
either owned or hired from their owners, found that their masters val-
ued and rewarded their willingness to come to the city and their pro-
ductive service even to the point of granting their freedom. 
Understanding how and why blacks came or were brought to Balti-
more and how that process led to freedom requires an examination of 
the ebbs and flows of the economy and the society both in the city and 
in the countryside. Two rural Maryland counties, Dorchester and Prince 
George's, will serve as examples of their regions. Dorchester County, 
on Maryland's sandy Eastern Shore, was a rural, mixed-agriculture re-
gion in the early 1800s with a few small towns, including a modest 
commercial center at the county seat of Cambridge. Prince George's 
County, south of Baltimore and east of Washington City, typified lower 
Western Shore tobacco growing counties. Almost entirely rural, its rela-
tively richer soils allowed the profitable cultivation of tobacco long 
after that crop had ceased to dominate Eastern Shore agriculture. Both 
counties thus featured different local economies from that of Baltimore 
and offer different perspectives on bound labor as well. Prince George's 
remained tied to tobacco and slaves throughout the early national and 
antebellum periods. Dorchester, like most of the Eastern Shore, shifted 
to a mixed-agriculture regime and gradually decreased its reliance on 
slavery after 1800, supplementing it with an equally mixed bag of la-
bor forms, including tenancy, indentured servitude, labor rendered de-
pendent by debt, and waged work. 
Slaves began to live and work in Baltimore in the third quarter of 
the eighteenth century. It was an inconsequential hamlet before 1750, 
but with the opening up of the Maryland and Pennsylvania backcountry, 
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the town grew up around mills on the Jones' Falls Creek and the adja-
cent harbor, as an entrepot for wheat, corn, and livestock. In 1768 
Baltimore became the seat of Baltimore County, a thirty-mile-wide 
swatch of land extending from the city and the Chesapeake Bay north-
ward to the Pennsylvania border. By 1800 rural manufacturers clus-
tered at mills on several of the county's smaller rivers that empty into 
the Chesapeake, while residents of the upper county, north and west of 
Baltimore city, grew grain and raised cattle in a landscape also dotted 
with flour mills, sawmills, and iron forges. 
Reflecting their diverse paths of development, the three counties 
exhibited different histories respecting their usage of slaves (see table 
1 ). Slavery's growth in the city of Baltimore outpaced that of Maryland 
at large between 1790 and 1810, but over the next twenty years a 
gradual decline prevailed, accelerating after 1830. In outlying Balti-
more County a modest increase in slavery before 1800 ceased there-
after.1 Likewise in Dorchester slavery dwindled rapidly after 1830, fol-
lowing a slow diminution that had begun as early as 1790, when the 
county recorded its peak slave population. Prince George's, on the other 
hand, with more slaves than any other Maryland county, showed little 
change in slave population throughout the early national and antebel-
lum periods. In both of the latter counties and their respective regions, 
masters did not welcome growth in the slave population, preferring to 
hire or sell off surplus "hands," both locally and to southwestern slave 
traders. 
Dorchester's slight loss in slave numbers from 1790 to 1810 paral-
leled downturns in Eastern Shore counties such as Kent, Queen Anne's, 
and Somerset. Prince George's static demography was replicated by 
sister tobacco-growing counties of the Western Shore: Anne Arundel, 
Calvert, Charles, and Saint Mary's Counties collectively showed a mod-
est 5 percent increase in slaves over these decades. 
Considered as a unit, Baltimore County and Baltimore city regis-
tered a 60 percent increase between 1790 and 1810, well within the 
range of Maryland's fast-growing northern tier: slave population more 
than doubled in Washington and Allegany Counties and increased by 
more than 50 percent in Frederick County, about 30 percent in Harford 
County, and some 25 percent in Montgomery County. Growth in 
slaveholding accompanied the opening up of previously untilled farm-
lands, as slaves took on the onerous tasks of clearing land and improv-
ing farmsteads. 
But slavery expanded much more vigorously in late-eighteenth- and 
early-nineteenth-century Baltimore city than in its outlying county or 
in Maryland generally: the city's numbers nearly quadrupled, from 1,255 
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TABLE 1 
Slave Population in Baltimore, Dorchester, and Prince 
George's Counties, 1790-1860 
(Units of 1 00) 
1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 
Baltimore Co. 59 68 66 67 66 
Baltimore-City 12 28 47 44 41 
Dorchester Co. 53 46 50 52 50 
Prince George's Co. 112 122 114 112 116 
1860 
32 
22 
41 
125 
NoTE: Prince George's County figures include a correction of 1810 census data, in which 
2,200 slaves were mistakenly counted as free persons of color in the county. I am in-
debted for this information to Prof. Steven Sarson of the University College of Swansea, 
Wales. 
to 4,672, while in the rest of the county slavery increased by less than 
15 percent. In fact, the city's growth in slaveholding exceeded that of 
any other county in the state; at the same time the increase in outlying 
Baltimore County was lower than that of any other northern or west-
ern county.2 
Baltimoreans purchased many slaves from rural owners. Between 
1790 and 1810 city dwellers bought more than eight times as many 
slaves from elsewhere as they sold to owners outside the city. Better 
than one quarter of all sales of slaves in the county before 1810 sent a 
rural slave to the city.3 Slaveholders moving to town with their chattels 
also swelled the slave population. James Piper, a onetime Kent County 
planter-merchant who later operated a ropewalk in Baltimore with slave 
workmen, and Seth Sweetser, an Annapolitan who took his boot-
making business and four slave craftsmen with him to the city, typify 
such migrations. Rural slave sellers, whether pressed by the debt and 
credit crises of the mid-1780s or by longer-term needs to reshape labor 
forces, supplied both new and old Baltimoreans with laborers rela-
tively cheaply. Planters were pruning their holdings of slaves as they shift-
ed from the year-round labor intensity of tobacco growing to crop mixes 
with seasonal peaks of labor demand, such as wheat, corn, and fruits 
and vegetables.4 
City dwellers also brought slaves to Baltimore from outside the 
state. Although Maryland had banned importing slaves "by land or 
water" in 1783, Maryland residents could obtain exemptions for do-
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mestic transactions. A slaveholder had only to file a declaration identi-
fying the slaves and specifying that their labor was intended for his use 
only rather than for resale. More than 300 slaves came to Baltimore in 
this fashion during the 1790s, mostly from Virginia, even as the prac-
tice of manumission spread.5 In 1792 the legislature authorized 
slaveholders fleeing Saint Domingue to bring their slaves into Mary-
land, a measure repealed in 1797, as fears grew that the "French negroes" 
would foment a slave insurrection.6 French emigres had meanwhile 
declared the importation of 133 slaves. A few more slaves entered the 
city with masters who chose to leave New York after passage of that 
state's post-nati emancipation law in 1799.7 Finally, slaveholders se-
cured dozens of private bills from the Maryland legislature to bring in 
still more slaves. 8 
The enslaved men and women who entered Baltimore in such large 
numbers from the 1780s to 1820 engaged in many kinds of work, of-
ten for new masters, in both senses of the phrase: slaves dealt with 
owners previously unknown to them, and many of the owners had not 
held slaves before acquiring them in Baltimore. A look at these 
slaveholders, focusing on their work, their level of wealth, and the rela-
tionship between slavery and the economic environment in which these 
masters operated will help to sketch in more of the background to 
blacks' ability to propel themselves from slavery to freedom in Balti-
more. 
Merchants, ship captains, public officials, and professionals such 
as doctors, lawyers, and bankers made up the majority of urban 
slaveholders, but hundreds of craft workers and manufacturers also 
had slaves residing in their households between 1790 and 1820.9 The 
breadth and depth of slaveholding in the crafts is an important element 
in the phenomenon of urban manumission. First, it compels caution in 
generalizing about artisans or mechanics as an antislavery element ren-
dering slavery unstable in a city setting. The spread of slavery in 
Baltimore's workshops from 1790 to 1810, coincident with the rise of 
manumission, raises questions whether connections between these two 
supposedly antithetical processes exist. One potential connection is that 
most manumissions freed African Americans only after a term of ser-
vice, during which time they could be bought and sold at prices dis-
counted below those prevailing for lifelong slaves. Purchasing such 
workers might have been highly appealing to craftsmen seeking to ex-
pand their command of labor as cheaply as possible. 
Slaveholding in the crafts peaked around 1810, when 325 people, 
19 percent of all those who could be matched from the census rolls to 
the city directory, held slaves. A higher proportion of practitioners held 
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slaves in 1810 than in 1790, 1800, or 1820, in nearly two-thirds of the 
crafts. Most of the remaining occupations showed the broadest partici-
pation in slaveholding in 1800; only four did so in 1820 or later. 10 
Slaveholding thus expanded in Baltimore's craft and industrial sector 
in tandem with the city's growth until the second decade of the nine-
teenth century. 
Both the share of all Baltimore slaveholders who worked in the 
crafts and the share of slaves held by artisans and manufacturers also 
peaked in the period from 1810 to 1820. In 1790 workers in crafts and 
industry made up 24 percent of slaveholders with identifiable occupa-
tions and held 23 percent of the slaves. By 1800 those proportions had 
increased markedly: craftsmen composed 33 percent of identifiable 
slaveholders and held 27 percent of the slaves. In 1810 they were 35 
percent of the slaveholders and held 33 percent of the slaves. But by 
1820 only 22 percent of the slaveholders practiced a craft, holding 21 
percent of the slaves.H 
Slaves were thus pulled into Baltimore during its rapid growth af-
ter 1780 by overlapping and mushrooming labor needs on the part of 
merchants, craftsmen, and manufacturers. Attracted by the ability to 
retain bound laborers in a boom town, even people of moderate wealth 
could obtain slave labor without committing themselves to lifelong 
ownership of slaves: throughout the period African Americans serving 
as term slaves pending manumission were commonly bought and sold 
for one-third to one-half less than slaves for life. 
The rise in slavery in Baltimore's workshops coincided with a de-
cline in skilled work by slaves and white apprentices in the surround-
ing countryside. Whereas runaway ads placed by Prince George's and 
Anne Arundel County masters in the Maryland Gazette described nearly 
a quarter of male slaves in the 1780s and 1790s as possessing artisanal 
skills, that proportion fell to less than one-tenth by the second decade 
of the nineteenth century. 12 A study of Saint Mary's County likewise 
found fewer skilled male slaves after 1810, a change attributable to 
changing market conditions: Baltimore-made goods increasingly un-
dersold local products, reducing the utility of rural slave artisans. 13 
Concomitantly, many of those artisans may have been sold to Bal-
timore, hired their own time there, or even run away to the city, simul-
taneously building up Baltimore's craft labor base and reducing the 
out-counties' capacity for craft production. As for apprentices, both 
the volume and the proportion of rural indentures promising to train 
children in craft skills were lower after 1815 than previously. 14 
Thus Baltimore drained its hinterlands of skilled slaves, many of 
whom then produced manufactures in the city's shops. The competi-
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tion engendered by the distribution of those goods in rural Maryland 
subsequently rendered rural craft work and the associated training of 
slaves less profitable. Eventually, with fewer rural African Americans 
learning craft skills, the continued recruitment of slaves for Baltimore's 
craft shops became more difficult: the scarcity of skilled slaves in rural 
counties after 1810 may have triggered the decline in slavery's share of 
the Baltimore craft labor market. 
The prevalence of manumission in Baltimore must therefore be con-
templated against the backdrop of slave migration to the city. One might 
be tempted to think that late-eighteenth- or early-nineteenth-century 
manumission was a sign that supply of slaves exceeded demand, or 
that slavery had become unprofitable. Clearly, such a view is highly 
unsatisfactory, if not for rural Maryland, then certainly for the city. An 
alternative view, which sees gradual manumission as a tactic of em-
ployers to encourage the entry of free laborers into a labor market, also 
fails to account for the active recruitment of slaves for craft work. It 
has been suggested that white craft workers especially disliked work-
ing alongside slaves who were bound for life and that craft masters 
used manumission to reduce this stigma. At the same time gradual 
manumission would retain the services of the bound laborers until the 
shift to a free labor market was completed. But if the masters had had 
this strategy in mind, they would not have continued to purchase slaves 
for craft work. 15 
In fact, one of the prime attractions of Baltimore, for both skilled 
and unskilled blacks, lay precisely in its reputation as a place where a 
slave could gain freedom through self-purchase or delayed manumis-
sion in return for rendering highly productive labor. Thus, Baltimore's 
growth, fed by voluntary and involuntary black migration, altered ru-
rallabor, choking off slavery-based craft work in the countryside. But 
the city could only temporarily fuel manufacturing growth with rural 
craft slaves; as that process shut itself down by the 1820s, new sources 
of labor had to be found: white immigrants and an ever-growing free 
black population would take the place of slaves. Nonetheless, slave-
buying artisans and manufacturers played an important part in this 
slow transformation of Maryland's economy and labor force. 
Of course, not all the slaves in craft work were owned by those 
who employed them; slave hiring from merchants, rentiers, and profes-
sionals offered a short-term, if expensive, source of bound workers. 
Hiring or hiring out slaves was the principal means by which a 
slaveholder could temporarily adjust his or her supply of labor power. 
Of course, in this situation a slave's willingness to work as a hireling 
would be worth encouraging with incentives and rewards. Shifts in the 
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need for slave labor could arise from changes in one's economic activi-
ties or from the evolution of one's family structure. Advertisers seeking 
to hire or sell slaves routinely assured readers that they were moved not 
by the slave's bad character or work habits, but by "want of employ-
ment" for the worker or by a plan to "retire from business." Whatever 
the realities, advertisers clearly expected such explanations to be plau-
sible to prospective customers familiar with Baltimore's volatile eco-
nomic climate. 16 
Slaves were hired, or hired themselves, for farm labor, craft or manu-
facturing work, and domestic service.l7 Because no transfer of title to 
property occurred, far fewer hiring contracts survive than do records 
of slave sales or manumissions, making it difficult to estimate the ex-
tent of the practice. In Baltimore between 1790 and 1820, one-sixth of 
slave advertisements expressed a desire to hire or hire out slaves. Just 
under 10 percent of runaway ads noted that the fugitive had been hired 
out. 18 Slave hiring had become common enough by the years between 
1810 and 1820 for several Baltimore concerns to play the role of em-
ployment agency. Alexander Stuart and Jacob G. Smith advertised that 
they had "a number of Negroes to Hire, by the day, week, month, or 
year. Also, several young ones, of each sex, which [they would] place in 
genteel families, for two or three years, for their victuals and clothes." 19 
Finally, the passage of a law in 1817 barring slaves from "going at 
large" to hire their own time suggests that the practice was widespread.20 
In other southern cities many widows, innkeepers, and lawyers hired 
out their slaves, who comprised their principal taxable property. For 
example, an 1813 assessment list showed thirty-eight slaveholding 
women identified as widows in the city directory. Twenty-one of these 
women held more than a quarter of their property in slaves; for twelve 
of the widows slaves composed a majority of their holdings. One of 
them, Ann Crow, hired out Sam, a man of unstated age who was rated 
at $125. Crow also owned Sarah, a woman over thirty-six years old, 
rated at $40. Her only other taxable property was $12 worth of furni-
ture; what Sam and Sarah earned probably was Crow's economic main-
stay.21 
Inns and taverns frequently served as points of rendezvous for slave 
hiring or brokering, allowing vendors of such laborers to capitalize on 
the flow of people and information that swirled through the doors. No 
doubt the innkeeper's ability to hire out his or her own slaves served as 
a hedge against slow times, an option that may have been particularly 
attractive for artisans operating a small inn or tavern as a sideline.22 
Baltimore's largest slaveholder in 1813, John Gadsby, employed his 
thirty-six slaves in operating his Indian Queen Hotel, but it is not likely 
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that Elizabeth Winkle needed the unremitting labor of six slaves to 
keep a tavern worth less than one hundred dollars, exclusive of the 
slaves.23 She may instead have hired them out, or allowed them to hire 
their own time. Account books of Baltimore manufacturers record such 
short-term transactions. For example, David McKim, a factory opera-
tor of the 1820s, noted payments to Mme. DeLozier "for her hands" 
and to attorney Simon Wilmer in amounts suggesting that one or two 
of his slaves had helped McKim deal with a short-term surge in work at 
his chemical plant.24 
Baltimore's professions included many men who might have been 
slave rentiers. The 1813 tax list records thirteen lawyers and eleven 
doctors who held four or more slaves composing at least a quarter of 
each man's wealth; slaves represented a majority of the wealth of nine 
of them. From bankers, brokers, cashiers, clerks, and insurance com-
pany officers came another twelve men whose holdings were strongly 
concentrated in slaves. All told, more than seventy slaveholders in these 
occupations had significant property holdings in slaves, which made 
them plausible candidates to have engaged in slave hiring.25 
Slaveholding merchants, storekeepers, and sea captains, as well as 
artisans, may also have rented out bound workers. A court case of 
1798 illustrates slave hiring by a seamstress. In that year Martha Hay 
sued Captain Conner over the loss of a slave named Perry. Hay, a widow 
managing the estate of her children, had hired Perry to Conner, "to 
perform a Voyage from Baltimore to Hamburg and thence back to Bal-
timore, as a Cook on board the Ship Mary," for twenty dollars a month. 
On the return voyage Perry escaped at Martinique and was not re-
taken. Hay sought to recover Perry's value from Conner and dwelt on 
the importance of Perry's income to the maintenance of her children. 26 
This case illustrates the role slave hiring could play and the difficulty of 
detecting it in the documentary record. Captain Conner does not ap-
pear to have been a slaveholder, yet he employed slaves on his shipP 
Only Perry's successful escape created the circumstances that allowed 
his work to reach our attention. All told, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that slave hiring affected the lives of significant numbers of 
Baltimore's slaves and masters. 
Slaveholders like Martha Hay and Ann Crow were not rich, and 
that made them fairly typical of Baltimore slaveholders. The evidence 
from Baltimore's 1813 tax list, which itemized slaves by age and sex 
and defined the portion of an owner's wealth they represented, sug-
gests that many people of moderate wealth relied on slave labor.28 In 
all, 3,367 resident property holders, including 1,135 masters and their 
2,740 slaves, appeared in the 1813 assessment lists. Most of these 
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slaveholders had one to three slaves, who commonly represented about 
one-quarter of an owner's total worth, despite assessment rules that 
often undervalued slaves by 60 or 70 percent by fixing a maximum 
value of $125 for a slave.29 Baltimore slaveholders thus almost cer-
tainly held a larger proportion of their real total wealth in slaves than 
is reflected in the 1813 assessments. 
One of the more striking aspects of this picture is the relatively 
equal likelihood that Baltimoreans possessing any taxable wealth would 
hold slaves, regardless of how rich they were. To be sure, a majority of 
the very richest citizens owned slaves, compared with only one in eight 
of those on the bottom rung of the taxable wealth ladder. But 
Baltimoreans holding as little as $140 of property were about three-
quarters as likely to be slaveholders as those worth five or six times as 
much. Table 2 illustrates this proposition. 
This fairly flat distribution of slaveholding across most strata of 
wealth does not fit well with a view of urban slaveholding oriented 
strongly toward status display. Were such an attitude a key factor, a 
stronger link might have appeared between great wealth and 
slaveholding. Moreover, the slave or slaves owned by property holders 
worth less than one thousand dollars represented a very substantial 
portion of their total taxable wealth; it may be doubted that people 
held a quarter or a half of their property in a nonproductive house 
servant, as opposed to a worker whose labor could yield income or 
accumulation of capital. 
One way to explore this question further is to revisit the question 
of whether merchants, professionals, and others not directly engaged 
in production were significantly more likely to hold slaves than arti-
sans were. Table 3 breaks down the 1813 taxables into craftsmen and 
manufacturers on the one hand, and all other wealth holders on the 
other.30 
Craftsmen and manufacturers were nearly as likely to hold slaves 
as others of similar wealth; only the middle quintile shows a dispropor-
tionately larger cohort of slaveholders among the other wealth holders. 
Perhaps the most telling thing about table 3 is that about two in five 
Baltimore craftsmen who could own slaves-who had enough property 
to choose-did so.31 
These data are incompatible with an opinion that artisans or me-
chanics were averse to slavery. The aversion may have been real enough 
on the part of apprentices and journeymen facing competition from 
slave workers, but those craft practitioners who had property, and from 
whose ranks employers of craft labor sprang, had a much more mixed 
reaction. 
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TABLE2 
Slaveholding and Wealth: Proportions of Slaveholders 
by Deciles of Taxable Wealth, Baltimore, 1813 
Decile Mean Median %Holding 
Ranking Wealth Wealth Slaves 
First $4,553 $3,310 59 
Second 1,488 1,447 45 
Third 900 890 39 
Fourth 603 600 37 
Fifth 411 400 33 
Sixth 290 285 25 
Seventh 204 200 30 
Eighth 141 140 28 
Ninth 100 94 19 
Tenth 53 52 12 
Overall 874 336 34 
NoTE: This group includes 3,367 wealth holders. 
Baltimore's slaveholders, whether craftsmen or not, held fewer slaves 
than rural Marylanders did: statewide, the average slaveholder owned 
seven or eight persons, but Baltimore's owners held an average of two 
or three slaves. Between 1790 and 1820 the mean holding among slave-
owning craft workers hovered around 2.5, as did that of all other 
slaveholders.32 For all four censuses, 80 to 90 percent of slaveholders 
owned four or fewer slaves, and only 1 or 2 percent Baltimoreans reached 
the "large planter" standard of owning 20 or more slaves. See table 4. 
More than four-fifths of Baltimore slaveholders, regardless of oc-
cupation, held fewer than five slaves at any given period. Correspond-
ingly, most slaves were part of small groups: In 1790, 8 percent of 
slaves were part of holdings of ten or more chattels; in 1820 the ratio 
was 12 percent, whereas in all four decades a majority of slaves were 
owned as part of a holding of one to three persons. 
This relative stability may be related to turnover in the ranks of the 
slaveholders. Less than one-third (29 percent) of the slaveholders in the 
1790 census for Baltimore town could be verified as Baltimore 
slaveholders in 1800. In 1810 and 1820 only 23 percent of those in the 
18 The Price of Freedom 
TABLE3 
Slaveholding and Wealth: Craftsmen and Manufacturers 
versus Other Wealth Holders, Baltimore, 1813 
Wealth Crafts/Mfg. Others 
Quintile N % Slaveholders N % Slaveholders 
First 115 63 366 68 
Second 145 42 271 47 
Third 148 28 278 43 
Fourth 141 36 266 38 
Fifth 115 22 200 21 
Total 664 38 1,381 46 
prior census still lived in Baltimore and owned slaves.33 Manufacturers 
and craftsmen were more likely than the norm, however, to remain 
slaveholders from one decade to the next, at least before 1820.34 In 
1800 half of the craftsmen (31 of 60) who had identifiably owned slaves 
in 1790 were still Baltimore slaveholders at work at their craft. In 1810 
34 percent (71 of 210) of those who had owned slaves in 1800 again 
appeared as slaveholders. By 1820, however, only 22 percent (66 of 
310) of slaveholders who had engaged in craft or industrial work ten 
years earlier retained slaves, a decrease that fits with other signs of 
slavery's weakening in Baltimore after 1815. The higher persistence 
rates between 1790 and 1810 corroborate other evidence that 
slaveholding grew stronger among the crafts before 1810 and did not 
begin to lose vitality until1820.35 
Black men and women thus participated extensively in the early-
nineteenth-century city's craft and manufacturing work. Slavery in late 
antebellum Baltimore increasingly fettered women working as domes-
tics or menials, but the picture is very different prior to 1830. To be 
sure, as early as 1820, female slaves outnumbered men by 2,368 to 
1,989, a ratio of 119:100. And by 1860 nearly two-thirds of Baltimore's 
dwindling slave population was female. These patterns have lent sup-
port to the view that Baltimore's slaves were primarily female at all 
stages of the city's development. But data from slave transactions sug-
gests otherwise. Before 1830 only 52 percent of slaves sold were women 
or girls.36 Similarly, manumissions exhibited a ratio of only 103 fe-
males to 100 males, and declarations of slaves brought into Baltimore 
city from outside the state actually exhibit a 99:100 ratioY Taken to-
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TABLE4 
Numbers of Slaves Held by Craftsmen and Manufacturers, 
in Comparison to Slaveholders of Other Known Occupations in the 
City of Baltimore, 1790-1820 
Slaveholders 
Percent owning 
Occupation Year N 1 2-4 5-9 10-19 
Craft & mfg. 1790 60 48 40 8 2 
Others 1790 188 39 45 15 1 
Craft & mfg. 1800 210 45 43 10 1 
Others 1800 435 36 48 14 2 
Craft & mfg. 1810 325 46 44 8 2 
Others 1810 612 43 42 12 2 
Craft & mfg. 1820 299 49 40 8 2 
Others 1820 1069 47 42 9 1 
19 
20+ 
2 
<1 
1 
0 
<1 
1 
1 
<1 
gether, the court documents identify 1,601 slaves, of whom 775 were 
males and 826 were females, a female-to-male ratio of 107:100. 
Patterns of slave employment in the crafts, whether of men or 
women, can be discerned by examining how many artisans and manu-
facturers owned slaves in selected trades. Elsewhere in the South, black 
women worked in tobacco manufacturing as well as in hatting, tailor-
ing, baking, and other food processing and clothing-related trades; most 
other trades relied on male workers. 38 
Slaves were most valuable in enterprises requiring uninterrupted 
labor over sustained periods: brick making, rope making, and ship-
building would be prime examples. Few businesses flourished as much 
as brick making during Baltimore's rapid commercial and residential 
expansion. The admixtures of clay and sand in local soils provided 
ideal materials, especially in the southern and western regions of the 
city, and the frequent fires that swept away wooden structures were a 
good advertisement for brick construction.39 Slaves who shaped and 
fired bricks by the tens of thousands were the brick makers' mainstays, 
as a 1798 brick makers' petition to the Baltimore City Council as-
serted: "If any of you gentlemen have been at our brickyard, you have 
no doubt observed four black Men for one white man ... because of 
the extream hard labor." In an early instance of what would become a 
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popular theme in discussions of Baltimore's labor market, the petition-
ers urged the council to repeal an ordinance regulating brick size and 
shape, arguing that doing so would lessen the harshness of labor and 
"incourage poor white men and boys to come to the brickyard for 
imployment." The repealing ordinance was approved, but in 1813 brick 
makers still relied heavily on slaves. Ten of seventeen brick makers 
found in the tax list owned slaves, including nineteen men and three 
boys.40 Six of these slaveholders were in the top quintile of wealth 
holding and were worth well over $1,000, but the other four were 
middling men worth from $120 to $520, three of whom held a major-
ity of their taxable worth in slaves. 
Twenty-two adult male slaves toiled at a ropewalk owned by Wil-
liam and Robert Patterson, composing the second largest group of slaves 
in Baltimore in 1813. Shipbuilders, who also worked with some of the 
largest groups of slaves, included more than thirty slaveholders in all.41 
The ship building and fitting industry enjoyed a peak period in early 
Baltimore as construction was spurred by naval warfare, both to build 
merchant vessels to replace those lost to warships or privateers, and 
(after 1812) to fit out American privateers. Half of the shipbuilders 
held 25 percent or more of their wealth in slaves, five of them a major-
ity thereof. However, crafts allied with shipbuilding, such as sail mak-
ing, block and pump making, and rigging, had fewer than ten 
slaveholders collectively; only two sail makers and one block maker 
can be identified as slaveholders on the 1813 tax rolls. Only Benjamin 
Buck, a sail maker with assessable wealth of $494, who owned three 
slaves, appears to have had a substantial proportion of his wealth in 
slaves. 
This phenomenon illustrates another important feature of the eco-
nomics of slaveholding. Shipbuilders orchestrated a host of activities, 
including design; construction; fitting out the vessel with its masts, spars, 
ropes, and blocks; and caulking, painting, and other finishing work. 
Ope~ating the way general contractors do in today's construction busi-
ness, they employed (or owned) some labor directly and subcontracted 
out other work, to riggers, for example. As the prime mover in the 
operation, the shipbuilder controlled the flow of work and was well 
placed to estimate ongoing labor needs, an ability that was important 
to investing efficiently in slaves and avoiding the maintenance of idle 
laborers. Subcontractors faced more uncertainty about the existence 9f 
the steady work that would make slave owning pay. Put another way, 
the shipbuilder could reasonably hope to find some kind of work-
caulking, rough carpentry, or the like-to keep slaves fully employed at 
all times; the rigger could not. 
Slavery in Early National Baltimore 21 
Differing degrees of specialization, technical knowledge require-
ments of the craft, and scale of operation shaped different labor strat-
egies for these two occupations. The rigger carried on a single special-
ized activity requiring a fairly high degree of knowledge and skill, and 
he operated on a small scale. He had little to gain by exploiting slave 
labor. The shipbuilder, operating in a larger and more diversified fash-
ion, could and did profit from slave workers, who provided him with a 
core of cheap labor augmented by more expensive wage labor as the 
volume of work dictated.42 
Other factors appear to have been at work in the metalworking 
trades. Blacksmiths did not rely heavily on slave labor: about one-third 
of those who appear on the tax rolls held slaves, but only four of twenty-
nine could be positively identified as owning an adult male worker.43 
Those who did hold male slaves were in the top two quintiles of wealth, 
suggesting that scale of operation may have borne on the utility of 
slave labor. Their ranks included Thomas Worrell, the richest of the lot 
at an assessed value of $2,370 and owner of nine slaves, and Thomas 
Perkins, assessed at more than $1,000, with four slaves. Specialized 
operators may also have seen more opportunities to exploit slaves prof-
itably; Richard Chenowith, who owned an adult male worker, listed 
his occupation as "blacksmith" but advertised himself in the Baltimore 
newspapers as a maker of ploughs and other farm implements. If 
Chenowith was in fact producing enough plows, harrows, and seed 
drills to warrant segmenting his production work into discrete jobs, he 
would have been better placed to exploit slaves for at least some of his 
labor needs. Chenowith was still on the make in 1813; by 1819 he 
reported his occupation as "patent plough maker" and owned three 
male slaves.44 
Nail making also shows links between slaveholding, specialization, 
and operational scale. Anyone familiar with Adam Smith's example of 
pin making to illustrate productivity gains associated with division of 
labor can imagine how nail making could lend itself to the same pro-
cess.45 In fact, the two richest nail manufacturers in Baltimore, Enoch 
Betts and Richardson Stewart, were major slaveholders: Betts owned 
eleven slaves and Stewart seven, including three men and two boys. 
Slaves composed more than four-fifths of Betts's wealth; even for the 
much richer Stewart they were a substantial one-fifth of his holdings. A 
third nail manufacturer, Bernard Coskery, no longer in business by 1813, 
had owned fourteen slaves at the time of the 1810 census.46 
Whether specializing or not, wealthier ironworkers were much more 
likely to own slaves: a majority of those in the top two quintiles of 
wealth were slaveholders, as opposed to only one in fourteen in the 
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lower ranks, a pattern contrary to the generally weak correlation be-
tween level of wealth and slaveholding. One explanation may be that 
entry into metalworking required larger amounts of capital than many 
other crafts. A cordwainer or a carpenter could practice his trade with 
a set of hand tools, but a blacksmith needed a forge and fairly expen-
sive appurtenances, such as bellows, anvils, and tools for shaping and 
handling hot iron. The absence of slaveholding among less wealthy 
blacksmiths may mean that these craftsmen lacked the wealth to have 
acquired ownership of all the tools and structures needed to practice 
their craft, or that they had no capital with which to acquire slaves 
after doing so.47 Only when they had passed beyond the unusually 
high threshold of wealth necessary for metalworking could they begin 
to consider the option of owning labor power as well. 
By contrast, in trades where high capital requirements did not pose 
a barrier to entry, there was not that marked variation in slaveholding 
between wealthy and less wealthy practitioners. Bakers, carpenters, 
painters, potters, and soap and candle makers were in this category.48 
In these trades masters of modest means could profit from slaveholding 
if demand for their product or service was high and inelastic. Bread 
comes readily to mind as such a product, and in fact 54 percent of the 
bakers on the 1813 tax rolls owned slaves. This proportion is nearly 
half again as large as the 38 percent average for all crafts. Slaveholding 
bakers ranged in wealth from three who had total assessable wealth 
under $250 to three well-off "biscuit bakers," that is, makers of ships' 
bread. Soap and candle makers, manufacturing minor household staples, 
also tended to hold slaves fairly commonly. 
The construction trades, however, had fewer slaveholders than the 
crafts as a whole. Carpenters, painters, and bricklayers, relying on out-
door construction work, were idled in the winter and could lose work 
days to foul weather throughout the year. Moreover, demand for their 
services could fluctuate dramatically with the changing fortunes of Bal-
timore generally. Maintaining slaves might be only sporadically and 
unpredictably profitable for them; slaveholders were rare in these trades 
even among the wealthiest practitioners.49 
Thus, in the construction sector manufacturers of producer goods 
(brick makers, stonecutters, and nail makers) owned slave labor power 
more often than did makers of finished goods (carpenters, bricklayers, 
painters). This pattern also appeared in the leather trades, where tan-
ners and curriers were nearly twice as likely to be slaveholders as boot 
makers, cordwainers, or glovers. 50 Though there were no iron makers 
operating within the city limits of Baltimore by 1813, those in the envi-
rons were much more oriented toward slave labor than the blacksmiths 
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and foundries they supplied.51 Larger concerns could more generally 
ensure profitable uses for slaves than could smaller counterparts. If it 
can be granted that overall taxable wealth predicted scale of operation, 
then most tanners had bigger operations than most cordwainers, most 
brick makers than most bricklayers, and most iron makers than most 
blacksmiths. In each case the supplier had more opportunities to divide 
labor, assign some tasks to slaves, keep them fully employed, and reap 
profits. 
Also, makers of producer goods often found themselves locked into 
lengthy production cycles, with little short-term flexibility to reduce 
production levels and work complement in response to demand shifts. 
Iron makers sought to keep their furnaces in blast for as long as iron 
ore, limestone, and charcoal could be hauled to the furnace to keep the 
process going, generally somewhere between five months and a full 
year. Tanners might need two years or more to transform raw animal 
hides into usable leather. Even if the market for iron or tanned hides 
turned bad, the producer had little choice but to see a production run 
through and make the best of things. Free labor could then be added to 
a slave or servant base in good times and dismissed when business 
slowed. Surviving business records are too scanty to indicate conclu-
sively the extent to which large-scale entrepreneurs employed such strat-
egies, but the link between slaveholding and large-scale operation is 
suggestive. 
Finally, slaves often performed work that white laborers avoided 
because of its noxiousness or social stigma, or both. Slaves thus toiled 
as servants, chimney sweeps, and washerwomen. But manufacturing 
work could also acquire a low status that channeled slaves in and free 
whites out. Thus, tobacco manufacturing, like the working of the to-
bacco crop in the Chesapeake, relied heavily on slaves. Eleven of twelve 
tobacco, snuff, or cigar manufacturers in Baltimore owned slaves, rang-
ing from three men in the lowest quintile of wealth to Baltimore's rich-
est businesswoman, Jeanne de Volunbrunn, whose twenty-two slaves 
made the cigars she sold. 52 
Finally, as a major port city, Baltimore was home to large numbers 
of seamen, whose ranks included enslaved sailors, often owned by ship 
captains. In wartime, privateers sometimes had slave crewmen, as evi-
denced by lawsuits over the ownership of prize shares garnered by en-
slaved sailors. So black workers percolated into virtually all the city's 
laboring ranks. To be sure, many slaves cooked food, kept house, or 
cared for their masters' horses. But many others worked for and with 
large and small producers, who sought efficient laborers who would 
generate high-quality, high-volume output. 
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Finding positive incentives to ensure steady production preoccu-
pied urban masters and those who hired their slaves. Reliance on the 
negative incentive of physical coercion, however brutally effective it 
might be on the plantation, carried far more risks in the forge or in the 
protofactory. Beaten craft slaves could sabotage much more valuable 
property than vengeful field hands could, and in any case it was more 
difficult to employ the whip or the fist to exact skilled labor. Accord-
ingly, to squeeze more work from their slaves, city slaveholders ap-
pealed to blacks' interests more than to their fears. Slaves might be 
allowed to choose a master to whom to be hired; once at work, they 
might be able to earn cash for working overtime or surpassing output 
quotas. The ultimate incentive would be the opportunity to liberate 
oneself through self-purchase, or perhaps a manumission granted in 
return for faithful service. Here lay openings that blacks would exploit 
to gain autonomy. 
In Baltimore the number of gradual manumissions rose dramati-
cally following the Revolutionary War in tandem with the vigorous 
expansion of slavery. As early as the 1790s, many enslaved craft work-
ers were entitled to freedom by a deed of manumission taking effect 
after service for a term of years. While serving out their time, these 
term slaves could be bought and sold, and in fact a quarter to a third of 
slave sales advertisements and bills of sale in Baltimore concerned men 
and women promised liberty in the future. 53 
Urban craftsmen and manufacturers were attracted by the cost of 
term slaves, typically one-third to one-half less than the cost of slaves 
for life. Such discounts often made purchasing a term slave less costly 
than annual hiring or owning slaves for life. An employer prepared to 
resell term slaves within a year or so could actually obtain labor at no 
cost other than food, shelter, and the opportunity costs of capital for 
the period of ownership.54 The average savings available to the pur-
chaser of term slave labor are difficult to isolate because many other 
variables influenced slave prices besides term of ownership, such as age 
or physical condition, skills possessed, and reputation as a good worker 
or a runaway. But examination of a large volume of slave sales in Bal-
timore indicates that term slaves generally could be bought for 30 to 
50 percent less than slaves for life of comparable age, sex, and vigor. 
Put concretely, a normally healthy young adult male slave for life sold 
for $300 to $375 in Baltimore about 1810; a comparable slave with a 
term of six to ten years to serve would cost from $150 to $250, while 
an annual hire might run $45 to $60. The discount for female term 
slaves was slightly greater than for males, although not dramatically 
so. 55 Under these circumstances gradual manumission lowered the cost 
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barriers and the risks associated with owning human chattels and helped 
account for the spread of slavery among urbanites of relatively modest 
wealth. 
Manufacturers and craft masters could also seek bound labor for 
limited terms from apprentices, indentured servants, or German 
redemptioners. These institutions embraced both white and free black 
youths and may have served as models for structuring gradual manu-
mission. The migration of German servants fell drastically from the 
1790s onward because of the turmoil of the Napoleonic Wars in Eu-
rope, but craft and orphan apprenticeship flourished. About eighteen 
hundred male apprentices were learning their trades at any one time in 
early-nineteenth-century Baltimore, a number approaching that of the 
male slave population. They composed an important source of labor in 
their own right, and their availability for any given trade affected par-
ticipation of African American workers in that occupation. 56 
Juxtaposing the occupational concentrations of apprentices with 
those of slavery in the crafts illuminates entrepreneurs' labor strategies 
and the work preferences of whites and free blacks. 57 In many trades 
the relative costs and potential gains of purchasing bound adult labor-
ers dictated a strong preference for slavery. In other work the all but 
free acquisition and low maintenance costs of bound children gave ap-
prentices a major competitive advantage. 58 
In shipyards virtually no boys served as apprentice ship carpenters 
or joiners, but sail makers had more apprentices than the average, across 
craft occupations.59 The shipbuilders, who could afford slaves, used 
them, while the less wealthy sail makers took on apprentices. Brick 
makers, bakers, and soap and candle makers, who commonly held slaves, 
employed relatively few apprentices.60 In the metalworking trades high 
proportions of masters had apprentices. Ninety boys who were bound 
out in the years sampled between 1800 and 1820 served eighty-one 
different blacksmiths, suggesting that the craft was still characterized 
by small, independent operators, teaching the secrets of their trade to 
one boy at a time. A blacksmith apparently could afford to keep and 
board an apprentice but did not find it profitable to purchase a slave. 
In still other situations masters reached out for bound labor of all 
kinds. William Camp, a cabinetmaker, appeared in the 1810 census as 
head of a twenty-six-person household that included two white boys, 
ages ten to fifteen, eleven white men, ages sixteen to twenty-five, and 
two slaves. Camp had a dozen or more apprentices under his direction 
at a time, and he also continued to acquire slaves; the 1813 tax lists 
showed him with four slaves, including two adult men, and in 1815 
Camp purchased Ashberry, a twenty-two-year old man who had five 
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years to serve before his delayed manumission went into effect.61 Other 
leading cabinetmakers, as well as chair makers, hatters, tanners, and 
cordwainers, commingled apprentices and slaves in large operations. 62 
These employers were segmenting labor, as evidenced by indentures 
limiting instructional obligations to certain aspects of a trade. Joseph 
Cox, a hatter, promised to teach one apprentice "the pulling and cut-
ting branch" of his trade, while another was to learn "the finishing 
branch." Richard K. Heath, tanner and currier, taught his apprentices 
tanning or currying, but not both. James Sloan taught some apprentice 
cordwainers only to make uppers or heels; only a few learned all 
branches of the trade.63 All three men owned male slaves of working 
age. 
Apprenticeship could also be a way station from slavery to free-
dom, defining the framework of control for a prospectively freed slave. 
Thus, Juliet, age seventeen, bound herself to Thomas Graham for eleven 
years "in consideration of [his] having paid two hundred dollars for 
her freedom." Graham secured an unusually long term of service for 
his investment, while Juliet derived the intangible but considerable ben-
efit of becoming at once a legally free person, lessening the danger of 
being sold, should Graham die before the expiration of her term.64 
Indentures could bind a series of family members to the same master, as 
part of the emancipation process. In 1810 Charles Brown, a freedman 
who had served as an indentured servant with Sarah Bennet to earn 
freedom for his wife, Lucy, bound out two daughters, born while Lucy 
was still a slave, to serve Bennet until their sixteenth birthdays. Brown 
surrendered control of his children but gained their immediate legal 
freedom. 65 An indenture could also provide an alternative to debtor's 
prison: Jacques Zacharie bound himself to Charles Pressoir for six years 
in 1805, with the agreement that on payment of $450 Pressoir would 
"manumit" Zacharie.66 In each of these examples a master and a de-
pendent person agreed to blur the line dividing slavery and freedom by 
entering into a contract for labor service according to which the weaker 
party surrendered practical control over his or her life for a time as a 
way of escaping permanent dependence. 
Masters could also agree among themselves to indenture slaves, as 
a form of long-term hire. Thus, John Duret bound out Joseph Baptist 
for six years to Joseph Leclair, a hairdresser, to learn Leclair's trade and 
to receive nominal freedom dues of six dollars at the expiration of his 
indenture. But Duret also specified that Baptist was "to be returned to 
me" at that time. Duret received no payment from Leclair; presumably, 
he bound out Baptist to enhance his long-term value by having him 
trained in a skilled occupation, with no maintenance costs while Bap-
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tist learned. An indenture could also be a disguised slave sale: Stephen 
Comte, an emigrant from Saint Domingue, could not legally sell slaves 
he had recently brought with him into the state. But he could indenture 
forty-year-old Negro Ann to Peter Rescaniere, a slaveholding baker, 
for twenty-five years, in return for two hundred dollars. 67 
More commonly, and more humanely, indentures promised skill 
training and education to term slaves. When Noah Richardson inden-
tured his grandson, John, a twelve-year-old scheduled to become free 
at twenty-three, he ensured that John Mowbray would not only teach 
young John coopering but would also provide him with twelve months 
of schooling and freedom dues.68 Elizabeth Edwards, a white woman 
who inherited slaves in 1812, manumitted all of them prospectively, 
and arranged for George, age fourteen, as well as sixteen-year-old John 
and eighteen-year-old Morris, to be bound out to blacksmiths or shoe-
makers. As a female head of household, Edwards may have felt un-
comfortable managing three nearly grown young men; although she 
sent them from her home, there is no indication that she bound out or 
sold female slaves whose manumissions she had also put in train. 
Edwards used apprenticeship to find masters preferable to herself for 
controlling three teenage boys. 69 
Nevertheless, in Baltimore apprenticeship remained a nearly all-
white institution, its counterpart for blacks being slavery for a specified 
term of years pending a promised manumission. A substantial propor-
tion of Baltimore's free blacks had been born as slaves and had gained 
their freedom as young or middle-aged adults. Very few recorded 
manumissions freed a male slave during his most productive years, be-
tween the ages of fourteen and thirty; accordingly, this age cohort of free 
black men was disproportionately small. The infrequency of free black 
bindings by Baltimore masters who otherwise avidly pursued bound 
labor contrasts sharply with the practice of rural farmers and crafts-
men elsewhere in Maryland. 
From the Eastern Shore, where free blacks were numerous, both 
whites and blacks migrated to Baltimore in search of greater economic 
opportunity.7° Large numbers of planters needing a reserve supply of 
agricultural workers for wheat and fruit harvests turned to binding 
free black boys as apprentice farmers, and girls as house servants, in 
tandem with reducing numbers of slaves owned. In Talbot County a 
quarter of all indentures bound free blacks, over four times the propor-
tion in Baltimore; even in slavery-oriented Prince George's County, one-
fifth of the indentures were of free blacks.71 
Where medium-term binding of children worked to a master's ad-
vantage, the power of the law was invoked to retain laborers who might 
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otherwise leave the county and who would be difficult to replace, given 
the lack of migration to Maryland's farm country. 72 In dynamically 
growing Baltimore, masters had little or no need to risk a commitment 
to free blacks as craft apprentices or as house servants, particularly 
when a stronger hold on such persons as term slaves was readily avail-
able. The gradual accretion of law permitting the binding of ever-larger 
classes of free black youth had little impact on the number of free black 
apprentices in Baltimore, further confirming the idea that lack of de-
mand for their services, under the terms of apprenticeship, was at least 
as important as a putative lack of supply of boys available to be inden-
tured.73 
But an economic rationale cannot fully explain why craftsmen, 
willing to use black slaves serving a term of years, would hesitate over 
black apprentices. The purchase price of an adolescent male term slave, 
at two hundred dollars or more, doubled or tripled the outlays for an 
apprentice's freedom dues and education, which might amount to fifty 
to one hundred dollars, and a person in either status would need to be 
fed, clothed, and housed. Thus, masters expended more to work with 
term slaves than with black or white apprentices. If free blacks were 
readily available to perform casual labor in the crafts and manufactur-
ing, why did reliance on term slavery persist? Alternatively, what set of 
attitudes dictated the employment of white and black free and bound 
labor, with only the category of black apprentices being ruled out? 
One possibility is that white craft workers objected to the presence 
of free blacks with status equal to them. In fact, whites and blacks 
worked together in virtually all the crafts and industries of Baltimore, 
and very little evidence, at least prior to 1830, suggests that whites 
found the presence of black workers demeaning, per se. But whites did 
expect and demand to be placed in a legally and socially superior status 
relative to all blacks, slave or free. 
Hence, rapid growth in the number of free blacks in Maryland was 
accompanied by legislation registering their subordinate status. Free 
people of color were barred from voting or holding elective office at 
the very end of the eighteenth century, as pressure was mounting to 
broaden the franchise for white men.74 In the same vein, revamped 
court procedures permitted slaves and free people of color to give evi-
dence against each other, but not against whites, narrowing the social 
distance between free and enslaved blacks while increasing it between 
black and white freemen.75 The Maryland penitentiary routinely segre-
gated white and black prisoners, and even barred free blacks from serv-
ing there at one point.76 And by 1818 the state's apprenticeship laws 
required higher educational benefits for white than for black children. 
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Though jealously protected, white racial superiority was not threat-
ened by the mere presence of blacks in the workplace, and black ap-
prentices posed no problem in largely segregated work settings, such as 
barbershops or naileries. But as craft apprentices, entitled to the same 
benefits and status as white coworkers, free blacks were socially unac-
ceptable. The rapid spread of the use of term slaves in Baltimore's work-
shops after 1790 may be partly cause and partly consequence of white 
concerns about status as measured by blacks' possession of the attributes 
of freemen. 
One indicator of this sentiment is that masters who indentured 
large numbers of apprentices bound disproportionately fewer free blacks 
than those who worked with a single apprentice. The absence of black 
apprentices in the protofactories of men like William Camp and Joseph 
Cox, who bound a dozen or more apprentices at a time and owned 
several slaves, is suggestive. Had revulsion toward free blacks origi-
nated solely with masters, there would be no reason to expect that 
masters binding many apprentices would enter into a different propor-
tion of free black indentures than those binding one boy at a time. 77 
Although few masters bound black children to do craft work in Balti-
more, in rural counties the occasional black boy bound to a shoemaker 
or a carpenter provided needed labor without infringing social codes 
that demanded black subordination, because he in all likelihood worked 
alone.78 
Changes in the apprenticeship laws may also have had differential 
impact in Baltimore and rural Maryland. The revised law of 1818, 
which allowed the binding of any free black child not "at service or 
learning a trade, or employed in the service of their parents" facilitated 
court-directed bindings of free black children in rural counties.79 In 
Baltimore, orphans' court judges took advantage of the new authority 
to waive the requirement that free black apprentices be taught to read 
and write, so long as the apprentices' freedom dues were then increased. 
By commuting masters' education obligations, the 1818law may have 
made free black apprentices more attractive to Baltimore masters, in-
creasing their bindings and reducing the number of free black children 
who might become public charges. But this relaxation of benefits owed 
to free blacks did little to alter their underrepresentation in apprentice-
ship: in the 1820s free blacks still made up only 9 percent of inden-
tured children, a 3 percent increase over the preceding decade but less 
than half of the free black population share of the city, which reached 
nearly one-fifth by 1830. 
Still another possibility is that the scarcity of free black craft ap-
prentices reflected an aversion on the part of black parents to placing 
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their sons under the legal control of a white master. Given the recency 
of most African Americans' exit from slavery, and the struggle that so 
often lay behind the attainment of autonomy, it is not difficult to imag-
ine that parents would have been extremely reluctant to compromise 
their children's freedom by putting them voluntarily in a status little 
different from the term slavery in which they themselves had perhaps 
toiled. The danger posed by gangs of kidnappers of free blacks, for 
whom teenage blacks, free or slave, were prime targets of opportunity, 
might have contributed to parents' desires to keep their children under 
their own supervision. 
Despite some individual cases illustrating this notion, however, the 
available data do not strongly corroborate it. Had free black parents 
been unusually unwilling to apprentice their children, one might ex-
pect the proportion of voluntary bindings of blacks, as opposed to court-
directed indentures, to be smaller than that which obtained for white 
children. In fact, there is no significant difference between the propor-
tion of white and black voluntary bindings. It would appear that black 
parents as a group were as likely to see apprenticeship as a step up for 
their children as they were to view it as a threat to freedom. 80 
Whatever the explanation for the small number of black appren-
tices in Baltimore, a modest upturn in their share of such work in the 
1820s came just as the institution itself was losing vigor, at least as a 
mechanism for combining cheap labor with the care, education, and 
craft training of boys. By 1830 bound labor, whether that of white 
apprentices, black apprentices, or slaves, had entered into a serious 
decline in Baltimore. As the city suffered prolonged hard times after 
the Panic of 1819, fewer artisans and manufacturers chose to bind or 
purchase labor for long periods. Slaves, who had earlier made up roughly 
one-tenth of Baltimore's population, and almost certainly a larger share 
of its workforce, composed only 5 percent of the city's residents by 
1830; the proportion of craftsmen and manufacturers holding slaves 
likewise continued to fall from the high point of 1810. Apprentice in-
dentures dipped even more dramatically: whereas well over three hun-
dred boys per year had been bound in most years prior to 1820, fewer 
than two hundred began such service in most years after 1820. An 
institution that had embraced nearly 10 percent of the male population 
in 1810 accounted for less than one-third that share by 1830.81 
The joint downturn in slavery and apprenticeship in Baltimore sug-
gests that employers were less willing in the 1820s to undertake the 
long-term costs of securing bound labor, or perhaps that they felt less 
need to do so in a looser labor market. Baltimore entrepreneurs were 
not necessarily discarding slavery as unworkable or unprofitable in an 
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urban setting, but in the 1820s they were more interested in cheap and 
quickly dismissible free labor. Nowhere was this more evident than in 
the textile mills. 
When large-scale cotton mills were first erected in Baltimore, bound 
laborers did the work.82 These firms weathered the post-1815 resump-
tion of British competition, but none continued to rely on indentured 
boys. By 1820 the two largest cotton manufacturers chiefly employed 
girls, who had not been offered indentures.83 Like black boys, young 
apprentice girls were disproportionately few in number, and they were 
generally placed as servants. 84 The increasing presence of female labor 
in the mills after 1815 thus coincided with the abandonment of bound 
labor. Perhaps, as in the case of free blacks, employers did not find it 
necessary to offer the benefits of apprenticeship to girls, to whom most 
craft occupations were closed. Although savings on education costs 
and freedom dues were small, Baltimore's cloth makers felt quite acutely 
the need to economize, and they abandoned apprenticeship. 
By the 1830s bound labor had been permanently relegated to a minor 
role; the return of good times reinvigorated neither apprenticeship nor 
slavery. Labor once performed by bound workers largely became the 
province of wage-earning free blacks, women, children, and a gradu-
ally increasing flow of European immigrants. To a degree the evolution 
of Baltimore's labor force in the fifty years following American inde-
pendence conformed to the image of nineteenth-century economic ex-
pansion sweeping away bound labor and ushering in a world of waged 
workers. But such a characterization fails to capture the critical role 
played by bound workers in Baltimore's emergence. 
The widespread use of slaves and apprentices in craft and manu-
facturing activities played a vital part in Baltimore's advance after 1780. 
In highly capitalized enterprises such as shipbuilding, iron making, brick 
making, and rope making, slaves were a mainstay, but they also worked 
extensively in many other crafts. Likewise, apprenticeship, rather than 
dwindling away at the first appearance of large-scale manufacturing, 
flourished in both large and small shops and was the labor institution 
of choice for the initial staffing of new industries, such as cotton mills. 
During a period of great economic dynamism, demand for bound la-
bor evoked a sophisticated interpenetration of its forms. Employers 
could purchase labor power for the long term by buying a slave for life, 
for a medium term by binding an apprentice or purchasing a slave for 
a term of years, for a few months or a year by hiring a slave, or by the 
day or week by paying wages. 
The simplification of these institutions into a market dominated 
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by wage work speaks less to bound labor's supposed inflexibility than 
it does to long-term increases in the supply of laborers. Where indi-
vidual circumstances still favored industrial slavery, it survived in Bal-
timore into the 1820s and 1830s, not merely in dying local industries 
like iron making, but in endeavors marked by new technology and 
investment, such as chemical production. 
2 
INDUSTRIAL SLAVERY IN BALTIMORE 
Chemical manufacturing began in 
Maryland around 1810, with local producers of alum, pigments, and 
dyes springing up to supply Baltimore's first cotton and woolen mills. 
When, in the mid-1820s, the firm of J.K. McKim and Sons decided to 
enter the chemical business, they erected a new factory and purchased 
slaves as operatives. The records of the McKim-led Maryland Chemi-
cal Works provide a rare, in-depth portrait of the operations of indus-
trial slavery in Baltimore and of the importance of prospective manu-
mission in making and keeping slave workers productive. 
More than twenty years ago, RobertS. Starobin in his path breaking 
Industrial Slavery in the Old South contended that slaveholding indus-
trialists were able "to create a fairly stable work force by means of 
sophisticated incentives"; he characterized industrial slavery as a largely 
successful institution, at least on its own exploitative terms. 1 Starobin's 
massive array of evidence challenged earlier dismissals of industrial 
slavery that had called it an exotic, aberrant, or insignificant variation 
of slavery as an institution of agricultural labor. That view had been 
perhaps best expounded by Richard C. Wade, who argued that diffu-
sion and fragmentation of the master's exclusive control of the slave in 
urban settings rendered urban and, by implication, much industrial 
slavery, unsuccessfuJ.2 Likewise thrown into doubt by Starobin's work 
was the view that enterprises reliant on slave labor must necessarily be 
inhospitable to technological innovation. 
Starobin placed his findings in time by noting that "campaigns for 
industry became most intense when southerners felt least secure within 
the Union" and singled out the years from the late 1820s to the early 
1830s, and the late 1840s and 1850s, as peak times in the development 
of industrial slavery. 3 Claudia Dale Goldin's analysis of the late ante-
bellum decline in urban slavery dovetailed neatly with Starobin's chro-
nology, as she advanced the view that urban entrepreneurs moved away 
from slavery when high demand for slaves in the agricultural South-
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west drove up the price of slaves beyond their worth as urban workers 
in the mid-1830s and again in the 1850s.4 Subsequently, however, Fred 
Bateman and Thomas Weiss have shown that industrial slavery remained 
highly profitable even in the late antebellum years when slave prices 
were highest and that southerners did, in fact, fail to take optimal ad-
vantage of entrepreneurial opportunities in industry. They concluded 
that the slaveholders' exceptional aversion to risk best explained the 
South's failure to industrialize.5 Charles B. Dew indicates the force of 
risk aversion by suggesting the incompatibility between slave labor and 
technological innovation. In a recent article on iron making, Dew ar-
gued that "slave labor, once it was trained and functioning in the tradi-
tional ways of making iron, exerted a powerful, conservative influence 
on the technology of the southern iron industry" because allocating the 
labor of skilled slaves by using task systems froze in place unchanging 
production quotas and negated potential gains in productivity that might 
have resulted from changes in iron production technology. 6 
These analyses return to the question of whether slavery and 
slaveholding-at least in the industrial sphere-were economically ir-
rational. This case study looks at a chemical plant in the late 1820s, the 
first of Starobin's boom periods but near the end of slavery's promi-
nence in Baltimore. In that decade the distance between northern and 
southern industrial activity had not yet become unbridgeable. In some 
industrial sectors, such as cloth manufactures, the South already lagged 
far behind. But in other realms, such as chemical manufacturing, Ameri-
can industrialization, both North and South, had barely begun. 
The Maryland Chemical Works was a Baltimore firm that manu-
factured industrial chemicals, pigments, and medicines with a mixed 
slave and free work force between 1825 and 1835. Situated at are-
gional transportation and marketing hub and blessed with strong capi-
tal backing and access to credit, the company did not fall afoul of the 
financial and marketing problems that plagued many startup indus-
tries in the South. Because such extraneous factors were not present to 
affect the composition of the workforce, it is possible to assess the pros 
and cons of industrial slavery at the Maryland Chemical Works with-
out encountering issues unrelated to the shop floor. Moreover, since 
both advanced technology and slave workers were present, some ob-
servations can be made on the utility of Dew's comments on the poten-
tial pitfalls of such enterprises. 
Labor cost and labor productivity were the most important ele-
ments in shaping the firm's employment strategies toward slaves. In 
addition, the slaves gained leverage from the firm's reliance on them, and 
they sought greater compensation and more autonomy, which required 
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frequent adjustments and responses by management. Ultimately, the 
unanticipated need to negotiate with their own chattels exacted a busi-
ness cost in time and trouble and, perhaps more critically, a psychic 
cost that led the owners to limit their commitment to industrial slavery, 
an outcome that helps to explain both the South's general slowness to 
industrialize in the early nineteenth century and Baltimore's virtual 
abandonment of slavery in its industries. 
The business arrangements that supported the Maryland Chemical 
Works began in 1825 when John K. McKim, Jr., a Baltimore merchant, 
launched his sons, David and Richard McKim, in business by funding 
their joint enterprise with Howard Sims, a chemical manufacturer. Sims 
borrowed money from McKim to expand his plant and in return en-
tered into a partnership with David and Richard McKim "in the art or 
business of manufacturing and vending Chemicals, Medicines, Paints 
and various articles necessary to the useful arts." 7 David McKim led 
the Maryland Chemical Works for the next eight years, during which 
time slaves played a key role in producing the factory's prize-winning 
industrial chemicals. 8 The interplay between McKim's entrepreneurial goal 
to maintain a mixed slave and free work force and the varied objectives 
of the slave hands illuminates with rare clarity the transmutation and 
adaptation of slavery at its geographic, social, and economic margin. 9 
During 1826 and 1827 David McKim bought fifteen adult male 
slaves for the company.1° Concomitantly, he expanded the plant dra-
matically, installing a twenty-four-horsepower steam engine; adding new 
buildings, including a dwelling for the slaves; and walling in the entire 
plant complex. 11 Then, in anticipation of the slave hiring season at the 
beginning of 1828, McKim announced to slave owners, and perhaps to 
slaves allowd to hire their own time, that he "Wanted on hire by the 
year TEN or FIFTEEN healthful able bodied NEGRO MEN, from 18 to 35 
years of age. To orderly and well recommended men liberal wages will 
be given." 12 Within weeks thirteen newly hired slaves were at work, 
swelling slave numbers to twenty-eight, two-fifths of all manufactur-
ing hands at the chemical works.U Over the next five years, David 
McKim tested the feasibility of slave labor in a factory setting, care-
fully monitoring his labor costs and production levels and gradually 
reshaping his workforce accordingly. In a curiously mixed outcome, 
McKim diminished the proportion of slaves among his workers but 
relied on those who remained to provide the skill and continuity needed 
for stable production of chemicals. McKim's careful attention to the 
composition of the workforce reveals the long-range utility of indus-
trial slave labor in the volatile economy of early-nineteenth-century 
America. Uncertain demand for products made total reliance on a slave 
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workforce in large enterprises an unsound economic strategy because 
employment levels often had to be adjusted to changing markets. How-
ever, high turnover among white wage workers disrupted production 
and encouraged employers to retain slave workers. 
The firm manufactured approximately thirty medicines, pigments, 
dyes, and industrial chemicals, but it was best known for its alum, used 
by cloth manufacturers as a mordant to set dyes in cloth.14 These goods 
were marketed nationally through commission merchants in major ports 
and were also sold directly to local manufacturers, painters, and drug-
gists.15 As a corporation, the Maryland Chemical Works barely broke 
even during the period from 1827 to 1833, which is covered by the 
surviving records, but large profits accrued to the McKims as merchants. 
Operating the family firm of J.K. McKim and Sons, they not only gar-
nered commissions on goods sold to or on behalf of the firm but also 
earned interest on working capital advanced to the firm. 16 
The manufacture of chemicals began with workers separating me-
tallic ore from rock in which it was embedded by calcining, crushing, 
grinding, and sifting. The ore was purified by cooking or saturating it 
repeatedly in chemical baths to draw off unwanted elements. More 
cooking or steeping then induced reactions with desirable elements to 
make up the final product, generally a metal sulfate or oxide. Total 
processing time varied enormously: some pigments could be made in a 
few days, but the manufacture of alum could take six months or more 
of steady laborY Slaves worked in all the production routines of the 
factory but were especially prominent in alum making. 
The Maryland Chemical Works produced large volumes of very 
pure alum, using a lengthy sequence of operations that transformed 
reddish clay into snowy white alum crystals. 18 Workers first shoveled 
the clay into a long, low furnace, where it was roasted continuously for 
several days and nights in order to increase its porosity and oxidize 
commingled iron compounds. After cooling, the clay was transferred 
to lead-lined cisterns and there dissolved in a heated sulfuric acid bath, 
agitated almost constantly by workers to speed up the decomposition 
of the clay.19 
The acid-sodden clay was then removed to a covered shed to dry, 
evaporation being helped along by repeated rakings.20 After that it was 
hauled to lixiviate in a water-filled cistern in order to extract soluble 
alum particles. Periodically the resulting mother liquor was drawn off 
to a holding tank while workers cleaned out the exhausted clay and 
added a fresh batch. Then the mother liquor would be pumped back 
into the refilled cistern. Three or four such "washings" brought the 
mother liquor to its alum-absorbing capacity. 
Baltimore as a city of about thirty thousand people, c. 1801. The three original settle-
ments-Fell's Point to the east, Old Town to the north, and Baltimore Town to the west 
and southwest-have already grown together. Warner and Hanna's Plan of the City and 
Environs of Baltimore, 1801. Engraved by Francis Shall us, Philadelphia. Maryland 
Historical Society 
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This super-charged liquid was next evaporated for seven or eight 
days in a low-temperature furnace and gradually cooked down to a 
viscous state. When the liquor was sufficiently syrupy, workers sluiced 
it into yet another container and fluxed or precipitated it into alum 
flour by bringing it into contact with potassium chloride, in the form 
of soap-boiler's waste, with more stirring to reduce chemical reaction 
time.21 The alum flour was reliquified in a steam-filled cistern and trans-
ferred to conical casks to recrystallize. After four to five days, workers 
loosened the hoops of the "cone" and removed the leaded staves, re-
vealing a tapering column of crusted alum with a core of partially crys-
tallized liquor. Ten days to two weeks of air drying ensued, to foster 
further crystallization; workmen then pierced the sides of the cone with 
axes to allow the remaining liquor to flow out.22 The now finished 
alum was milled, sieved, and packed in casks or boxes, ready for sale. 
Throughout the six-to-eight-month process, laborers stoked furnaces, 
agitated alum broth, raked up drying alum heaps, and shoveled alum 
from furnace to cistern and back again, day and night, seven days a week. 
David McKim thus needed steady labor over many months to pro-
duce his factory's top-selling chemical, and in fact the firm operated 
year round, obviating one potential disadvantage of industrial slave 
labor in the early nineteenth century. McKim had no reason to fear 
that capital invested in slaves would be underutilized, because there 
was little slack time during which slaves might have been unproduc-
tive. Only heavy capital expenditures could ensure such full-time op-
erations: without the steam engine, the covered factory buildings, and 
the large stockpiles of raw materials kept on hand, the Maryland Chemi-
cal Works might well have been forced to shut down from time to time, 
in which case an investment in slaves would have become less attrac-
tive.23 In this regard investment in advanced factory technology and 
production setting may have been necessary in order to make slave 
labor profitable. 
Another potential economic objection to industrial slave labor, the 
risk of capital loss through accidental death or injury in the workplace, 
clearly received little weight in David McKim's plans. Though the plant 
was noxious, it was not especially dangerous. Slaves might not thrive 
in the heat, dust, and fumes they worked with, but they faced a low 
level of risk in comparison to the perils of mining, railroad construc-
tion, and canal building. These enterprises, despite the constant danger 
of explosions and cave-ins, relied heavily on hired slaves in the upper 
South of the 1820s.24 In short, McKim probably felt no qualms on this 
score and expected to persuade owners to hire slaves to him, as he was 
in fact able to do.25 
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Unrelenting physical labor in the heat of the furnaces may have 
been regarded as an urban equivalent of plantation field labor. Blacks 
were thought to have greater tolerance for working in heat, and per-
haps in McKim's view that putative trait recommended slaves for the 
chemical works.26 
A need for year-round labor is one component of a production 
system reliant on slaves; a significant market demand for slave-made 
goods is also necessary in order to provide a return on the investment 
in owning and maintaining a workforce. Here, too, circumstances 
seemed favorable in the late 1820s: Baltimore's expanding industrial 
base included mills turning out cloth, paper, gunpowder, glass, soap, 
starch, and paints, all of which needed industrial chemicals to make 
their goodsF In addition McKim could ship goods cheaply from 
Baltimore's wharves to other seaboard cities. 
But perhaps the biggest incentive for acquiring slaves came from 
the turnover of free laborers, which routinely exceeded 100 percent per 
year. Although some turnover of unskilled laborers was expected and 
even welcomed, hiring two or three workers per year per job must have 
impeded production, a problem that could be addressed by obtaining 
bound labor.28 For all these reasons, then, David McKim committed 
the firm extensively to slave labor from 1826 through 1828. The firm 
bought slaves, contracted with owners for the hire of others, and dealt 
directly with a few slaves who hired their own time.29 
Compensation for both free workers and slaves was based princi-
pally on the number of hours they worked; relatively few jobs had pay 
pegged to units of production. Free workers typically earned $. 7 5 per 
day or $4.50 per six-day week, with overtime paid at the same rate. 
Slaves also worked a six-day week but were paid money only for over-
time work, which was called "extras" and usually was expressed and 
paid for as units of time rather than of production. Because of the 
nature of most work in the chemical plant, few jobs easily resolved 
themselves into tasks with measurable output. Workers in furnaces or 
foundries might be paid by the weight of iron produced in a day or the 
number of stove plates cast, but a chemical worker could hardly be paid 
by the amount of alum made, when the process took months and many 
different workers to complete. 30 Given the need for continuous monitor-
ing of the cooking, bathing, and drying of chemicals, most extras were 
earned by Sunday or nighttime tending of furnaces, cisterns, and vats. 
The Maryland Chemical Works' pay book indicates that about fif-
teen slaves worked at the chemical plant on average; altogether forty-
six slaves appear by name. As a method of reducing worker turnover, 
slave labor unquestionably succeeded: while two-thirds of the wage 
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TABLES 
Free and Slave Workers: Employment Duration at the 
Maryland Chemical Works 
Free 
Workers' Length of Employment N % N 
1 Week or less 89 (25) 0 
2-4 Weeks 71 (20) 3 
5-12 Weeks 77 (21) 3 
13-26 Weeks 37 (10) 6 
6 Months to 1 year 38 (10) 8 
1-2 Years 32 (9) 13 
2-3 Years 10 (3) 3 
3 Years or more 9 (2) 10 
Total 363 46 
NoTE: Percentages are rounded and may not add to 100. 
41 
Slave 
% 
(0) 
(7) 
(7) 
(13) 
(17) 
(28) 
(7) 
(22) 
Table 5 characterizes employment duration of wage and slave workers who appeared in 
the Maryland Chemical Works Pay Book from September 15, 1827, to April28, 1832. 
Slave totals do not include unnamed "hands" whose owners received payment for their 
occasional services. Free workers' totals do not include salaried plant managers, such as 
Howard Sims or his successors. 
workers stayed less than three months and six-sevenths worked less 
than a year, a majority of the slaves spent a full year or more at the 
works. The slaves made up only one-ninth of all workers at the factory 
but performed about one-third of all labor. To the extent that longer 
service rendered workers more valuable, the importance of the slaves 
was heightened: 40 percent of the workmen whose experience exceeded 
two years and 53 percent of those who labored three years or more 
were slaves, as shown in table 5. 
But these data conceal an uneven pattern of slave usage by the 
McKims: the plant had as many as thirty and as few as seven slaves on 
the books at different times. As a proportion of the total workforce, 
slaves declined from a high of 42 percent in 182 7 to 14 percent in 
1831. Despite the slaves' contribution to reducing turnover, the firm 
relied less on slave labor and more on free workers over time. The 
number of slaves declined steadily from twenty-eight to eight between 
1828 and 1831 and then leveled off for the last year and a half of the 
records. In comparison, the number of free workers fluctuated much 
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TABLE6 
Number of Slaves and Free Workers at the Maryland Chemical Works 
Date Free Workers Slaves Total %Slaves 
Sept. 1827 28 20 48 42 
Jan. 1828 42 28 70 40 
Jul. 1828 41 21 62 34 
Jan. 1829 43 17 60 28 
July 1829 40 14 54 26 
Jan. 1830 36 14 50 28 
July 1830 37 13 50 26 
Jan. 1831 34 8 42 19 
July1831 42 7 49 14 
Jan. 1832 32 7 39 18 
Apr. 1832 32 7 39 18 
less, being usually no more than five workers over or under an average 
figure of thirty-seven or thirty-eightY A gradual but steady reduction 
in the overall factory workforce was thus effected principally by lessen-
ing the number of slaves. 
David McKim chose to reduce but not to eliminate slave labor, and 
he did so by decreasing the number of slaves hired by the factory. 32 
Thirteen of the twenty-eight slaves employed in January of 1828, or 46 
percent, were hired, but all of the seven or eight at the plant in 1831 
and 1832 were owned.33 McKim's continued reliance on owned slaves 
and his declining use of annually hired slaves argues that he sought to 
use slave labor not as cheap, undifferentiated labor but as increasingly 
skilled and experienced workers. The switch away from hired slave 
labor further underlines that, unlike many southern industries reliant 
on slave labor, the Maryland Chemical Works was not tightly con-
strained by lack of capital. Had McKim been financially pressed, he 
might have sold slaves to get cash and then met subsequent needs for 
slave labor through increased hiring. 
One could speculate that McKim chose to hold on to his slaves for 
reasons having nothing to do with their work output or skills, perhaps 
because a downturn in slave prices prevented him from recouping his 
investment. But prices for adult male slaves sold in Baltimore in the 
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late 1820s and early 1830s were slightly higher than what McKim's 
slaves had cost. He had paid an average of $295 in 1826 and 1827 for 
male slaves varying in age from seventeen to twenty-nine; average Bal-
timore prices for comparable slaves were $320 for the period 1828 
through 1831.34 
Further evidence that McKim based his decision whether to retain 
slaves on their contributions in the workplace arises from slave records 
in the pay book, which show that, of slaves owned by the factory, 
McKim kept his best workers and sold the others.35 His chief evalua-
tion criteria were slave absenteeism and willingness to perform extras. 
One baseline against which to measure slaves was the absence rate 
of free white workers, which amounted to just under one-tenth of all 
work days.36 Perhaps to McKim's surprise, the slaves missed work 9.4 
percent of the time, virtually the same rate as that of the free laborers, 
9.6 percent.37 To the extent that McKim's decision to shift to slave 
labor in 182 7 reflected dissatisfaction with wage laborer turnover and 
absences, the fact that slave laborers appeared for work no more fre-
quently than freemen may have made McKim reconsider the size of his 
slave force. Nonetheless, although McKim could discharge unsatisfac-
tory workers, slave or free, the only good workers he could be assured 
of keeping were those he owned. 38 
A second look at the absentee data shows that slaves missed slightly 
more than half of their lost work days because of illnesses lasting a 
week or more. But one- or two-day absences also occurred with what 
must have been an irritating frequency for David McKim, accounting 
for over 4 percent of their scheduled work days. 39 McKim hired substi-
tutes for workers recuperating from extended periods of illness or from 
accidents; obtaining replacements for short stints was no doubt more 
difficult and probably disrupted production disproportionately more 
than hiring longer-term replacements.40 
In fact, slaves who frequently missed work for a short term did not 
stay long at the factory. Among slaves employed for less than eighteen 
months, 63 percent exhibited above-average short-term absenteeism 
compared to 21 percent of slaves who labored there for more than 
eighteen months. Free workers showed a comparable pattern. Of thirty 
who stayed more than eighteen months, twenty-four or 80 percent 
missed work less often than the median for their group.41 
Two of three long-staying slaves with above-average absence rates, 
William Adams and Perry Tilghman, had one extended illness each but 
were otherwise steady workers.42 More positively, both Tilghman and 
Adams worked extras frequently, which McKim also valued highly. 
Tilghman earned cash by working extras in 86 percent of the weeks 
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Business card of the Maryland Chemical Works, 1828. The card is 
addressed to Samuel Thomas, the firm's Philadelphia agent. From the 
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when he was healthy. Adams earned extras in 90 percent of the weeks 
in which he was not sick, frequently by casting lead.43 
David McKim consistently evaluated an employee's worth, regard-
less of race, in terms of steady work with infrequent absences. In fact, 
a group of about fifteen veteran workers, roughly half slaves, became 
the core of employees upon whom he relied for stable output. Their 
efforts were supplemented by thirty to thirty-five casual laborers, whose 
composition over the years was increasingly white. These laborers typi-
cally left after six months or less and were quickly replaced. White and 
black veterans performed different but complementary roles in keeping 
production going in this potentially chaotic atmosphere. 
Longtime white workers tended to specialize in one production 
process in the plant and gradually commanded higher wages.44 Vet-
eran slaves displayed more versatility in tasks they undertook. Of ten 
slaves who stayed longer than three years at the factory, eight did three 
or more different jobs; six worked four or more jobs. These men may 
have functioned as all-purpose trouble-shooters, filling gaps occasioned 
by frequent departures of white laborers.45 
The firm's records reveal nothing about McKim's motives for not 
channeling his veteran slave hands into specialized work routines. Pos-
sibly the high volume of white turnover precluded that option. Alter-
natively, McKim might have felt that specialization paid dividends only 
when a seasoned worker could lead a crew of men (this may have been 
what fattened the pay envelopes of the veteran whites); if so, specializ-
ing his slaves would have done no good unless McKim could put them 
in charge of all-slave crews, for clearly no white man would take direc-
tion from a slave. The slave crew option, in turn, would not have been 
likely to appeal to an entrepreneur who was, in general, reducing his 
commitment to slave labor over time. 
This admittedly speculative chain of inferences sketches a poten-
tial drag on the efficiency of mixed free and slave labor enterprises: the 
difficulty of retaining and advancing good workers to more productive 
and responsible duties without falling afoul of race-based strictures. 
McKim may have been making the best of an unalterable situation in 
using his slaves as versatile gap fillers in a mostly free white labor force. 
It is worth noting that by this strategy, knowingly or not, McKim re-
duced the risk of experiencing what happened among the ironworkers 
described by Charles Dew: that slave-dominated workforce was able 
to limit the pace of production by turning customary task-based out-
put quotas into production ceilings.46 
In contrast to McKim's treatment of his good hands, James Jacobs's 
encounter with the Maryland Chemical Works illustrates the dismissal 
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by sale of the slave who would not or could not meet McKim's expec-
tations of six days of work a week and lots of extras.47 The initial slave 
pay list, for September 15, 1827, shows Jacobs at work in the alum 
room, working a full week and earning two extras worth fifty cents, 
perhaps for agitating lixiviating baths at night. Shortly thereafter, Jacobs 
switched to the magnesium room, where he missed one day's work in 
his third week and two days in the next. In November 1827 he missed 
eight days in two weeks and was switched to the calomel room. Per-
haps Jacobs objected to working in a room permeated with mercurous 
vapors: after working one full week, he missed twelve days in a row 
with illness. After another three months of frequent absences, Jacobs 
disappeared from the firm's pay books in March 1828 and was sold 
later that year.48 James Jacobs stayed twenty-six weeks at the firm, the 
shortest period of any of the slaves McKim had bought. During that 
time he missed work 35 of 156 days, an absentee rate of 22 percent, 
and worked a full six-day week only 58 percent of the time. Both his 
total and his short-term absentee rates were more than double the aver-
age for slave workers. Moreover, Jacobs worked for extras only once in 
six months. McKim probably sold him as quickly as possible, although 
eight months elapsed after Jacobs had left the factory before his sale.49 
James Winder, a slave for life bought by McKim on January 9, 
1827, had a stormy three years at the firm before he was sold. At age 
"about 22 years," Winder first appears in the pay book "sawing wood," 
either to help the carpenters who were expanding the factory or to 
provide firewood for the furnaces. 50 After a stint in the Prussian blue 
room, Winder returned to sawing wood in December of 1827. Through-
out 1828 he toiled at the woodpile, compiling the kind of work record 
that David McKim liked: Winder missed only two days in his first nine 
months at the firm, and he earned cash for extras more than half of his 
work weeks. After an eight-week bout of unspecified illness in June 
and July of 1828, Winder worked without interruption for six months 
and frequently earned extras. 
Then, during the week of February 7, 1829,James Winder tried to 
run away.51 His attempt failed quickly; he was returned to the Mary-
land Chemical Works after only one and one-half days. Winder may 
have had a long-nurtured plan to make a bid for freedom, or perhaps 
he intended to return and was registering a protest against unfair treat-
ment by McKim. Whatever his motive for running, James Winder 
worked no more extras and earned no more cash in his remaining year 
at the firm. He began to miss work more frequently, including a six-
week illness in July and August of 1829, accounted for by an exasper-
ated "Sick or Lazy" in the pay book. Winder's record ends in February 
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of 1830 with the note "at Woolfolk's," presumably referring to the 
Baltimore slave dealer Austin Woolfolk.52 McKim had rid himself of 
another unreliable worker and perhaps had sent a disciplinary message 
to other slaves: Winder was the first and only slave sold by McKim to 
a slave dealer who specialized in sales to the Southwest. 53 As for Winder, 
he may have been neither especially angry nor calculating in early 1829; 
he may have simply run off on impulse when the chance arose. But his 
refusal thereafter to work extras suggests a steadfast attempt to protest 
his continued servitude at the factory and to change his situation. Winder 
wanted out of the factory, and he had fastened on a method of escape. 
Other explanations do not account for Winder's strike against ex-
tras. Perhaps he was denied extras and spending money as a punish-
ment for running away, but another runaway who had been caught, 
Allen Henson, worked extras and earned cash after his return to the 
firm. 54 Or perhaps Winder's failure to earn extras could be explained 
by a temporary decline in overall labor requirements of the firm. Dur-
ing the period when Winder earned no extras in 1829, however, there 
was a typical pattern of steady extras for nearly all the other slaves. 55 It 
appears far more likely that McKim wanted and needed Winder for 
extras at the unabating toil of stirring and shoveling alum, magnesia 
salts, and pigments and that Winder either refused the work or malin-
gered in carrying it out until McKim ceased to offer it to him. 
Reviewing Winder's and James Jacobs's records from David 
McKim's point of view illustrates the methods of control available to a 
slaveholder dealing with recalcitrant industrial workers. McKim relied 
strongly on the positive incentive of pay for extra labor and dealt hesi-
tantly with slaves he owned who did not respond to that. McKim was 
slow to sell Jacobs even after taking him out of the factory and likewise 
kept Winder around for nearly a full year after his escape attempt, a 
period during which Winder was clearly rebellious and uncooperative. 
Slave life at the chemical works limited the effectiveness of two 
traditional methods of manipulating slaves into working harder. One 
time-honored technique in the upper South was the threat to sell shirk-
ers and resisters to the Southwest, removing them from kin and friends 
and dooming them to harsh labor in cotton fields or cane brakes. But 
the men at the factory, living in an all-male environment at the Negro 
House, probably had little or no family life to lose. Moreover, the work 
routine at the plant, with McKim urging his slaves to work extra hours 
at the boilers and evaporators, closely resembled a sugar plantation at 
harvest and sugar-boiling time. James Winder may well have been threat-
ened with sale out of Maryland, but he probably perceived it as no 
worsening of his situation. 
48 The Price of Freedom 
In this context the notion that a slave could refuse work seems less 
bizarre. Still, one might ask why McKim could not invoke the threat of 
physical punishment. How could a slave, subject to the coercion of his 
master, refuse to work extra time? In fact, Winder and the others might 
have exercised considerable leverage in this realm. 
Alum making required work or oversight twenty-four hours a day 
for weeks and months at a time. Workers regulated the heat of fur-
naces; they stirred reducing or lixiviating baths; they raked heaps of 
alum to speed its drying. Perhaps two or three workers made the rounds 
of such chores nightly. Each had to be reasonably diligent to keep up 
the pace of production and avoid ruining batches of chemicals. An idle 
or disaffected worker could do a great deal of harm in such a setting. 
From a manager's standpoint, the slaves at the plant must have seemed 
suited for night work. They were experienced and they knew the busi-
ness better than most white employees; in fact, in many cases they would 
be seeing to the same cisterns, vats, and evaporating beds they tended 
during the day. Retaining wage laborers was difficult even for day work 
and was probably almost impossible for night work, but the slaves 
housed at the plant could be made to work at night. They could not be 
compelled to do good work, however, without hiring a night manager. 
Even then, there was no guarantee of the night manager's reliability. 56 
If active cooperation of slaves in night work could be enlisted, they 
could work largely unsupervised, calling the plant manager, who lived 
at the plant, only when an emergency arose. 57 Faced with the choice of 
incurring the added cost of hiring a night manager or motivating his 
slaves to do good work unsupervised, David McKim chose to pay his 
slaves for extra work, as many other slaveholders did, both industrial-
ists and planters. Presumably, he hoped thereby to engage their inter-
est, at least quasi-voluntarily, in the nighttime operation of the plant. 58 
He soon came to rely heavily on slave overwork, prizing those who 
could be counted on to do such work and being sufficiently aggravated 
by the likes of Winder or Jacobs to sell them. But by increasing the 
demands on his slaves, McKim became more dependent on them. Not 
only could James Winder force a change in his situation by "shirking," 
but McKim's most reliable slaves could also turn the tables on him, 
successfully ratcheting up their compensation by demanding higher rates 
of pay for extras. McKim had purchased slaves in part to render him-
self immune to the turmoil occasioned by the frequent departures of 
independent-minded free workers; now he discovered that owning 
workers transformed but did not eliminate his labor problems. Unable 
to quit, the slaves could use their value both as a form of capital and as 
experienced workers to negotiate for improvements in their lot. 
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Pay for extras was present in the earliest records of the plant, an 
extra being a unit of time equal to one day. 59 Industrial concerns with 
mixed slave and free workforces often paid slave overwork at the same 
rate as basic pay for white wage laborers, but the Maryland Chemical 
Works rewarded slaves only twenty-five cents for each extra, rather 
than the seventy-five cents per day paid white workers.60 McKim val-
ued slaves who worked extras partly because the incremental cost of 
such labor was very cheap. Slaves worked extras far more often than 
their white counterparts, which fits and supports this view. The typical 
slave worked some extra hours in more than 70 percent of his work 
weeks, whereas for white workers the rate was 20 to 25 percent. 
The need to obtain reliable night workers goes far to explain these 
developments. McKim's use of veteran slaves as all-purpose workers 
fits hand in glove with a heavy usage of them for night work. As the 
workers with the broadest familiarity with the plant's production rou-
tines, a slave night crew could carry out the needed work with fewer men. 
But McKim may have unwittingly started an interactive process 
that led him away from his planned extensive utilization of slave labor; 
he imposed a work regime that many of his slaves would not or could 
not bear, rendering him more dependent on those slaves who cooper-
ated. McKim increased his exploitation of slaves by paying them for 
extras because the twenty-five cents he paid for an extra day or night's 
labor was considerably less than the basic daily cost of feeding, cloth-
ing, and sheltering a slave.61 Thus, McKim's practice of keeping slaves 
who worked many extras and were seldom absent was economically 
sound.62 
McKim's unwillingness to pay slave overwork any more than one-
third the rates paid free workers may, however, have unwittingly con-
tributed to the gradual elimination of hired slaves from his workforce. 
The slaves, like McKim, undoubtedly had their own expectations about 
hired work and would have had no economic reason to relish working 
in a factory that may have paid far less than other employers for over-
work, their one source of cash income. Hired slaves who were unhappy 
with their work could seek to improve their lot in several ways. They 
could ask their owner to terminate the hire and place them elsewhere, 
at once or in the next hiring year; they could engage the owner's pecu-
niary interest by offering to hire their own time at a higher rate than 
their present hirer was paying; or they could seek to be discharged by 
the hirer by absenting themselves from work, malingering, or feigning 
illness.63 
McKim's system of overwork incentives thus had several impor-
tant ramifications. By basing overwork on time, rather than output, he 
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reduced the danger of incentive goals becoming production ceilings 
through the customary expectations of slave workers, the fate that be-
fell southern iron makers in Charles Dew's view.64 McKim paid slaves 
less for overwork than white counterparts. But the lower overwork 
pay may have intensified some discontented slaves' efforts to leave the 
plant and may have caused the slave workers to use the incentive sys-
tem to control the pace of production. 
The plant's pay book records several experiences with hired slaves 
that suggest a malfunctioning incentive system. In 1828 Stephen Dorsey, 
a hired slave with a good work record in just over a year at the plant, 
began "hiring his own time" according to a pay book marginal note. 
The firm no longer provided Dorsey with food, clothing, and lodging 
and no longer paid Dorsey's master for his labor. Instead, Dorsey be-
gan to earn a weekly wage from the firm and paid his master for the 
right to hire out his time in a separate transaction. Two weeks after this 
shift of status first appeared in the pay book, Stephen Dorsey had quit 
after missing seven days out of twelve while hiring his own time. It is 
tempting to conclude that Dorsey wanted the autonomy of hiring his 
own time so that he could quit, presumably after skipping work for a 
few days to give himself time to find a better-paying job. 
At least two other slaves, Donald Fender and Moses Murphy, were 
hired to the plant for a year and compiled exemplary work records but 
did not return in the ensuing year. Fender in fact worked extras every 
week in the year but one, which represented the highest rate over a 
sustained period of all the slaves in the pay book. McKim probably 
sought to rehire Fender and Murphy, but it may well be that they per-
suaded their masters to send them elsewhere. 65 An adverse reaction to 
the unfairness of the extras pay may also have influenced the refusal of 
James Winder and James Jacobs to work extras. 
Further evidence that McKim found himself hampered by his insis-
tence on underpriced extras appears in the pay book starting in 1829. 
In that year the firm began to pay its slaves $.375 per extra for unusu-
ally noxious duties.66 McKim did not increase the wages of his white 
employees, so these raises for extra work were not made to match other 
pay adjustments. Rather, he may have been obliged to acknowledge his 
dependence on his own slaves by granting an increase in the rate of 
extra pay.67 Those earning the new, higher rates were precisely the vet-
eran slaves who been at the works since 1827, whose skill and experi-
ence became ever more critical as McKim encountered difficulties with 
other slave workers.68 
By 1831 McKim had stabilized the factory workforce at forty to 
forty-five hands, including a nucleus of seven or eight long-serving slaves 
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and about thirty-five white laborers. 69 Financial conditions continued 
to improve for the veterans: in the week ofJanuary 21, 1832, six slaves 
began drawing a regular weekly wage of fifty cents, whether or not 
they worked extras, which continued to be paid at twenty-five cents 
apiece, over and above the fifty-cent base pay.7° Inasmuch as slaves 
continued to work and earn large numbers of extras after this develop-
ment, the January change was not merely one of accounting routine. 
Rather, the slaves were now formally receiving some small proportion 
of the fruits of their labors as a cash wage.71 
For David McKim an additional three and a half dollars a week to 
reward or placate seven veteran hands probably represented a prudent 
investment, a sound move to help protect the health of his sixty-thousand-
dollar-a-year chemical business. For the men, fifty cents a week repre-
sented a doubling of their weekly cash income. 72 What McKim might easily 
have seen as a minor concession may have been a significant victory for 
the men who made his fortune for him. Or McKim may have viewed 
the need to pay his own slaves as a further complication in the intricate 
business of making a success out of industrial slavery, while the slaves 
may have regarded the fifty cents a week as a pittance that underlined 
· their still virtually uncompensated servitude. The whole episode dem-
onstrates how protean slavery could be: experienced, knowledgeable 
wage laborers, working independently in a prize-winning plant in a 
new industry, able to influence their compensation, were nonetheless 
slaves. 
Although some of them were slaves for life, McKim had also bought 
men who were slaves "for a term of years," after which they would be 
free, as provided for by a manumission by deed or will. Scipio Free-
man, who toiled at the Maryland Chemical Works for the full five years 
recorded in the pay book, was one such man. McKim bought Freeman 
in January 1827 for two hundred dollars, a low price for a healthy 
twenty-three-year-old male slave. But, as William Wilmer explained in 
the bill of sale, he was selling "my negro man Scipio to serve from the 
first of January 1827 to the first of January 1835, ... after which he is 
to be free .... this Scipio was born February 4, 1804 ... and was left by the 
will of Philip Taylor of Kent County to be free at the age of 31 years." 73 
Freeman missed work only 4 percent of the time, less than half the 
normal rate, and worked 460 extras, more than any other slave; he 
worked the night shift about twice a week on average.74 Then in 1830 
Freeman began to earn another dollar or more per week by digging or 
hauling alum clay at four or six cents a barrow load.75 Scipio Freeman 
was trying to give truth to his name: he was buying his way out of 
slavery. 
52 The Price of Freedom 
No record of Freeman's self-purchase survives, but the 1833 city 
directory identifies a free black laborer named Scipio Freeman living in 
Federal Hill on Johnson Street, near the Maryland Chemical Works. It 
is almost surely.the case that Freeman's unrelenting toil allowed him, 
at four cents per load of clay dug and twenty-five cents per extra for 
each sleepless night among the alum cisterns, to buy his freedom two 
years or so before his scheduled manumission. 76 
Scipio Freeman overlooked nothing in his drive to amass his pur-
chase price. When, late in 1830, David McKim ceased buying food for 
the men and instead began paying a free black woman $1.50 per slave 
per week for boarding, the pay book noted almost immediately that 
Scipio Freeman was receiving $1.50 directly and "boarding himself." 
For the remaining nineteen months of the pay book, Freeman took his 
$1.50 and cut corners, hard as that must have been on a slave rations 
stipend, to save more money.77 
Scipio Freeman's market value, as an adult male slave with two 
years to serve in 1833, would have ranged from $100 to $120.78 McKim 
may of course have pegged Freeman's manumission price higher, incor-
porating a premium for consenting to emancipate Freeman ahead of 
schedule. 79 If McKim charged no premium, and if Freeman bought his 
freedom solely from his own resources, Freeman must have saved about 
a third of all the money he received from the firm, despite boarding 
himself for the last year and a half of that period.8° Freeman must have 
been self-disciplined to have saved so much from endeavors generating 
less than a dollar a week before 1830 and three to four dollars a week 
once he began boarding himself and digging clay. 
Freeman had to work six days and two extras and dig about thirty 
loads of clay to earn $3.50 a week, which was $1.00 less than the 
weekly wage for unskilled free labor. These figures convey why David 
McKim cooperated with Freeman's efforts at self-purchase. From 1830 
to 1832 Freeman worked half again as much as a typical wage laborer, 
yet he cost McKim about 15 percent less than the laborer's $4.50 a 
week. Moreover, when McKim sold Freeman his freedom, he probably 
recouped half or more of his original $200 outlay for the slave. Six 
years of labor at Freeman's volume might have cost McKim as much as 
$2,000 in wages to white laborers; his actual costs were about $800 
less.81 Cheap labor could be extracted from a slave in return for the 
prospect of manumission. But had Freeman done no more than the 
"lazy" slave for life James Winder did, he would have generated about 
$1,250 worth of labor in six years, at a cost of about $400 less, an 
outcome far less favorable to David McKim than the actual result. 82 
McKim must have believed initially that the inducement of cash 
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would spur slaves to work long and hard, since he secured slave labor 
of all kinds for the plant. But the hired slaves produced less than those 
owned by McKim, because they missed work more often and worked 
fewer extras. After four and one-half years, McKim employed only the 
slaves he owned, and his outstanding producer for the whole period 
was the soon-to-be-manumitted Scipio Freeman. Freeman may not have 
been typical, but for David McKim he represented the ideal of the pro-
ductive slave laborer's response to cash incentives. In order to better 
understand McKim's incentive system, it may be useful to turn to the 
companion question of how much slave labor cost the firm. 
The journal of the Maryland Chemical Works included among its 
debit accounts a line item for slave expenses. In 1828 David McKim 
kept minute records of money spent on slave upkeep, from which the 
basic maintenance cost for slaves can be reconstructed. McKim spent 
about eighty-five cents a week per man on food, mainly duplicating the 
monotonous fare of the plantation: the men ate chiefly bacon and corn-
meal, augmented by molasses and coffee. McKim also regularly purchased 
small amounts of milk, bread, and vegetables. Seasonal variations played 
their part in the slaves' diet: McKim bought barrels of herring and, in 
the spring, shad, as bacon substitutes. Less often, generally when a 
man was sick, he supplied small amounts of sugar, lemons, oranges, 
pepper, and mustard. Occasional ledger entries record the purchase of 
a gallon or two of whiskey and a few hands of tobacco. 
Early in 1828 McKim distributed clothing and shoes to all the men 
except those hiring their own time, at a cost of about nineteen dollars 
per slave. 83 His only other clothing expenditure for the year was to hire 
Rebecca Demby, a free black, at $1.50 a week to wash the slaves' cloth-
ing and blankets. 84 McKim entered in his 1828 books an expense of 
$4 77 for construction of the Negro House. Other minor shelter ex-
penses included a few dollars for "straw for the Negro House." Per-
haps the men needed to restuff straw mattresses, or possibly the Negro 
House was strewn with rushes that required periodic freshening. 
Miscellaneous expenses included a medical retainer fee of one hun-
dred dollars paid in January to Dr. Winkelman, presumably both for 
McKim's slaves and to satisfy masters who may have required that 
medical attention be available before leasing their slaves to a chemical 
plant. 85 Other fees indicate the need for coercion in a slave society: 
McKim purchased fetters from a blacksmith and paid a white laborer a 
reward of $2.625 for retrieving the slave runaway Allan Henson, in 
September 1828. All told, McKim's direct expenses totaled $2,217.49, 
for slaves who were present at the plant for a total of 1,175 weeks, or 
22.6 work years. Annual direct costs thus equaled $98.12 per slave. 
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Slave labor also generated indirect costs, including payments to 
owners for hired slaves, opportunity costs for capital employed to hire or 
buy slaves, depreciation of owned slaves over time due to aging, property 
taxes, and losses occasioned by slaves' deaths or successful escapes from 
captivity. Table 7 lists McKim's direct costs for 1828 and estimates 
indirect costs, in order to portray total slave labor costs, differentiated 
by slaves owned for a term of years, slaves owned for life, and hirelings. 
Direct costs include total expenditures for food, clothing, shelter, 
and medical attention, divided by the total number of work weeks in 
which slaves were present. Capital opportunity costs represent invest-
ment interest forgone, valued at 6 percent per annum, on capital used 
to buy or hire slaves. 86 Depreciation estimates the loss of potential re-
sale value of each slave for each year of work and added age. 87 Tax 
costs are an average figure for early-nineteenth-century Baltimore.88 
Runaway costs reflect capital losses for successful runaways, averaged 
against the total number of work weeks in which slaves in each cate-
gory were present. Death costs are calculated in the same fashion. Both 
are pegged at zero for 1828, a year in which no slaves died or ran away 
successfully. Finally, annual costs are divided by the number of weeks 
of labor actually performed by the slaves, in order to factor in the hid-
den costs of absenteeism and arrive at a weekly cost directly compa-
rable to that of wage labor. 89 
In 1828 all forms of slave labor cost the firm significantly less than 
the $4.50 a week paid free laborers. Hired slaves cost the most per 
week, at $3.38, but were still25 percent cheaper than free labor; slaves 
owned for life, at $2.89, cost McKim 36 percent less, and slaves for a 
term of years, at $2.93, were 35 percent below the cost of free labor.90 
In 1829, however, slave labor costs soared because two slaves es-
caped and one, John Sewell, died. Holding all other cost data equal to 
1828, table 8 shows that the cost advantage of slaves all but disap-
peared in the wake of slave losses in 1829. 
Hired slave labor cost $4.45 a week and slaves owned for life $4.38, 
only pennies cheaper than the $4.50 wage labor standard. In fact, had 
James Winder succeeded in escaping, slave labor would have been more 
costly than free. Even unsuccessful escapes could affect the cost pic-
ture: slaves known to be "runners" lost some of their market value and 
were difficult to sell. David McKim did in fact take a loss when he sold 
Allen Henson in 1829, ten months after Henson tried to run. 91 
The sharply higher costs of 1829 must have been a strong factor in 
McKim's decision to reduce reliance on large numbers of slave labor-
ers. Exogenous factors could be invoked but in fact do very little to 
explain McKim's revised labor management plans. Had slave prices 
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TABLE 7 
Annual Cost per Slave at the Maryland Chemical Works, 1828 
Type of Cost Slaves Slaves 
Owned for a Owned for Hired 
Term ofYrs. Life Slaves 
Direct costs 98.12 98.12 98.12 
Capital opportunity 12.00 21.00 3.30 
Hire costs 55.00 
Depreciation 25.00 14.00 
Taxes 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Runaway costs 
Death costs 
Annual total $138.12 $136.12 $159.42 
. 
Weeks worked 47.1 47.1 47.1 
Cost per week $2.93 $2.89 $3.38 
NoTE: Free laborers earned $4.50 for a six-day work week. 
risen dramatically in the late 1820s, further purchases might have be-
come disadvantageous; but, as noted above, the Baltimore County bills 
of sale show flat or very mildly rising slave prices in the 1827-32 pe-
riod. In any case, slave prices double those paid by McKim in 1826 and 
1827 would only have raised his annual capital opportunity and de-
preciation costs another $35.00 or $.67 a week, leaving total costs of 
$3.56 per week for owned slaves, still 21 percent cheaper than free 
labor, so long as no deaths or escapes occurred. 
Nor can one argue that the Maryland Chemical Works was too 
strapped for working capital to buy more slaves. David McKim was a 
junior partner in J.K. McKim and Sons; his father was one of the orga-
nizers of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and had an estate valued at 
over three hundred thousand dollars at his death in 1842.92 The solid 
finances of the McKims had made it possible in the first place to oper-
ate the plant as a major year-round business in which slave labor could 
be fully and profitably employed. Had the McKims wished to buy more 
slaves for the plant, they would have been able to come up with a few 
thousand dollars to enhance the profitability of a business generating 
over sixty thousand dollars per year in sales. 
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TABLE 8 
Annual Cost per Slave at the Maryland Chemical Works, 1829 
Type of Cost Slaves Slaves 
Owned for a Owned for Hired 
Term ofYrs. Life Slaves 
Direct costs 98.12 98.12 98.12 
Capital opportunity 12.00 21.00 3.30 
Hire costs 55.00 
Depreciation 25.00 14.00 
Taxes 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Runaway costs 35.00 50.00 
Death costs 35.00 
Annual total $138.12 $206.12 $209.42 
Weeks worked 47.1 47.1 47.1 
Cost per week $2.93 $4.38 $4.45 
The explanation that David McKim was simply unaware of the 
potential cost advantages is not adequate either. His sedulous record-
ing of six-cent expenditures for lemons, the dogged itemization of the 
exact number of pounds of bacon bought and the per-pound price for 
each and every order, and the logging of half and quarter extras worked 
all bespeak the cost-conscious entrepreneur who knew fully what he was 
spending to procure labor power and cared to save a penny if he could.93 
The slaves themselves had changed McKim's outlook, by a rash of 
runaway attempts that must have made it nearly impossible for him to 
. take the serene long view. McKim clearly took no comfort from the 
marginally lower slave labor costs in a "bad" year like 1829; he could 
have little confidence of making slavery pay at the rate of ten or twenty 
cents per week saved after a year in which he had lost at least eight 
hundred dollars of slave property. 
The first escape attempt took place in August 1828, when Allen 
Henson ran. Henson was recaptured in two days with the aid of a 
white coworker, George Rea, a plumber, and McKim responded care-
fully. Henson was not fined for running off, and he continued to earn 
extras, but McKim ordered locks and fetters, possibly to restrain Henson 
when he was not working. 94 
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In the first week of February 1829 James Winder tried his unsuc-
cessful run; the very next week twenty-year-old Joseph Smith, a slave 
for life owned by the firm, made the first successful getaway. Then in 
late March two hired slaves cooperated in a runaway attempt. Nicolas 
Ford escaped; Hall Brittain, who did not run but assisted Ford, was 
fired and sent back to his master.95 Ford had come to the plant to re-
place Joseph Smith. 
Smith had just entered his prime as a worker; David McKim lost at 
least the $275 he had paid for the then-seventeen-year-old slave in 
1826.96 Nicolas Ford, whose age and condition are not known to us, 
could easily have cost McKim more, unless the circumstances of the 
escape forced Ford's owner to absorb the loss. 97 Whether or not McKim 
had to pay Ford's owner, the escape probably made future hiring more 
difficult for McKim, because slaveholders would have begun to judge 
the plant an unsafe place to which to rent their human property. 
That possibility took on another dimension when in mid-July 1829 
one of McKim's most reliable workers, William Sewell, fell sick. De-
spite Doctor Winkelman's ministrations, Sewell remained ill for over a 
week and then died suddenly on July 26, 1829.98 Coming on the heels 
of the disturbances of the spring, Sewell's death propelled McKim to 
try new ways of managing his slaves. 
First, McKim loosened his purse strings to diversify the slaves' diet 
and make life at the factory more bearable. He had already begun to 
buy sugar, pepper, oranges, lemons, vinegar, and mustard more fre-
quently after the attempted escapes of the winter and spring; after 
Sewell's death he expanded the provision of food treats. This new-found 
awareness of the importance of food culminated in 1830 in McKim's 
decision to board the slaves out, a concession of autonomy that prob-
ably mattered more to the men than what they ate, and which may well 
have originated with the idea of using better rations to buy peace with 
the slaves. 
Second, McKim began to pay time-and-a-half extras in the sum-
mer of 1829. More than likely the veteran slaves had a hand in the 
establishment of this practice, possibly by voicing objection to extra 
work associated with Sewell's illness and death, possibly by unspoken 
resistance in the form of poorly done extras. 
Finally, in 1829 David McKim committed himself to a permanent 
reduction in the number of slave workers. In July he sold off Henson 
and Edward Norris, to be followed in early 1830 by James Winder. 
Twenty slaves had been at the plant in the spring of 1829, but McKim 
let the figure drift down to fourteen by the year's end and hired only 
enough new slaves at the New Year in 1830 to replace departing hires.99 
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McKim, by becoming more selective, hoped to reduce the risks that 
had cost him so much in 1829. 
Thus did the Maryland Chemical Works' uncharacteristically heavy 
resort to slave labor in a new industry gradually wind down. Some of 
the black men confined in the plant were willing enough to participate 
vigorously in McKim's program of exploitation: Scipio Freeman ap-
parently judged the reward of a hastened manumission as the best avail-
able alternative. He accepted being underpaid as the price of gaining 
more rapid entry into a less constrained wage market. Others, like James 
Jacobs or James Winder, refused to respond to McKim's incentives and· 
chose to take their chances with a new owner. Some hired slaves used 
their leverage with their masters to avoid extended service at the fac-
tory. Still others bid for freedom directly through escape. Collectively, 
their actions prodded David McKim toward a broader use of free labor 
and toward the creation of a hybrid, quasi-free labor regime for those 
slaves who remained. 
In the end, McKim had perhaps transformed his own modes of 
determining what constituted a good labor force. The cost-conscious 
plant owner of 1826 through 1828, buying and hiring cheap slave la-
bor and grinding maintenance costs down wherever possible, had 
become more production conscious, winnowing out unproductive work-
ers and providing growing, though still woefully small, compensation 
to his loyal slave hands by 1831 and 1832. By then slaves made up a 
far smaller share of the men at the factory than they had five years 
earlier, but in tandem with a few key white hands, they provided expe-
rience that the free workforce largely lacked. The firm no longer de-
pended so much on slave brawn to turn out alum and Prussian blue; it 
may have depended more on slave brains. 
The Maryland Chemical Works suffered from some of the problems 
discussed in Richard Wade's Slavery in the Cities-slave absenteeism 
and runaways. The chemical company's cost data suggest that slavery 
was still cheaper than free labor, even in a year like 1829. The company 
operated during a time of relatively low slave prices, at least compared 
to those in the 1850s, and in that sense it does not speak to Goldin's 
slave price-driven model for the decline of urban slavery. But it is worth 
noting that even a doubling of slave prices would have left slave labor 
marginally cheaper at the plant, unless accompanied by the extremely 
high losses of a year like 1829.100 As for Fred Bateman and Thomas 
Weiss's risk aversion explanation, the actions of David McKim provide 
only partial confirmation: McKim certainly sought to minimize his risk 
of slave losses by his selective retention of slaves who worked hard and 
Slaves were key workers in Baltimore's shipyards, as this scene suggests. "Fardy and 
Auld's shipyard, Federal Hill," attributed to William Hare, 1854. The Peale Museum, 
Baltimore 
who were "safe property," in the argot of the day, but he persisted in 
using slave labor even after absorbing significant losses. Finally, al-
though the Maryland Chemical Works was not constrained by anti-
quated technology because of using slave workers, McKim's trials in 
operating a successful overwork incentive system obliquely support 
Charles Dew's point about the difficulty of innovating to increase pro-
ductivity of slave workers. 
Of course, no one case can confirm or deny these competing and 
sometimes overlapping theories. Nonetheless, this case study suggests 
that the intricacy of managing a mixed slave and free labor work force 
may have limited or constrained the development of industrial slavery. 
David McKim devised a cost-effective way to extract labor profitably 
from workers whose differing legal statuses-free, slave for life, slave 
for a term of years, or hired slave-gave them different motivations 
and responses to his wage and cost incentive systems. McKim adjusted 
the incentive scheme and other aspects of slave compensation andre-
made his workforce. His final muted use of industrial slaves may well 
exemplify a more widespread response to the unforeseen difficulties of 
commingling slavery and industrial capitalism. 
As an episode in the history of slavery in Baltimore, the events at the 
chemical factory occurred at the very end of fifty years of widespread 
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employment of slaves in crafts and industry. David McKim's constant 
struggle to reshape his workforce and secure steady labor through re-
wards, slave sales, and accelerated manumission by self-purchase rep-
resented but a few examples of the tactical battles masters and slaves 
waged throughout the early national period. McKim's difficulties are 
one indicator of how contestation of the terms of slavery, often focused 
on the operations of gradual manumission, had transformed the insti-
tution in Baltimore, limiting masters' power over their chattels, and 
giving slaves a powerful weapon in their pursuit of autonomy. 
3 
THE BLACK DRIVE FOR AUTONOMY AND 
MASTERS' RESPONSES 
W.en James Gunn advertised for 
the return of a runaway slave, twenty-four-year-old John Scott, he ad-
vised that if Scott "returns before my departure for Georgia I will give 
him his freedom at age 31." Whether Scott took Gunn's offer is un-
known, but this ad neatly brings together three powerful influences on 
the operations of slavery in Maryland: the master's power to remove 
the slave from home and family by sale or migration, the slave's ability 
to counteract this threat by running off, and the possibility of resolving 
conflict by concessions of autonomy. 1 
Although the threat of sale was hardly a lever of control uniquely 
employed by Maryland masters, their slaves could combat that threat 
with two unusual advantages.2 First, they had an uncommonly good 
setting for attempted escapes. Nearby Pennsylvania beckoned, both from 
all the counties of Maryland's northern tier and from the upper Eastern 
shore. Slaves could also seek aid from Baltimore's free blacks in finding 
temporary hiding places while hatching more complete escape plans. 
Second, slaves could pursue liberty through the courts, by filing peti-
tions for freedom: during the 1780s and 1790s several hundred blacks 
were emancipated via this procedure. These potentialities constituted 
powerful counterweights to the master's power, the effects of which 
can be detected not only in the manner in which masters sought to 
retrieve runaways but also in their exercise of such defining acts of 
slavery as the buying and selling of human beings and the disposition 
of their labor. The time period here examined is that of slavery's growth 
in Baltimore, from the Revolutionary War until around 1815, and the 
beginning of its decline as a labor institution, from 1815 to 1830. In 
the earlier part of this period, slaveholders had been able to contain 
challenges to their control by judiciously softening some of the harsh-
ness of slavery. HoweveJ; as the city of Baltimore and its environs became 
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a haven for runaways, many of whom found it unnecessary to flee 
slave territory to gain at least a measure of freedom, masters needed 
different means to appease their slaves.The attempts by slaves to gain 
freedom over their masters' objections and the masters' countering strat-
egies, especially conceding to slaves a voice in their hire or sale and 
offering them delayed freedom, assumed central importance in blacks' 
efforts to gain autonomy. What drove masters to such concessions was 
the need to secure slaves' cooperation in maintaining predictable and 
uninterrupted employment, production, and profit. Uprooting them to 
Baltimore, after all, had flowed from the perception that slaves could 
generate more output as urban laborers, craftsmen, and domestics than 
in the stagnating agricultural economy of the late eighteenth century. 
But Baltimore masters soon discovered, as rural planters had long 
known, that matching one's supply of slave laborers to the demand for 
their services could be a serious problem. Both urban and rural masters 
engaged extensively in hiring slaves out by the year or the month. In 
that way they could generate income from laborers who might other-
wise be underemployed, while retaining ownership of these persons in 
anticipation of further shifts in labor costs that would once again make 
directly exploiting their slaves more profitable than hiring them out. 3 
But the more slave sellers or hirers sought to fine tune their capi-
talization of labor by assigning slaves to new jobs or new masters, the 
greater the risk that the slaves would resist through flight, especially if 
removal to the Southwest loomed as a possibility. Runaway ads testify 
to the frequency with which recently purchased or hired slaves ran off. 
One slaveholder noted querulously that he had paid two hundred dol-
lars for the runaway "not three weeks ago," and that the "rogue" had 
already run off twice.4 Overall runaway rates dropped during most of 
Baltimore's boom years, but the general consolidation of control had 
to be recreated every time a slave encountered a new master. 
To avoid disruptive slave resistance to sale or hiring, some buyers 
and sellers informally surrendered a degree of their theoretically unlim-
ited powers and attempted to co-opt slaves by allowing them to choose 
the locale, work, or master to whom they would be assigned. A prom-
ise of eventual freedom, often made in concert with sale for a term of 
years to a new master, represented the ultimate concession of autonomy 
but certainly not the only one masters made. 
Transactions of this sort have been cited as examples of slavery's 
early-nineteenth-century "amelioration," emphasizing mutual obliga-
tion rather than compulsion as the keynote of the master-slave rela-
tionship, supposedly driven by slaveholders' humanitarian motives as 
well as a self-conscious redressing of slavery's tarnished image in a re-
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publican society. Although these influences no doubt played their part, 
slaveholders also pursued their self-interest through such new ways of 
managing human property. The upsurge in gradual emancipations, so 
noticeable in the early 1800s, was only the most visible product of the 
negotiated concessions of masterly authority that constituted slavery's 
amelioration. 
The roots of such changes are to be found in the difficulties experi-
ence in maintaining plantation slavery from the late 1770s onward in 
Maryland. During the Revolution, military action in the Chesapeake 
offered frequent opportunities for slaves to flee to British troops or 
ships, or indeed to the Continental army, in the hope of gaining free-
dom as soldiers or camp followers. 5 The passage of French troops 
through Maryland both before and after the Yorktown campaign af-
forded more chances for escape.6 Other runaways took advantage of 
the general breakdown of civil authority during the war to make off on 
their own to Baltimore, to Pennsylvania, or to sea. Conditions were 
especially unstable on the disaffected Eastern Shore, where Revolu-
tionary Whigs struggled to preserve even a shadowy semblance of or-
der.? The difficulties of controlling slaves in such circumstances were 
no doubt extraordinary, especially for Quakers and Methodists, who 
generally classed themselves as neutrals and accordingly had few allies 
to call upon if their slaves decamped. It is tempting to speculate that 
the very real threat of slaves defecting successfully, as well as emerging 
religious sensibilities, played a part in moving some of these Eastern 
Shore masters to make the first large-scale promises of delayed emanci-
pation to slaves in the late 1770s and early 1780s. 
After the war a new threat to slaveholding appeared, or rather 
reappeared, in the form of slaves' petitions seeking freedom by legal 
action. Maryland's judges did not embrace freedom petitions as a tool 
to rule in toto against the legitimacy of slavery, as jurists in Massachu-
setts and New Hampshire did, even during the state's greatest openness 
to antislavery views in the economically depressed 1780s. Instead, cases 
in Maryland centered on the particular claims of blacks seeking to prove 
free female ancestry to win liberty. The long-term reliance on white 
indentured servants in colonial Maryland meant that large numbers of 
slaves could hope to advance claims to having had white forebears. 
In Maryland's most celebrated case, Mary Butler obtained her free-
dom in 1787 by proving descent from Eleanor or "Irish Nell" Butler, 
who had come to Maryland in 1681 as the servant of the proprietor, 
Lord Baltimore, and then had married an enslaved black. Under the 
Act concerning Negroes of 1663, her marriage made Butler and her chil-
dren slaves for life.8 When the proprietor learned of her enslavement, 
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he swiftly secured a new law, in 1681, banning marriages between 
female servants and slaves. The law imposed a staggering fine of ten 
thousand pounds of tobacco on any master permitting such a marriage 
and freed the woman and her issue. The 1681 law also formally 
repealed the 1663 act, but it noted that all "matters and things relating 
in the said act to the marriage of negroes and free-born women and 
their issue, are firm and valid until this present time of the repeal 
thereof." 9 Lord Baltimore then returned to England, but back in Mary-
land Nell Butler and her descendants were treated as slaves, because 
her marriage had occurred while the punitive law of 1663 was still in 
force. 
In 1770 William and Mary Butler filed petitions for freedom, ar-
guing that the 1681 act should be construed to effect their liberation, 
as Lord Baltimore had presumably intended. Mary Butler was a great 
grand-daughter of Nell Butler, and she and William were parents of the 
1787 petitioner. The provincial court ruled against them, construing 
the savings clause of the 1681 statute to preserve the property rights of 
Nell Butler's master and his descendants. The court noted, "The con-
struction is good in a political point of view. Many of these people, if 
turned loose, cannot mix with us and become members of society. What 
may be the effects cannot perhaps be fully pointed out; but as much 
inconvenience may reasonably be expected, their title to freedom ought 
to be made out very clearly." 10 The pre-Revolutionary provincial court 
thus narrowed the road to freedom via petition, reflecting attitudes 
that would evolve little in the remaining century of slavery's life in 
Maryland. Blacks, even if free, "cannot mix with us and become mem-
bers of society." Given the perceived immutability of racial barriers, 
and the "inconvenience" that whites might experience from widespread 
black freedom, it should be granted only electively for meritorious in-
dividuals. 
Mary Butler's successful freedom petition of 1787 must be under-
stood against this background. Her attorney sought a flat affirmation 
that descent from a white woman entitled one to freedom. The defen-
dant contended that the long possession of Nell Butler's descendants as 
slaves was proof of title and urged that the 1770 opinion be upheld. 
The appeals court affirmed Mary Butler to be free, but not solely be-
cause she was descended from Nell Butler. Rather, the court found that 
as no documentary proof existed that Nell Butler had ever been con-
victed of marrying a slave, she could not have forfeited her freedom.1 1 
By the same token, mere descent from a white woman did not auto-
matically grant freedom. 12 The court seized on a procedural point that 
only minimally disturbed property rights. 
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In another landmark case filed in 1791, the brothers Mahoney 
sought to prove descent from an admitted negro woman named Ann 
Joice, arguing that she had become free by residing in England with her 
master in the late 1670s and that her descendants ought also to be free. 
After eleven years of litigation, the court of appeals denied freedom, 
ruling that because Ann Joice had never formally been declared free, 
slavery "reattached" to her when she accompanied her master to Mary-
land. Another avenue of legal assault on slaveholding was blocked. 13 
In both the Butler and the Mahoney cases, the courts admitted 
hearsay evidence on the ancestry of freedom petitioners, under the doc-
trine that the general reputation of the petitioner's neighborhood as to 
his or her descent would often be the only reliable evidence. This atti-
tude did open new legal strategies to blacks, who filed a spate of cases 
trying to show descent from white women or Indians. 14 In a different 
vein, runaway bondmen could improve their chances of passing as free 
by "claim[ing] to be descended from the famous and prolific Nell But-
ler," as one slaveholder wryly noted in a 1792 advertisement for a run-
away.15 
Aiding freedom petitioners constituted a major activity of the 
"Maryland Society for promoting the abolition of slavery, and there-
lief of poor negroes and others unlawfully held in bondage," a group 
with some 250 members in the 1790s, mostly merchants and profes-
sionals from Baltimore and its environs. 16 In one controversial case the 
society sustained the efforts of Jonathan and David Fortune to estab-
lish their freeborn lineage through two years of litigation, eliciting a 
shrill complaint from the Fortunes' ostensible owners, Ezekiel and Ed-
ward Dorsey of Anne Arundel County. The Dorseys told a Maryland 
House of Delegates committee of having expended more than 250 
pounds in contesting the Fortunes' freedom petitions, more than the 
slaves were worth. Agreeing wholeheartedlywith the Dorseys' self-serving 
portrayal of themselves as innocent victims of "improper interference" 
with their slaves, the Committee of Grievances flayed the abolition 
society for that classic sin against true republican values, the exercise 
of arbitrary power: "From the numbers, wealth, influence, and indus-
try of the society, with their extensive connexions, an individual has 
but a slender chance of encountering them; and that if interest only 
was to be considered, he had better content to give up a slave .... their 
conduct has been unjust and oppressive." 17 Three years later the as-
sembly rallied to protect powerless slaveholders, requiring that costs of 
unsuccessful petitions be paid before appeals could be filed. 18 Sub-
sequent laws would strike directly at antislavery advocates for blacks, 
by making petitioners' attorneys responsible for the costs and fees of 
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unsuccessful freedom suits. The legislature thus shored up the power of 
the master; it gave him or her a freer hand in dealing with black desires 
for freedom. 
Despite these restrictions, freedom petitions afforded some men 
and women leverage with which to bargain for eventual freedom. Slaves 
rapidly informed themselves about and took advantage of their peti-
tion rights. The Butler case had originated in Saint Mary's County, at 
the southern tip of Maryland's Western Shore, but the torrent of white 
complaints about petitioners centered on Baltimore and nearby coun-
ties such as Anne Arundel and Prince George's only a few years after-
ward. Slaves also were quick to challenge masters who transported 
them into or out of Maryland in violation of the state's ban on slave 
importation, knowing that such masters might have legally forfeited 
title to such slaves.19 
Moreover, masters knew that contesting a freedom suit might not 
end their troubles. Courts could order a petitioner removed from a 
slaveholder's control for months or even years pending resolution of a 
petition, with attendant loss of the slave's labor. And victory in court 
could bring on new difficulties, as Gassaway Rawlings, an Anne Arundel 
County planter, learned. He first advertised to recover his slave Ephraim 
in 1797, noting that he was contesting a freedom petition. In October 
of 1800 Rawlings sought Ephraim again, declaring that he had run 
away immediately after the courts rejected his petition.20 
Faced with such possibilities, some masters chose to manumit free-
dom petitioners. Although the Reverend John Ashton finally triumphed 
in court over the Mahoneys in 1802, at least six of the seven brothers 
were freed by 1808, either by Ashton or by Charles Carroll of Carrollton. 
It is not clear why Carroll purchased some of the Mahoneys from 
Ashton, but as an owner of more than two hundred slaves, including a 
number surnamed Joice (whose freedom might also be at stake), he 
was intensely interested in the outcome of the case. Carroll may have 
judged it wise to dampen his own slaves' discontent with the court's 
rejection of the Mahoney's petition by purchasing some of the Mahoneys 
in order to eventually grant them freedom, six years after their final 
defeat in court. In a similar move, Carroll sold John Joice his freedom 
for two hundred dollars, immediately after the Ashton-Mahoney deci-
sion.21 
At least one master explicitly manumitted a slave on the contin-
gency that no petition for freedom be filed during the eight years that 
the slave was to serve before gaining liberty.22 In these cases the prom-
ised freeing of an individual, rather than weakening the social fabric of 
slavery, may in fact have reinforced it by providing an outlet for the 
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resistant or potentially troublesome slave. Nonetheless, freedom peti-
tions constituted a potentially major irritant to slavery, at least in the 
1790s, one that loomed larger in Baltimore than in rural areas, given 
the greater flow of information among city residents and the presence 
of the abolition society headquarters there. 
The granting of selective freedom after a term of service not only 
functioned as a compromise to avoid freedom petitions but also har-
monized with masters' desires to regard slavery as becoming progres-
sively ameliorated in keeping with America's republican and Christian 
ideals. Hostility to the abolition society (which did not long survive its 
rebuke from the slaveholder-dominated House of Delegates) bespoke 
resentment toward those who failed to appreciate such progress, as 
well as the unwelcomeness of any interference with a master regarding 
the terms of releasing a chattel from bondage. 23 
The theme of granting masters more flexibility to deal with slaves 
also informed new manumission laws of the 1790s. Efforts to mandate 
gradual emancipation in Maryland, proposed in 1789, quickly foun-
dered. Instead, one year after the failure to obtain a post-nati emanci-
pation bill on the Pennsylvania model, the legislature eased a long-
standing ban on manumission by wili.24 In the debate on testamentary 
manumission, delegate William Pinkney foreshadowed the economic 
analysis that would become the sheet anchor of antislavery arguments 
in Maryland, contending, "Never will ... agriculture, commerce, or 
manufactures flourish, so long as they depend on reluctant bondsmen 
for their progress." Pinkney also challenged the "notion that freedmen 
will be instruments of usurpation" of others. He insisted that allowing 
slavery to continue unabated would be more likely to lead to black 
insurrection. Pinkney conceded that some free blacks would be lazy or 
criminal but noted that some whites already fit this description. Agree-
ing that permitting manumission by will might give a slave a motive to 
murder his master, Pinkney noted that the same motives also applied to 
whites under existing law. He ridiculed claims that manumissions by 
will would impoverish white families and averred that even if that were 
true, a diminished patrimony "honestly come by" was preferable to 
subsisting on the labor of slaves.25 
Pinkney thus wrestled with the same questions that had troubled 
judges in the Butler case. Would having a sizable free black population 
increase the chances of a black revolt? Would free blacks succumb to 
laziness and criminality and become a public burden? Finally, should 
individuals be permitted to free their slaves if doing so might harm 
manumitters or their families? Only the last of these questions was ever 
answered confidently in Maryland before the Civil War. Few whites 
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would accept the existence of free people of color with the equanimity 
displayed by the then-young Pinkney.26 
As might be expected of Maryland's cautious and conservative 
ameliorators, the repeal of the ban on testamentary manumissions was 
hedged with protections for heirs, creditors, and taxpayers. Testators 
could not manumit slaves if so to do would prejudice the payment of 
debt. Nor could they manumit any person over the age of fifty or other-
wise unable to gain his or her living. Finally, no manumissions would 
be acknowledged if written up during the testator's final illnessP This 
provision not only prevented the diminution of patrimony by 
slaveholders with deathbed qualms about meeting their Maker; it also 
guaranteed that few testamentary manumissions would free slaves with-
out a significant passage of time between the promise of liberation and 
its arrival, ensuring a period of preparation in which to learn the ways 
of freedom. 
In reality, many men and women delayed writing wills until death's 
approach was evident and then promised to free slaves regardless of 
the law. When heirs contested such manumissions, they generally over-
came the testimony of a decedent's intent to free slaves prior to a last 
illness, as courts adhered to the letter of the law.28 But in keeping with 
the desire to safeguard masters' flexibility and credibility in promising 
freedom, the legislature eliminated the "last illness" restriction in 1796.29 
The hesitant, much-qualified expanding of masters' freedom to 
manumit slaves suggests that misgivings about free black indolence 
appeared almost at the outset of delayed manumission's surge in popu-
larity. As Maryland's lawmakers moved at the close of the eighteenth 
century to regulate the lives of free persons of color, they evinced con-
cerns that had long been given voice regarding propertyless white ser-
vants, concerns that transcended racial lines. Masters must not free 
people who could not sustain themselves; hence, the law required that 
apprentices and indentured servants receive freedom dues, so that the 
newly freed had time to find their place in the world and would not 
become public charges. In the case of slaves, a surer way to minimize 
such risks was to simply bar the master from emancipating the unfit in 
the first place. 
The Act concerning Negroes of 1796 lowered the maximum age 
for manumission from fifty to forty-five. The lower age limit tempered 
the increase in manumissions that might have been expected from the 
simultaneous waiving of the last illness restriction on manumission by 
will.30 Manumitting masters could not free older slaves by leaving them 
land or money as a means of support; courts ruled that because slaves 
over forty-five could not be freed in the first place, they were legally 
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incapable of controlling bequests and thus still unable to meet the test 
of self-maintenance.31 Courts also disparaged acts of emancipation that 
might impoverish a property holder, rendering him or her dependent, 
while creating yet another dependent propertyless laborer. Early-nine-
teenth-century case law specifically established a widow's right to over-
turn manumissions under the doctrine of refusing a husband's bequest 
and claiming her rights to a share of the estate. 32 
When legally challenged, the manumitting of young children also 
met with rebuff. Though many slave children worked from the age of 
ten or occasionally even younger, judges regarded them as incapable of 
supporting themselves until the age of majority, twenty-one for males 
and sixteen for females, the ages at which the binding of apprentices 
ended. In 1825 attorney Francis Scott Key advised George Calvert to 
manumit a mother and then sell the daughter to her, as "the courts ... 
are very strict on the interpretation of the manumission law .... chil-
dren of such an age as to be unable to work cannot be manumitted, 
even if the master makes the most ample provision for their support. " 33 
This entire approach to manumission helped to preserve slavery across 
generations of black families trying to acquire freedom and posed little 
or no threat to the continuation of slavery. Maryland's manumission 
laws did not indicate outright antislavery sentiment but rather regarded 
slavery's elimination equivocally and stressed selective liberation. 
Although lawmakers thus reined in legal routes to freedom via pe-
tition and carefully structured the master's right to manumit, slave flight 
could not so readily be rendered harmless. Here, too, masters were 
pushed into cessions of control. 34 Blacks who ran from Maryland 
slaveholders were, as a group, much like their peers elsewhere in the 
South. About three-quarters were male, predominantly in the age range 
fifteen to twenty-four. The ads contain those ubiquitous but nonethe-
less gruesome references to twisted limbs, missing fingers and toes, burn 
marks, and scars, as well as poignant descriptions of people unable to 
look a white man in the eye or to speak to one without stuttering or 
trembling. Likewise, the ads sketch various runaway personalities, as 
seen through masters' eyes: some fugitives are described as likely to be 
"artful," "plausible," or "unusually well-spoken," in trying to pass as 
free or to claim to be at large for a legitimate purpose. 
Beyond these general similarities, patterns relating to fugitives' skills, 
why they fled, and where they were going tell much about shifts over 
time in the conditions of servitude and in black ability to shape those 
conditions. Table 9 categorizes masters' statements about the putative 
destinations of male runaways. 
Over time, male runaways were increasingly likely to remain in 
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TABLE 9 
Destinations of Male Runaways from Baltimore 
Masters and Runaway Rates, 1773-1820 
Percent of Runaways 
Destination 1773-1790 1790-1799 1800-1809 1810-1819 
Baltimore 9 17 16 29 
Maryland (not Baltimore) 12 18 18 11 
Pennsylvania & north 8 7 7 6 
Elsewhere 7 7 4 1 
No indication 64 51 55 53 
No. of advertisements 177 168 109 258 
Annual no. runaways 
per 1,000 male slaves 20 16 7 14 
NoTE: Baltimore is defined as the city itself, or Baltimore Town, Old Town, and Fells Point 
before its 1796 incorporation. "Pennsylvania" totals include three runaways thought to be 
headed for points further north. "Elsewhere" includes runaways said to be going "to sea" 
or, in wartime, fleeing to the British or French armies. The runaway rate derives from 
slave population figures for Baltimore interpolated from ( 1) the Maryland census of 1776 
(2) the first four federal censuses, as interpolated with numbers of male slaves derived 
from the tax lists of 1783 and 1798, and (3) the Baltimore assessment record of 1813. 
Baltimore, with both the 1790s and the years from 1810 to 1819 show-
ing major increases in the proportion of slaves who were thought to be 
"hiding," "lurking," or "skulking" in and around the city. In the 1770s 
and 1780s masters had thought that Maryland, Pennsylvania, or other 
more distant locations were each as likely to be the fugitive's destina-
tion as Baltimore itself. By the second decade of the nineteenth century, 
three to four times as many masters guessed that a slave would be 
"harbored" in Baltimore rather than heading for any other given place; 
more than half of those advising ad readers where to find runaways 
identified a location in or near the city as the most promising site. By 
contrast, no more than one-twelfth of escapees in absolute terms were 
thought to have headed for Pennsylvania or other free territories in any 
period from 1773 to 1820. Although slaveholders earlier described more 
men as having fled to Maryland counties outside Baltimore, such themes 
also gave way, especially after 1810, to the notion that Baltimore itself 
served as the fugitive's hiding place. The shift after 1790 toward fugi-
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tives' remaining in Baltimore coincided with a dramatic decline in ad-
vertised runaways; the proportion of advertisements fell from twenty 
per one thousand male slaves in the 1770s and 1780s to barely a third 
of that rate in the first decade of the 1800s. But the second and larger 
shift toward local flight in the second decade of the century occurred as 
escape attempts turned upward again, although at fourteen per thou-
sand male slaves per year, the rate still failed to match those of the 
Revolutionary era. 35 
These fluctuations in runaway rates contrasted with a relatively 
stable distribution of skills among fugitives. Throughout the period, 
just under half of advertising masters identified a skill practiced by the 
men who ran from them. Tabulations of these notations confirm that 
slaves worked in a wide variety of crafts that played a central role in 
Baltimore's dynamic growth in the post-Revolutionary decades. Roughly 
one-fifth of skilled runaways had worked in the shipping industry, in-
cluding not only sailors and watermen but also ship carpenters, rope 
makers, sail makers, and caulkers. Metal fabricators, such as forge and 
furnace hands, blacksmiths, anchor makers, nailers, and coppersmiths, 
composed a similar proportion of skilled and semiskilled runaways. 
Construction trades had been the metier of a third large group of fugi-
tives, within which brick makers and bricklayers dominated; there were 
also carpenters, painters and glaziers. Finally, food and clothing pro-
duction accounted for about one-seventh of skilled runaways, of whom 
shoemakers, bakers, tailors, and butchers were most numerous. 36 Per-
haps having a craft skill gave blacks greater confidence in their ability 
to fend for themselves and made them more likely to run off. It is also 
possible that slaves brought to Baltimore to work in the crafts more 
commonly fit the runaway paradigm of being single young adult males. 
These factors may also have affected the escapees' outlook regarding 
where they would go. 
By the early nineteenth century roughly half of the advertisers tried 
to alert would-be slave catchers to fugitives' likely destinations or routes 
of escape. Blacks fleeing Baltimore masters, like slaves everywhere, were 
often supposed to be seeking reunion with kinfolk or avoiding separa-
tion from them. Runaway ads routinely identified the presence of a 
parent, a spouse, or a sibling dwelling in a specific spot, such as "Mr. 
Bowen's plantation on Middle River Neck," or more vaguely, "in Calvert 
County, where he [the runaway] was raised." By the early nineteenth 
century many Maryland slaves were second, third, or fourth genera-
tion African Americans, with ties to kin scattered all over the state. 
Thus an 1811 ad listed "Negro George's" wife, who cooked at the 
Fountain Inn in Baltimore; his brother, in Frederick County; and his 
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mother, on Kent Island, in hope of tracking down the missing George. 37 
Desire to be with relatives helps explain part of Baltimore's increasing 
popularity for runaways. As the city's slave population swelled from 
less than one thousand circa 1780 to more than four thousand by 1810, 
slaves had a correspondingly greater chance of having a relative in the 
city who could help them when they ran. 
The explosive growth of Baltimore's free black community, from a 
few hundred in 1790 to more than ten thousand by 1820, played an 
even greater role in the evolving pattern of runaway destinations. Con-
stituting a majority of Baltimore's blacks after 1810, free people of 
color could ally with runaways, harbor them, or provide other ser-
vices, even more effectively than slaves, as disgruntled but resigned 
masters often outlined: "He was seen at Fells' Point among the free 
negro houses where he is no doubt concealed" or "It is needless to 
describe his clothes, as by now he will have obtained a change through 
the management of the free negroes" or yet again, "He will probably 
have obtained a pass from the free negroes at the Point." Some run-
aways, like Maria Cooper in 1818, apparently had several options: 
"She is supposed to be lurking in the neighborhood of Chatham Street 
where her mother is hired to Mr. Robinson, or in Saratoga Street, where 
her grandmother lives .... she has also a sister living at Mrs. Bush's 
tavern, where it is said she was seen a few days ago." 38 
The presence of ten to fifteen thousand blacks in early-nineteenth-
century Baltimore, slave and free, allowed many runaways simply to 
melt into anonymity, living with other blacks, huckstering, pursuing a 
trade, or working as day laborers. 39 Advertisers frequently expressed 
the fear that a runaway would seek work at the wharves and the ship-
yards, hoping to pass as free. Such a stratagem might be foiled by an 
employer who asked to see a nonexistent certificate of freedom or who 
was thorough-minded enough to scrutinize and detect forged freedom 
papers, but clearly not all hirers did so. A runaway wishing to avoid 
possible difficulties could, in Baltimore's labor market, adopt a slightly 
less devious pose, admitting to being a slave but claiming to be autho-
rized by a master to hire his or her own time. Employers seeking an 
active man for a day's or a week's work often failed to ask for proof of 
the master's imprimatur for the slave's self-hire, if the frequent warn-
ings of masters against such ploys are any indication. Indeed, know-
ingly hiring a suspected runaway gave an employer additional leverage 
in negotiations over wages or over the mode or timing of their pay-
ment: a fugitive would be unlikely to call attention to himself by com-
plaining about short or late pay. So common was the practice of hiring 
runaways that even the master of a twelve-year-old runaway girl theo-
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rized that she might try to hire her own time as a nursemaid.40 Thus, 
Baltimore's rapid growth from a town of six thousand to a city of more 
than sixty thousand in the forty years after the Revolution helped slaves 
to flee masters, at least for a time, without leaving kin, friends, or fa-
miliar surroundings. 
Ultimately, many runaways did leave Baltimore to avoid recapture 
and fled northward.41 But the ability to live in Baltimore undetected, 
while working to make money and otherwise prepare for a longer jour-
ney, must have made running away a generally more tempting option. 
The careful planning of the final escape journey, as described by 
Frederick Douglass and others, need not have preceded the initial bolt 
to a haven with a friend or relative. 
Many runaways did not intend to decamp permanently but rather 
fled on the spur of the moment to escape or defer punishment or per-
haps to disrupt a sale to an undesirable master. Some may simply have 
wanted a "vacation" from the hard work and close supervision of ur-
ban slavery. William Norris, seeking to retrieve Nicholas Everson, 
vexedly noted that Everson "takes a frolic of this kind about once a 
year, and will no doubt be found among the free negroes at Fells' 
Point. "42 But recalcitrants described as being "addicted to running off" 
may have been pursuing more proactive motives than avoidance of 
harm or enjoying free time. 
A slave who ran away and then returned to his master, voluntarily 
or otherwise, could improve the chances of gaining freedom through 
self-purchase or delayed manumission. While at large, one could pocket 
earnings as an apparent free person of color or a self-hired slave, speed-
ing up the accumulation of cash to buy one's freedom or that of kin-
folk. Concomitantly, by establishing oneself as bold enough to run away, 
one could hope to command more serious attention from a master to 
the idea of self-purchase or delayed manumission. To be sure, there 
were risks: a master might decide to sell a runaway to the deep South, 
either to dissuade others from running or simply to convert a demon-
strably unprofitable investment into cash. But the fact of a slave's hav-
ing run away, if known to potential buyers, might diminish his value 
by destroying his reputation as safe property and thus actually work to 
reduce the attractiveness of sale. In addition, with most of Baltimore's 
masters holding only one to four slaves, the appeal of sale as exem-
plary punishment was limited. 
All in all, a slaveholder otherwise reluctant to sell freedom to a 
slave, or to offer it in return for steadily productive labor, might well 
find discretion to be in order, once a black's flight and return had al-
tered often closely balanced expectations of gain or loss from hiring, 
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selling, or gradually manumitting him or her. The nexus between flight, 
sale, and manumission thus could influence any number of master-slave 
transactions. 
For example, the ability to hide within the city changed the sea-
sonal patterns of running away, making the slaveholder's job of sur-
veillance of his chattels more difficult. Slaves running from rural sites 
had to anticipate moving across the countryside, traveling by night and 
perhaps sleeping in the open air over days or even weeks on the road. 
Under such circumstances they were more likely to flee in the warm 
weather from late spring to early fall than in the winter months. For 
masters concerned about potential runaways, the months from No-
vember to March provided something of a respite. By contrast, Balti-
more masters needed to be always on guard, for even in the coldest 
times a slave might slip across town to a street or an alley in Fells' Point 
or Federal Hill and lie low among free black protectors. Just over 70 
percent of rural runaways departed their masters in the six months 
from April through September, with less than a third doing so in the 
fall and winter quarters. In Baltimore these warmer months claimed 
only 54 percent of the runaways, little more than the remainder of the 
year.43 Although difficult to quantify, the costs of preventing escape by 
urban slaves might thus be higher than for rural masters. 
When a slave did run off, search and recapture could stretch out 
over days or weeks, with slave catchers' rewards and expenses eating 
up the profits of a year or more of the slave's labor. Typically, slaveholders 
offered sliding-scale cash rewards, keyed to the fugitive's distance from 
home when captured and returned; top rewards averaged nearly seventy-
five dollars in the period 1810-20.44 The large rewards for recovering 
distant fugitives may have intensified slave-catching activities on the 
Philadelphia road, especially where it crossed the Susquehanna some 
forty miles northeast of Baltimore; this in turn could have contributed 
to the low proportion of runaways thought to be heading for Pennsyl-
vania. As one master opined, "if he is headed for Pennsylvania, he will 
avoid the scrutiny he would undergo on the Philadelphia Road."45 And 
Christopher Hughes, advertising for the runaway Murry, noted that 
three other men had been retaken on the banks of the Susquehanna, 
despite the aid of a Quaker there.46 
Even in seeking slaves hiding within Baltimore, masters had few 
alternatives to soliciting slave catchers, given Baltimore's tiny consta-
bulary during the early nineteenth century. Some, like James Gunn, 
employed the runaway ad to encourage the slave's return on his own 
volition. Although pride no doubt prevented masters from speaking in 
print directly to a runaway, they could nonetheless declare to the public 
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at large, presumably for conveyance to the slave, that "treatment shall 
be humane and liberal if he repairs his Error [and returns]." Other mas-
ters sought to dispel "misapprehensions," such as fear of being sold, 
that they judged might have caused the slave's flight. Ads such as these 
represented a master's belated concession on a point of conflict with a 
slave, in an effort to retrieve a fugitive without paying slave catchers. 
No action produced more conflict than the sale of a slave or events 
that presaged sales, such as a master's death, an announcement of mi-
gration plans, or the appearance of a slave trader. Frederick Douglass's 
autobiography recounts the dread and sorrow that he and fellow slaves 
felt following their owner's death. Removed from Baltimore to the East-
ern Shore, the adolescent Douglass could only wait and wonder whether 
the settling of his deceased master's estate would lead to his sale. Adults 
placed in Douglass's situation were often less resigned. Taking advan-
tage of the confusion surrounding the inventorying of property and 
probating of wills, blacks fled, particularly when slave sales threat-
ened. James Hughes, an executor, explained in an orphans' court peti-
tion seeking immediate authority to sell slaves that he was "fearfull 
that ... Property will be wasted in Consequence of the plantation 
being advertised. "47 Other less foresighted administrators tried to ob-
tain from the courts relief from financial responsibility to the estate for 
slaves who had run off.48 
Removal to Georgia or New Orleans was widely regarded by blacks 
as a virtual death sentence, permanently separating one from family 
and friends. Blacks were accordingly highly sensitive to the prospect of 
distant sale, even to the point of resisting violently. When Basil and 
Philip, two young Frederick County slaves, learned that Haden Edwards 
proposed to buy them and take them with him to Kentucky, they were 
suspicious. After inquiries revealed that Edwards intended to resell them 
to New Orleans as soon as he reached Kentucky, the two young men 
refused to go with him. When Edwards tried to tie the men up, they 
struck him down and escaped. Though recaptured, Basil and Philip 
secured Edwards's promise to resell them to Maryland owners, and 
they gained his support in obtaining a pardon for their violence against 
him.49 
Faced with such dangers, slaveholders increasingly sought to as-
suage slaves' fears by placing restrictions on the terms of sales. Table 
10 illustrates these patterns. 
The table lists three limits on conditions of sale that might be ex-
pected to reassure a slave who was going to be sold, assuming that 
blacks typically desired to obtain eventual freedom and to remain in 
Maryland with kin, spouses, and friends. Over time, greater proportions 
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TABLE 10 
Conditions of Slave Sales Imposed by Baltimore Sellers, 1791-1820 
Percent Frequency by Decade 
Sale Requirements 1791-1800 1801-1810 1811-1820 
Sold for term of years 19 33 36 
Maryland buyer required 13 18' 
Baltimore area buyer required 1 3 6 
Distant buyer required 7 2 1 
Total Sample 139 230 537 
No. sale ads p.a. per 1,000 slaves 7 7 12 
'After 1817, Maryland law forbade the sale of prospectively manumitted slaves to out-
of-state owners; hence, sellers of such slaves had no need to stipulate a "Maryland only" 
sale in their advertisements. If such cases are excluded from consideration, the propor-
tion of owners who voluntarily barred out-of-state sales rises to 25 percent. 
of slaves were sold for a term of years rather than for life. Likewise, 
more and more sellers required that purchasers of slaves keep them in 
Maryland, whereas fewer openly sought to punish slaves by selling 
them at a distance. The advertisements leave little room to doubt that 
searches for Georgia, Tennessee, or Alabama buyers were intended to 
punish a disobedient, negligent, or runaway slave. One 1796 ad seek-
ing to dispose of a slave "at least one hundred miles from Baltimore" 
noted that the woman could be seen in the Baltimore jail; another mas-
ter boasted of his cook's abilities but added "frankly" that a buyer 
from Georgia would be preferred because of the woman's "impertinent 
language to her Mistress." 50 In contrast, one seller prefaced his de-
mand for a Maryland buyer with a terse "as they are sold for no fault." 
Ads seeking to discourage buyers from taking slaves outside of Mary-
land might also cite the seller's desire to avoid separation of husband 
and wife or, less specifically, a desire to see the slave remain where he or 
she was "raised" or "bred."51 In the same vein, sellers of slaves who 
had been promised eventual manumission by an earlier deed or will 
occasionally insisted on the prospective freed person's remaining in 
Maryland as a guarantee against the reimposition of lifelong bondage 
by a buyer who removed to the Southwest. 
The willingness of many masters to refuse to sell a slave or slaves 
to outsiders could also represent self-denying humanitarianism, as evi-
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denced by two-tiered pricing. That is, some sellers accepted less money 
from local buyers than they could hope to receive from a southwestern 
trader. 52 Few sellers named a specific asking price, but phrases such as 
"will be sold cheap to one undertaking not to remove him from Mary-
land" were not uncommon. Similarly, estate administrators routinely 
sought and obtained permission from the orphans' courts to sell slaves 
privately rather than at public auctions, to assure local purchase of 
slaves. 
When sellers or administrators announced that they would sell only 
to Maryland buyers "to avoid trouble" or "difficulty," they also had in 
mind the very real possibility that a slave might run to avoid sale to a 
distant or otherwise unacceptable master.53 A master might forgo a 
higher-priced offer from a Tennessee or Louisiana purchaser in order 
to gain greater assurance of consummating a slave sale without pro-
voking costly flight either by the person to be sold or by others fearing 
a similar fate. 
Recovering a runaway could cost perhaps one-quarter of a slave's 
market value, even more if the fact of having absconded reduced the 
amount buyers would pay for a recaptured fugitive. Securing an Afri-
can American's cooperation by combining a discounted price to a local 
buyer with a deed of prospective manumission after a term of servitude 
might well generate about the same financial result for a slaveholder as 
having to pursue a fugitive sold at full value but against his will, and 
such a course would completely eliminate the chance of major loss 
associated with the slave's escaping altogether. 
In assessing how important it was for masters to negate the threat 
of flight, we must also note that the prices offered by slave dealers were 
not dramatically higher than those obtainable for African Americans 
sold locally. Large-scale slave dealers, such as Austin Woolfolk, gener-
ally paid from $300 to $350 for an adult male slave in the second or 
third decade of the nineteenth century, prices well within normal local 
ranges. True, Woolfolk and his ilk could pay in full and in cash, and 
they stood ready to do business at the seller's pleasure; for planters 
seeking to dispose of large numbers of chattels, such features were ex-
tremely attractive, as slave sale records for rural counties indicate. But 
the typical Baltimore slaveholder, seeking to sell one or two slaves, 
would not receive much more money from a dealer than from a local 
purchaser. The advantages of selling to a dealer might thus seem small 
compared to the risk of loss if a slave got wind of sale plans and es-
caped; securing cooperation by promising sale to a local owner might 
well be the financially prudent action. 
From the slave's perspective, threatening to flee could counterpoise 
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if not eliminate the threat of sale. This form of contesting the condi-
tions of slavery can be specifically linked to fluctuations in the south-
western slave trade. Escape attempts surged in years in which unusually 
large numbers of southwestern dealers were operating in Baltimore. In 
the period 1811 to 1820, advertisements to buy slaves in large num-
bers appeared far more frequently between 1816 and 1818 than in 
other years, as men like Woolfolk, a Georgian, or David Anderson of 
Tennessee sought to buy as many as "100 Negroes," offering cash pay-
ment and "the highest" prices to procure slaves for the cotton fields of 
the Southwest.54 Slave dealers advertised infrequently before 1816 be-
cause the War of 1812 made shipment of slaves by sea risky owing to 
the presence of British naval raiders and privateers. Moreover, demand 
for slaves in the Gulf region was temporarily deranged by the war with 
the Creeks. In 1819 and 1820 the impact of the Panic of 1819, felt 
particularly severely in Baltimore, no doubt contributed to the tempo-
rary disappearance of large-scale slave traders. 
Table 11 shows the relationship between overall sales of Baltimore 
slaves, runaway rates, and the presence or absence of slave dealers in 
Baltimore, as indicated by the number of advertisements in the news-
papers. 
Although the volume of slave sale ads remained fairly stable 
throughout the decade, runaway advertisements increased by 40 per-
cent during the three peak years of slave trading activity and then 
declined by more than half as slave dealers' operations diminished in 
1819-20.55 Moreover, a higher than normal proportion of 1816-18 
runaways came from the age group most avidly sought by dealers, males 
ages 15 to 24.56 Slaves were more ready to accept a local sale, and 
slaveholders seeking to "avoid trouble" by selling to Maryland buyers 
were pursuing their own interests as well as mitigating the harshness of 
slave sale. Possible slave flight thus pushed masters' and slaves' inter-
ests into running in tandem. 
The pursuit of profits in the slave trade also brought forth a wave 
of abductions of both slaves and free blacks. Consistent with the com-
placent view of slavery's relative mildness in Maryland, the legislature 
became somewhat hostile to the export of slaves from Maryland by 
slave traders, an issue that flared into prominence during the post-1815 
cotton boom. In 1817 legislation criminalized the sale or transporta-
tion out of state of slaves who had been promised manumission after a 
term of years, on the presumption that term slaves would be denied 
freedom, once taken to Georgia or Kentucky. Earlier laws had imposed 
civil penalties on such sales, but the 1817law provided for a peniten-
tiary sentence of up to two years. 57 
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TABLE 11 
Slave Dealing and Runaway Rates, 1811-1820 
Avg. Annual No. of Advertisements 1811-1815 1816-1818 1819-1820 
To sell slaves 50 52 55 
For runaways 34 48 22 
To buy 10 or more slaves 1 7 2 
Whites eager to ameliorate slavery thus protected the rights of blacks 
and the credibility of their own offers of future freedom. If term slaves 
could be cheated of their freedom with impunity by out-of-state sale, 
the reliability of prospective manumission as a device for inspiring hard 
work and deterring flight would wane, and the stability of slavery in 
Maryland, especially in Baltimore, would be disturbed. But, although 
the 1817 law proscribed both the act of sale and the acts of purchase 
and transportation, the practical effect fell almost exclusively on buy-
ers. Court and prison records show virtually no convictions for selling 
a term slave to a person intending to remove him from Maryland; con-
victions fell rather upon the purchasers and transporters. In effect, 
slaveholders publicly condemned out-of-state sales but stopped short 
of punishing themselves for engaging in stratagems to avoid the prom-
ised freeing of a slave.58 
As always, these efforts were couched within an overall acceptance 
of slavery's legitimacy. When the Baltimore County grand jury initiated 
public discussion of the kidnapping problem in 1816 and singled out 
private prisons ("houses appropriated ... for the reception of the negroes 
intended to be carried to other states") as an evil, the jurymen feared 
that "the depraved part of our community" employed such places to 
effect the sale of term slaves and indentured free children. But the most 
damaging feature of private slave jails was that "slaves, the legal prop-
erty of individuals, and, in some cases, the chief support of helpless 
widows, are stolen away from their owners and deposited in these cells 
of misery to await transportation," in conditions "abhorrent to every 
condition of humanity." Convinced that such nefarious practices were 
"increasing with enormous rapidity," the grand jury petitioned for a 
law barring private jails.59 
Others campaigned against traders' holding slaves in public jails, 
pending transportation to Savannah, New Orleans, or Kentucky. By 
1818, faced with a dramatic increase in slave flight, itself a response to 
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the swelling activity of slave dealers, the state barred traders from lodging 
slaves in public jails, but it continued to allow any bonafide resident of 
the state to do so at his or her own cost; slaves could also be kept in 
private dungeons without restriction. 60 A slave dealer could comply by 
becoming a Maryland resident, by building his own strong house, or 
by arranging for would-be sellers to place slaves in a public jail pend-
ing removal. Advertisements by dealers indicate that the first two courses 
were followed and that the antikidnapping laws had little impact other 
than to foster consolidation of the trade into larger operations that 
could afford resident agents or private jails, or both.61 
Another area of concern lay in the treatment of blacks seized as 
runaways. Maryland law presumed all blacks at large to be runaway 
slaves unless they produced a master's pass or a certificate of freedom. 
Reports of the re-enslaving of free blacks who lacked freedom papers, 
or whose papers were destroyed by slave catchers, led the legislature to 
authorize judges to use their discretion to determine a black prisoner's 
status. More critically, the new law declared that blacks deemed free by 
judges would no longer be held liable for jail fees, averting the sale into 
servitude of blacks proven free but unable to pay jail and court fees. 
This change hampered kidnappers who had captured and jailed free 
but poor blacks in the hopes of buying them cheaply at auction when 
no one could prove ownership.62 
Jail law reforms indicate white concern regarding attacks on free 
blacks and term slaves, but as always, that concern was tempered by 
fear that assistance to such blacks might undermine slavery. When the 
Protection Society of Maryland was founded in 1816 to combat kid-
napping, public reaction was skeptical, despite the presence of promi-
nent commercial and professional men among its leadership. The soci-
ety devoted two-thirds of an early public statement to disavowing in-
terest in "interference with any subsisting legal tie or duty, resulting 
from the relation between masters and slaves," whether to "lessen the 
value, impair the obligation, relax the rigor, or shorten the duration of 
legitimate servitude." In short, the society would not intervene in dis-
putes between masters and slaves over the carrying out of promises of 
delayed manumission. The Protection Society even denied any desire to 
"meliorate the condition" of slaves.63 Indeed, in a memorial to the 
General Assembly of Maryland, it gave equal billing to the horrors 
attending "negroes ... entitled to freedom after a term of years ... 
[being] reduced to perpetual slavery" and "masters in many instances 
[being] deprived of their slaves." 64 The view that free blacks were an 
adjunct to the slave population remained strong in 1816. 
After two turbulent years, the Protection Society reported in 1818 
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that it had "rescued more than sixty human beings from the grasp of 
lawless oppression, and restored a number of legal slaves to their prop-
er masters." Unfortunately, the society found itself short of funds, 
because opponents were "leaving no means untried to paralyze the ex-
ertions of the Society," chiefly by groundlessly accusing members of 
abolitionist tendencies. Once again, the society categorically denied such 
aims.65 But shortly thereafter, the society disbanded, as the Panic of 
1819 dampened the slave-dealing boom and kidnapping with it. 66 
Though ideologically much less threatening to slaveholders than the 
Abolition Society of the 1790s, the Protection Society fared little better 
in attracting sustained support. Its benevolent stance toward free blacks 
perhaps contributed to its speedy demise. 
Humanitarian action by slaveholders both partook of and was 
judged by instrumental standards. Laws to check the worst abuses of 
kidnappers and slave traders, undertaken to reassure vulnerable term 
slaves of the reliability of promises of prospective freedom and thereby 
prevent their flight, could win public acceptance by buttressing the sys-
tem of delayed manumission. Where slaves' chances to evade the master's 
grasp were poorer, and the master's interest in humane treatment as a 
prop to control was less critical, little amelioration occurred. 
Consider the sale of slave women and their children. The master's 
interest was best served by the ability to sell women either with or 
without their children, with an eye to getting the best deal. Black fami-
lies, however, would wish to avoid separation. Given the difficulties of 
fleeing slavery with children in tow, masters seeking to sell women had 
less reason to shape their sales strategy to counter the threat of flight. 
Accordingly, any increase in the tendency to keep families together over 
time would be strong evidence of ameliorative behavior, uncomplicated 
by self-interested motives.67 
Table 12 shows the patterns of sale advertisements for women age 
15 or older, by decade from 1791 to 1820, distinguishing between 
women offered for sale alone and those sold with children. A majority 
of slave women of childbearing age were offered for sale singly in each 
decade, with nearly three-quarters of those sold from 1811 to 1820 
thus advertised, even though 55 percent of slave women resided in a 
household that contained one or more slave children, according to 1820 
census data. Nearly two-fifths of the slave children, moreover, lived in 
a household with no resident black woman, slave or free. This picture 
suggests numerous separations of mothers and children by sale, giving 
little support to the idea of spontaneous humanitarianism on the part 
of slaveholders. This is negative evidence, of course, and it must be 
used cautiously. Federal census data provide no way before 1820 to 
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TABLE 12 
Advertisements for Sales of Baltimore Slave Women 
of Childbearing Age, 1791-1820 
1791-1800 1801-1810 1811-1820 
Percent sold alone 
Percent sold with children 
Sample size 
57 
43 
53 
72 
28 
96 
74 
26 
234 
analyze what proportion of slave women were mothers or lived with 
slave children.68 The conclusion that large and perhaps increasing pro-
portions of Baltimore slave women were sold separate from their chil-
dren does not seem unwarranted, however. In short, masters made 
concessions over sale to those slaves who could generate pressure 
through plausible threats of flight or violent resistance; those unable to 
do so were treated worse. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that sellers anticipated that a woman 
sold alone might well be marketable to a wider array of potential city 
buyers than one with children. An eighteen-year-old girl was offered 
for sale in 1809 because "her being pregnant does not suit her present 
owner." A mother of two having "no fault but a family of children," 
was put up for sale in 1818, and a similar ad vouched for a woman's 
being sold "for no other reason than the inconvenience" of her four-
year-old son and infant daughter. At least a half dozen ads offered to 
exchange a slave woman and her child for a childless woman of similar 
age and condition, and one seller urged the purchase of a woman who 
was "has no children, nor likely to have any." Finally, some sellers of 
women with children announced their willingness to part with a woman 
"with or without her children," according to the buyer's choice.69 
Even in dealing with slave mothers, masters eventually began to 
face a small danger of runaways. Sixteen of the nineteen runaways 
advertised as having fled with children left their masters in the 1811-20 
decade, making up 84 percent of all such cases reported between 1791 
and 1820. This upsurge far exceeded that of runaways generally. None 
of the women were thought to have departed for Pennsylvania, and 
only one to an Eastern Shore county. Nine of the remainder had, in 
their masters' views, hidden out somewhere in Baltimore city or county 
with fathers, mothers, or husbands, or "at Federal Hill, where she has 
many acquaintances among the Shoe Blacks. " 70 
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Chastened by the threat of flight, masters looked for ways to smooth 
the transition to a new owner. Trial slave sales comprised one such 
device, with the seller promising to take the slave back if the buyer was 
not satisfied. 71 Although it aimed chiefly to influence the prospective 
buyer, the trial sale also created an opening for the slave to influence 
his fate by his behavior during the trial period. In at least one case a 
slave exercised something approaching a veto right over his own sale. 
When Gerrard Troost, manager of the Cape Sable Company, an alum-
producing firm, tried to buy a laborer at an estate sale in the spring of 
1816, he was temporarily rebuffed when the slave, Emanuel, refused to 
report for duty. Ten days passed before Troost learned from the estate 
administrators that "the boy Emanuel ... is now willing to go with 
you," implying that the administrators had not been prepared to go 
forward with the sale over Emanuel's objections. 
John Gibson, who sold four men to Troost later that spring, pro-
posed deception to gain his former slaves' cooperation. "If [Troost] 
would buy them for the company that he would send them up the 
following Monday, but he requested not to mention to the Negros that 
they were sold, because they did not like to go [to the factory.]" Gibson 
hoped that the men would believe they had been hired only tempo-
rarily to the alum maker, assuming that if so, they would be less likely 
to run off than if they knew they had been sold. 72 
That Gibson's fears were not exaggerated may be illustrated by the 
complaint of Job Garretson, who sought redress in chancery court in 
1802 regarding his disastrous purchase of Negro Ben from William 
Hollis. According to Garretson, Hollis had interested him in buying 
Ben by touting the black man's skill as a waterman, "knowing that I 
kept a small vessel in the Patapsco in carrying wood and other things 
to Baltimore." When Garretson lamented that he lacked cash to buy a 
slave, Hollis assured him that Ben could be had on a short credit. 
Garretson then became suspicious, asking why such a valuable man 
was for sale on such easy terms. Hollis invoked a variant on the "want 
of employment" argument, noting that his own boat had a full crew, so 
Ben had been employed on another boat. There, "under the care of a 
hired captain, with whom the aforesaid negroe could not agree, and 
that the skipper having whipped him the negroe complained to [Hollis] 
and told him that he could not bear the treatment Hollis gave him, and 
begged ... Hollis to sell him, saying that if ... Hollis would not take 
him from under the control of the skipper he should be obliged to run 
away." Garretson gibed that perhaps Ben was too used to "that busi-
ness of running way and if so is not worth having[.]" Nonetheless, 
after seeing Ben, "who consent[ed] to live with [me]," he bought him 
84 The Price of Freedom 
for three hundred dollars. In fact, Garretson noted ruefully, Ben was 
"addicted" to running away, and did so only two months after being 
sold.73 
Garretson no doubt tried to place himself in the most favorable 
light in pleading his case and may have pretended to a greater degree of 
caution than he actually exercised in buying Ben. What stands out is 
that Hollis virtually admitted that Ben's demand for a change of super-
visor, if not legal master, coupled with a threat to run off, had pushed 
him into acting. Garretson, despite this knowledge, bought Ben, but 
only after dealing with him man-to-man and obtaining his consent for 
the sale. Both seller and buyer presumed that Ben's wishes had to be 
taken into account. 
Nevertheless, Ben rejected his new master. Perhaps Garrison had 
flunked his trial period as master. Or perhaps Ben simply wanted to 
continue working on Hollis's boats, but away from the abusive hired 
captain who had whipped him. Garretson suspected something of this 
sort, alleging that Ben had returned to Hollis's service after running 
from his new master. Whatever we make of this case, Ben's influence 
over his fate, and its low-key characterization by Garretson in a claim 
that elsewhere crackles with animosity, permits the inference that seek-
ing a slave's consent to a new master was not uncommon. 
A similar arena in which the master formally retained full author-
ity, but in fact conceded much to the slave's wishes, is represented by 
advertisements in which the slaveholder cited the slave's desires as the 
stimulus provoking the sale. Three ads appearing around 1810 stated 
that "he is sold because he is dissatisfied with his master" or "with his 
current place" or "at her own desire and her owner's regret. " 74 Intrigu-
ingly, a number of advertisements identified the slave's wish "to live in 
this city" as the motive force behind the sale. Such a statement could 
naturally be self-serving, a clever way of stating that the goods offered 
for sale were "safe property" and would not run oft But it might also 
be quite truthful; the excitement that young Frederick Douglass felt 
when he learned that he would be sent to a Baltimore master and the 
dejection occasioned by his return to rural Talbot County were no doubt 
shared by many other Maryland slaves. 
Thus, an advertisement such as that placed in the Baltimore Ameri-
can and Commercial Daily Advertiser by the captain of the bay schoo-
ner Two Brothers, regarding two slaves shipped to Baltimore from 
Cambridge who would "be sold only in Baltimore, as it is their wish to 
live in this city," can be read as evidence that slaves themselves helped 
fuel the rise of slavery in Baltimore.75 Their desires to come to Balti-
more justified slaveholders, buyers or sellers alike, in believing that 
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they were maximizing gain and minimizing risk by putting slaves to 
work in the city. It would be perilous to presume that the female cook 
and male driver offered for sale on board the Two Brothers necessarily 
saw transit to Baltimore as part of a larger plan to gain freedom. They, 
or either of them, may have primarily esteemed the greater opportuni-
ties to earn money and enjoy free time that Baltimore's environment 
could provide. Or the already large relocation of blacks to Baltimore 
may have brought kin or friends to the city before them. In any case, 
such men and women were exercising control over their lives, even if 
they only changed the location of their servitude. Those who managed 
to get to Baltimore "at their own desire" must surely have eventually 
gained a new outlook toward a lifetime in slavery. 
From the slaveholder's standpoint, granting the slave a voice in 
blocking or initiating a change of masters probably did not seem like a 
major concession of control. A more significant reduction of authority 
occurred when a bondman actually selected a new master, as when the 
executors of William Weatherly's estate advertised the sale of "two Negro 
men and one woman, the Negroes at private sale if they can get masters 
to purchase them, if not they must be sold at public sale the last day of 
the sale." 76 The slaves could hope to pick their new master, and pre-
sumably they gained some room thereby to discuss terms and condi-
tions of servitude. The executors improved their chances of disposing 
of slave property without having to pursue runaways, and they trans-
ferred expenditures of time and effort to find buyers from themselves 
to the slaves. They also could hope to avoid payment of the commis-
sion fee that a public sale by an auctioneer would require. By retaining 
the option of sale at auction, however, the executors underlined their 
ultimate power. They simultaneously provided an incentive for the slaves 
to seek a new master and set a limit to wheedling for concessions: push-
ing for too much might backfire, kill a private sale, and leave the slaves 
on the auction block. 
Explicit acknowledgments of slaves being authorized to find new 
masters appeared infrequently in the sale advertisements. A seller who 
authorized "self-sale" to save time and money would probably not 
have been as likely to advertise the slave for sale as a master intending 
to manage the transaction actively. Perhaps the more common practice 
would have been a unwritten understanding between master and slave 
that the latter was at liberty to seek a new master, subject to the current 
owner's approval. Surviving evidence of these arrangements comes 
mainly from cases in which a slave took advantage of such latitude to 
run off, as when Richmond Gustus of Baltimore advised newspaper 
readers that he had given the runaway Priscilla "a note to look for a 
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master to buy her, but as she has not returned ... I declare this pass to 
be invalid." Rural slaveholders could likewise be fooled, as may be 
seen from the advertisement of William Beanes of Prince George's 
County, whose runaway carpenter, Tom Hudson, had gone to Balti-
more in the fall of 1797 "on pretence of looking for a master." 77 Samuel 
Pitt, the slave of William Duvall, likewise outsmarted his master, run-
ning off under color of a "certificate to hire his own time or sell himself 
to another master." 78 
Samuel Pitt ran away in 1817, and Priscilla in 1816, years in which 
slave dealers were operating in Baltimore in unprecedented numbers. 
Either may have looked for an alternative to sale to a dealer and then 
fled after efforts to find a new master in Baltimore failed. Alternatively, 
they may have intended to flee all along, using the pass both to facili-
tate movement and to gain time to disappear before the master sus-
pected something amiss. Whatever Pitt's or Priscilla's original thinking, 
they transformed a slaveholder's stratagem for reducing the likelihood 
of escapes into a device that assisted their flight. 
Other slaveholder measures to secure faithful and productive la-
bor could also go awry, including delayed manumission itself. In 1791 
Harry Dorsey Gough bitterly condemned the runaway blacksmith Will 
Bates as "a very ungrateful Young Rogue who was born a Slave and 
Manumitted by me only to serve a few years." Gough expressed his 
hope that "an Atrocious Ingrate may be apprehended and brought to a 
sense of his Duty, and that his unsuccessful Villainy will prove an ex-
ample to others under similar circumstances." A prominent landowner 
and a convert to Methodism, Gough had complied with the church's 
urging not to hold slaves for life. But perhaps he was also influenced by 
Will Bates, who had run away before, in 1785.79 When Bates decamped 
again despite what Gough saw as a generous promise of eventual free-
dom, Gough's rage knew no bounds. 
His anger notwithstanding, Gough grounded his appeal for assis-
tance to recover and make an example of Will in the form of a public 
plea to slaveholders. He implied that the failure to close ranks and 
enforce the completion of Will's term of servitude would increase the 
tendency of "others under similar circumstances" to run. In urging Will's 
recapture as consonant with both his own and the general interest, 
Gough unwittingly acknowledged the potential conflict between those 
interests. When he promised Will his freedom, Gough had intended to 
strengthen Will's desire to serve a master, albeit for less than a life term. 
If Will's escape succeeded, then other slaves offered delayed manumis-
sion might feel as free to run as slaves for life did, and a major justifica-
tion for term slavery would disappear. Fully aware of what was at stake, 
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Gough underlined his seriousness by offering the staggering sum of 
two hundred dollars for Bates's return. 80 Whether Will Bates succeeded 
in advancing the date of his freedom is unknown, but Gough gauged 
correctly the potential for term slaves to become more, rather than less, 
impatient in bondage. By 1804 Will Bates had enough imitators for the 
Maryland legislature to authorize county courts to extend terms of 
servitude to cover the lost time of recaptured prospective manumittees. 
A generation later, in 1833, legislators took the further step of autho-
rizing court-regulated out-of-state sales of "turbulent" term slaves, a 
prospect tantamount to re-enslavement for life. 81 
The legislators would perhaps have sympathized with Gough's 
portrayal of such runaways as "atrocious ingrates," but the fugitives 
had a different perspective. including the fear that the promise of even-
tual freedom might not come to fruition. According to the law, a mas-
ter could not revoke a properly executed and registered manumission; 
in practice, however, if the master died or sold the slave for his remain-
ing term of years, a new owner could find ways to abrogate the promise 
of his predecessor. William Green, a successful escapee of the antebel-
lum period, had been owned by Molly Golds bury, whose will promised 
him freedom at age twenty-five. But he was "handsomely cheated out 
of it" by Goldsbury's relative, Nicholas Singleton, whose inheritance 
included the right to Green's labor for the remainder of his term. Single-
ton, who planned to leave Maryland, hoped to sell Green out of state 
as a slave for life, intending (in Green's words) to "put me in his pocket." 
Green's mother intervened and persuaded Singleton to delay the sale 
for one week, in the hope of finding a person who would buy him and 
keep him in Maryland. When such a buyer, Edward Hamilton, ap-
peared, Singleton sold Green with no mention of his eventual manu-
mission, and Hamilton treated him as a slave for life until Green es-
caped to free territory. 82 
lu this instance Singleton engaged in an unequal negotiation that 
temporarily secured Green's acquiescence to remaining in lifelong sla-
very, by granting Green and his mother a few days to find a Maryland 
master to buy him. Green was indeed "handsomely cheated" by Single-
ton, who had disposed of Green, presumably at the more lucrative price 
a slave for life brought, without provoking Green's immediate flight. 
Both Harry Gough's and William Green's experiences illustrate the 
ambiguities faced by masters or slaves who attempted to finesse the 
rigidities of slavery through agreements aimed at giving the slave a 
stake in labor productivity for his master. With power so heavily con-
centrated in the master's hands, he could not be held accountable for 
keeping promises, a circumstance that tempted either party to depart 
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from those promises when a better opportunity arose. A bondman un-
fairly denied freedom could go to court and file a freedom petition, but 
this was not a real choice for many, particularly when a term slave was 
sold out of the state.83 Precisely because the master's promise of free-
dom could be withdrawn, some term slaves still ran when they could. 
To assure that manumission bargains were honored, a white pa-
tron might offer to protect a slave's interest, but here, too, the slave's 
legal incapacity could create difficulties. When Gibson Readle sued 
Ninian Willett over Willett's failure to honor a self-purchase agreement 
with his slave John, he alleged that John was "hard working and indus-
trious" and had "long since ... earned for Willett more than double 
the sum of the payment of which he was to have been set free." But 
Readle had not witnessed John actually paying Willett the sums in ques-
tion, and John, as a black, could not testify against Willett, so the suit 
failed. Even with a white intermediary, John could not compel Willett 
to live up to their self-purchase agreement. 84 
Looked at coldly in terms of maximizing one's short-term interest, 
self-purchase agreements were an ideal strategy for masters seeking to 
extract the most from a slave. Not only did the self-purchaser provide 
funds to buy a replacement, but his payments toward the purchase of 
freedom represented a form of insurance for the master. If the slave 
died before gaining his freedom, the master's loss would be mitigated 
by keeping what the slave had already paid over, those monies being 
legally the master's property. Also, the master selling a slave his liberty 
could reconsider the price, insisting on more than had initially been 
agreed upon if slave prices had risen since the bargain had been struck. 85 
These advantages for the master constituted obstacles to self-
purchase that might be overcome by having free black kin or whites buy 
a slave and then immediately manumit him. But no matter how the trans-
action was managed, things could go wrong. When Joseph Hart adver-
tised Moses Lemmon as a runaway, he noted that Lemmon had over 
three hundred dollars in h1s possession, earned as a hostler at a Balti-
more hotel. It is tempting to speculate that Lemmon ran after failing to 
convince Hart to sell him his freedom, or after Hart reneged on a price. 86 
Whatever may have induced Lemmon's flight, tension could build 
up in all the arrangements designed to assure the provision of reliable 
slave labor. In conceding eventual freedom or the choice of a new mas-
ter, the slaveholder inevitably refocused his own interests, shortening 
his perspective to the near term. Doing so increased the pull of pros-
pects for short-term gain, which might impel a master not to abide by 
promised concessions. When individual masters gave in to this impulse, 
they undermined slaves' willingness to trust those very mechanisms, 
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such as delayed manumission, that had been employed in the first in-
stance to maintain slaveholders' own longer-term interests. 
Running away, slave sale, self-sale, and gradual manumission thus 
functioned as arenas in which masters and slaves commonly negotiated 
and contested the terms of their relationship. Additional complexities 
entered the picture when power relations became triangular through 
the hiring of slaves to another master. Historians have established that 
slaves could play on the resulting division of authority to achieve their 
own goals. 87 Complaining to the master about unreasonable treatment 
by the hirer, in order to avoid an unpleasant job, could give a slave 
more influence over his work life than might normally be available. To 
recall the case of Job Garretson and Negro Ben, the scene opened with 
Ben's complaint to his master about harsh treatment by his surrogate 
master and a demand for a change of supervisor. 
Hired-out slaves had other opportunities to derive advantage from 
having two masters. Journeys between master and hirer could become 
springboards for escape attempts. Maryland masters often described a 
missing slave as last seen on his way to a job in or around the city. Or 
a runaway could pretend to be a slave hiring his own time. Here too, 
the ability to avoid recapture simply by blending into the ever-growing 
free black population of the city presented an opportunity uncommon 
elsewhere: a runaway posing as a slave hiring his own time could earn 
money without even leaving familiar territory. So, at least, feared Wil-
liam Dorsey, as he made a far-from-unique announcement: "All per-
sons are forwarn'd from hiring or employing Molatto Man DANIEL, 
bred to the Anchor Business, without [my] permission." The brevity of 
Dorsey's ad makes it difficult to be certain whether Daniel had ab-
sconded altogether or was merely suspected of underreporting his in-
come to Dorsey. 88 Other advertisers expressed similar warnings about 
workers who might try to hire themselves out as sailors, ironworkers, 
chimney sweeps, sawyers, axmen, or domestics. 
These warnings were, on the one hand, aimed at white employers 
who might unwittingly offer work to a runaway; on the other hand, 
such advertisements also threatened prosecution of those who know-
ingly "harbored" such workers. Baltimore employers presumably found 
runaways potentially appealing for many of the reasons that today drive 
the hiring of undocumented alien workers. With the threat of exposure 
always available as a disciplinary instrument, the in-town runaway had 
virtually no leverage in any disputes that might arise over pay or work-
ing conditions, other than to run off yet again. So long as he escaped 
detection, a fugitive's employer could not be held financially respon-
sible to a slaveholder for property loss, as a legitimate hirer could be, if 
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a slave was injured, died on the job, or ran off.89 Virtual freedom from 
such responsibility in turn reduced the employer's need for close super-
vision of such workers, further trimming their cost. In short, all the 
advantageous features of slave hiring, such as smaller initial outlay to 
purchase labor power, a supply of labor tailored to short-term demand 
shifts, and lessened risk of property loss through death or disappear-
ance applied even more strongly to the employment of slaves hiring 
their own time, legitimately or otherwise. 
For many African Americans, gaining more autonomy must have 
outweighed other considerations, particularly when self-hire meant "liv-
ing out," in a household free of slaveholders.90 Estimating the number 
of black people who lived in what has been called quasi-freedom must 
be a treacherous business; those so situated had good reason to avoid 
census marshals or tax assessors. It is therefore all the more surprising 
to discover that 238 of Baltimore's slaves were identified in the 1820 
census as living in households containing no white person, a ratio of 
about one in every eighteen of the city's slaves. More than two-thirds 
of these persons were adults, so the phenomenon does not represent 
prospectively manumitted children living with their freed parents. The 
proportion of slaves in all-black households more than quadrupled 
between 1810 and 1820; none of the first three censuses had found as 
much as 2 percent of the slave population so situated.91 This shift to-
ward "living out" in the second decade of the nineteenth century coin-
cides with other patterns that show greater concessions of authority 
exacted from masters by slaves; masters were inclined to cooperate 
because they hoped to blunt the multiplying threats to control posed 
by the changing environment for blacks in Baltimore. 
Not all slaves who lived on their own negotiated self-hire agree-
ments or seized their status through local flight to quasi-freedom. Some 
older slaves were allowed to go at large by masters blocked from eman-
cipating them. The stricture against manumission of a slave over forty-
five could be circumvented by a master's ceasing either to demand labor 
from or provide maintenance for the slave.92 Permitting a slave to "go 
at large" occurred frequently enough for the state to enact its prohibi-
tion several times. The 1796 Act concerning Negroes had authorized 
county courts to prosecute complaints regarding slaves who "begged" 
or were "burthensome." Significantly, the law was toughened and fines 
to masters increased in 1817, as part of new legislation penalizing em-
ployers dealing with self-hired slaves.93 But masters and slaves contin-
ued to ignore the law. 
A review of Baltimore County wills turned up twenty cases in which 
a master specifically authorized a slave to go at large; presumably many 
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more such actions occurred informally.94 In a typical case John Battee 
stated simply enough that "Old Will may go where he pleases at my 
decease and when he cannot maintain himself then he is to return to 
the family for a subsistence. " 95 Perhaps Will benefited from Battee's 
action; perhaps he found that he had been "turned out to die," as 
Frederick Douglass bitterly characterized his aged grandmother's fate 
when she could no longer work for her master.96 In all likelihood Will 
found work in Baltimore, joining the growing ranks of quasi-free ca-
sual laborers there. At least one prominent Baltimorean found such 
cases altogether too common. Newspaper editor Hezekiah Niles, an 
antislavery Quaker, complained in 1815 that a "large proportion" of 
the city's paupers were "worn out negroes" sent to Baltimore by their 
masters to "beg or starve."97 Exemplifying Niles's assessment, Negro 
Rachel, a sixty-year-old black woman, asked the orphans' court in 1820 
to support her in her old age from the estate of a former master whose 
heirs had left Maryland and left Rachel to her own devices.98 
Relationships in which slaves gained autonomy by playing owner 
against hirer or by convincing owners to allow "living out" as an alter-
native to such manipulation, or yet again by going "at large" with the 
master's acquiescence, no doubt became familiar to urban whites em-
ploying slave labor, as instances in which white and black short-term 
interests could coincide. Rarer, but more threateningly, blacks and whites 
conspired to play on a hirer's interest to part him from his money. Job 
Garretson concluded his catalog of woes by insinuating that Hollis and 
Ben had set out from the beginning to dupe him. Garretson complained 
that Ben had run from a previous owner and that Hollis had employed 
Ben as a runaway and then purchased him for "some small sum of 
money in the situation of a runaway" from his then owner in Calvert 
County. Garretson claimed that Hollis was trying to repeat this coup 
when he offered to buy Ben back for half of what Garretson had paid 
for him. 
Nor was Garretson alone in his fears of potential cooperation be-
tween unscrupulous whites and runaways. Joshua Barney, seeking the 
return of Harry Harrison, a runaway shoemaker, advertised that he 
believed Harrison to be in the vicinity of Port Deposit, on the 
Susquehanna, and implied that the Woodland family of that locale had 
connived at Harrison's flight. Barney had bought Harrison only weeks 
before his run "on the recommendation of Major Woodland" and was 
now in receipt of an offer by the major's brother to "buy Harry Harrison 
running." Barney clearly intended to shame the Woodlands through 
his advertisement and perhaps to corroborate his suspicions.99 Similar 
aims probably motivated Richard Anson, a Virginian, to advertise in 
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the Baltimore American and Commercial Daily Advertiser for his run-
away Tom. Anson's ad unfolded a picaresque tale featuring Mistress 
Elizabeth Marks as the central character. According to Anson, Marks 
had sought out Anson in order to hire out Tom, a sawyer, for a short 
stint of work. She and Tom had promptly disappeared, and Anson was 
forced to conclude that he had been cheated of his slave. Swathing his 
anger in public spirit, Anson advised Baltimoreans that Marks was 
rumored to have sailed from Norfolk to Baltimore, where he expected 
that she would switch roles, offering to hire Tom out as a preliminary 
to yet another disappearance. 100 
Machinations on this order of duplicity appeared infrequently in 
newspapers and court records; Marks, Hollis, and the Woodlands, even 
if guilty of conspiring with slaves to defraud "honorable" masters, be-
haved most abnormally. But for a slaveholder, especially a small to 
middling artisan, for whom purchasing or hiring a black laborer meant 
risking much if not all of his liquid capital, even marginal threats to the 
profitability of slaveholding might loom large. To such men and women 
the attractions of slave buying or hiring may have been significantly 
tempered by the dangers of fraud stemming from the very flexibility in 
labor control that made such arrangements appealing. Finally, precau-
tions taken to control slaves and free blacks could be turned to advan-
tage by African Americans. Passes, permits to go at large or to hire 
one's time, apprentice discharges, freedom papers, and sailors' protec-
tions could be and were forged, sold, and stolen to facilitate free move-
ment and employment. 
Slaveholders' efforts to make servitude more secure by palliating 
strains on the master-slave relationship through concessions of autonomy 
temporarily succeeded in blunting slaves' northward flights. But the 
accompanying growth in Baltimore's free black population called into 
being a graver threat to the slave owner: the ability of slaves to flee and 
be sheltered within the city itself. For masters a prime attraction of 
gradually manumitting slaves had lain in its reducing the risk, uncer-
tainty, and contentiousness associated with slaveholding. As slaves 
learned to seize the opportunities associated with gradual manumis-
sion to advance their own interests more swiftly and certainly, masters 
found holding slaves an increasingly uncertain proposition, in terms 
both of maintaining control and ensuring return on their investments. 
They drifted to a safer, though often less convenient course: they hired 
free workers, drawn in no small measure from the ranks of recently 
freed slaves. The story turns now to a closer examination of how Afri-
can Americans and their families became free via manumission. 
4 
MANUMISSION AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF SLAVERY 
·Manumission in many societies 
coexisted with perpetual bondage, frequently in the shape of self-
purchase by slave artisans and sometimes monitored through recognition 
of the slave's legal personality as a contracting party.1 But manumis-
sion played a comparatively minor role in North American slavery, 
with debatable exceptions in the mid-Atlantic region; historians of sla-
very there have portrayed manumitters as individuals of conscience or 
economic maximizers, or both at the same time, seeking profitable ex-
its from a locally declining labor institution.2 This contrast was first 
noted by Frank Tannenbaum, who cited slaves' greater access to free-
dom in Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking America as a factor distin-
guishing those systems of slavery from that which prevailed in British 
America. Tannenbaum targeted differences in religion and in the Euro-
pean history of slavery of each society to explain the differences. 3 
Although early national Maryland hardly fit the cultural mold 
Tannenbaum described for Brazil or Latin America, the state did de-
velop a large population of free people of color and did have many 
manumitters who did not abandon slaveholding. Masters instead em-
ployed offers of delayed manumission in the ongoing management of 
slave workers, countered by slaves' attempts to negotiate the condi-
tions of servitude. Viewed thus, manumission became yet another arena 
in which masters and slaves contended, conspired, and sometimes co-
operated in shaping their respective worlds. This relatively rare North 
American juxtaposition of frequent manumission with continued reli-
ance on slave labor helped expand slavery in Baltimore until about 
1815 and stabilized it for a while longer. Only in the late antebellum 
years did manumission there operate solely as a slaveholder's exit from 
slavery. 
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Baltimore's declining position in foreign trade after 1815, coupled 
with the financial crunch of the Panic of 1819, disrupted the city's 
economy well into the 1820s and may have contributed significantly to 
the loss of its status as a magnet for slaves. While slave numbers dropped, 
free black population soared at a rate in excess of natural increase and 
manumissions combined. 4 Voluntary relocation of free persons of color 
to Baltimore thus replaced an earlier wave of involuntary migration by 
slaves. 
By 1830 the extensive in-migration of both free blacks and subse-
quently manumitted slaves created the paradox of an essentially free 
labor city largely surrounded by a slave labor region. Though Balti-
more merchants, craftsmen, and entrepreneurs could still buy or hire 
slaves from planters seeking to trim the ranks of their bound workers, 
they all but ceased to do so. So long as slaves had formed the dominant 
element in the influx of black workers, masters could develop and 
manipulate delayed manumission to maintain control of their chattels 
in an urban setting. But the very dynamism of Baltimore's growth, es-
pecially as compared to the torpor of the surrounding slave labor econo-
mies, upset this balance. 
As free blacks came to outnumber slaves in the city, lifelong sla-
very tempered by occasional manumission evolved toward a system of 
slavery as a stage of life, ended by testamentary manumission, self-
purchase, or flight. In this regard, delayed manumission, whatever its 
short-term utility for securing reliable labor, served to increase the at-
tractiveness of Baltimore for would-be black migrants. The presence of 
mounting numbers of blacks, in turn, eventually increased the level of 
pressure on lifelong slavery as a system and accelerated its marginal-
ization in the city. 
To a degree, we can say that slavery's sickness in Baltimore was 
contracted in the countryside. Relatively low rates of manumission in 
most of Maryland's rural counties sufficed to keep slavery viable there; 
but as Baltimore became the prime destination for the exodus of free 
blacks from everywhere else in the state, slavery in the city became all 
but unsustainable, despite its previous compatibility with relatively high 
rates of manumission. 5 Marylanders manumitted thousands of slaves 
by individual voluntary acts recorded in deeds or wills. Here, Maryland's 
path diverged from that of neighboring states. The northern states ended 
slavery through legislative or judicial action, typically through the de-
layed emancipation of all slave children born after a fixed date. Some 
southern states liberalized private manumission laws in the 1780s or 
1790s but then clamped down on the practice in the early 1800s, to 
contain increases in the number of free blacks. 6 In Maryland, despite 
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repeated efforts to limit private manumissions, the practice remained 
legal and popular, although not equally so throughout the state. 
Maryland's manumitters granted freedom to men and women in 
virtually equal numbers from the 1770s through the 1820s, contrary to 
the general tendency in Atlantic slave societies for about two-thirds of 
those liberated to be women. 7 This pattern fits neither with the as-
sumption that slavery's unprofitability led masters to sell black men to 
the Southwest, while more frequently retaining or manumitting less 
valuable women, nor with the supposition that women were more of-
ten freed as a consequence of sexual liaisons with masters. Given the 
skew elsewhere to manumitting women, the Maryland ratio provides 
strong inferential evidence that slaves there, not just masters, were help-
ing to determine who gained freedom. 
The attempt to determine what motivated masters to manumit their 
slaves has led researchers to consider also whether persons of mixed 
racial descent were more likely to become free. In Maryland this ap-
proach yields similarly negative evidence, which may also suggest that 
white motivations did not alone decide who was manumitted. Left to 
their own devices, masters might have preferred to free slaves of mixed 
race, either to liberate their own children by slave mothers or in the 
belief that mulatto or "yellow" persons would be more intelligent and 
thus better fitted to be free than "Negroes" or "blacks." Even a master 
with no intentions of freeing slaves might have been more likely to 
select someone of mixed race for craft training, thus giving that slave a 
better opportunity to work or buy himself free. 8 
In fact, little in the public record suggests that free people of color 
or prospectively manumitted slaves in Maryland were disproportion-
ately of mixed race. Manumissions generally did not provide a physical 
description of the slave being freed, nor did masters acknowledge kin 
ties. Where it is possible to compare the color labels applied to slaves 
with those of free people of color, the proportions of each group de-
scribed as mulatto or yellow are about the same.9 Although Maryland 
law offered slaves the hope of freeing themselves by proving descent 
from a free woman, typically a white indentured servant, only a few 
hundred freed men and women, a tiny fragment of those liberated, 
could thus capitalize on their mixed-race ancestry, and they did so over 
the objections of their masters. Working with this admittedly sketchy 
evidence, it would appear that Maryland whites did not see mixed-race 
appearance as a key factor inclining them toward freeing a slave. Or if 
they did, such leanings failed to influence overall patterns of manumis-
sion, suggesting that the desires and actions of slaves, independent of 
coloration, were critical in shaping who became free. 
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Whoever was being liberated, the deeds that did so timed the be-
stowal of freedom with considerable diversity. Masters could eman-
cipate a slave "from this day forward," but often they established a 
future date on which freedom would occur. In rural counties about 
two-thirds of deeded manumissions had delayed effect. 10 In Baltimore 
the tendency to grant delayed freedom decreased during the post-1815 
decline of slavery. Before 1815 half of Baltimore manumissions were 
conditioned on a further term of service; after 1815 that proportion 
fell to a third. 11 By looking at individual manumissions, changes in law 
and court precedent touching manumission, and discussions of the sub-
ject in the press, we can discern the motivations of masters and slaves 
that informed these patterns. 
A master considering manumission might be moved by benevo-
lence, egalitarian principles, fear for his soul, desire for gain, or all of 
the above. Some deeds state a belief that slavery is against God's will or 
inconsistent with the principles of American society. But such unequivo-
cal statements are generally quite rare, even in manumissions of the 
1780s and early 1790s, and become virtually nonexistent in nineteenth-
century deeds. 12 
Of course, failure to record humanitarian sentiments does not prove 
their absence. It was easy for manumitters to leave their motives unre-
corded because court clerks, attorneys, and conveyancers who drew up 
legal documents had quickly developed a formulaic code for 
manumissions that satisfied the law's requirements but said little else. 
As early as 1789 Baltimore printers sold forms for manumission that 
provided all the boilerplate to give the deed legal effect, with blank 
spaces left for the name, the age, and the date of freedom.l 3 The state-
ment of intent, with slight variations, indicated that "diverse good causes 
and considerations" had caused the manumitter to act. 
Baltimore's notable Quaker and Methodist presence invites further 
investigation into the role of faith and benevolence in manumission 
practices in the city. But matching manumitters' names with congrega-
tion membership lists reveals that less than one-tenth of Baltimore 
manumissions could be identified as having been granted by masters 
identified with either discipline. 14 
The Friends in Maryland had largely divorced themselves from sla-
very before Baltimore's post-Revolutionary expansion. The Baltimore 
Yearly Meeting had agreed as early as 1768 to disown members who 
bought and sold slaves and was considering disowning slaveholders by 
1773. By 1778 the practice of hiring slaves was being discouraged, and 
slaveholders were barred from conducting any church affairs. Balti-
more Quakers regarded themselves as largely free of the toils of slavery 
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by the 1790s and were turning their attention outward, to petitioning 
the Maryland General Assembly and the U.S. Congress for laws to 
restrain the slave trade. 15 
Baltimore's Quakers ultimately succeeded in distancing themselves 
from slavery, but Methodism's encounter with the institution yielded 
far less clear-cut results. As early as the 1780s, the Methodist church in 
America had denounced slaveholding in all forms among its itinerant 
preachers and was moving to ban both slave dealing and the holding of 
slaves for life among its lay members. But hostility to these measures in 
Virginia and the Carolinas began a long retreat on the issue, culminat-
ing in an uneasy "local option" approach that allowed regional confer-
ences to determine church discipline on slaveholding.16 
The Baltimore conference long adhered to the policy that Method-
ist elders and preachers should not own slaves for life and should manu-
mit those acquired by marriage or inheritance, after terms of service 
approved by the elders, under penalty of expulsionY But compliance 
was far from perfect. Methodists initially had few slaveholders in their 
ranks; as church members amassed wealth, however, their tendency to 
hold slaves increased: the 1820 census showed 145 Methodist 
slaveholders in the city, a number more than double that of 1810 and 
in excess of the documented manumissions of slaves by Methodists for 
the entire preceding thirty-year period.18 Whatever their degree of faith-
fulness to church dictates, manumission by Methodists accounts for 
about 140 of the more than 2,000 manumissions by deed that survive 
from early-nineteenth-century Baltimore.19 
Both Methodists and Quakers may have slowed the growth of sla-
very in Baltimore, to the extent that church members with the means to 
do so bought slaves less often than similarly situated individuals out-
side those sects. Certainly some noteworthy examples of the exclusion 
of slave labor can be attributed to such influences, as in the construc-
tion of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad or among the laborers in the 
mills and foundries owned by a prominent Quaker family, the Ellicotts.20 
But neither Quakers nor Methodists were responsible for the large and 
continuing volume of manumissions in the city. 
The most common explanation offered by manumitters, appearing 
in about one-quarter of the deeds, was the "further consideration" stirred 
by receipt of a sum of money "paid to me in my hand this day," rang-
ing from a token dollar to as much as five hundred dollars. Denwood 
Jones, in his 1821 manumission of "my negro man Kit" justified his 
action "in consideration of the love and affection I have for [him] from 
his good behavior, as well as the sum of one hundred dollars. "21 Only 
a handful of the hundreds of manumissions specifying payment identify 
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the source of the cash; in these cases "manumission" almost invariably 
featured the purchasing a husband, a wife, a son, a daughter, a mother, 
or a brother by free black kin. The vast majority of payments have no 
attribution; in all likelihood these represented slaves buying their own 
freedom. 
Buying and selling of freedom occurred commonly enough to war-
rant legal recognition, even during Maryland's attempts to restrict manu-
mission in the aftermath of Nat Turner's Rebellion. In 1832, when the 
legislature sought to limit future manumissions by requiring the newly 
freed to leave the state, it nonetheless stipulated that "if any slave or 
any person, for or in behalf of such slave, shall, previously to the pas-
sage of [this] act have entered into an agreement ... for the purchase ... 
of the freedom of the said slave, ... and there shall have been paid or 
performed all or any portion of the stipulated price or consideration 
for such freedom," then that person could remain in Maryland.22 Since 
Maryland law did not otherwise acknowledge a slave's legal personal-
ity in manumissions, most were in law deeds of gift and not contracts.23 
However, the master manumitting prospectively could not revoke his 
or her action without challenge once the deed was filed with the county 
court; a slave thus denied liberty could file a petition of freedom. 
But the slave could not formally participate in establishing the terms 
of manumission or insist on their being recorded. This explains why a 
transaction as critically important to slaves as manumission, which might 
be expected to occur in many different modes and terms, takes on such 
a bland and uniform aspect in the deeds actually filed: masters were 
required only to identify the slave being freed, testify to his or her abil-
ity to earn a living, set the date of freedom, and have the deed signed by 
two witnesses.24 
Nevertheless, we can occasionally glimpse a hint, a shadowy out-
line, of negotiations between master and slave preceding manumission 
and occasionally continuing during and after the filing of a deed. We 
have already seen that manumissions could be acts of self-purchase; 
some of the deeds speak to the question of how slaves amassed the 
sums needed to buy freedom. In 1820 Dianna Howard, a free black 
woman, manumitted Augustus Howard, "whom I purchased from 
William Brown" as well as Samuel and Emanuel Howard, "purchased" 
from John Chauncey of Harford County. The ages of the freedmen 
make it quite likely that Dianna Howard had freed her husband and 
two sons, possibly purchasing them with sums earned by the entire 
family.25 Deeds of this sort, often found with the bills of sale from the 
white master to the black kinfolk, compose the most common varia-
tion on unadorned self-purchase. 
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White philanthropy also came into play on occasion. Isaac Tyson, 
a wealthy Quaker who owned merchant flour mills on the Jones Falls 
in Baltimore, manumitted James Davis in 1817, noting that he had 
purchased Davis eight months earlier, in August 1816, "of a certain 
John Williamson of South Carolina." Williamson in turn had just ac-
quired Davis from Peter Carnes of Baltimore. Tyson stepped in to pre-
vent Davis's separation from his family, "fully believing he will be able 
so to refund the money paid for him," some $412. It is worthy of note 
that Tyson did expect to be repaid and did hold Davis as a slave some 
months before freeing him, perhaps to ensure himself that Davis pos-
sessed the industry and self-discipline necessary to pay back his pur-
chase price. Tyson appears not to have insisted on security for the funds 
advanced on Davis's behalf.26 
Other freed men and women, who faced more demanding lenders, 
often had no security to offer but the promise of their labor power. In 
1813 Negro Cato Mink indentured himself for a year, in return for 
maintenance plus thirty dollars. Mink, a former slave, may have thus 
made up a part of his purchase price. Edward and Elizabeth Brown 
were obliged to take a far bigger risk when, in 1819, they mortgaged 
"all the right, title, Interest and claim ... to their freedom" to James 
Blair as security for a one-year loan of four hundred dollars. If they 
defaulted, they would regain their freedom only if "they serve[ d) faith-
fully for 5 years." No mortgage release was filed in 1820 when the 
debt fell due, so the Browns probably slipped back into slavery, at least 
for five years, possibly forever. 27 
The Browns may have gained their freedom and subsequently ac-
quired the debt that dragged them down; in other cases bondmen who 
could not pay their full purchase price bought freedom on the install-
ment plan. William Carroll's master agreed to manumit him "when 
and so soon as [he] pays ... five hundred dollars and not sooner, pro-
vided that not less than eighty dollars is paid in any one year and the 
whole sum is paid within five years." If Carroll could not keep to the 
payment schedule, he would stand to lose all that he paid in the in-
terim, and his freedom would be foreclosed on. 28 Thomas Perry ar-
ranged to buy his freedom from Michael Lucas for two $120 payments 
and then borrowed money, presumably to prevent default on his obli-
gation. Lucas moved ahead with the agreement on January 2, 1801, 
noting that he had received $60 from Mr. Henry Rhodes "for the use of 
Thomas Perry," this being the residue of the first payment still due 
Lucas.29 
Manumission deeds that say nothing of money can also uncover 
some of the give and take that informed the institution. Numerous 
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deeds offered freedom after a term of years, "provided that the said 
negroes shall serve faithful and in all things remain faithful and obedi-
ent servants until" the freedom date. 30 Manumitting masters could thus 
offer the reward of freedom but demand steady work and no running 
off in exchange. 
Slaves could seek to reduce the amount of uncompensated labor 
they rendered in other ways too, though. Edward Wrotten specified 
that his slave David would be freed in six years, provided that "all sick 
time from this time forward be made up at the end of the six years 
before he is absolute free." 31 Wrotten may simply have been unusually 
meticulous in protecting himself from reduced worker output once he 
promised to free David; nonetheless, by insisting on full makeup of 
illness he virtually ensured more labor from David in the next six years 
than he would otherwise have obtained. Wrotten thus mixed the posi-
tive incentive of eventual freedom with the threat of delaying that free-
dom if David "malingered"; Wrotten, needless to say, would be the one 
to determine whether or not David had measured up. 
Other manumitters also manipulated freedom dates, but they re-
lied more on the positive incentive of freedom granted sooner than 
promised. In 1808 former governor Richard Mackall drew up a deed 
of manumission promising eventual freedom to some thirty-two slaves. 
Diverging from a common pattern in multiple manumissions, Mackall 
set no uniform age of freedom, such as freeing all males at twenty-eight 
or all females at twenty-five. Mackall freed two slaves who were over 
forty immediately and set up terms ranging from eighteen months to 
twenty-one years for the others, with anticipated ages at freedom vary-
ing from twenty-two to forty-two. But Mackall later shortened the terms 
of several slaves, on individual bases. Mackall may have filed the origi-
nal document, with its generally long terms, as a benchmark, hoping to 
spur his workers to greater efforts in return for freedom more speedily 
obtained, either by an agreed commutation of the term or by self-
purchase of their remaining time. 32 
Linkages between slaves' behavior during their term of years and a 
potential speedup of emancipation could be quite explicit: Edward 
Griffith promised Jack and seven other adolescent slaves freedom at 
the age of thirty but allowed in the manumission deed that, "provided 
that the said negroes shall serve faithful and ... remain ... obedient 
servants until they come to the age of 25 years I do hereby agree and 
determine that they shall be free at the age of 25 years." Griffith's 
straightforward language vividly illustrates what many more circum-
spect manumission deeds no doubt concealed. As master, he "deter-
mined" when Jack and the others would become free, but only after 
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having "agreed," presumably with the young slaves or their parents, 
on a potential early release date. An 1823 manumission revealed an-
other negotiation: Job's master, James Chaplain, promised to free him 
on January 1, 1837, "provided ... that if the said boy Job ... or any 
other person ... shall petition any legal authority for his freedom then 
this deed of manumission shall be null and void ... and Job ... shall 
remain a slave for life." It does not seem unreasonable to regard Job's 
eventual manumission as an out-of-court settlement of a claim in law 
to his freedom. 33 
Regardless of the slaveholder's rationale, gradual manumission had 
an obvious potential for extending slavery across generations in the 
name of compensatory service rendered to manumitters or creditors, 
or both, of free blacks. Immediate grants of freedom, however, appear 
to have been no less strongly motivated by the same desire. A survey of 
manumission deeds filed in the Baltimore County Court reveals that 
men and women manumitted with immediate effect tended to be older 
at the moment of freedom than counterparts liberated after a further 
term of service. A majority of women manumitted immediately were 
over thirty, an age reached by only two-fifths of female gradual 
manumittees. Nearly two-thirds of the men manumitted immediately 
were over thirty, as compared to about half of the men granted delayed 
manumissions. In fact, the modal age for immediately freed blacks of 
both sexes was forty, suggesting that a good many manumitters ex-
tracted virtually all the labor they could before releasing their slaves.34 
Female slaves thus manumitted typically already had borne children, 
who were already slaves, and masters and freed people could and did 
go through the same permutations of granting, denying, and buying 
freedom as surfaced in gradual manumission. Masters granting "im-
mediate" manumissions were thus, as a group, no less moved by self-
interest and no more influenced by humanitarian or egalitarian motives 
than their gradualist counterparts. 
In fact, masters who formally granted delayed manumission actu-
ally conceded some control over their chattels' lives during their term 
of service: a master could not legally revoke a prospective gradual manu-
mission for which a deed had been filed at the county courthouse, nor, 
after 1817, could a term slave be sold out of state. 35 The master who 
confined freedom overtures to oral promises could renege on those of-
fers more readily. Of course, the passage of a law barring out-of-
state sales of term slaves suggests the existence of a practice that could 
negate a prospective manumission by removing the slave from access 
to Maryland's courts via a freedom petition, in the event of the mas-
ter's refusal to liberate the slave at the expiration of his or her term. 36 
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Nonetheless, the prospective freedman whose master attempted to back-
track on a written promise of liberty had legal recourse, and as judged 
by the law of 1817, he had some measure of public sympathy to draw on. 
It may not be coincidental that a higher proportion of manumission 
deeds granted freedom immediately in the 1820s than in earlier decades. 
Given the strictures of the 1817law, an 1820s master seeking to wheedle 
more work or cash from a slave or his kin in return for eventual manu-
mission was well advised to keep his promises unwritten, to eventually 
grant immediate liberty, as it were. Had such a master reflected on the 
growth of the domestic slave trade to the southwest during the same 
time period, he or she might have been tempted to retain the financial 
option-and threat to the slave-of sale to Georgia or Louisiana, by 
filing no manumission deed until the actual day of emancipation. 
The slave whose master made no written promises was much more 
vulnerable to the loss of prospective freedom through changes in the 
master's outlook, or for that matter, a change of masters through sale, 
death, or gift. For slaves so situated, attempts to gain freedom through 
manumission may well have involved a ceaseless round of pleas, bar-
gains, negotiations, and reconsiderations with a master who could not 
be bound to his or her word. Many "immediate" manumissions must 
have been the outcome of lengthy and contested interactions between 
master and slave. 
Further evidence for this view may be derived from examining the 
age distributions of slaves freed by immediate manumission. Despite 
the existence of an eighteenth-century statutory "model" age of thirty-one 
at which to manumit slaves, masters in fact chose every conceivable 
age up to the legal limit of forty-five, as we might expect of decisions 
governed more by personal interaction than resort to customary proce-
duresY There was no particular age that defined the moment of free-
dom for even as much as one-tenth of either male or female ex-slaves 
who were manumitted immediately; no five-year age grouping cap-
tured more than two-fifths of such manumissions. 
Gradual manumitters were not necessarily more liberal in their 
promises than immediate ones: when Sarah Turnbull filed manumis-
sion deeds in 1804 for twenty slaves, each was to gain freedom on his 
or her forty-fifth birthday. Turnbull also stipulated that any children 
born to the women or girls while serving their terms would serve as 
slaves until their forty-fifth birthdays, thus guaranteeing that Turnbull 
and her heirs would have slave labor at their disposal for as much as 
eighty years into the future. 38 In fact, an unusually determined master 
could successfully evade the age limit on manumissions, as Charles 
Goldsborough demonstrated by manumitting Benjamin Jackson, age 
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44, "upon condition that [he] shall immediately after the execution of 
the deed of manumission except from me a bill of sale for his mother, 
an aged negro woman named Hannah, and shall ... support his said 
mother during her life. " 39 But as noted above, most manumissions oc-
curred only after the slave had labored five to twenty years as an adult. 
However manumission was granted, the basic unit of exchange in 
bargaining over freedom was the black worker's labor or, more speci-
fically, the promise of more work, more production, and fewer inter-
ruptions to work than could be compelled from a slave for life. The 
starting point for a delayed manumission might thus have been aver-
bal agreement to allow a slave to purchase freedom for himself or her-
self or a family member with labor, or cash equaling a putative sale 
price, or a combination of the two. Both in shaping such an agreement 
and in bringing it to fruition, the competing interests of slaveholders 
and the would-be freed persons might be subject to further negotiation 
or manipulation at every stage of the process. 
Masters discussing delayed manumission with a slave might, for 
example, seek to maintain maximum control by keeping the promise 
of eventual manumission informal. In that way a master could ensure 
flexibility regarding the length of a slave's term of service or price of 
self-purchase. Slaves benefited most from a clearly worded commit-
ment to freedom, recorded at the county court house, which was le-
gally binding on the master or his heirs or assignees. Accordingly, the 
act of recording the promise of freedom could itself become a bone of 
contention. 
Problems surrounding the formalizing of manumission deeds im-
ply that "immediate" acts were not impulsive gestures by humanitar-
ian masters but rather represented a slave's final satisfaction of the 
master's long-spun-out demands. Occasionally, a manumitter testified 
directly to this point. Henry Darden's grant of immediate freedom to 
Benjamin took effect when Darden and two co-owners pronounced 
themselves "fully satisfied by his faithful services and monies paid"; 
they had "purchased [him] for a valuable consideration with a promise 
he should be free on his good behaviour by a limited time. "40 
Should a master be induced to put the promise of eventual manu-
mission in writing, he or she could still seek to retain room to maneu-
ver by delaying the recording of the deed at the county courthouse. A 
good many masters yielded to the temptation to thus deprive their 
slaves-at least for a time-of the right to petition against them, in 
case they defaulted on their promise of freedom. As early as 1796, the 
state legislature felt compelled to regulate the recording of manumissions 
by means of a statute requiring their registration within six months of 
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being signed and witnessed. The frequency with which the six-month 
rule was violated, as evidenced by the reregistration of "defective" 
manumissions, not to mention the large number of deeds registered in 
the sixth month after their creation, suggests that many masters may 
have sought to extract more from their term slaves by deferring deed 
registration as long as possible.41 
What did masters hope to gain from such a strategy? If masters 
saw delayed manumission as an incentive for their slaves to give steady 
and productive labor, an incentive so valuable as to make eventual 
manumission an economically desirable outcome, why would they un-
dermine this incentive by introducing elements of uncertainty over 
making good on their promises of freedom? Slaveholders perhaps be-
haved inconsistently or erratically because they harbored doubts about 
the path on which they had embarked and wanted tangible evidence of 
"good behaviour" or "faithful service" from a term slave before mak-
ing an irrevocable commitment to liberation. Thus, when William 
Browne manumitted Phill in 1800, he specified a seven-year term of 
service to be backdated from January of 1797. Browne was honoring 
his original bargain with Phill, but only after Phill had performed nearly 
half of the agreed-upon service.42 
In another revealing case, Joseph Blackiston, manumitting Negro 
John in 1805 with immediate effect, noted that he had sold John in 
1797 to Thomas Granger for a term of seven years, with an expiration 
date of December 25, 1804, "at which time I was a going to manumit 
the said negro man, but Thomas Granger requested me not to [do so], 
for fear he should know he was to be free at the end of seven years and 
cause him to behave amiss." Blackiston deferred to Granger and re-
frained from filing a manumission deed, but he did tell John of his 
intentions, inasmuch as "the term has expired and Uohn] has since 
complained to me that Thomas Granger will not let him go from him." 
Significantly, Granger had himself granted delayed manumission to eight 
of his slaves in the 1780s and 1790s but had become disenchanted with 
the device. His attitude was revealed not only by his objection to John's 
knowing he was to be free, but also by his two subsequent manumissions, 
in 1814, which were "immediate."43 
What could be done to thwart such delaying tactics or to deal with 
slaveholders who-even worse-disavowed verbal commitments and 
refused, like Granger, to let their slaves go at the end of their terms? 
The greatest security could be gained by purchasing freedom in a cash 
transaction, thus avoiding prolonged negotiation while still in slavery, 
but the costs of immediate self-purchase could be prohibitive. Adult 
male slaves for life typically sold for $300 to $350 in late-eighteenth-
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or early-nineteenth-century Maryland, a sum equal to fifteen or sixteen 
months' wages for day laborers in Baltimore; in the rural areas it would 
take even longer to earn such a sum. Nevertheless, hundreds of manu-
mission deeds record substantial cash payments by slaves and free people 
of color, to free themselves or relatives. Where did the money come 
from? 
Dealing with this question means uncovering complex meanings 
behind the language of those deeds. Many manumission documents 
entailed both the sale of a slave to a purchaser identified as a spouse, a 
sibling, or a parent and the purchaser's immediate manumission of that 
slave. With a self-purchase the manumitter acknowledged the receipt 
of cash and then granted immediate freedom. But in fact, many such 
deeds effectively describe not a single transaction occurring at a discrete 
moment in time, but rather the completion of an installment pur-
chase that may have been negotiated three, five, or ten years previ-
ously. Blacks generally gained formal recognition of such agreements 
only when the final payment was made or when performance of the 
installment "contract" was interrupted either by the death of one of 
the parties or by the master's transfer of his or her interest in the would-
be self-purchaser. 
Struggles over manumission could extend beyond the master's life, 
as revealed in testamentary manumissions, crafted to avoid slave flight 
at a master's death. In Maryland most slaveholders held small numbers 
of chattels, at least compared to the large plantation standards of the 
deep South. In fact, in Baltimore four-fifths of the slaveholders had 
fewer than five slaves. In both rural and urban settings, slaves nonethe-
less typically comprised significant shares of a decedent's wealth. A 
master's death therefore frequently compelled the division of slaves into 
inheritance shares, as described by Frederick Douglass in his autobiog-
raphy, or the conversion of slaves into cash by sale to settle the estate.44 
The prospect of being sold soon after a master's decease caused 
some blacks to flee rather than to submit to a new and unknown mas-
ter. Anticipating such problems, many slaveholders in their wills prom-
ised eventual manumission. They hoped that would induce their slaves 
to continue to give them reliable service and later provide years of in-
come-generating labor for their heirs. As a form of endowment for the 
support of minor children, slaves represented a potentially high-yield, 
middle-term investment. An adult man, worth perhaps three to four 
hundred dollars at sale, might readily generate sixty dollars of income 
each year, clear of expenses, if hired out.45 A property earning 12 to 20 
percent of its value in yearly income was not to be spurned; by com-
parison, city lots usually rented at 6 percent of their presumed value. 
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50 Dollars Reward.· 
-<:><::,>o<::><:>-
ABSCQND£0 from on board the Sloop Jo!ltflvliller in llaht· 
more, _on the 28th 111~1. a Negro> Man, n~mcd iACK, ;ometimcs 
calls h1mself hcK_ALEXANDEn; 'lout :3 ft"et !! o:· 9 inches hi<>h 
no~ very black, Wtth a small sc21· on his forehead, round face ~1,j 
talks fast when first spoken to ; he is a very active and a "ood 
coun~en~ncer_l fellow. It is supposed he will obtain a pass as a"' feet: 
man . 1115 object IS to go to sea, a 'ld Will be trying to ship on board 
~ome ve~sel bound our. He hat.. on and took with him a brown 
Jacket w1t~1 pearl buttons, and waistcoat of the same; his trowsers 
coar~ wh1~e country cloth, with a variety of other clothes that he ~~s wnh htm.. ~hoever takes 1..p and secures said Ne ro in any 
Jail, _shall rece1ve, 1f take~ in the city, 20 dollars; if 30 ~iles from 
Baltimore, 30 dollars ; if 40 miles, 40 dollars ; and if out of the 
state, the above rew~trd, and all reasonable charges, ifbrou• ht home 
~ "' 
Ananias Divers 
' Near w~r. PATTERSON, Esq'rs. Mills, Cunpowder Falls. 
MARCH 30th, 1810. 
N. B; . All Maa~era o/ 'llesse/s and others are forewarned !tarbor-
mg or taAJng ojf amd Negro, at t!teir peril. 
-=·<><>--
BALTI~XORE-Printed by W. PECIIIN, Office of the America11• 
Runaway slaves such as Jack Alexander often sought to pass as free men 
to obtain employment. Masters offered sliding scale rewards keyed to the 
fugitive's distance from Baltimore when captured. Advertisement of 
Ananias Divers, 1810. From the broadside collection of the Maryland 
Historical Society 
Most mortgages and commercial loans were also pegged at 6 percent 
interest.46 Of course, land might appreciate in value, whereas a slave's 
aging would eventually lower both income-producing capacity andre-
sale value. Nevertheless, leaving slaves in trust to one's children might 
well generate a high yield of income over spans of ten to fifteen or even 
twenty years. 
Children's guardians filed numerous accounts with the orphans' 
court detailing earnings accrued to an estate by hired-out slaves. Thus 
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Ranaway on Saturday the t7th inst. a coloured 
woman by tbe name of 
Who was formerly the property of Arthur Rill, near 
Reisterstown;-the said Easter is ratb.-r between a 
mulatto and J»lack, s~•!!t chunky, with thic~ lips and 
somewhat freckled in.ber face; slie is a hoot !! .ft!'itrl!l 
of 11ge; she bad on a light calico frot·k when she went 
awa,r, and a cloth over coat, olive colour. She has 
some rt•lations Jiving in Baltimore at Fell's· Point, 
where she is expected to be lurking at this time. If 
she is take-n in Baltimore Count.r and secured so that 
I get her again I will give ~.1 dollars, and if out of 
the State 50 dollan. · 
I.&COB 'WOOLIDI.'Y', 
INc, It, 1815. 
Baltimore became the destination of many runaway slaves seeking 
help from kin in eluding pursuit. Advertisement of Jacob Woolery, 
1825. From the broadside collection of the Maryland Historical 
Society 
107 
John Wooden managed the estate of Joseph Bowen for his three chil-
dren, Rebecca, Pitt, and Wilkes. The principal income of the estate 
derived from the hire of Lee, Allen, Milly, and Betty, who together 
brought in around $250 a year. Edward Pannell, administering his 
brother John's estate from 1801 to 1810, hired out a skilled shipwright, 
Peoly, for as much as $242 a year to shipbuilders James Biays and 
Dixon Brown.47 
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Promises of eventual manumission were included in Lewis 
DeRochebrune's will, presumably as a way of averting slave flight and 
the resulting loss to the estate. DeRochebrune, a shipbuilder and the 
owner of seven adult male slaves at his death in 1802, manumitted 
each man but staggered their freedom dates at intervals of from three 
to fifteen years. He named fellow shipwright William Price as one of 
his executors, and Price hired out all seven men. All of this suggests 
strongly that DeRochebrune was attempting to provide a long-term 
flow of cash support for his heirs; he may have spaced the manumis-
sion dates with this in mind.48 
Caleb Hewitt, a tobacco manufacturer, left slaves in trust to his 
daughter, Mary, in his 1805 will and promised manumission to two of 
them, Saul and Charles. The two men apparently obtained their free-
dom in 1811 or 1812, when Francis Hopkinson, Mary's guardian, noted 
in his annual account to the court a revaluation of the estate "due to 
slaves who have become free." 49 In a third case, James Piper, rope maker 
and merchant, directed in his will, "All my indented apprentices, male 
servants and male slaves shall be continued in the rope walk for the 
remainder of their time of servitude after my decease, ... that the 
profits arising from their services shall be received by my Executors to 
the use of all my children." Piper, a Methodist who took seriously the 
church discipline's ban on holding slaves for life, had previously granted 
deeds of delayed manumission to his slaves, and having placed them on 
a par with his other bound laborers, expected all to serve out their time 
for the benefit of his heirs. 50 
The wills of craftsmen/manufacturers DeRochebrune, Hewitt, and 
Piper and the accounts filed by their heirs' guardians reveal that slaves' 
craft skills could continue to generate profits even after their master's 
death. Foresighted masters could thus use offers of gradual manumission 
quite successfully to conserve wealth and income for their posterity. 
In comparing manumission by deed with manumission by will, it 
is noteworthy that slaves freed by will were significantly more likely to 
be compelled to endure a further term of service than those manumit-
ted by deed: less than one-fifth of testamentary manumissions were 
immediate, versus nearly three-fifths of deeds granting freedom. 51 A 
promise of delayed manumission by deed registered the master's offer 
of future freedom; slaves with such deeds in hand had wrung a more 
secure prospect of emancipation from their masters than those work-
ing without guarantees toward an eventual "immediate" manumission. 
In contrast, a master promising freedom directly after his or her death 
was indeed emancipating a slave more quickly than one delaying that 
event until after a further period of service to an heir. The relative dis-
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inclination of testators to free slaves immediately fits with the view of 
manumission as the product of a contested negotiation between master 
and slave. In deeded manumission, which most likely signified either 
the execution of a self-purchase agreement or the master's formal rec-
ognition of service rendered following an initially unwritten or unre-
corded promise of eventual freedom, "immediate" emancipations were 
common. Where the master acted more unilaterally, as a testator, and 
immediate manumission entailed an unrecompensed sacrifice of prop-
erty, delayed manumissions were the rule. 
It might also be noted that in the city of Baltimore manumissions 
by will were a smaller proportion of all grants of freedom than they 
were in the rural counties of Prince George's and Dorchester. 52 In rural 
areas, where threatened flight or the ability to purchase freedom were 
perhaps less viable options, weakening slaves' ability to negotiate for 
freedom, masters who did manumit were more likely to hold on to 
slaves until death and less likely to concede freedom by a deed in their 
own lifetime. In one respect manumitters by deed and by will acted 
similarly. Very few of them cited religious sentiments or beliefs in lib-
erty as justification for freeing a slave; most testators simply identified 
the name, age, and freedom date of the prospective freed person and 
moved on to the next bequest. 
In sum, manumissions appearing in the wills of Baltimoreans provide 
surprisingly little support for the view of testamentary manumission as 
a convenient marriage of self-interested exploitation of slaves during 
life with benevolence after death. Rather, they suggest that slaveholders 
sought to extract continued profit from their chattels even after death, 
for the benefit of their heirs, and that such manumissions may well 
have been motivated in large part, like deeded manumissions, by the 
desire to forestall flight and secure further uninterrupted service. 53 
Although negotiated manumission might flow from a wide variety of 
situations, its appeal as a strategy for securing bound labor was un-
questionably greatest among small slaveholders, for whom the resis-
tance or flight of individual slaves posed a greater proportional threat 
to economic well-being. In Baltimore holders of three or fewer slaves 
were much more likely to engage in manumission than masters who 
held seven or more slaves. The latter group comprised 277 households 
listed one or more times in one of the first four federal censuses of the 
town or city of Baltimore. The ownership of seven slaves would have 
placed a rural slaveholder at or just below the mean holding for a 
Maryland master, but a Baltimorean so circumstanced had more slaves 
than all but 5 percent of city slaveholders. These "large" slaveholders 
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of the early nineteenth century manumitted their chattels at the rate of 
only three slaves per thousand per year, barely a third of the overall 
rate for city slaveholders. 54 
This disparity makes good sense if we regard negotiating delayed 
manumission or self-purchase as a form of insurance against slave flight 
or death. Risks of loss were hedged, but chances for maximum exploi-
tation of a slave's labor were compromised. Such strategies appealed 
less to holders of many slaves, who could better afford to "self-insure" 
by hiring slave catchers to retrieve fugitives, and more to small 
slaveholders, to whom the successful defection of even one slave might 
spell financial disaster. 
The distinction between large and small slaveholder propensity to 
manumit also helps to account for the disproportionately large number 
of manumissions granted by women: roughly one-tenth of Baltimore's 
slaveholders were women; they held a corresponding share of the city's 
slaves, but they liberated between 20 and 25 percent of all persons 
manumitted. 55 Such behavior might reflect a higher level of discontent 
with slavery on the part of women than men. But in addition women 
slaveholders were much less wealthy than men and thus more reliant 
on their slaves for the production of income; women were therefore 
prime candidates for the risk-avoidance tactics of gradual manumis-
sion, regardless of their views on slavery's propriety. Slaves made up 35 
percent of the wealth of the female slaveholder of median wealth ver-
sus 24 percent for her male counterpart. 56 The average male slaveholder 
had assessed property valued at over $1,400, slightly more than twice 
the average for women on the tax rolls. 57 Thus, although women slave-
holders typically owned the same number of slaves as men, they had far 
less other wealth, and like men with small holdings, they may have been 
inclined to trade eventual freedom for secure income in the interim. 
Those few women who did fit the definition of "large slaveholder" 
were, like men, far less likely to manumit slaves than were owners of 
one, two, or three chattels.58 They manumitted slaves at the rate of 
about five per year per thousand slaves owned, a rate well below the 
general average for Baltimore and less than one-half that of a sample of 
women owning one, two, or three slaves.59 
Perhaps the greatest economic significance of gradual manumis-
sion, whether practiced by men or women, or by large or small 
slaveholders, lay in its creation of a new form of labor power that 
could be purchased by employers: the term slave. The combination of 
large numbers of gradual manumissions and long terms of service 
brought into being a market in which substantial numbers of slaves 
could be bought and sold at prices well below those prevailing for slaves 
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for life. That buyers and sellers were active in this sector of the market 
for slaves is beyond doubt: surviving court papers for Baltimore record 
more than four hundred sales of term slaves in the first thirty years of 
the nineteenth century. It can also be confidently stated that many un-
recorded sales occurred; again, the requirement of the law of 1817 that 
sales for a term of years be registered implies that many buyers and 
sellers had failed to do so. Indeed, many of the surviving bills of sale 
record-through notes scrawled on the back sides of the bills-repeated 
transfers of a slave from master to master.60 
Allusive anecdotal evidence appears elsewhere. Frederick Douglass, 
describing a chance encounter with two Irishmen in Baltimore, noted 
that one of the men quickly asked him if he were a slave for life or for 
a term of years, suggesting that either status was fairly common for a 
young Baltimore black around 1830.61 Estate appraisers appointed by 
the orphans' courts frequently valued slaves on two different premises: 
as slaves for life or to be sold for a term of years.62 David McKim, 
purchasing slaves for the Maryland Chemical Works in 1826-27, bought 
eleven slaves for life and four slaves for terms of six to ten years.63 
Although term slavery thus appears to have been driven mainly by 
masters' calculations of self-interest, the institution nonetheless appealed 
strongly to slaves, who associated it with service in Baltimore. As an 
1802 advertiser selling a slave put it, "She wants to go to Baltimore so 
she can get free." Another announced that two slaves from Cambridge 
would be sold "only in Baltimore, as it is their wish to live in this city." 
What these slaves perhaps knew was that Baltimore masters were interested 
not only in buying term slaves, but also in selling freedom to those 
same persons, payable by earnings as craft workers or day laborers.64 
Baltimore could also be a place of concealment for urban and rural 
runaways aided by free people of color, according to pursuing masters, 
as discussed in chapter 3. The presence of a growing and increasingly 
free African American population in Baltimore allowed many runaways 
to melt into anonymity, living with other blacks, pursuing a trade or 
working as day laborers, passing as free or as slaves hiring their time 
with a master's approval.65 Thus Baltimore's rapid influx of people of 
color helped slaves to flee masters without leaving kin or familiar sur-
roundings and exacerbated underlying tensions in measures designed 
to assure the reliability of slave labor. Not only was slaves' willingness 
to trust informal offers of self-purchase or gradual manumission un-
dermined by the inability to hold masters accountable, but also the 
option of flight became more feasible. 66 
By the 1820s the uncertainties and anomalies of term slavery elic-
ited a negative comment, nonetheless suggestive of the institution's 
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ubiquity, from Nicholas Brice, chief judge of the criminal court of Bal-
timore County. In an 1827 public letter to the governor, Brice con-
tended that "the manumission of slaves ... at certain ages, or after a 
term of years, appears to be peculiarly injurious ... and renders [Ne-
groes] wholly unfit." Brice argued that "the state should make a law 
for the gradual emancipation of these people at proper ages, or estab-
lish some tribunal to decide ... and not leave a matter of such impor-
tance to the community ... to individuals who in general consult only 
their own interest."67 Brice believed that freed term slaves constituted 
a potentially significant threat to the institutional stability of slavery. 
For him, the benefits that individual masters secured through gradual 
manumission, in the form of more productive workers, added up not 
to a social benefit but to a threat that needed to be curbed by imposi-
tion of sterner control over manumission. 
In effect, Brice was proposing to limit slaveholders' decision-making 
power over the granting of manumission and to shield them, whether 
they liked it or not, from the pleas, importunings, and offers of self-
purchase of their slaves. Brice may thus have sought to establish a new 
balance between positive and negative mechanisms of controlling term 
slaves, who in his view "were a sort of middle class, neither slave nor 
free; exempted from many of the motives for obedience which influ-
ence slaves." 68 Thus, while Brice did not object in principle to gradual 
emancipation, he strenuously denounced the undermining of the master's 
ability to maintain control of a prospective free black through negative 
incentives. Brice aimed to create such mechanisms anew and to hold 
out the threat of denial of manumission to term slaves who absconded, 
shirked, or otherwise failed to hold up their end of the manumission 
bargain. Simultaneously, he would rein in masters whose manumis-
sions on "contingencies" or other "injudicious" acts tended to set bad pre-
cedents and weaken the ability of masters generally to control their 
bondmen. 
Brice's thoughts bore no immediate fruit, but in the early 1830s 
Maryland legislators surpassed what he had urged. The 1833 "act re-
lating to persons of Colour, who are to be free after the expiration of a 
term of years" authorized county courts to sell out of the state any 
slave whose conduct was "notoriously vicious or turbulent." An ab-
sconding term slave could be sold "within or without the state" upon 
application of any master or mistress. The incentive of future freedom 
could now, for the unruly, be counterbalanced by its threatened denial, 
by selling them south. To be sure, the law dictated that the county clerk 
supply Negroes thus sold with a copy of their deed of manumission, 
but as opponents of the law pointed out, southwestern slave traders, 
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the likely buyers of such slaves, would not let such a document long 
remain in the slave's possession. 69 
The 1833 law did enshrine some additional protections for the 
term slave, however, thus furthering the tendency Brice had disparaged 
to treat them as "possessed of some rights in common with free men." 
The courts could only act if satisfied on "the testimony of disinterested 
witnesses" that the master had "notified such servants of the existence 
and effect of this law, and that this information had failed to correct his 
or her habits." 70 
Thus, slaveholders constructed an elaborate series of graduated 
sanctions for the disobedient or unproductive term slave: putting him 
or her on notice, threatening adjudgment by a court as vicious, and 
ultimately, sale back into possibly perpetual bondage. But enforcing 
these penalties consumed the master's time and money-court expenses 
had to be paid from the purchase price of the slave sold out of state-
and the outcome, given the court's interpretive role, could not be cer-
tain. Even this effort to curb the term slave's seizure of autonomy left 
such men and women more room for further negotiation with their 
masters than that afforded the slave for life. So, by their continued 
resistance, term slaves slowly reshaped the terms and conditions of 
gradual manumission to win greater autonomy and to become in Brice's 
words "a sort of middle class," entitled to legal notice and protection, 
however precarious, before masters could change their status. 
The evolution of term slavery into a quasi-regulated institution 
governing manumission and self-purchase invites comparison with 
mechanisms performing the same function in other slave societies, no-
tably coartaci6n in contemporary Spanish colonies and slaves' use of 
the peculium to purchase freedom in ancient Rome. In all three societ-
ies, manumission by self-purchase served to stabilize master-slave rela-
tions, especially in urban and craft settings, by allowing slaves to acquire 
wealth of their own with which they could purchase freedom, by pro-
viding public recognition of their new status, and by regulating future 
relations between former masters and freedmen. 
Coartaci6n, meaning to limit or cut off, was the right of a slave to 
demand that his price be set by a court of law and that he be permitted 
to pay this price in several installments. Originating as a customary 
procedure in seventeenth-century Cuba, it was codified in the eigh-
teenth century; in that form it later spread to Louisiana after Louisiana 
was transferred to Spanish control in 1763.71 Coartaci6n relied on the 
idea, derived from Roman law, of the peculium, property accumulated, 
managed, and disposed of by the slave. In both colonial Cuba and im-
perial Rome, slaves might hope to amass enough wealth to buy themselves 
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free, either by payments in cash or kind or by the purchase of a replace-
ment slave. In neither society was a master compelled by law to allow 
a slave to accumulate such wealth; rather, the voluntary concession of 
that privilege, accompanied by respect for slaves' claims to property 
thus acquired, served as an incentive to hard work that stood to benefit 
the master as well as the slave. Here, the behavior of Cuban, Roman, 
and North American slaveholders converged.72 Likewise, masters al-
lowing a slave to hold his or her own property might also expect the 
slave to provide some or all of his maintenance from that property. 
Slaves who had provision grounds placed at their disposal might be 
expected to provide some or all of their own food; urban workers al-
lowed to hire their own time might also be required to maintain them-
selves from sums left over after the master received a portion of the 
slave's earnings. 
Neither Romans nor Americans emulated coartaci6n's formalizing 
of the slave's right to self-purchase through court intervention, but all 
three societies did tolerate, and even provided some legal protection 
for, installment payment contracts for freedom. And although neither 
Roman nor American courts would impose manumission of a slave on 
an unwilling master, slaveholders in those societies could go to court 
and bind themselves to manumit, both to legitimize their actions and 
to make their promises credible to slaves, in the hope that slaves would 
enter wholeheartedly into the self-purchase bargain. Likewise, all of 
these societies regulated the ages and conditions of those to be set free, 
to prevent masters from "dumping" slaves unable to support them-
selves and to prevent the too-rapid growth of a population of freed 
people.73 
In all three societies the slave who had been promised freedom 
was, in Brice's terms, a member of a "third class," not wholly a slave 
but certainly not possessed of all the rights or duties of a freeborn per-
son. Coartados, as black Cubans who had partly purchased their free-
dom were often called, could not be held responsible for debts nor 
made to serve in the militia. In imperial Rome, most ex-slaves were 
classified as "Junian Latins," a status short of full citizenship in the 
empire that nonetheless gave them some important property rights, 
such as the right to make a will.74 As we have seen, in Maryland term 
slaves could still be bought and sold, but they could not legally be 
transported out of state, beyond court supervision of their right to even-
tual freedom. 
Perhaps the greatest difference in the treatment of the freedman lay 
in how Rome, Cuba, and Maryland dealt with the question of the 
freeman's obligations to his ex-master. On the surface a sharp divide 
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appears: Roman or Cuban slaveholders could use legal process to re-
enslave former chattels who were "ungrateful" or "negligent," that is, 
freedmen who failed to show appropriate deference to former masters 
or who did not perform ongoing duties that had been stipulated as part 
of the freedom bargain. Marylanders who felt insulted or ignored by 
their onetime slaves had no such right. This important distinction goes 
far to help explain their making prospective manumissions contingent 
on faithful service in the interim before freedom arrived, as well as the 
desire to punish the ungrateful with extended terms or even the reim-
position of slavery for life: Maryland masters could exact deference 
and service with the force of law only while the would-be freeman was 
yet a slave. 
The "problem" of the term slave, if not peculiar to Baltimore, at 
least attained there its greatest dimension. In Baltimore city and Balti-
more County, according to the fragmentary surviving court papers, just 
over 20 percent of all surviving bills of sale are for a term of years. For 
the compared rural counties, we find in Dorchester about 5 percent of 
all sales, and in Prince George's County only 2 percent of total slave 
sales, were for a limited term.75 
Would-be employers of bound labor, including those in the crafts 
and in industry, could thus choose from alternatives less costly than 
annual hiring of slaves, alternatives that tied up capital less perma-
nently than purchasing a slave for life. Under such circumstances 
slaveholders employed gradual manumission, not merely as a profit-
able exit from slavery, but also as a low-risk way of continuing to enjoy 
the advantages of owning human chattel. 
One way for a master to gain from gradual manumission would be 
to buy term slaves in succession, replacing those who gained their free-
dom with new time-limited slaves. Such an owner might have reasoned 
that people with a promise of eventual freedom were less likely to run 
away than perpetual bondmen. They might also work harder, out of 
motivation to acquire a good reputation on which to build a life as a 
freedman or to continue employment with the ex-master after freedom 
arrived. Moreover, the owner of term slaves avoided the expense of 
maintaining old, worn-out slaves, although owners of slaves for life 
could offer delayed emancipation to deal with this problem as well. 
A cross-referencing of slave bills of sale and deeds of manumission 
reveals that many slaveholders purchased one or more slaves after eman-
cipating others; such a comparison provides potent evidence to regard 
manumission as part and parcel of strategies to employ slave labor 
successfully in an increasingly hostile environment in Baltimore. Of 
757 manumitters filing deeds of manumission before 1825, 68 (about 
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9 percent) later purchased one or more slaves.76 The prevalence of re-
purchase among employers of craft or manufacturing labor may have 
been considerably more widespread, as nearly one-third of the 
manumitters were free blacks, Quakers, or women who had no inten-
tion of using slave labor in shops or factories.77 If these groups are 
discounted, about one in eight white males who manumitted slaves 
would later buy a slave or slaves. But the incompleteness of the surviv-
ing Baltimore manumission and sale records means that the actual re-
purchase rate was probably still higher. Because it is necessary to find 
two transactions to identify a repurchaser, incomplete sales or manu-
mission records will result in undercounting the repurchasing propor-
tion of manumitters. 78 Thus, if only half of all Baltimore sales are to be 
found among surviving records, repurchase by manumitters might take 
in not an eighth but a quarter of all manumitters.79 
Failure to record slave sales could further artificially depress the 
repurchase rate. After the 1817 ban on out-of-state sales of term slaves, 
which also imposed more stringent requirements for recording such 
sales, registrations of slave sales in Baltimore increased 55 percent the 
next year, and more sales for a term of years were recorded then in any 
other single year from 1789 to 1830.80 In view of these facts, a plau-
sible estimate is that from 20 percent to as high as 40 percent of Balti-
more manumitters acquired new slaves in the two generations between 
Baltimore's post-Revolutionary War rise and 1830. 
This estimate reinforces a modified view of the usage of manumis-
sion by city-dwelling craftsmen, emphasizing its character as a tool in 
managing slave workers and as yet another contested ground in mas-
ter-slave relations. Indeed, the existence of sequential or serial 
slaveholding helps to make sense out of the petty contingencies and 
sanctions with which masters hedged their grants of eventual freedom. 
More was at stake than the extra few dollars of labor that might be 
garnered by requiring makeup of lost sick time from a given slave: 
masters were attempting to set or maintain standards that could apply 
in the future to prospective freed men and women of similar circum-
stances. 
In sequential slavery's most fully developed form, we find masters 
buying slaves for life, commuting their servitude to a term of years, and 
then buying a replacement when that slave's term expired. John Kelso, 
a butcher and merchant of Baltimore, thus bought Thomas Cook, age 
twenty-three, for $300 in 1802. About nine months later, presumably 
satisfied that Cook was earning his keep, Kelso manumitted him, effec-
tive in 1811, after a further eight years of service. Apparently, Kelso 
found the experiment of offering delayed freedom to be a useful work 
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incentive, for in late 1810 Kelso purchased Romulus, a sixteen-year-
old who had fifteen years to serve, paying $300 for him likewise. In 
1820, with Romulus still having a few years to serve, Kelso bought a 
thirteen-year-old boy named Jacob for the remaining eight years of his 
servitude. 81 Although Romulus's eventual fate is unknown, it is con-
ceivable that he was sold with a few years left on his term, so that Kelso 
could recoup some of his $300 investment. An adult male with five 
years to serve might have brought $150 in 1820, allowing Kelso to 
have enjoyed ten years' worth of labor for a net outlay of $150 plus 
maintenance. As a Methodist, Kelso was also complying with the let-
ter, if not the spirit, of church discipline banning the ownership of slaves 
for life. 82 
That at least some manumitters transacted business in this manner 
is graphically and depressingly illustrated by another of Kelso's hands, 
a man named Jerry. In 1807 John Woodard of Prince George's County 
sold Jerry, then "about 50" to Frederick Eislen, a Baltimore butcher, 
for $115. Perhaps Eislen overestimated his need for hands, for in 1808 
a hand-scrawled note on the back of the 1807 bill of sale indicated that 
Eislen had "assigned" Jerry to John Kelso for $75. Two years later, 
Kelso passed Jerry on to Stephen Hill, yet another butcher, for $60. 
Hill, perhaps finding the aging Jerry an ineffective worker, hired him 
out to Nicholas Jackson for $25 and then manumitted Jerry with a 
term expiring at the end of his hire with Jackson in 1811, declaring in 
the deed that Jerry was "about 45." 83 In this case Jerry dealt with five 
masters in four years, as each sought to obtain a year or so of low-cost 
labor followed by a resale at or near the last purchase price. 
But some masters had no wish to retain the services of term slaves, 
preferring instead to schedule a slave's future manumission and then 
sell him or her to a new owner, often recording both transactions in the 
same document. 84 Methodist scruples regarding selling slaves for life 
may have helped generate some such transactions. 85 But more tangible 
appeals to self-interest may have informed other actions. When Samuel 
Davis manumitted Harriet and sold her to John Fisher for a term of 
eight years and six months, Davis promised to "be answerable for any 
damages that may be sustained by the said Negro Woman being pressed 
to be free at a shorter period than the time she is sold for." Because 
Harriet's age was not given, there is no way to tell whether the $150 
Davis received was a "below market" price. But the inference that Davis 
was disposing of troublesome property and attempting to wangle com-
pliance from Harriet by promising eventual freedom is strengthened by 
the fact that Davis had originally intended to sell her to another buyer: 
Fisher's name appears throughout the bill interlined in place of one 
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John Vernon. Harriet may have threatened to run off to dissuade Vernon 
from buying her or, for that matter, to induce Davis to sell and manu-
mit her in the first place. Or her agitating the question of gradual eman-
cipation might have driven Davis to sell her and Fisher to seek security 
for her good behavior during her term. 
The goal of securing reliable labor from term slaves could even 
override customary slaveholder approval of slave women bearing chil-
dren and thereby increasing the master's wealth: when Lucy Soper 
bought Margaret for a term of six years, she required that Margaret 
"make ... ample compensation, for all lost time that may arise in 
consequence of such Issue or Issues which might so happen." 86 
These examples show how gradual manumission could be at once a 
vehicle for resolving disputes between masters and slaves and a mecha-
nism for transferring the problem to a new master, within its more 
general use as a device for securing dependable and productive labor 
from slaves. Looking at the operations of manumission as a regulator 
or modifier of the terms of slave labor in Baltimore, we see an institu-
tion driven by complex and shifting forces. Masters' reliance on gradual 
manumission helped spread slavery among craftsmen and at first 
strengthened slavery in Baltimore, as masters evoked such strategies as 
sequential slaveholding to maximize gains and minimize the risks en-
tailed in capitalizing their workforce. But, as we have seen, African 
Americans were much more active in that process than to tamely take 
the bait of long-delayed freedom and self-purchase. 
5 
FREE BLACK FAMILY STRATEGIES FOR 
GAINING FREEDOM 
In early America families worked 
together to maintain themselves. By pooling their labor, fathers, moth-
ers, sons, and daughters could hope to gain a "competency," that is, 
enough wealth to live comfortably and to stake the children to a start 
in life through inheritance of land, tools, livestock, fishing boats, or 
money with which to acquire craft training or attract a suitor. Although 
this view of family economics derives primarily from whites in New 
England or the mid-Atlantic region, blacks, too, strove to unite their 
families' productive capacities. 1 
In order to do so, people of color had first to create the family as a 
legal entity, by securing freedom and the right to own their labor power. 
Some might be fortunate enough to be manumitted en bloc by a Quaker 
or Methodist master, but most blacks had to struggle to free them-
selves. Manumission as a "gift" from a master, whatever the legitimacy 
of such a construction, represented one route to autonomy, but far 
more often freedom had to be purchased with labor and money. 
The process might be envisioned as a kind of bootstrapping, begin-
ning with obtaining the freedom of one family member, possibly by 
pooling resources accumulated by others. Over time, the freed person 
could hope to save or borrow more money, eventually "buying out" 
spouse, children, or other kin. Ideally, an entire family could together 
leave slavery behind, but that could occur only with the agreement of 
the master or masters who owned the family's members. 
Slaveholders, who wished to maintain predictable, flexible, and 
cheap labor, knew that an unvaried reliance on slavery might not meet 
these objectives. At the same time the emerging but imperfect market 
for free labor could not yet be trusted to produce enough surplus work-
ers for seasonal peak periods of work or steady and compliant workers 
on a year-round basis. 
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Manumitting slaves presented attractive possibilities for meeting 
these challenges. If a master could dictate the cost and term length of a 
gradual manumission, he or she could reshape the institution of slavery 
to emphasize its advantages, such as the legal ability to compel labor 
from the worker, and to minimize its disadvantages, notably lifelong 
commitment to providing for the worker and the resulting costs of 
capitalizing one's labor force. The story of term slavery in Maryland 
thus often centers on clashes and accommodations between powerful 
whites and dependent blacks, driven by blacks' search for autonomy 
for their families and whites' attempts to manipulate that impulse. 
Finding out how blacks freed family members again entails bur-
rowing beneath the language of manumission deeds to uncover under-
lying activities and contingencies. Anna Emory, for example, had agreed 
in 1803 with "negro Samuel, commonly called Middleton's Sam" to 
make Sam's wife Chloe and their children his property "as soon as he 
... shall pay or cause to be paid unto Anna Emory ... seventy five 
pounds." Sam sealed the bargain by paying Emory fifteen pounds on 
January 7, 1803, and made five subsequent payments over the next 
two years, including, in November of 1804, "One Dutch Oven, price 
15 s." By January of 1806 Sam, now having taken the name Sam Stewart, 
had "settled ... the full consideration" and obtained an immediate 
manumission of Chloe, though not of her children, from Robert 
Goldsborough, the administrator of Anna Emory's estate.2 Had Emory 
survived to that point, she would almost certainly have issued a manu-
mission deed for Chloe, but she would have had no compelling reason 
to record the financial details. Goldsborough did so to account for his 
handling of the estate and to protect himself against possible charges 
by Emory's heirs of wasting or looting it. 
Sam Stewart's ability to raise seventy-five pounds in Maryland 
money (about two hundred dollars) within three years distinguished 
him as being uncommonly quick to accumulate wealth. Far more typi-
cal was the lot of William Chambers, who needed nine years to scrape 
together $120 to buy freedom for his wife Hannah and their five chil-
dren, or Isaac Bellows, who freed his wife eight years after contracting 
to purchase her.3 At that, Chambers was fortunate that his wife's mas-
ter did not insist on further compensation to free William and Hannah's 
children, four of whom were born after the price of freedom for Hannah 
and their eldest child had been set. 
Many masters demanded "expences" or "consideration" for the 
maintenance of young children born while a mother's self-purchase was 
pending. They might indenture such children as servants, denominate 
them as term slaves, or regard them as slaves for life, requiring a sepa-
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rate purchase agreement from their parents. When Jesse Higgins sold 
Coffee Gibbs his wife Jane's liberty, they resolved the fate of the Gibbs's 
seven children by Higgins's agreeing "to take two girls and one boy for 
terms specified in their manumission and indentures" as full satisfac-
tion for freeing Jane and her four younger children. Gibbs succeeded in 
obtaining legal freedom for his entire family, but Higgins retained con-
trol of three valuable workers, the eldest children. In a similar transac-
tion, Phill Howard in 1817 paid one hundred dollars to Mary and 
Isaac Paul as a down payment on the freedom of his wife and their 
three children and registered a deed manumitting his wife Mary and 
daughter Mary Ann. A year later, perhaps unable to produce the re-
mainder of the purchase price, he indentured his two grown children, 
George, twenty-four years old, and Rachel, eighteen years old, to the 
Pauls for five-year terms.4 
Even infants commanded a price, as Peter and Cassey Porter dis-
covered. Peter had bought Cassey from James Troth, a Talbot County 
tavern keeper, in 1795, promising to pay Troth thirty pounds in Mary-
land money, or about eighty dollars. Porter paid Troth fairly quickly, 
but the latter procrastinated over having Cassey's bill of sale drawn up 
by the county clerk. When Cassey gave birth to a son before she had 
formally become a free woman, Troth seized on the opportunity to 
squeeze a further five pounds from the Porters for manumitting one-
year old Harry in 1797.5 
Matters could become particularly complicated when masters in-
sisted on shaving the terms of manumissions involving spouses and 
children. A deposition in an 1815 Baltimore case described a "bargain" 
between George Stevenson and Negro David, a free man, respecting 
David's wife, Jane, and sons. Stevenson had agreed to manumit Jane 
and two boys, Aron and Ben, upon payment of one hundred dollars, an 
unusually low price for such a transaction. Perhaps one reason for the 
low price was that Stevenson retained legal title to Aron and Ben, stipu-
lating nonetheless that David was to bear the expense of maintaining 
the boys. Thus, Stevenson avoided the expense of providing for two boys 
too young to generate a positive cash flow as workers, while also hold-
ing back on manumitting the children as a form of security for David's 
payment of the one hundred dollars. Moreover, he declined to issue manu-
mission papers for the ostensibly free Jane, stating that "when David 
paid the ... one hundred dollars, he would Emancipate the whole of 
them together, ... at one cost and trouble." 6 When Stevenson died 
before the debt was cleared, the whole matter was thrown before the courts. 
Although Troth and Stevenson may have been petty connivers, their 
interest in using children to control their parents was far from rare. 
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After 1809 Maryland law specified that children born during a pro-
spectively manumitted slave mother's term of servitude were slaves for 
life unless the mother's manumission set other terms. 7 Manumitters 
could declare future children of a term-slave woman free at birth, or 
they could categorize such offspring as term slaves themselves. Most 
chose to remain silent, and even among those who did specify the con-
dition of future children, only a handful granted immediate freedom. 
More than 90 percent of those who spoke to the subject declared pro-
spective children to be slaves for terms of eighteen to as many as forty-
five years. Indeed, the number of manumitters who prescribed term 
slavery for unborn grandchildren of women granted delayed manumis-
sion exceeded the number freeing such women's unborn children at 
birth. A few emancipators even stated expressly that "all future gen-
erations" of term slave descent would themselves be term slaves "until 
the end of time." 8 
Under these circumstances, women who served a stint as term slaves 
would commonly find that their children were slaves with long terms 
to serve. Slaveholders could seek to derive advantage from this anomaly, 
by choosing either to take possession of the children or to leave them 
with their parents, as their need for child labor dictated. To keep fami-
lies together, some free people of color agreed to bear the cost of raising 
their own children, rather than claiming support from the legal master. 
Such bargains might well be nested within the question of a woman's 
obtaining freedom in the first place. When John Jones manumitted 
Dafney, with immediate effect, he required her to keep her three chil-
dren "until I call for them." Jones could thus bank on the future labor 
of two boys and one girl whenever, in his judgment, he could extract 
more from them than their maintenance would cost. In the meantime 
Dafney would raise her children at no expense to Jones. 9 
Both large and small slaveholders had to deal with thorny ques-
tions surrounding the manumission of black children. Many white 
Marylanders believed that manumitting small children contravened the 
law by setting at large individuals who could not support themselves 
and who might become public charges, but manumissions by deed of 
parents and children occurred frequently and generally went unchal-
lenged.10 As the examples cited above suggest, however, most 
manumitters freed young slaves only after they had worked some years 
as adults to "pay" for their rearing. Nearly half of all male freedmen 
were over thirty when manumitted; nearly three-quarters were over 
twenty-five. Black women tended to be freed a bit younger, but about 
two-fifths had passed thirty when manumitted, and a little more than 
three-fifths were over twenty-five. 11 
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The prevalence of long terms of servitude for prospectively eman-
cipated children played a critical part in perpetuating slavery in spite of 
widespread manumission. A majority of slave girls promised eventual 
enfranchisement would live through five to fifteen, or more, of their 
childbearing years while still legally slaves. Any children born to them 
during this period would be slaves for life, unless specified otherwise in 
their own prospective manumissions. The thrust of this practice was 
not to terminate slavery, immediately or gradually, but rather to extend 
it to new generations of blacks, while transmuting it: the institution 
was sustained, but individuals could, eventually, escape its oppressions. 
Slaves and masters maneuvered for advantage over which members of 
black families became free and when. Blacks knew that the purchase of 
a young man's freedom might create an extra wage earner in the family, 
thereby speeding up the buying of other family members still enslaved. 
But doing so in preference to liberating a young woman could lead to 
her bearing children and passing the curse of bondage on to another 
generation. 12 The agony of dealing with such choices can only have 
been increased by the knowledge that children or siblings might be sold 
out of the state, never to be seen again, even as free members of the 
family struggled to generate cash to buy them out. 
Buying out family members must always have been onerous when 
the value of an adult slave routinely equaled twelve to twenty months' 
earnings for a laborer, but difficulties could become insuperable when 
fate conspired against a black family. In an 1829 case a Maryland freed-
man who had married a slave was compelled to buy his wife and infant 
child at a public estate sale following the sudden death of her master. 
Having only recently acquired his own freedom, he was obliged to seek 
credit for almost all of the purchase price, with the patronage of two 
white guarantors of his debt. They took title to his wife and baby as 
security and, when he proved unable to clear his debt, seized his family 
and sold them to Georgia. 13 
This tragic case also illustrates the intertwined operations of manu-
mission and the laws of property and debt. For the freed person, the 
very effort to keep a family together devoured any slender stock of 
capital he or she might have accumulated, forcing an overextension of 
resources and acquisition of heavy debt under terms of repayment that 
could not be controlled. In the case set forth above, a man who had 
risen to become a captain of a Chesapeake Bay schooner lost not only 
his family but in addition all the liquid capital he had paid to the adminis-
trator of his wife's master's estate. There is no way to know how fre-
quently free blacks suffered such doubly crushing setbacks, but the heavy 
financial drain of self-purchase, whether successfully consummated or 
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not, must have played its part in preventing free blacks from attaining 
tangible property other than themselves. It thus surely contributed to 
the white perception of free blacks as improvident and unsuited to life 
in a competitive society. 
For the "white gentlemen" who beneficently lent their names as 
security to the freedman's debt, the transaction held much promise of 
gain and relatively little risk. If not called upon to act, they could con-
gratulate themselves on having assisted a worthy black in uniting his 
family in freedom. If compelled to claim their collateral property, they 
could console themselves with the thought that here lay proof of blacks' 
unreadiness for freedom and of the likelihood that they were better off 
under the care of a master. Moreover, they might realize a tidy profit if 
the sale price of the woman and child exceeded their exposure for the 
remaining portion of the freedman's debt. For men who sought profit 
from private lending, few collateral properties can have been as reli-
ably negotiable as slaves. Thus could self-purchase and debt combine 
to transfer wealth from some of the poorest members of society, the 
newly freed, to well-off whites. 
In at least one documented case, parents who were both still slaves, 
perhaps seeking to avoid this cycle of debt and reimposed dependency, 
purchased freedom for their son but not for themselves. Fielder Dorsett, 
in manumitting a twelve-year-old boy named Jones, noted that Jones's 
father, John, "the slave of Mrs. Martha Roundell" had put up the money 
to buy Jones, on "Conditions that I should set him free from Bond-
age." Dorsett then dictated that Jones was freed on "Condition that he 
serve John and Henrietta, his Father and Mother, ... during their natu-
rallives, ... to be released from such Service when they ... shall think 
proper." 14 In this case the anomalous outcome made Jones, a prospec-
tive freedman, the lifelong servant of his slave parents. 
Entanglement in such situations presented blacks with unenviable 
choices. Children born while the mother was still enslaved added to the 
costs of buying freedom for a family already under financial strain. But 
couples who deferred having children until the woman was free also 
ran risks. Given the many years needed to buy freedom, a woman might 
have passed her prime childbearing years before such a date arrived. 
Moreover, a couple who delayed having children also delayed reaching 
the point at which children could begin contributing to the household 
economy. 
Many men and women sought to avoid this dilemma by shorten-
ing the term of installment purchases or by obtaining money on credit 
with which to bargain for liberation. Borrowing to buy freedom could 
also satisfy a master unwilling to engage in manumission paid by in-
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stallments. Finally, borrowing could generate cash quickly and allow a 
free person of color to avert the sale and dispersal of his or her loved 
ones following upon a slaveholder's relocation or after the death of the 
slaveholder and the ensuing division of the estate. Thus, John Joice, 
identified by Charles Carroll of Carrollton as "Old Shoemaker John," 
became free immediately in 1802 upon payment of two hundred dol-
lars by a third party, Samuel Hopkins. 15 Carroll's manumission of Joice 
said nothing about Joice's obligation to Hopkins, but other deeds speak 
more plainly. Buying freedom on credit did not erase the possibility of 
separation from one's kin but rather postponed it. Not all families were 
able to clear their debts and free their children. 
In a Kent County case, Isaac Hackett freed Delia, her son Jake, and 
a daughter in 1793, "upon receipt of thirty pounds ... by William 
Sluby," and set Delia's freedom date as "when the said Negro woman's 
husband, Negro Chester Bowes, who is a free man, pays to Sluby ... 
the aforesaid sum of thirty pounds and the Interest thereon." Two years 
later, Sluby duly filed another manumission deed, freeing Delia but not 
mentioning either of her children.16 From Chester and Delia Bowes's 
standpoint, an effort to "refinance" their debt to Isaac Hackett proved 
only partially successful, because their children most likely remained in 
slavery. 
Given the difficulties faced by free blacks hoping to borrow and 
repay freedom loans, the question arises, What inherent attractions did 
such measures hold, as distinct from desperation-induced borrowing 
to avoid forced migration or sale of kin south or westward? The impe-
tus for buying oneself out could come from several sources. Moses 
Stevenson, agreeing to purchase himself from James Carey for fifty 
pounds in 1789, secured Carey's promise not to demand service from 
him. Stevenson thereby gained immediate freedom of action to sell his 
labor as he saw fit, in order to meet his obligation to Carey, rather than 
serving Carey for a term of years. Along the same lines, one of the 
provisions of Sam Stewart's purchase of Chloe from Anna Emory was 
that Chloe would be able to work for Sam during the time he paid for 
her freedom. Emory did extract a hiring fee of five pounds a year, and 
Sam became responsible for Chloe's maintenance as well, but in this 
case their joint action no doubt facilitated Sam's fairly speedy repay-
ment of Chloe's purchase price. 
For William Berry, a master's borrowing led to an opening for his 
manumission from Morgan Brown. Berry had been owned by Brown's 
brother-in-law, who offered him to Brown as collateral for a debt. By 
subsequently assembling the twenty-six pounds and ten shillings owed 
Brown, after his master failed to do so, Berry gained his liberty in 1783.17 
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Slaves and free people of color, then, had ample reason to venture into 
the world of credit and borrowing in order to leave slavery behind. But 
what motivated white lenders? 
In the case of Morgan Brown, the manumission documents pro-
vide little clue as to his motivation. He may have had scruples about 
owning slaves for life (he did manumit other slaves on terms), or he 
may simply have sized up William Berry as the best available bet for 
recovering the money owed him. But Brown's case was not an isolated 
one. In several instances merchants and private lenders functioned re-
peatedly as go-betweens or brokers of manumissions by self-purchase. 
Men like Philip Fiddeman of Queen Anne's County, Joseph Court of 
Anne Arundel County, Thomas Sluby of Kent County, and David 
Stewart of Baltimore County engaged in a series of individual 
manumissions for cash, repaid with interest by the beneficiaries, in trans-
actions stretched out over their life spans in business. Let us examine 
the story of Philip Fiddeman. 
Between 1790 and 1816 Philip Fiddeman recorded eleven deeds of 
manumission in Queen Anne's County, freeing twelve women and seven 
men. Fiddeman was not slowly downsizing his holdings; he never owned 
more than six slaves at any one time. But neither did he cease to own 
human chattel, at least as measured by the first three federal censuses. 
Indeed, most of his manumissions noted a former owner from whom 
he had bought the slave about to be freed. In two-thirds of the cases 
Fiddeman had received money, ranging from token amounts to sixty 
pounds, or $160, for his 1801 grant of freedom to Adam. Where no 
payment was mentioned, Fiddeman stipulated terms of service, rang-
ing from seven years for adults like George Garnet to twenty years for 
nine-year old Hetty. 
In at least two instances, Fiddeman adjusted terms of servitude, 
possibly to recognize loans repaid faster or slower than scheduled. 
George Garnet became free in 1809, one year sooner than promised in 
his original1803 manumission, but his son Henry, promised freedom 
in 1813 in return for service until]anuary 1, 1823, saw his term length-
ened in 1816, with a new date of freedom set for July 1, 1824. The first 
deed filed respecting Henry had not included any language stipulating 
that Henry make up for time lost by illness or running away; how then 
could Fiddeman extract an extra eighteen months of service from him? 
By law, Fiddeman's original deed would bind him to freeing Henry 
on the promised date, unless he went to court to have Henry's term 
lengthened for absconding. There is no evidence-either in court records, 
or in the language of the second manumission, or in runaway ads-
that Henry did abscond. 
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Fiddeman could have justified lengthening Henry's term, however, 
if Henry's freedom was conditional on a combination of service ren-
dered and cash paid and if Henry or someone acting in his interest had 
failed to make a stipulated payment_ Failure on Henry's part to per-
form contractual obligations fully and punctually would have released 
Fiddeman from his corresponding duty to manumit, allowing him to 
dictate a new release date or even to cancel the manumission altogether_ 
Although this inference is admittedly speculative, it is not an unreason-
able one. If a contract, even a written one, defined Fiddeman and Henry's 
manumission agreement, its absence from the public record is hardly 
surprising; rather, this reflects normal practice. Neither contracts nor 
their supporting documents, such as penal bonds or other transfers of 
property incident upon failure to perform, were recorded with county 
courts. Even if such had been the practice in Maryland, no recogniz-
able or binding contract could exist between a slave and a free person. 
To return to Fiddeman's and Henry's dealings, the extension of Henry's 
term of servitude via the registration of a new deed of manumission 
might best be compared with the extension of the term of payment for 
a loan. Just as renegotiating the repayment of a loan might lead to 
redefining its terms regarding collateral or interest rates, Henry's need 
to renegotiate the terms of obtaining his freedom may have led to his 
new and longer term of service.18 
The picture of Fiddeman that emerges is that of a rural entrepre-
neur ranging widely to seek opportunities for profit on the economi-
cally stagnant Eastern Shore. He might have relocated to Baltimore, as 
many other merchants or artisans did, but Fiddeman and Thomas Sluby 
chose to remain where they were, in Queen Anne's County and Kent 
County, respectively, and try to reap a return on investments in private 
lending. Lending to slaves seeking to purchase freedom may well have 
presented itself as a simple, secure, and risk-free type of loan. A brief 
comparison may illustrate. 
When Fiddeman lent to a free white person, he no doubt sought to 
secure his loan by having the borrower assign collateral to him in the 
event of default, such as land, work animals, or slaves. He would also have 
demanded that the loan be guaranteed by cosigners. As we have seen in 
the case of Morgan Brown and William Berry, manumission by self-
purchase on credit could be triggered by a defaulting borrower's loss of 
assigned property to his lender: Fiddeman may well have undertaken 
some of his manumissions for the same reason. Fiddeman probably 
preferred slaves as collateral, because they represented a commodity of 
stable value that could be either converted to liquid capital by sale or 
held as a short- to medium-term income-producing asset by hiring out. 
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But actually gaining control of one's collateral from a nonpaying 
borrower could be time-consuming and uncertain. Debtors or their 
guarantors could attempt to evade their responsibilities through legal 
action; lengthy and expensive court battles might ensue before Fiddeman 
could actually obtain seizure of property and execution of a debt. Even 
then, he might find that the proceeds of a sheriff's sale failed to recoup 
his outlays or that he had to compete with other creditors, perhaps 
entailing further litigation. 
By contrast, lending to slaves or free people of color allowed 
Fiddeman to short-circuit most of the uncertainties imposed by the law 
for recovering unpaid debts. When Fiddeman lent to an African Ameri-
can, he literally took legal possession of his "collateral," by purchasing 
the slave whose freedom he intended to sell. If the slave or his free 
black kin failed to repay Fiddeman, he could proceed directly to "ex-
ecution" by reselling his human property. Even if a free person of color 
felt that Fiddeman was cheating him in such a transaction, his or her 
testimony would be inadmissible in a court, effectively barring any le-
gal recourse. 
Not only did Fiddeman have virtually impregnable legal guaran-
tees of recovery; he could also be reasonably sure that his black bor-
rowers would do their utmost to repay him, because they were seeking 
to reunite families in freedom or to obtain that freedom for themselves. 
Should they falter, he also had the option of compounding with them 
by manumitting a slave in tandem with selling that person for a term of 
service. The price of the sale would be dictated by what Fiddeman 
deemed a suitable return on his loan, and a term of service would be set 
accordingly. 
We can get a glimpse of how such transactions worked by looking 
at the story of Henry Toomey. According to his former owner, Tristram 
Thomas, "Harry Toomey fell into [his] possession in right of his wife, 
... served him a few months as a slave, after which [he] sold Harry to 
William Thelery, ... the object of the sale ... being to enable the said 
Harry to obtain his freedom after fulfilling a certain contract of ser-
vice." Thomas thus commuted his investment in Henry Toomey into 
cash, while Toomey worked out his time with a new owner. 19 It is worth 
noting that these details about Henry Toomey's acquisition of freedom 
did not appear in his manumission deed; their existence was recorded 
only by chance when Thomas penned a letter supporting Toomey's re-
quest for pardon from a larceny conviction. 
In addition to the option of selling a freedom-seeking black, a 
manumission broker could secure profits by transferring his interests 
to other slaves, such as the would-be freed person's children. As men-
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tioned above, George Garnet obtained his freedom from Philip Fiddeman 
in 1809, a year ahead of his scheduled manumission date. But in 1810 
Garnet mortgaged his two daughters, Phillis and Netter, to Joseph Blake 
and Richard Rochester for $160. He entered into this grim bargain in 
the same year that Phillis and Netter's mother, and George's wife, Jenny, 
was to be freed by yet another slaveholder, Thomas Burgess, at the 
expiration of a two-year term. 
George Garnet may have needed money to complete the purchase 
of Jenny's freedom. Although no payments were mentioned in Burgess's 
delayed manumission of Jenny in 1808, the very short two-year term of 
service he stipulated renders the imposition of further required payment, 
either in George's labor or in cash, quite likely. Alternatively, George 
may still have owed Philip Fiddeman for his own manumission. In any 
case he could get the cash he needed to liberate his entire family only by 
offering up Phillis, age twelve, and Netter, age two, as hostages to a 
new set of white lenders. As Phillis and Netter had themselves been 
prospectively manumitted by Thomas Burgess upon reaching their 
twenty-sixth birthday, they ran less risk of remaining trapped in life-
long slavery than George's sons. In Henry's case, no manumission of any 
kind had as yet been arranged with Fiddeman; a younger son, named George 
after his father, had been promised freedom by Burgess, but it would 
occur only after a twenty-seven-year term, at the age of thirty-four.20 
Shedding the yoke of bondage all too often meant shouldering the 
burden of debt, with the threat of permanent enslavement hanging-over 
one's head. When Rosalia, a woman freed by Thomas Mordieu, sought 
to buy her son from Mordieu's estate, executor John Dubernat set a 
price of seventy-five dollars on the boy and required Rosalia to obtain 
security for the credit purchase. After she failed to do so, Dubernat 
petitioned the orphans' court for the right to sell the boy and protect 
the estate from loss, because he feared that "she would make for Santo 
Domingo and carry her child thither." 21 
In short, the sale of freedom from master to slave was fraught with 
uncertainties, ambiguities, and unstable agreements, like every other 
aspect of master-slave relations. Whites like Philip Fiddeman could 
envision the brokering of manumission as an income-generating device 
and perhaps see themselves as humanitarians at the same time. None-
theless, despite the advantages they enjoyed, they could not be certain 
of black compliance with the terms of mortgaged freedom. One could 
minimize the risk of loss presented by black flight, by freeing parents 
but not children, or husbands but not wives, but risks remained. 
Moreover, like other businessmen, Fiddeman faced subtle restraints 
not fully encompassed by the legalities. If he pressed his legal advantages 
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relentlessly and sold or repossessed people of color who failed to 
meet their obligations, would he find subsequent "customers" willing 
to borrow from him to buy themselves out? That Fiddeman engaged 
in as many sales of freedom as he did, with only the Garnet family 
case coming to light as a "problem case" suggests that he and his 
black counterparts judged each other well. The power relations be-
tween them were no doubt far from equal, but Fiddeman apparently 
forbore extreme pressure on his black clients in Queen Anne's County 
enough to generate repeated manumission business over a twenty-six-
year period. 
For blacks hoping to unshackle themselves or their family mem-
bers, men like Fiddeman may have represented a last resort, to be turned 
to when one's master exhibited recalcitrance or when an executor could 
not free one from the dead hand of an estate. Such a hypothesis helps 
explain why manumission brokering would be relatively more visible 
in rural counties like Queen Anne's or Kent than in urban settings. In 
Baltimore free blacks or slaves hiring their own time enjoyed extensive 
opportunities to earn wages and thereby deal directly with a master 
willing to consider the sale of freedom. Similarly, the spread of slavery 
in Baltimore's craft shops created a network of employers who might 
be willing to buy a term slave, thereby helping a slave to complete a 
mixed cash-and-service self-purchase bargain. Accordingly, the need to 
resort to a lender to acquire lump sums for buyouts would be less press-
ing. Those blacks who did seek to borrow in this fashion might find 
more prospective lenders to choose from and might be less likely to 
deal with any given merchant. People with liquid capital not tied up in 
land or slaves already were far more numerous in the city; a few of 
them might even be blacks, with whom one might hope to deal on less 
onerous terms. 
It is also possible, to return to a white lender's perspective, that 
loans for the purchase of freedom might have appealed less to a 
Baltimorean, who could invest in bank stock or manufacturing compa-
nies or could speculate in urban lots and rents. Furthermore, the single 
young black males who made up a notable proportion of Baltimore's 
hired-out slave workforce, although they may have been prime wage 
earners and thus likely risks for loans, also fit the profile of the high 
runaway risk, perhaps discouraging the buyout option. In addition they 
were less likely to have wives or children assignable as collateral secu-
rity. All of these factors would make a would-be manumission broker 
in Baltimore cautious about carrying too much risk by engaging in 
more than an occasional loan of this type. On the rural, isolated East-
ern Shore, merchants like Fiddeman could make brokering of freedom 
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into a profitable sideline. In Baltimore, with far more masters to choose 
from, blacks gained a far larger proportion of manumissions in return 
for loyal service but without the encumbrance of debt. 
On the Eastern Shore there were more laborers, black or white, 
free or enslaved, than employment opportunities, other than at sea-
sonal peak moments of demand, such as during the wheat harvest. In 
this setting manumission could be attractive to a master, if accompa-
nied by cash payment. A slave attempting to obtain freedom on these 
terms might well migrate across the bay to Baltimore to find wage 
work or turn to someone like Fiddeman. 
In Baltimore the labor shortage could cause artisans, merchants, 
and professionals to compete for the workers and servants they wanted, 
offering delayed manumission in return. Thus, the contiguity of two 
rather differently structured labor markets generated a flow of black 
workers from rural seats to the town of Baltimore and concomitantly 
encouraged a partial transition from slave to wage labor in each set-
ting. But regardless of locale, employers wished to retain power over 
their workers and sought to use indebtedness, linked to continuing con-
trol of workers' family members, as their hold. Free blacks, fully aware 
of this strategy, endeavored to wrest their children from the slaveholders' 
grip at the earliest opportunity. 
We can gain insight into how these struggles played out by exam-
ining manumissions to see which family members blacks tried to free 
first, and correspondingly, which persons slaveholders clung to most 
determinedly. Freeing boys, for example, might have seemed financially 
more advantageous to black families, because they could earn more 
than young girls, but obtaining freedom for boys might be more costly 
than buying out girls. Slaveholders could employ the same rationales 
to arrive at somewhat different conclusions, of course. Holding onto 
boys and letting girls go might maximize a slaveholder's income from 
enslaved children, so long as they could be employed profitably. By the 
same token, maintaining control of girls might be preferable to a 
slaveholder who wished to combine manumission with the continued 
reproduction of new generations of slaves. 
Both black parents and slaveholders might be expected to display 
considerable variation in their strategies for freeing or retaining chil-
dren in slavery, to the extent that decisions were tailored to short-term 
labor needs within the slaveholder's or the black family head's respec-
tive business enterprise or household. In other words, patterns of slave 
retention or freedom acquisition may have responded to the same kinds 
of forces that drove the hiring of servants in economies based on family 
labor, such as colonial New England. Small slaveholders in particular 
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might be expected to space out manumissions of a group of children in 
order to assure a continued supply of farm or domestic labor. 
One further complexity has to be worked into the equation of 
manumitting family members, and that is the timing of delayed 
manumissions and their impact on the family's life cycle. Were black 
parents, for instance, more desirous of manumitting their eldest or their 
youngest children? Again, whatever the quality of emotional attach-
ments among family members, older children could earn more and might 
be more valuable as free workers. Alternatively, younger children, par-
ticularly infants, might be easier to set free, precisely because they had 
less short-term economic value and might the more readily be sold to a 
parent by a white master. In addition, parents might well fear that their 
youngest children were the most vulnerable to remaining forever in 
slavery, as they were most likely to be orphaned while still in child-
hood. With so many competing factors impinging on the desires both 
of African Americans and manumitting slaveholders, it might be ex-
pected that few clear patterns of child manumission would emerge. But 
two things do seem to have made a difference for an enslaved child's 
prospects of becoming free: gender and place of residence. 
Girls and boys had fairly equal chances of being manumitted pro-
spectively after a term of service; however, girls were much more likely 
to benefit from immediate manumission during their infancy or child-
hood, as shown in table 13. 
Of approximately 2,500 children whose manumissions indicated 
their sex and age at freedom, 53 percent were girls and 47 percent were 
boys. Four-fifths of these manumissions promised freedom after a term 
of servitude, with boys and girls being equally likely recipients: 991 
girls and 990 boys received delayed manumissions. But girls composed 
almost two-thirds of the children manumitted with immediate effect, 
outnumbering boys by 304 to 177.22 
It is difficult to account for a skew toward immediate manumis-
sion of female children that is not replicated in delayed manumissions. 
The hypothesis that masters were more reluctant to free male slaves 
because of their higher value is appealing, but it fails to explain the 
even sex distribution of delayed manumissions. The theory that black 
parents might have leaned toward manumitting daughters to avoid their 
reaching maturity and bearing children while still enslaved falls afoul 
of the data as well. But if we imagine these two sets of attitudes con-
verging, the patterns begin to make sense. 
In economic terms, slaveholders saw slave children as assets that 
would appreciate over time, boys yielding a greater eventual return 
through their labor or by bringing a higher price if sold. Although chi!-
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TABLE 13 
Manumission of Children, 1770-1830 
Boys Girls Total 
Immediate Manumissions 177(37%) 304 (63%) 481 
Delayed Manumissions 990 (50%) 991 (50%) 1981 
Total 1167 (47%) 1295 (53%) 2462 
dren under five commanded little value, because they were too young 
to work and might well die before paying for their upbringing, even 
infants could be sold for a positive price, with boys fetching somewhat 
more than girls.23 Boys and girls five or older, the dangers of child 
mortality largely behind them, became increasingly valuable with each 
passing year; boys of all age groups sold at higher prices than girls of a 
like age. This sex-based disparity increased as children approached 
adulthood. Left to their own devices, slaveholders disposed to manu-
mit slave children might then have consistently favored the manumis-
sion of less valuable girls. 
Free black parents whose children had been born as slaves would 
have known that buying out their sons and daughters would become 
more costly as they grew older and that girls, even infant girls, could be 
freed more cheaply than boys. In fact, the skew toward freeing girls 
immediately may reflect that free blacks generally found it difficult to 
amass money to purchase any of their male children, or indeed girls 
beyond their earliest years. Age distributions of immediately freed chil-
dren lend support to this proposition, as table 14 shows. 
Nearly twice as many children were freed before their fifth birth-
day as between ages five and nine, and more than twice as many were 
freed before age five as were liberated between the ages of ten and 
fourteen. In all three age groups, girls significantly outnumbered boys. 
This suggests that parents found it easiest to purchase infant or very 
young children, perhaps because slaveholders were more willing to avoid 
risks of mortality and pocket small profits by selling this subset of slave 
children. 
When, for whatever reason, immediate manumission of children 
yielded to term slavery, the concomitant shift in the price mechanism, 
from cash to future service, worked to equalize the number of boys and 
girls prospectively freed. Slaveholders still demanded more for liberat-
ing males, but those demands could be met by fixing longer terms of 
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TABLE 14 
Immediate Manumission of Children by Sex and Age at Freedom 
Age Group Boys Girls Total 
0-4 73 111 184 (38%) 
5-9 46 62 108 (22%) 
10-14 33 44 77 (16%) 
15-19 25 87 112 (23%) 
Totals 177 304 481 
service for boys than for comparably aged girls. Two-thirds of the boys 
promised future freedom had to serve terms of more than fifteen years, 
compared to just half of the girls; more than a third of the boys would 
be term slaves for more than twenty years, compared to barely one-
fifth of the girls. See table 15. 
In short, prevailing prices for slave children significantly shaped 
which African American children were manumitted and the timing of 
those acts. Further support for this view derives from comparing child 
manumission patterns in Baltimore with those of nearby rural coun-
ties. A much higher proportion of manumitted children gained their 
freedom immediately in Baltimore than in the hinterlands. Of 551 
manumissions by white masters of city-dwelling slave children, 197 
(36 percent) took effect immediately, compared to just 284 of 1,911 
manumissions (15 percent) of children in rural counties. The market 
value of slave children did not vary significantly between city and coun-
tryside, but costs of food and shelter were decidedly higher in Balti-
more, and opportunities to employ children were certainly no greater. 
Accordingly, urban slaveholders may have been more disposed to sell 
slave children to their parents and less interested in retaining control of 
them until early adulthood than their rural counterparts. Also, urban 
black parents almost certainly had more access to cash than rural ones, 
both through wage work in Baltimore's craft shops and shipyards, and 
from entrepreneurial activities such as huckstering, carting, or doing 
laundry. The result was that city folk were better placed to purchase 
children outright and could thus free more of their children immediately, 
settling less frequently for the uncertainties of delayed manumission. 
But other obstacles, besides accumulating the funds needed to pur-
chase freedom for one's kin, had to be overcome. Slaveholders could 
refuse to part with their chattels or could seek to extract exorbitant 
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TABLE 15 
Delayed Manumission of Children: Sex and Length of Service 
Years of Service Boys Girls Total 
1-5 4(<1%) 47 ( 5%) 51 
6-10 98 (10%) 153 (16%) 251 
11-15 209 (22%) 280 (29%) 489 
16-20 315 (32%) 278 (28%) 593 
>20 351 (36%) 216 (22%) 567 
Totals 977 974 1,951 
NoTE: These data exclude thirty delayed manumissions of indeterminate length, i.e., 
until the death of the manumitter or his spouse. 
prices, given their position as "monopoly sellers" of the human beings 
parents most wished to rescue from slavery. Faced with intractable 
masters, free people of color sometimes persisted for many years in 
their attempts to free their families, even pursuing the matter beyond 
their own deaths through instructions in their wills. Thomas Pitt, a 
black Baltimorean and a great-grandfather, was still struggling at the 
end of his life to free his son George and George's children by his late 
wife Dinah, as his will, recorded in 1819, reveals. George and his chil-
dren were the slaves of Parker Lee of Harford County. Pitt ordered his 
executors to "purchase and set at liberty" all three, but "if difficulties 
occur ... endeavor particularly to purchase the father, but if he cannot 
be purchased ... and it be practicable to purchase the two Children ... 
that they be purchased accordingly." Perhaps anticipating trouble with 
this plan, Pitt asked that one hundred dollars be set aside as a trust for 
the "comfort of each one or all of them who cannot be purchased and 
set free." If neither George nor either of his children could be freed, Pitt 
directed that fifty-dollar trust funds be set up for three sons of a daugh-
ter who had predeceased him. In this case the three boys were prospec-
tively manumitted term slaves, whose legacies were to be turned over 
them when they attained their freedom. The balance of Pitt's estate was 
to be divided among three sons already free. Despite these elaborate 
contingencies, Pitt's priorities were clear. Above all else, he wanted all 
of his descendants to be free: children and grandchildren already freed 
or promised freedom would receive bequests only after the executors 
had made every exertion to free George and his children. 24 
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Pitt's case was not unique. Carlos Hall was perhaps the richest free 
black in Baltimore in the 1820s, having amassed a small fortune by 
devising, manufacturing, and selling an improved boot-blacking sub-
stance. But Hall himself had only gained his freedom in 1817; in the 
meantime his enslaved daughter had been sold or taken to New Or-
leans by her master. When Hall died in 1823, he had not given up hope 
of freeing her: he left "one thousand dollars plus the interest on a six 
thousand dollar trust to liberate my daughter Mary Ann Hall." Frank 
Armstrong's will offered nine hundred dollars of wages due him from 
George Grundy "for the purchase of freedom of my Daughters Rosetta 
and Angelina, by Leah, Slave of Christopher Hughes, provided he will 
take such a sum as I may leave after my funeral expences and Physician 
are paid." And Amy Scoggins left all of her tiny estate, "two horses, 
one waggon, one cart, one bed, bedding and bedstead, curtain, six chairs 
and three tables" and a few other household effects, "for the sole use 
and benefit of my beloved husband Isaac Scoggins ... to be applied 
towards obtaining his Freedom."25 
Blacks displayed a settled determination to enfranchise their spouses 
and children, combined with a desire to minimize terms of servitude 
incident upon such manumissions by purchase. Nonetheless, even when 
they were free of dealing through whites, freedom was not always 
granted immediately. Nearly a quarter of deeds of manumission granted 
by a free person of color promised the beneficiary only eventual free-
dom, after a term of servitude.26 In a few cases these black masters 
used manumission to ensure their own support and maintenance in old 
age. David Polk, "advanced in years and ... soon ... unable to support 
and maintain himself," felt he had "not only a natural claim to the ... 
assistance of his ... son ... and grandson," but "a peculiarly strong 
claim ... having purchased them at great expense ... and having at a 
still greater expense brought them up and educated them." Seeking to 
"insure to himself the certainty of not being left helpless and destitute 
in his old age," Polk set his son David and grandson Benjamin Handy 
free only at his death. Much as a patriarchal father in colonial America 
might have retained control of his land in life to assure continued loy-
alty, obedience, and service from sons, David Polk reserved the grant of 
freedom to his descendants until his death.27 Polk's desire to protect his 
own interests may have been widely shared: fully half of the boys manu-
mitted by free black men were required to perform a term of service.28 
Other blacks delayed liberating their children and employed the 
broad legal powers of the slaveholder to guard those children from 
white depredations in the guise of indentureship. Maryland courts could 
and did bind out as indentured servants poor children whose parents 
Free Black Family Strategies 137 
could not support them. First envisaged in the seventeenth century as a 
means of providing for the welfare and maintenance of orphans, by the 
early nineteenth century the binding of children, with or without the 
consent of living parents, often assumed the characteristics of an insti-
tution for supplying child labor to landowners and the well-to-do gen-
erally. Although free black children were not exclusively the target of 
such court actions, they were, particularly in many Eastern Shore coun-
ties, disproportionately likely to be taken from their parents and bound 
to serve a farmer or a tradesman. One way for a black parent to avoid 
losing a child through such indentures would be to own the child as a 
slave; the courts had no authority to remove a slave from a master's 
household. Indeed, the possession of a slave, even if that slave were 
one's own child, might undercut the presumption of being propertyless 
and thus a suitable target for the binding out of one's other children. 
The hypothesis that ownership of one's children might represent a 
conscious defensive strategy to avoid white control fits well with re-
gional data regarding the frequency with which black parents chose to 
delay to adulthood the manumission of their children. In Baltimore 
city, where the involuntary indenturing of free black children was rare, 
only 10 percent of black-granted manumissions of children were de-
layed. In rural Maryland, where court bindings of "indigent" free blacks 
constituted a much higher proportion of indentures, 23 percent of black-
granted manumissions stipulated a term of servitude preceding a child's 
freedom. In fact, in Kent County, where indentureship had become vir-
tually an all-black institution by the early nineteenth century, 31 per-
cent of black-granted manumissions were delayed until adulthood.29 
The case of Ben Copper, a free black sailor, illustrates how ma-
nipulating children's status could protect against white exploitation. 
Copper, the father of two boys, had arranged for his sons to be em-
ployed as hired hands by Patrick Gallagher, a white lime kiln operator. 
Worried that Gallagher might try to gain legal control of his sons dur-
ing his absence on a voyage to the West Indies, Copper made out bills 
of sale for his two sons and presented them to his friend Thomas Win-
ston, shortly before his departure. When Gallagher in fact obtained 
"fraudulent" indentures for Copper's sons, by claiming that they were 
indigent free blacks, Winston petitioned the orphans' court to have the 
indentures voided. 
In the ensuing hearing, the white Gallagher asserted that the boys 
were free, to back up his claim to them through articles of indenture, 
but the black Winston triumphantly produced the bills of sale to prove 
that Copper's sons were his slaves and hence beyond Gallagher's grasp. 
As a black man, Winston could not testify directly against Gallagher's 
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claims regarding the boys. But he could successfully pray that the court 
recognize a documented transaction between himself and Copper that 
effectively negated Gallagher's strategy. 30 
Taken together, the black manumission data and the Copper case 
suggest some new lines of thought concerning the vexed question of 
how and why some blacks became slaveholders. One line of thinking, 
espoused by scholars since the time of Carter Woodson, views black 
slaveholding as primarily a beneficent enterprise, typified by the own-
ership of kin, and as a product of antebellum laws restricting manu-
mission. For these writers, black slaveholders were people whose chil-
dren could not legally be freed or whose children's emancipation would 
have required them to leave the state in which they resided. 
Recently, Michael Johnson and James Roark have challenged this 
interpretation, working with extensive census data on black slaveholding 
as well as family papers of prominent free people of color who owned 
large numbers of slaves. In their view free people of color, pressured by 
white hostility to their very existence, and perceiving this pressure to 
be on the rise in the antebellum South, turned to slaveholding as a way 
of demonstrating their acceptance of and solidarity with core values of 
white southern society. For Johnson and Roark, black slaveholding thus 
represents a gesture of accommodation to the dominant forces of their 
world, which may have had relatively little to do with protecting kin or 
keeping families together.31 
The Maryland data regarding black manumissions cannot be fully 
comprehended by either of these two streams of thought. Most black 
manumitters freed relatives, but the law and practice of Maryland did 
not require that black children be held as slaves until attaining their 
majority. The Maryland legislature tinkered fairly often with the legali-
ties of private manumission but never banned it outright or required 
that manumissions be granted only by acts of the legislature, as did 
several deep South states. Likewise, although the state did enact stat-
utes in the aftermath of the Gabriel and Nat Turner insurrections to 
prevent the migration of free people of color into Maryland, every in-
dication is that these laws were all but universally ignored. In short, 
free black parents in Maryland had little reason to think that freeing 
their children would ensnare them in legal difficulties with the public 
law. The view of black slaveholding as a device forced on black parents 
by white social policy does not explain why significant minorities of 
Maryland blacks chose to keep their children in term slavery. 
The Johnson-Roark thesis also runs into difficulties in explaining 
slave ownership by blacks in Maryland, at least for the period before 
1830. Census data show few if any free people of color whose house-
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holds contained more than one or two slaves. Bills of sale recording the 
purchase or sale of a slave by an unrelated black are likewise virtually 
nonexistent.32 Of course, it could be argued that Maryland's relatively 
less inhospitable reception of free people of color, at least as compared 
to South Carolina or the Gulf states, rendered the strategies described 
by Johnson and Roark unnecessary, making Maryland's exceptional 
case compatible with their underlying arguments about black masters. 
But perhaps the behavior of Maryland's black slaveholders sug-
gests areas of overlap between these two strands of interpretation. Most 
black masters in Maryland did own kin, rather than strangers, as 
Woodson and his continuators argued. However, those masters chose 
their status for instrumental reasons, rather than having it forced upon 
them by restrictions on manumission. The rationale behind the choice 
to become a slaveholder, as Johnson and Roark suggest, derived from a 
need to assume the role, status, and legal rights of the slaveholder. Ben 
Copper's slaves were his sons, but he was not forced to own them; he 
seized on the prerogatives of the slaveholder and even delegated them 
to someone outside his own family, his friend Thomas Winston, as a 
way to protect the boys from a predatory white employer. 
Even though Copper's maneuvers were undoubtedly atypical, they 
represent no more than an unusual variation on the central theme of 
the operations of slavery and manumission in Maryland: the contest 
over the terms of labor and its projection into the future via struggles 
to control black children. Slaveholders' interest in delayed manumis-
sion and in selling freedom to slaves sprang from the oversupply of 
African American workers in the countryside. Selective manumission 
offered a way to streamline while retaining the flexibility to "gear up" 
by hanging on to claims to the next generation of African American 
workers. For their part, African Americans made the most of the com-
bination of economic and social factors that rendered gradual manu-
mission a sound strategy for masters; they did their best to counteract 
the transmission of slavery to their children. Chapter 6 reviews these 
on-the-ground struggles from the standpoint of ideology and examines 
the significance or lack thereof of white antislavery thought in shaping 
the world of free people of color in early national Maryland. 
6 
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC THOUGHT 
AND FREE BLACKS 
By 1830 some fourteen thousand 
free African Americans made up almost one-fifth of Baltimore's resi-
dents, outnumbering slaves nearly four to one. The commercial out-
look of Marylanders had strongly shaped the emergence of this black 
community over the preceding forty years. Self-purchase or delayed 
manumission contingent on hard work were the modes by which people 
of color became free; migration to Baltimore was often part of the 
process of liberation. 
In this setting discussions of emancipation shifted away from the 
abstract antislavery of the Revolutionary era and slavery's moral im-
pact on whites, to pragmatic estimates of the capacities of freed people 
and their effects on the American economy. By the second decade of the 
nineteenth century, appeals to religious or republican sentiment were 
giving way to political-economic assessments of blacks as workers, sav-
ers, and consumers. The workings of delayed manumission critically 
affected perceptions of free people of color as economic actors and 
ultimately buttressed intellectual justifications for race-based exclusion 
of blacks from full participation in society. This new, more virulent 
form of racism contributed to squeezing blacks out of the crafts and to 
the increased concentration of blacks in lower-paid, unskilled work. 
The resulting loss of income made it harder for blacks to come up with 
a purchase price in cash or future work to buy themselves or family 
members out of slavery. These difficulties, coupled with an expanding 
market and rising prices for slaves sold to the cotton states, slowed the 
pace of self-emancipation of Maryland's blacks in the decades after 
1830 and thus help account for the state's far advanced but incomplete 
transition from slavery to freedom by 1860. 
The central question whites posed about former slaves was whether 
freedmen would work without compulsion. 1 In postemancipation plan-
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tation societies, the perceived withdrawal of former slave women and 
children from field labor would often feed doubts on this point; in 
Baltimore the idea of the "lazy" freedman drew strength from the out-
comes of delayed manumission. To be sure, blacks saved for years and 
accumulated impressive amounts to buy themselves or family members 
out of slavery or to pay debts incurred in self-purchase: an adult male 
slave's price matched the median taxable wealth of urban property 
holders.2 But these expenditures on the invisible asset of personal lib-
erty left little capital with which to obtain the tangible property that 
signified a worker's industry, thrift, and accumulative mentality. In the 
same vein manumissions negotiated by commuting slavery for life into 
a term of service generally did not take effect until the freed person had 
passed the age of thirty, denying that person the benefit of many of his 
or her peak earning years. However freedom was attained, after the 
long struggle to pay its price was over, an African American family 
could maintain a given level of subsistence with lower earnings than 
before. Such a choice might have been quite tempting to people who 
had often won freedom through extremely heavy and prolonged physi-
callabor, as the work record of Scipio Freeman at the Maryland Chemi-
cal Works suggests. But any diminution of labor that might flow from 
that circumstance could be observed and adduced as "proof" of free 
black sloth. 
Maryland commentators were not slow to conclude that freed blacks 
were "lazy" or "improvident." Antislaveryite Daniel Raymond com-
. plained that, "in regard to manumitted slaves ... nine out of ten ... 
industrious and moral before, become vagabonds, and one half of them 
perhaps, get into the penitentiary." Editor Hezekiah Niles found in 
1819 that "free blacks among us are less honest and correct, less indus-
trious and not so much to be depended upon ... as the well-treated 
slaves," and he argued that "worn out slaves," manumitted by their mas-
ters to avoid supporting them in old age, were one cause of the problem. 3 
The negative comments about blacks of antislavery sympathizers 
like Niles and Raymond underline the point that intellectual support 
for emancipation, as a device to preserve and protect whites' republi-
can virtue, failed to evoke any corresponding enthusiasm for freed 
blacks. It is not much of an overstatement to say that Revolutionary-
era antislavery was a program intended to benefit whites, whereas the 
actual emancipation of blacks was seen as the price to be paid. Through-
out the decades from 1780 to 1830, proponents of antislavery stressed 
the gains of ending slavery; opponents dwelt on the unacceptable so-
cial and economic costs of freeing blacks. What changed over time was 
the increasing presence of free people of color, with the concomitant 
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opportunity or burden, depending on one's position, of assessing their 
successes and failures in free society. 
An exchange in the Maryland Gazette in late 1790, occurring as 
the legislators debated legalizing manumission by will, illustrates ideas 
in play early in the period. "A Freeman" opened the debate with the 
argument that Americans' claims to cherish liberty were inconsistent 
with the continuation of Negro slavery. He then smeared slavery by 
pointing to the "impious" Algerine practice of enslaving Europeans, 
disposed of historical precedents for slavery's legitimacy with reference 
to the historical ubiquity of monarchy, and rested his case with an in-
vocation for slaveholders to free their chattels in obedience to the Golden 
Rule.4 Antislavery was republican, Christian, and moral; slaveholding 
was the obverse of these virtues. 
Two weeks later "A True Friend to the Union" responded that 
although slavery "ha[d] been a curse to the southern states," it seemed 
likely to be "entailed" on them for some time to come. This writer 
insisted that, "As the evil came among us slowly ... so must it be done 
away, almost as gradually as it came on." His principal justifications 
bespoke fear of free blacks ("You could not with propriety, let all loose 
among us at once") and concern that financial "ruin to white inhabit-
ants would ensue." Citing the "convenience" to propertied men of being 
able to leave slaves to their daughters, whose "hire, with the industry 
of their mistresses, yields a competency for the support of all," the 
defender of slavery embodied a patriarchal inclusion of white women 
and black slaves in the same dependent category and an assertion that 
slavery would foster labor and industry. Whatever the virtues of anti-
slavery as a theoretical construct, actual emancipation was to be weighed 
for its economic and political consequences.5 
In a rejoinder the Freeman conceded that many free blacks "would 
abuse their freedom and render themselves more miserable than they 
are in bondage" and quickly passed on to a restatement of the moral 
necessity for whites of liberating their slaves. True Friend's rebuttal of 
December 16 hammered away at the point that "a general manumis-
sion" would be dangerous without "exportation .... It would not do 
to keep them among us." 6 Eventually, the Freeman entered a carefully 
qualified class-oriented defense of free blacks, claiming that their "in-
dustry and honesty" would equal that of whites "of a similar station" 
in life.? The debate between True Friend and Freeman thus turned chiefly 
on the criteria for evaluating the desirability of emancipation for white 
society. Freeman advanced no independent counterargument for the 
potential gains of liberating slaves; he contended mainly that free blacks 
would implicitly be no more harmful to society than propertyless whites. 
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In so doing Freeman was scarcely unique; at least one contempo-
rary combined advocacy of immediate abolition with a demand for 
colonization of all freed blacks. "Othello," in a pair of letters to the 
American Museum in 1788, insisted that slavery was "inconsistent with 
the declared principles of the American revolution" and urged that "we 
should set all our slaves at liberty, immediately, and colonize them in 
the western territory." Othello then linked emancipation and the en-
couragement of industry among whites, claiming that abolition would 
make America "a richer and more happy country" because "our lands 
would not then be cut down for the support of a train of useless inhab-
itants," whose existence inspired only "sloth and voluptuousness among 
our young farmers and planters." 8 In common with many opponents 
of emancipation, Othello apparently held no great expectations for the 
future of blacks in America. 
Othello, Freeman, and True Friend positioned themselves along a 
spectrum of views ranging from ambivalence through pessimism to a 
negative certainty regarding the prospects of free blacks. They all drew 
on the idea, still prevalent in the late eighteenth century, that work was 
a divinely ordained curse on sinful man that most persons naturally 
sought to avoid. This perception originally contained no racial over-
tones; many late- eighteenth-century thinkers feared that white Ameri-
cans could sink into indolence because of the supposed ease of satisfying 
basic wants and needs in a well-endowed country. James Madison 
worried that western settlers would succumb to the temptation to en-
joy the produce of rich new lands without having to labor extensively. 
Their resulting indolence and torpor would unfit them for the respon-
sibilities of citizenship, threatening the stability of the republic. Madi-
son favored the encouragement of commercial agriculture to induce 
Americans to work hard to sell surplus crops and accumulate wealth. 9 
To some who worried about white industriousness, the "sloth and 
voluptuousness" encouraged by slavery were equally threatening tore-
publican virtue, making the extinction of slavery desirable. But however 
beneficial emancipation might prove in preserving a sturdily working 
white citizenry, the resulting creation of a free black populace presented 
problems. To men who metaphorically associated change with decay, 
who feared that white Americans would yield to the temptation to live 
rudely to avoid work, the notion that ex-slaves could be self-reliant 
and industrious was alien. Blacks had lived without the ability to accu-
mulate property, and the urge to do so would not automatically come 
with striking off their chains. Free blacks would become a propertyless 
class of dependent laborers, constituting another problem for the main-
tenance of the commonweal. 
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Observations, accurate or otherwise, of "shirking" by slaves do 
not appear to have played a central role in this line of thought. Theo-
retical concerns dominated the formation of the belief that the benefits 
of industry and labor, deemed so essential to the progress of white 
American society, were unlikely to be earned or enjoyed by free blacks. 
The near uniformity of these late-eighteenth-century stereotypes of 
"lazy" free blacks as a "useless" caste predated the presence of any 
substantial population of free people of color. 10 But the weight given to 
such stereotypes increased as free blacks became a more visible and 
numerous element of society. 
In 1805 the Maryland General Assembly expanded efforts to man-
age free blacks, cracking down especially to ensure that they not dis-
turb the security of slave property. A law requiring free blacks to ob-
tain court-registered certificates of freedom cited as its chief object the 
prevention of "slaves coming into possession of the certificates of free 
negroes ... running away and passing as free." In order to obtain 
convictions in crimes involving blacks, the legislature also broadened 
the state's rules of evidence to admit the testimony of slaves and free 
blacks against each other.l1 At this stage free blacks were still seen as 
an anomalous adjunct to the slave population. Acts more frankly de-
signed to create mechanisms for controlling free blacks per se received 
less emphatic support. A prohibition on free black emigration to Mary-
land and bans on "tumultuous meetings" or carrying guns were en-
acted, but all had loopholes granting wide discretion in enforcement. 
Moreover, these laws failed to provide monetary rewards to private 
citizens who prosecuted violations, a sign that their enforcement was 
not of central importance to Marylanders. 12 Free blacks thus did not 
bulk large in the concerns of whites, but nonetheless they were regarded 
with suspicion. 
More broadly based evidence of perceptions of free blacks appears 
in petitions to Maryland's governors seeking pardons for convicted crimi-
nals. Petitions on behalf of whites routinely averred that the proposed 
beneficiary had led a life of "industry, honesty, and sobriety" before his 
unfortunate misstep, while those for free black felons, whether drafted 
in 1790 or 1820, made such claims far less frequently and attracted 
relatively few signers when they did so. In fact, pardon petitions on 
behalf of slaves more commonly attested to the subject's work ethic 
than those for free blacks. 13 
Ex-slaves in Baltimore frequently sought self-employment as cart-
ers, hucksters, washerwomen, or chimney sweeps; whites could mis-
read such desire for autonomy as unwillingness to work steadily over 
long periods, that is, to become wage workers. Similarly, seasonal un-
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employment at the port or in ci-aft work, or layoffs due to hard times, 
provided further "evidence" of incapacity for freedom.l4 The prudent 
and foresighted laborer, aware of the vicissitudes of the local labor 
market, would save up to get through lean times, but a free black who 
did "follow some regular course of industry" would still be mired in 
the "habits of thoughtless improvidence ... contracted while a slave" 
and would inevitably become a public charge.15 Even those who were 
an "ornament to the ranks of day laborers" were prone to "indolence" 
stemming from "an understandable lack of familiarity with the mys-
tery of property," a mentality difficult to erase.l6 
The supposed shortcomings of slaves and free people of color as 
savers and accumulators were ironically complemented by the suspi-
cion that they were inadequate consumers. Niles, a proponent of devel-
oping the "home market" for American manufactures, worried about 
the presence of people too poor to purchase such goods. Daniel 
Raymond also advocated a high-production, high-consumption 
economy and explicitly identified African Americans as an impediment 
to that goal. Slaves did not "labor to increase the product" because 
they did not "derive the benefit of the increase," but more critically, the 
bare subsistence level at which most slaves lived focused them strictly 
on obtaining the "necessaries" of life. In contrast, the free white worker's 
"wants always exceed his power of supplying them, as artificial wants 
spring up" as soon as necessaries were met. 
Freeing blacks would not increase their demand for "comforts," as 
habits of enforced frugality acquired in bondage would be retained and 
even transmitted to their children. Overlooking the impact of self-
purchase on freed peoples' disposable income and consumption patterns, 
or perhaps drawing the right conclusion for the wrong reason, Niles 
and Raymond held that the problem of the parsimonious ex-slave un-
derlined the importance of free birth as a prerequisite for satisfactory 
membership in society. They looked for outward signs of prosperity as 
a way of ascertaining the freedman's character and, seeing instead an 
absence of household goods, they equated the absence of those sym-
bols of respectability with a supposedly irredeemable povertyY 
These hard-eyed assessments of free blacks against standards of 
political economy that valued high consumption were reinforced by 
older, environmentalist pessimism about the capacity of freed blacks to 
overcome the degradation of slavery and reorient their behavior. Blacks' 
status as propertyless laborers thus served both as evidence of innate 
immorality and of unfitness for life in a competitive society, threaten-
ing a consequent slowdown of the engines that propelled American 
growth. 
Detail of commercial street scene in early national Baltimore, where black workers and 
families were able to unite in freedom. Lithograph printed by E. Sachse and Company, 
c. 1850. Maryland Historical Society 
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The charge against freed people of economic shortcomings drew 
strength from other, more axiomatic objections. Raymond asked, rhe-
torically, "In a political, a moral, an intellectual, and a religious point 
of view, is not a white population better than a black one?" Likewise, 
Hezekiah Niles prized a "uniformity of habits and manners" in America 
and found its development impeded by the presence of blacks and sla-
very. Convinced that blacks would continue to pose a "problem" for 
white America, and immersed in a city with a swelling population of 
free people of color, both pro- and antislavery thinkers turned to the 
analysis of demographic trends to determine whether America could 
purge itself of blacks to white advantage. 
In 1819 Niles projected a slave population of three million by 1835 
and feared that such numbers would "prove a serious incumbrance on 
the white population .... it will be difficult to employ and maintain 
them to advantage." 18 Raymond, while caught up in the Missouri con-
troversy, went beyond linear projections of slave population growth 
and analyzed free and slave state census data to construct a demo-
graphic argument for manumission and against "diffusion,"-allow-
ing slaves to be taken into the territories of the Louisiana Purchase. He 
found that slave population grew at a faster rate than white popula-
tion in a slaveholding state, that white population grew faster in free 
states than in slave states, and that free black population grew less 
than half as fast as the white population in free states. To Raymond, 
these patterns proved that diffusion would encourage growth of slave 
population and retard that of whites, whereas more extensive manu-
mission would reduce the ratio of blacks to whites. 19 If freed slaves did 
"become a nuisance to society," were they not as slaves "an infinitely 
greater nuisance?" Besides, the "idle, vagabond blacks do not raise 
families, or comparatively none." Those who exhibited industry would 
raise children, and manumission must thus either promote the extinc-
tion of unworthy blacks or aid the development of a reliable black 
citizenry. Freedmen "would ... acquire the habits of free men ... or 
dwindle to nothing."2o 
Raymond's patronizing tone notwithstanding, his observations 
accurately captured some aspects of manumission and self-purchase. 
Free black parents would be raising children, as opposed to having 
them languish in slavery, to the extent that their hard work allowed 
them to buy out their sons and daughters (unless good fortune or in-
dustry had permitted them to become free early in life, before having 
children). In that sense free blacks might well "dwindle" if they could 
not break their families out of the transgenerational cycle of term sla-
very. 
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Raymond's pamphlet did not long go unchallenged. Proslavery 
Baltimore attorney Joseph D. Learned countered that diffusion would 
enrich both masters who went west and those who stayed behind, al-
lowing improved slave maintenance and reducing the dangers of a slave 
insurrection arising from ill-fed, ill-clad chattels.21 Learned also de-
bunked Raymond's data on free blacks, insisting that "seven-eighths" 
of them had been born in slavery and that freeborn people of color 
would raise larger families. In a telling comment showing his familiar-
ity with gradual manumission, Learned observed that "much the great-
est portion [of manumitted slaves] have not acquired their freedom 
until the natural period for increase is past." This would artificially 
depress the growth rates of free blacks, whose "numerous offspring, 
perhaps, are held in slavery," falsely inflating the slave population 
growth rates that so alarmed Raymond. 
Likewise, northern experience with free blacks might not be a valid 
predictor for the South: the harsher climate and more competitive la-
bor market rendered free black subsistence there more "scanty and 
precarious," so free blacks in the South would grow at a faster rate 
than Raymond expected. Finally, if slaves actually did increase faster 
than free blacks, that merely proved the "degraded" state of free people 
of color and argued against their liberation, for "only the most worth-
less [were] freed, and that for the purpose of being relieved of them."22 
Proponents and opponents of diffusing slaves to Missouri thus both 
forecast that blacks might not succeed in freedom, but they differed 
over whether manumission would accentuate or alleviate the demo-
graphic threat to white prosperity. Exporting slaves to Missouri and 
deporting freed blacks to Africa in the guise of colonization both had 
their adherents in Maryland, where a state chapter of the American 
Colonization Society had been founded in 1817. 
Robert Goodloe Harper laid out the case for colonization in a 
lengthy public letter developing themes that were already hardening 
into conventional wisdom.23 Harper neatly combined the conceits of 
white-oriented antislavery and black unworthiness, asserting that colo-
nization would "confer a benefit on ourselves, by ridding us of a popu-
lation for the most part idle and useless, and too often vicious and 
mischievous." Freely admitting that white "prejudices" influenced these 
perceptions, Harper nonetheless saw free blacks as "condemned to ... 
hopeless inferiority and degradation" by their skin color. He discounted 
the significance of the transition to free status for blacks and embraced 
the equally conservative notion that public opinion would immutably 
reject black participation in republican society.24 
Harper insisted that this "impassible barrier" to social equality 
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meant that for the African American "the incitement to good conduct 
... which arises from the hoping of raising himself ... is a stranger to 
his breast." Self-discipline would never take root, and even the rare 
freedman who discarded habits "contracted while a slave" might be 
reinfected by "the slaves among whom he is forced to live," leading to 
the inexorable outcome of "liv[ing] as a pauper, at the expense of the 
community." Imbued with the idea that desirable changes could only 
occur over imperceptibly long periods of time, Harper despaired equally 
of whites accepting blacks and of blacks meriting such acceptance.25 
Harper brought his argument full circle by objecting to free blacks' 
tendency toward "corruption of the slaves ... by rendering them idle, 
discontented and disobedient." Painting a gloomy picture of free black 
disorder provoking otherwise hard-working and loyal slaves into flight, 
theft, and resistance to masters, he opined that free blacks would be to 
blame if future slave misdeeds provoked masters "to a severity, which 
would not otherwise be thought necessary. "26 
Harper's sometimes tortuous reasoning bespoke a fundamental 
objection to the anomalous status of emancipated blacks in a society 
with race-based slavery. That objection nonetheless had some ground-
ing in real experience. Free blacks were aiding discontented slaves in 
escaping their masters, for example. Because they could not be sub-
sumed satisfactorily under preexisting social categories, they threat-
ened to blur the definition of other groups, including whites. Black 
workers, slave or free, also inspired a contempt for hard work among 
"the class of free whites who ought to labour" and who instead, "saw 
labour as a badge of slavery," so Harper concluded that free blacks 
were "injurious to all. "27 
Colonization would allow free blacks to escape white prejudice, 
lessening the corruption of slaves and encouraging white immigration 
into slave states. Harper closed with an adjuration against sending colo-
nists to British-established Sierra Leone, as "our colony ... ought to be 
republican." 28 Far from a mere rhetorical flourish, Harper's uncharac-
teristic optimism about black potential in Africa represented another 
salute to social homogeneity. Although their indeterminate status could 
only disrupt America, free blacks might erect their own republican so-
ciety in Africa, contributing by subtraction to the purification of the 
United States. These views resonated with the political community of 
Maryland; in its 1817-18 session the legislature unanimously endorsed 
the colonization principle.29 
Harper's privileging of homogeneity as a way of reading free blacks 
out of the polity melded with other invocations of republican equality 
advanced for the same purposes. An anonymous contributor to Hezekiah 
150 The Price of Freedom 
Niles's Weekly Register decried treatment of free blacks: denying them 
equality tended to "aggravate their feelings of inferiority"; however, 
giving blacks full equality would lead to "a war of complete extermi-
nation (as was the case in St. Domingo)." Seeking to bolster his view of 
free blacks as inveterately vengeful, and reading manumissions as acts 
of white benevolence, the writer observed the lack of black "testimony 
of gratitude for this boon [of freedom]." Citing the experience of the 
"most sensible, informed and discreet members of the Methodist soci-
ety," who had freed slaves, the author found a unanimous sentiment 
that those freed were "unhappy, abject, and miserable, and to society 
its greatest evil." Freely conceding that slaveholding was "politically 
wrong," this commentator characterized emancipation as a hypocriti-
cal sop to white conscience, of "no benefit to [blacks], unless we raise 
them to the enjoyment of equal privileges, and ... amalgamate with 
them on the most liberal and reciprocal terms." 30 
Both procolonization writers dwelt on the benefits or social costs 
of emancipation for broad "classes" of whites and blacks but displayed 
little interest in evidence of individual African Americans' success in 
freedom. Harper mentioned Paul Cuffe, a wealthy free black ship cap-
tain and merchant from Massachusetts, to recapitulate his argument 
on the alleged social incompatibility of the races: whatever Cuffe's at-
tainments, he would not be invited to dinner by any white merchant of 
Boston.31 
By the period of 1815-19, the view of "mere" emancipation as a 
dangerous half-measure that might corrode white Americans' moral 
fiber or cheat them of economic opportunity, while bringing little hap-
piness to former slaves, had gained wide currency: far-reaching action 
would be needed to attain the desideratum of a uniracial, white society. 
Avowed antislaveryites, limited in the upper South by this time to Quak-
ers, a few Methodists, and emigrants from northern states, could deride 
the impracticality of colonization, but their own conservative environ-
mentalism generated equally improbable and ponderously gradual rem-
edies, informed by many of the same doubts about black capacity to 
survive in an increasingly competitive society. 
In 1819 Hezekiah Niles's editorials on the "mitigation" of slavery 
vetoed colonization, advocating the gradual extirpation of domestic 
slavery, preceded by education in self-denial and love of property while 
the prospective freed person was still enslaved.32 Like Harper, he feared 
the mingling of free negroes and slaves, contending that "mixture is 
fatal to the improvement of both." In gauging the time needed for the 
transformation of slaves to free men, Niles alluded to "our ancestors of 
England," who when "first known to the Romans" were "as much the 
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objects of scorn ... as the negroes are to us." Freedom had come far 
too quickly for Niles's virtually geologic sense of progress; in Baltimore's 
uncontrolled atmosphere, freedmen were doomed by contaminating 
contact with those still enslaved. 
Such corruption of nominally free citizens was a critical problem, 
for Niles, like Harper, stressed social uniformity as essential to America's 
realizing its destiny as a chosen land for a chosen people. In a teleologi-
cal account of American origins, Niles avoided the construction of sla-
very as "entailed" on America by England, but he still laid the blame 
for its introduction squarely on the monarchical British. Noting with 
approval the "growing disposition to ameliorate" the institution, he 
nevertheless warned of the dangers of inaction. Taking his text from 
Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, Niles lamented "industry destroyed" by 
slavery's degradation of honorable labor and alluded to a possible race 
war if slavery continued. 33 
This anxious review of the history of slavery, like Niles's plans for its 
extirpation; bestrode new and old attitudes toward the flow of human 
affairs. In his introductory paean to a rising American republic, the 
lineaments of a nineteenth-century progressive view of change may be 
discerned. But in thinking about blacks, Niles operated with eighteenth-
century categories, seeing freed people as a subset of slaves, unlikely to 
be swept up in America's advance. 
Like Raymond, Niles studied black and white demographics, view-
ing with alarm the doubling of the slave population between 1790 and 
1810 and extrapolating further growth that would cramp opportuni-
ties for white workers. Here Niles was tapping into strains of thought 
about employment and wealth loosely derived from the classical econo-
mists, a harbinger of things to come in slavery debates. Although whites 
would gain from ending slavery and the attendant competition for jobs, 
to give slaves freedom at once would be "worse than 'throwing pearls 
before swine."' Only a few free blacks could grudgingly be conceded to 
be industrious; most had few dreams of attaining independence and 
the accompanying willingness to work hard. Instead, "they will make a 
thousand shifts rather than seek employment," including theft or re-
ceiving goods stolen by slaves. Concluding this vilification, Niles found 
that free blacks had no one but themselves to blame for the "slacken[ing] 
... zeal of the friends of emancipation." 34 
Niles's preoccupation with free black crime derived in part from 
the influx of free blacks to the newly erected state penitentiary. Black 
property crime, less visible when privately punished by slaves' masters, 
had become a "new" phenomenon in the public eye. Prejudice against 
free blacks may have contributed to higher conviction rates and fewer 
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pardons; in turn, perceptions of free blacks as a criminal class added to 
their ill-repute and stirred up early reservations about the wisdom of 
the penitentiary concept. 35 Responding to charges that the penitentiary 
was failing to reform criminals or deter crime, the Maryland legisla-
ture targeted blacks as the problem. Stopping short of proposals to re-
enslave free black criminals, an 1818 law allowed courts to whip or 
banish free blacks in lieu of a penitentiary sentence; the statute barred 
the penitentiary to criminal slaves. The reauthorizing of corporal pun-
ishment for free African Americans symbolized their affinity with slaves 
in white minds and registered the political community's reluctance to 
pursue the presumably hopeless task of reforming free blacks by sub-
jecting them to closely supervised hard labor in the penitentiary.36 
The antislavery political economist Daniel Raymond elaborated 
on the theoretical difficulties in devising systems of crime and punish-
ment for blacks, linking inadequacies of manumission and public 
misperception of the dignity of labor to the failure of the penitentiary 
"both to prevent crimes and to reform criminals."37 Hard labor was 
"wholly ineffectual in reforming the convict," because laborious em-
ployment was not, as outmoded notions held, a punishment. Rather, 
Raymond pictured the "fatigued laborer" in the penitentiary "eat[ing] 
heartily and sleep[ing] soundly, the two greatest comforts and blessings 
an uneducated man can hope to enjoy." Moreover, the close control 
and the formation of "habits suited to a penitentiary" left a man "en-
tirely unsuited to the world, or to personal liberty. " 38 Then, linking ex-
convicts and ex-slaves, Raymond stated, "We see this same principle 
... producing the same effect in regard to manumitted slaves." 
The problems symptomized by black convicts could be attributed 
to lack of suitable education, according to Niles. Brought up in slavery 
and surrounded by slave companions after winning freedom, blacks 
could not be expected to emulate honest white freemen, "but by the 
exertion of virtues that would exalt a white man to a high rank in 
society." Only schemes for gradual emancipation that inculcated self-
denial and a love of property in the prospective freedman while still a 
slave could make the transition to freedom successfut39 
Attempting to overcome the contradiction between slow-paced 
emancipation and the manumittee's clean break with slavery, Niles made 
a startling proposal to remove twelve thousand slave girls a year to 
northern households, where they would serve a term of years and then 
become free. These children, "isolated from their former companions . 
. . immersed in a moral atmosphere ... and educated to a virtuous 
life," would become useful citizens; moreover, they and their children 
would acquire whiter skins. Denying any veiled approval of race mix-
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ing, Niles argued that skin color was governed by climate and environ-
ment and that "a family of colored people, insulated by white people, 
and having no communication with others of a darker race ... would 
in time lose ... their darkness." 40 
Although white tutelage might improve blacks, Niles also advo-
cated his plan as "the proper means of checking the propagation of the 
slave species." Only thus could Americans hope to "eradicat[e] the of-
fensive colour and the distinctions it causes." Emigration and etiola-
tion would together lead to "the final accomplishment of ... the desire 
of every man's heart in America-the final abolition of slavery and the 
extinction of the slave species, as we designate the people of color-for 
such they are in the United States." For Niles, changing color was the 
key preparation for freedom, without which African Americans could 
not escape mutually reinforcing white prejudice and black improvi-
dence.41 
Niles also projected more direct benefits from his plan: Slave owners 
could profitably sell female slave children at prices that would appeal 
to Northern householders seeking domestic help, and slave mothers 
would gladly relinquish their daughters to future freedom and respect-
ability. Any public subsidy needed would be far smaller than that pro-
jected for African colonization. Niles stressed relocating only women, 
in a statement striking for its interpenetration of patriarchal views with 
those of an emerging model of female governance of a domestic realm. 
He contended that "women are more tractable than men" and that 
therefore the "transferred female negro ... would sooner fit herself for 
freedom," as her "communication with the females of the family, would 
daily and hourly impress upon her mind a sense of right and wrong. "42 
Although the free black man at large in society could not hope to im-
prove, the black woman, shielded in the bosom of a proper white home, 
could make the transition to life as a free person. White women, them-
selves secluded from direct participation in the affairs of the republic, 
would teach virtue to young black women, who would absorb the hab-
its needed for success. Black men were simply not included in this child-
focused plan for creating self-reliant but safely subordinate members 
of a republican society.43 Niles was not alone in demanding segrega-
tion of freed people from slaves. Daniel Raymond also felt that "Blacks 
... who have been born free, and educated with the expectation of 
being free, ... make as industrious, sober, good citizens, as any." Like 
Niles, Raymond favored placing black children with "some good mas-
ter, who should instruct them. "44 
Aversion to immediate liberation bespoke a deep commitment to 
closely monitored change as essential to improving black moral char-
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acter. Others were even less sanguine than Niles and Raymond about 
the feasibility of black improvement. John Pendleton Kennedy, like 
Harper, regarded prejudice against blacks as insuperable, making freed 
people a "proscribed and a forbidden class," unable to "compete for 
work with . . . whites." In his view the free blacks generally became 
profligate and contaminated the slaves with their vices. 45 "A Colored 
Baltimorean" pleaded vainly for whites to "Give us the same stimulus 
to honesty, industry, and virtue .... And if we fail ... then brand us 
with the epithets of thieves, vagrants, &c. "46 But in general, only whole-
sale relocation, whether to the west, the east, or the north, was deemed 
likely by most whites to secure the environmental purity needed to 
nurture the habits of freedom. 
However implausible these assessments of free black character and 
their proposed remedies, the workings of manumission did foster a 
world in which slaves for life, slaves serving a term of years, and freed-
men were commingled within and across family lines. Slavery as a stage-
of-life institution could be perpetuated for generations as women prom-
ised freedom at twenty-five, thirty, or older gave birth to children who 
became slaves for life or until well into their adult years, according to 
the provisions of the mother's manumission. It is not surprising, then, 
that those at least marginally sympathetic to black liberation, like Niles 
and Raymond, sought either to get black women out of Maryland or 
to wish the "problem" of newly freed blacks away by predicting their 
· disappearance or deracination. 
An unabashed conservative like Robert Harper could call for colo-
nization without internal contradiction, but those like Niles, who had 
a foot in each camp, could only strain to bridge the conceptual gaps in 
their mental universe by indulging in fanciful hopes, such as turning 
black servant girls white by moving them to northern homes. In turn, 
although Daniel Raymond sympathized with humane proposals to su-
pervise the black transition to freedom, his focus on self-interested eco-
nomic action allowed him to define the "problem" of the fate of blacks 
out of existence, by proclaiming that they would either thrive or disap-
pear. It was all too easy, however, for conservative opponents like Jo-
seph Learned to appropriate Raymond's methodology and mount a 
defense of the status quo, by arguing that self-interest should indeed 
reign supreme, both in manumission decisions and respecting the diffu-
sion of slavery. 
By 1824 even unqualified adherents of antislavery had become 
tinged by negative estimates of free black capabilities. Elisha Tyson, a 
leader of the early abolition society, a challenger of kidnappers, and the 
bane of slaveholders generally from the 1780s onward, chided an audi-
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ence of free people of color: "How lamentable is the reflection that the 
misconduct of some amongst you . . . should afford ground for the 
assertion that you are unworthy of liberty." Tyson urged greater atten-
tion to religion and more sobriety among his hearers and argued that 
more decorous free black behavior would "lead [slaves] to be faithful 
servants. "47 
Only one Baltimore commentator sought straightforwardly to re-
form delayed manumission in a Maryland setting. The peripatetic Ben-
jamin Lundy, newly arrived in Baltimore in 1825, belieed that black 
labor could be linked to the desired modes of acquisitive and accumu-
lative behavior by public regulation of delayed manumission terms. He 
enthusiastically endorsed self-purchase on an installment plan in his 
antislavery weekly, the Genius of Universal Emancipation. Apparently 
unaware of gradual manumission's long history in Maryland, Lundy 
produced precise calculations to the effect that a slave allowed initially 
to work for himself just one day of the week could buy successive in-
crements of his work week and become free in seven and one-half years. 
Masters could "ensure ... punctual performance" of tasks during the 
buying-out period, and blacks would learn "habits of industry and tem-
perance." Perhaps unconsciously mirroring the sentiments of mariy 
slaveholders, Lundy concluded that "any slave who failed to save 
enough" to buy himself out "is scarcely entitled to the enjoyment of 
civil liberty. "48 
Whereas Raymond objected to the supposed suddenness of manu-
mission by will, Lundy criticized deeded manumission and the shifting, 
unenforceable bargains that masters and slaves struck; he returned re-
peatedly to the theme of validating free black worth by contractual 
self-purchase, urging that slave earnings be protected by law and that 
self-purchase agreements be enforceable by law.49 In 1827 Lundy en-
thused over the coartaci6n laws of the former Spanish colonies and 
government-mediated pricing of self-purchase. The regularity and pre-
dictability of the process would "incite [slaves] to industry and economy, 
and prevent those from gaining their freedom who are unworthy of 
it. "50 
Lundy also strove to show the bankruptcy of bound labor both at 
the microeconomic and at the macroeconomic level. He claimed on the 
one hand that free labor was cheaper than slave labor, because of the low-
er productivity of the latter, and on the other hand that both employ-
ers of labor and workers would find a free labor economy more generally 
prosperous and progressive, because of the higher levels of consumer 
demand that free replacements for slave workers would generate. Like 
Harper, Niles, and Raymond, the editor of the Genius concerned himself 
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only tangentially with the fate of blacks once they attained freedom, 
and he, too, framed his discussion in terms of whether, and under what 
white-managed plans, they could become reliable wage workers. 
For Lundy the visibly structured acquisition of freedom would both 
mold free blacks into promise-keeping actors in a market economy and 
validate their worth in white eyes. But slaveholders had already con-
structed an elaborate array of positive and negative incentives within 
the framework of delayed manumission in order to obtain greater pro-
duction from term slaves. Varying the term of servitude, with reduc-
tions for "faithful and obedient" service or additions for illness or run-
ning away, was a key device in this realm. Lundy's desire to eliminate 
the uncertainty surrounding the promise of prospective freedom would 
have vitiated a cherished management tool. Slaveholders' views on re-
forming manumission were reflected in the 1833 law allowing the out-
of-state sale of refractory term slaves who had failed to respond to 
lengthened terms. Lundy's proposed hobbling of slaveholders' freewheel-
ing and open-ended transactions with slaves, and of the powerful ad-
vantages they enjoyed in negotiating manumission, found little public 
support. 51 
In this uncertain environment, term slaves used all the options avail-
able to dissuade slaveholders from retaining them for their full term, or 
to seize freedom from masters who reneged on promised manumission: 
they withheld their earnings as hirelings, they threatened and assaulted 
their masters, and sometimes they ran away. The program of slaveholders 
to maximize the exploitation of term slaves by tightening discipline 
through the threat of sale thus generated resistance that further fueled 
perceptions of blacks as unwilling or unable to conform to the canons 
of the work ethic. 
The rejection of Lundy's reform proposals and a concomitant weak 
showing for Daniel Raymond's antislavery candidacies for the legisla-
ture in 1825 and 1826 further registered white indifference to or dis-
taste for African Americans in Baltimore. These events were soon fol-
lowed by the Baltimore carters' petition of 1828, to bar free blacks and 
slaves from working as draymen, one of the first legislative efforts by 
white workingmen in Maryland to ban black competitors. Intellectual-
ized reservations toward free black workers were now succeeded by 
overt hostility; the carters decried free blacks as "more easily influ-
enced by temptations to steal, less influenced by the desire of maintain-
ing an honest reputation, and ... less fear[ful] of the operations of the 
law than the white people." Opposition from Baltimore merchants 
alarmed by prospective increases in drayage costs stymied the petition, 
but by the 1830s public opinion had settled into regarding free blacks 
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as an ineradicable nuisance with a consequent retelling of the Revolu-
tionary-era myth of the "entailment" of slavery's curse on America .to 
apply to unwelcome freed people. 52 
The modes of thought and life that allowed whites to profit from a 
slavery they described as evil had been adjusted to encompass exploit-
ing free blacks seen as unworthy of enjoying the advantages of free 
society. Along the way contests between masters and slaves over the 
terms of manumission may well have contributed to white resentment 
of free African Americans; many former slaveholders would have shared 
Hezekiah Niles's sense that manumission had proceeded too rapidly, at 
least compared to their desires. The partial effacing of the "stain" of 
slavery in Maryland, a consequence of African American pressure and 
narrowing profitability, occurred without a significant diminution of 
white revulsion toward blacks. Rather, in the transition to free labor, 
assessments of freed people as inadequate workers, savers, and con-
sumers augmented earlier, more visceral fears of blacks and thus con-
tributed to the elaboration and strengthening of racism. 
CONCLUSIONS 
On July 4, 1828, an "immense 
throng of spectators ... filled every window ... and the pavement 
below ... on Baltimore Street ... for a distance of about two miles." A 
crowd of seventy thousand, "placed as closely as they could be stowed," 
assembled to view an enormous parade celebrating the ground breaking 
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The city's drive for western mar-
kets in place of its stagnating oceanic trade was symbolized by a float 
bearing a fully rigged ship, The Union, which led a lengthy procession 
of artisans with floats displaying their crafts. Crewed by leading mer-
chants and manufacturers, the ship responded to hailing calls from 
parade officials, its captain bellowing that he was "bound for the Ohio 
over the mountains, by the railroad." Recalling the frigates that 
Baltimore's shipyards had constructed, The Union also evoked the spirit 
of Independence Day. Commercial and patriotic themes were further 
tied together by the frail flesh of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, a major 
backer of the railroad, who at age ninety-one was the last living signer 
of the Declaration of Independence and hence an inevitable choice as 
icon of the festivities. 1 
Although the association of Carroll with the Revolution made him 
an ideal person to preside over the inauguration of the railroad, his 
activities as investor, landowner, s~aveholder, and occasional manumitter 
serve equally well to represent the shifts in economic activity and pat-
terns of labor use in Maryland over the course of his long life. Heir to 
a huge estate, including more than two hundred slaves, Carroll had 
been part owner of an ironworks that relied on slave labor drawn from 
underemployed workers on his plantations.2 A sponsor in the 1790s of 
a measure to bring about post-nati emancipation in Maryland, Carroll 
nonetheless freed only a small fraction of his chattels and continued to 
use slave labor in industrial ventures into the 1820s.3 But now his com-
mitment to the railroad, an enterprise that would rely exclusively on 
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free labor, fell in line with the growing shift of Baltimore and Maryland's 
northern counties away from bound labor. 
Carroll's status as the chief person honored at the railroad's dedi-
cation offered craftsmen working on floats a chance to show off their 
skill by making presentation items for Carroll en route. Hatters fin-
ished a beaver hat for him, and cordwainers produced a pair of green 
morocco slippers. Not to be outdone, weavers turned out a bolt of 
"shambray" that tailors then made up into a coat. The bookbinders 
obtained copies of dedicatory speeches, bound them, and produced a 
finished volume for Carroll as they rolled along. Dozens of other groups 
took part in the march, with special interest attaching to two cars from 
the Union Manufacturing Company that bore over a hundred female 
mill hands. These were placed near the head of the procession on its 
return to the city, a rare public recognition of women workers. 
Efforts to embrace dignitaries, craftsmen, political activists, mili-
tary veterans, and women in the railroad's dedication did not extend to 
people of color. If free black workers or slaves were among those march-
ers representing the seamen, rope makers, bakers, bricklayers, or cart-
ers and draymen, which were all trades with many African American 
workers, no mention of them appeared in the press. In this regard the 
absence of blacks in the July 4 parade exemplified the theory that cer-
emonies show society as their participants would like it to be: white 
Baltimoreans acknowledged no role for black workers in the prosper-
ous future that the railroad's construction was designed to foster. 
The parade's implicit message of yearning for an all-white society 
in Baltimore more nearly predicted the future than its frankly stated 
desire for the railroad to bring back the booming growth of the years 
before 1815. Construction delays, financial setbacks, and political 
struggles with backers of the rival Chesapeake and Ohio Canal over 
right-of-way slowed the westward progress of track-laying gangs; the 
road did not reach the Ohio River for twenty years and more. Difficul-
ties with laborers also brought work to a halt, most notably when an 
Irish track-laying crew working near New Market, Maryland, in 1831 
destroyed extensive sections of track after a contractor absconded with 
their payroll. Company efforts to end the trouble failed; eventually, the 
local militia company was called out to restore order. At least in this 
instance, reliance on supposedly more productive white workers back-
fired.4 
But as the Baltimore and Ohio crept westward from Baltimore, 
black workers, free and slave alike, became less significant in the city's 
labor force. African Americans had composed about one-quarter of 
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the city's eighty thousand residents in 1830; that proportion would 
decline to about one-seventh of the more than two hundred thousand 
residents of 1860. By then white wage workers had increasingly re-
placed free blacks, even in the ranks of unskilled laborers, just as freed 
people had supplanted slaves a generation earlier. 
In assessments of these longer-range developments from a late-twen-
tieth-century perspective, two themes about workers and American cit-
ies have predominated. Under the subject heading of white workers, 
treatments tend to focus on working-class formation, with a heavy 
emphasis on origins of class consciousness. Recent variations on this 
theme either substitute an examination of artisan republicanism for 
that of class consciousness or attempt to link the two. In these stories 
black workers, slave or free, are largely irrelevant or even nonexistent, 
or are employed as a static background, a "before" picture from which 
discussions of white labor's working-class development commences. 5 
Alternatively, studies of urban blacks before the Civil War typically 
pass fairly quickly over slavery and the process of emancipation and 
expend most of their effort in depicting the struggles attending the build-
ing of free black communities and culture. 6 The impact of these the-
matic choices has been to relegate the study of urban slavery and eman-
cipation to a minor role, as if the absence of blacks from the Baltimore 
and Ohio dedication ceremony of 1828 had in fact mirrored the makeup 
of the urban craft workforce and society for the entire early national 
period. 
This present work has operated from the premise that bound labor's 
eclipse by wage labor was not an inevitable product of historical forces 
somehow embodied in the "rise of capitalism" but rather a contingent 
outcome flowing from a particular interaction of local, regional, and 
international economic and social events and processes. Understand-
ing how Baltimore's transition from bound to free labor came about is 
important precisely because the transition did not occur in all nine-
teenth-century cities embedded in slave society. 
During the city's first period of vigorous growth, from the 1 770s 
to around 1815, urban businesspeople in the crafts and manufacturing 
owned or employed slaves and bound white laborers to perform large 
and increasing shares of the city's work. Indeed, it is difficult to imag-
ine how Baltimore's rise to prominence could have occurred without 
the ability to meet labor needs by uprooting rural slaves, bringing them 
to the city, and exploiting their labor in shipbuilding, rope making, 
ironworking, brick making, and a host of other trades. 
Dislocating African Americans from the rural communities that 
they had begun to construct in late-eighteenth-century Maryland was 
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not without consequences for slaveholders, as the high runaway rates 
of the 1780s and 1790s suggest. In the short to medium term, indi-
vidual slaveholders mitigated this problem by grudgingly conceding, 
under pressure from their slaves, measures of present or future autonomy. 
Thus, slaves sometimes had a choice among new masters when sold, or 
the chance to win freedom through hard work or self-purchase (or 
both) over long years of service. The spread of industrial and craft 
slavery after 1790 beyond its initial base in ironworking and shipbuilding 
testifies to the success initially achieved by slaveholding craftsmen in 
buying peace and exploiting the labor of slaves uprooted from the coun-
tryside. By the close of the first decade of the nineteenth century, sig-
nificant numbers of entrepreneurs in occupations dominated by smaller 
operators, including tobacco manufacture, the leather trades, and some 
aspects of food processing, were using slaves in their shops. The breadth 
of slavery's appeal among people in the crafts, merchants, and profes-
sionals possessed of taxable wealth underlines the muted, barely no-
ticeable effect of early antislavery sentiment on the attitudes of 
Baltimoreans regarding the purchase and retention of African Ameri-
cans before 1815. 
Although there is no denying that manumission occurred more fre-
quently in the city than in rural areas, a reading of the manumission 
documents suggests that reducing risks of slave flight and spurring higher 
production were far more important to most slaveholders than disso-
ciation from an evil institution. Few Baltimore slaveholders recorded 
humanitarian impulses as a basis for their actions, and the conditional 
nature of most deeds belies giving any great weight to unstated motives 
of generosity or assuaging guilt. The popularity of self-purchase ar-
rangements, of long-delayed grants of freedom conditional on faithful 
service, of freeing mothers but attempting to hold as yet unborn chil-
dren in slavery, and the frequency with which manumitters serially freed 
slaves and purchased new ones, all suggest that we should understand 
manumission not primarily as an exit from slaveholding but rather as a 
reluctant, minimal shifting of strategies in employers' attempts to re-
tain control of their labor supply. The fact that holders of larger num-
bers of slaves, those who could best afford to indulge themselves in 
manumission as a way of expressing humanitarian or republican be-
liefs, freed fewer slaves proportionally than small holders reinforces 
this understanding of the institution's purposes for masters. 
Viewed in this light, African American attempts to escape from 
slavery, whether by flight or by the less risky strategy of negotiating 
manumission, played a more complex part in the fate of slavery in the 
city than the overused word "resistance" can capture. Although mas-
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ters may have been driven to manumission bargains with slaves to 
counter flight or improve production, the creation through delayed 
manumission of the category of term slaves appears initially to have 
helped spread slavery to a wider domain in the city's workforce, by 
creating a form of coerced labor affordable to craftsmen and manufac-
turers of modest circumstances. 
On the other hand, the resulting diffusion of slaves across a wide 
stratum of wealth holders brought about a change in the pattern of 
slaveholding: now, most Baltimore slaveholders owned only one to four 
slaves. For owners of a few slaves, seeking maximum gain from 
slaveholding by purchasing slaves for life, or by refusing to manumit 
slaves on any tenus, or both, also maximized risks of slave flight and 
attendant loss of much if not all of their capital. Accordingly, such 
owners tended to follow a more cautious course, replicating the pat-
terns of delayed manumission that had first become popular in the 
1790s. The distribution of income-producing slaves to women also 
worked against amassing large slave holdings in the city, by creating 
another subclass of only modestly wealthy slave owners who found 
controlling adult male slaves especially difficult, because of their in-
ability to dominate such chattels physically. As a result, women mas-
ters, an ever-growing subset of the city's slaveholding class, were even 
more likely to manumit male slaves or to fail to pursue runaways, thereby 
contributing indirectly to the dissolution of slavery in the city. 
But these problems with using slave labor to accumulate and main-
tain wealth were neither unique to the urban setting nor so insurmount-
able as to constitute a full explanation of why slavery ultimately failed 
in Baltimore. Planters in Maryland as well as urban craftsmen had to 
be hard-driving to keep hold of freedom-seeking slaves and fortunate 
enough to avoid losses from illness or accident, if they were to build up 
a large and stable holding of slave wealth. Ironically, the decisions of 
those planters regarding slavery appear to have been at least as critical 
to the institution's survival in Baltimore as those of city slave owners. 
Planters' needs to trim their slave workforces, flowing from the 
disruptions in the European tobacco market and the consequent shift 
away from tobacco after 1770, may have initially stimulated slavery in 
the city: slave workers as a result of those changes became generally 
available for purchase to substitute for European indentured servants 
and redemptioners who were no longer available because of the Revo-
lutionary and Napoleonic wars. The attractiveness of such purchases 
to urban buyers can only have been increased to the extent that rural 
slaveholders were willing to sell slaves with craft skills. Planters seek-
ing to diversify their activities had begun to train slave carpenters, tan-
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ners, shoemakers, and the like in increasing numbers in the last third of 
the eighteenth century, just as the movement of slaves to Baltimore 
began. But planters not only sold off slaves; they also engaged in selec-
tive manumission, as indicated by the data from rural counties. To be 
sure, rural planters, having larger holdings and facing perhaps less se-
vere threats from slave flight, manumitted slaves far less often than 
urban slaveholders did; each county yielded only a small trickle of freed 
blacks relative to its slave population. From Baltimore's perspective, 
however, a series of trickles became a torrent of free and would-be free 
blacks flowing into the city from every county of the state, as evidenced 
by certificates of freedom and prison records indicating free black birth-
places.7 
Although this flow of freed people may have been a safety valve 
for slavery in the countryside, it blew up the boiler of slave relations in 
the city. Controlling slaves became much more difficult because the 
rising numbers of urban free blacks facilitated flight to locations within 
the city, especially after 1810. More owners were thereby induced to 
entertain the gradual manumission strategy for managing slave work-
ers, thus further destabilizing the master's long-term control. By 1820 
the expansion of slavery had ceased, and much of the work formerly 
done by slaves was being performed by freed blacks. 
The flexibility of master-slave relations, then, as embodied in com-
plex bargains over sale and manumission, acted before 1810 to spread 
slavery within the city. That process helped to draw rural slaves to 
Baltimore, to the extent that they could influence their masters' plans 
for sales or hire. In any event, viewing the city and its surrounding 
counties as a market region, Baltimore's magnetic pull on rural slaves 
exemplified the portability of wealth held in slaves that has been char-
acterized as one of the chief economic attributes of slavery. 8 
This market-driven accession of slaves to the city and the arrange-
ments for self-hire, self-purchase, and the like made between city own-
ers and African Americans did not fatally weaken slavery or provide 
enough free but propertyless black workers to replace slavery's role in 
the city's labor market. Slavery in Baltimore did not wither from inter-
nal failure; it was a casualty of the continued weakness of slavery in the 
Maryland countryside and of the continued flow of freed people aris-
ing therefrom. 
The case study of the Maryland Chemical Works permits us to 
speculate on alternative developments in Baltimore's labor market that 
might have occurred, had slavery retained more strength rurally. The 
operators of the firm invested in significant numbers of slave workers, 
and despite some retrenchments, they continued to rely significantly on 
164 The Price of Freedom 
coerced labor in combination with mostly casual wage workers. This 
workforce produced chemicals and medicines in a highly capitalized 
business employing the most modern technologies of the day. After 
experimenting with slaves employed under a variety of terms, McKim 
chose to bank on slaves he owned and to extract as much labor as he 
could from them through wage incentives and, in the case of Scipio 
Freeman, the possible negotiation of an accelerated manumission by 
self-purchase. McKim appears to have initiated no manumissions; as a 
large slaveholder he effectively chose to self-insure against losses from 
flight rather than minimizing risk by promising freedom. Had demand 
for slave labor remained higher in Maryland's agricultural counties, 
with a consequently smaller flow of free blacks into the city and a 
lesser degree of threat to the retention of profitable slaves, the 1820s 
and 1830s might well have seen more Baltimore industries relying on a 
mix of slaves and free whites, as McKim's chemical works did. 
The records of the chemical company thus sketch out ways in which 
industrial capitalists could quite advantageously combine wage labor 
and slave labor to attain their ends. They also testify, by their silence, 
to the feasibility of commingling free whites and enslaved blacks in the 
workplace without racial strife. Nor is this an isolated case; as the com-
bined data on slaveholding, indentures, and apprenticeship in the crafts 
demonstrate, slaves worked with whites in most if not all of the trades 
before 1820. By comparison, the virtual exclusion of free blacks from 
craft apprenticeship suggests that white workers were far more troubled 
by working with or in the same trade as free blacks than with slaves. 
Reflections on white attitudes toward free blacks, as delineated in 
the previous chapter, do little to dispel this speculation. Feared as a 
threat to a devoutly wished for social and political uniformity in the 
republic, suspected both of producing and consuming too little for the 
enhancement of the nation's political economy, free people of color 
could displace slave workers in Baltimore's economy precisely because 
they, like slaves, remained dependent on white employers. Such depen-
dency may have arisen from debts acquired in purchasing freedom, or 
from the desire to buy out other family members, or as a consequence 
of race-based antagonisms that walled off some occupations and 
crowded free people of color into others. Whatever its origins, that 
dependency on the part of legally free persons fed resentment of free 
blacks. Slaves could safely be pitied, but propertyless free blacks could 
only be viewed as failures and hence burdens on society in the emerg-
ing categories of political economic thought. 
As the record of the 1840s and the 1850s shows, free black work-
ers themselves were replaced by European immigrants as the city's pro-
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letarian workers, a pattern that would be repeated in slave state cities 
in which free blacks, by whatever process, had replaced slave workers. 
In regions where slavery remained well entrenched in its rural strong-
holds, numbers of urban free blacks were smaller, urban slavery re-
mained viable, and white immigrants were fewer. 
These shifting patterns of labor usage suggest that the fate of sla-
very in nineteenth-century cities may not be fully explained either by 
its theoretical incompatibility with industrial capitalism or by the rela-
tive robustness of market demand for slaves in field labor. Baltimore's 
experience shows that slaves could be and were used quite profitably in 
enterprises with all the hallmarks of industrial capitalism. Likewise, 
the records of slave sales in the city indicate that although trade within 
Maryland was quite vigorous, prices responded imperfectly at best to 
interregional stimuli. Here, the ability of slaves to threaten flight if sold 
away from kin may have significantly influenced the behavior of some 
sellers. 
What emerges from this study of early-nineteenth-century Balti-
more and Maryland is the criticality of black efforts to obtain freedom; 
those efforts in combination with rural planters' decisions drove events 
in the city. Individual slaveholders in Baltimore could, and for a time 
did, transform the outlines of slavery without discarding it; indeed, 
their interactions with slaves seeking autonomy may have helped spread 
a transmuted form of slavery as a stage of life rather than as a lifelong 
institution. In this regard the struggles of Baltimore's masters to main-
tain control and African Americans' efforts to win autonomy may have 
been working toward a dynamic equilibrium in which a modified form 
of slavery would have thrived. 
But Baltimore's masters could not cope with the consequences of 
their rural counterparts' similar strategies. While selective practices of 
manumission and sale stabilized slavery in all but Maryland's northern 
counties, the continued migration of large numbers of free people of 
color to Baltimore at once rendered slave labor less valuable and made 
its profitable exploitation more risky, given the aid offered by freed 
people to slaves. 
Thus, masters' efforts to manipulate and control dependent black 
labor by retaining modified forms of slavery, applied consistently in 
both the city and the country, were partially frustrated, as black migra-
tion and mutual aid all but ended slavery in antebellum Baltimore. By 
winning through to freedom, Baltimore's blacks eliminated any likeli-
hood of Baltimore's becoming a slave labor city, an outcome that white 
political economists might well have applauded. But in a final irony, 
the economic dependency of free black workers, in part a by-product 
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of the process of self-purchased emancipation, formed grounds for the 
theoretical condemnation of free blacks, adding strength to racist sen-
timents that themselves may have fed on white resentment at Baltimore 
blacks' largely self-led liberation. Escaping slavery, however ambigu-
ous the outcome, proved easier than shedding racism. 
APPENDIX A 
BALTIMORE SLAVEHOLDERS, 1790-1820: 
CRAFT AND TRADESPEOPLE, 
NUMBER OF SLAVEHOLDERS AND 
PROPORTION OF ALL PRACTITIONERS 
Slaveholders 
Occupation 1790 1800 1810 
N % N % N % N 
Baker 1 2 5 9 12 24* 5 
Blacksmith 1 2 7 15 12 18* 8 
Block maker 2 7 2 15 4 24 2 
Brass founder 0 0 2 67'' 2 20 2 
Bricklayer 2 50* 9 24 4 7 4 
Brick maker 1 17 1 6 4 15 11 
Brush & comb maker 0 0 2 18'' 2 18* 2 
Butcher 0 0 2 8 5 17* 5 
Cabinetmaker 1 3 6 19 8 21* 8 
Carpenter 6 3 19 10 30 14"" 45 
Carver 0 0 0 0 1 17'' 0 
Chair maker 0 0 3 21 7 37'' 4 
Coach maker 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Coach trimmer 0 0 0 0 1 100'' 0 
Confectioner 0 0 0 0 1 8* 0 
Cooper 3 8 6 12 12 16* 10 
Coppersmith 1 17 3 75'' 3 50 2 
Cordwainer 6 6 15 10 18 11'' 21 
Currier 1 12 5 28 7 30* 6 
Distiller 2 40'' 3 25 3 23 4 
Gunsmith 0 0 0 0 1 13* 0 
167 
1820 
% 
8 
7 
25'' 
13 
10 
20* 
9 
10 
13 
11 
0 
21 
4* 
0 
0 
9 
33 
7 
22 
17 
0 
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Occupa:tion 1790 1800 1810 1820 
N % N % N % N % 
Hatter 2 9 6 19 6 14 8 23* 
Jeweller 0 0 0 0 2 40'' 1 14 
Last maker 0 0 0 0 1 so•· 0 0 
Mattress maker 0 0 0 0 1 100* 0 0 
Millwright 0 0 0 0 2 25* 3 20 
Nail mfr. 1 25 0 0 4 67'' 1 33 
Painter 2 8 4 11 ,, 4 10 6 7 
Paperhanger 0 0 0 0 1 100'' 1 33 
Plane maker 0 0 0 0 1 33 1 50'' 
Plasterer 0 0 3 13'' 2 8 3 10 
Plumber 0 0 0 0 1 33'' 1 14 
Printer 0 0 2 18 5 38'" 5 14 
Rigger 1 5 6 21" 2 6 0 0 
Rope maker 1 12 2 29* 2 12 3 11 
Saddler 0 0 6 38'' 7 35 3 11 
Sail maker 2 12 4 24'' 3 12 3 8 
Ship carpenter 12 19 18 23 32 32'' 34 30 
Ship chandler 0 0 5 33 8 47" 4 44 
Silk dyer 0 0 0 0 1 50'' 0 0 
Silversmith 0 0 2 18 6 35'' 2 17 
Soap & Candle maker 0 0 4 29 6 55* 3 30 
Stonecutter 1 10 2 40* 4 24 5 28 
Sugar refiner 0 0 1 50'' 2 25 3 14 
Tailor 7 8 10 9 20 24''" 10 8 
Tanner 1 11 5 50'' 3 27 2 11 
Tinplate worker 0 0 0 0 3 18* 2 13 
Tobacco mfr. 1 9 4 21 6 23'' 7 13 
Trunk maker 0 0 0 0 1 20'' 0 0 
Turner 0 0 1 20 2 40* 0 0 
Turpentine distiller 0 0 0 0 1 50'' 0 0 
Umbrella mfr. 0 0 0 0 ~ 25* 0 0 
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Occupation 1790 1800 1810 1820 
N % N % N % N % 
Upholsterer 0 0 1 25'' 2 17 2 18 
Watchmaker 2 15 7 44* 3 23 4 27 
Weaver 0 0 0 0 2 17'' 0 0 
Wheelwright 0 0 3 25* 1 8 1 4 
Whip mfr. 0 0 0 0 1 25* 0 0 
Other craft 0 25 28 43 
Total 60 11 211 14 315 19'' 301 11 
NoTE: '"Denotes decade with highest slaveholding percentage. 
This list includes different names for given occupations under single 
headings. Baker includes biscuit, cake, and loaf bread bakers. Block 
maker includes block and pump makers. Carpenter includes house 
carpenters and house joiners. Cooper includes oak and cedar coopers. 
Cordwainer includes boot maker, shoemaker, and ladies' shoemaker. 
Saddler includes harness makers. Ship carpenter includes boat build-
ers, shipbuilders, ship joiners, and shipwrights. Soap and candle manu-
facturer includes chandler. Tinplate worker includes tin man, tinner, 
and tin manufacturer. 
APPENDIX B 
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES: 
CRAFT WORKERS AND OTHERS 
The occupations marked with an asterisk were counted as artisans or 
manufacturers in analyses of who held slaves. 
Accountant Brass founder ,, 
Anchor mfr. ,, Bricklayer ~:-
Apothecary Brick maker ,, 
Architect Bridge builder ~-
As sayer ~:- Bridle maker 
,_ 
Auctioneer Broker 
Baker " Brush maker ~:-
Bandbox maker ,, Butcher ,, 
Banker Cabinetmaker ,, 
Barber ~:- Cake baker ,, 
Billiard table keeper Calico printer ,, 
Birdcage maker * Canvas mfr. * 
Blacking mfr. ,_ Captain 
Blacksmith 
,_ 
Carpenter ,, 
Block & pump maker * Carpet mfr. ~:-
Boardinghouse keeper Carpet weaver ~:-
Bookbinder ~:- Carter 
Bookseller Cartwright 
,_ 
Bookkeeper Carver * 
Bootblack Cashier 
Boot & shoe maker ,, Caulker ,, 
Botanist Chair maker ~=-
Box maker 
,_ 
Chemical mfr. ~:-
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Chocolate mfr. ,, Drum maker * 
Clergy Dyer * 
Clerk Ebonist ,, 
Clothier Engineer 
Coach painter ,, Engraver ,, 
Coach maker * Fan maker * 
Coach trim mfr. ~:- Farmer 
Cobbler ,, Farrier ,, 
Coffeehouse keeper Fender mfr. ,, 
Collector * Fisherman * 
Comb maker * Founder * 
Confectioner ;:. Gauger * 
Constable Gentleman 
Conveyancer Glass cutter * 
Cook Glover * 
Cook shop keeper Grocer 
Cooper, cedar * Gunpowder mfr. * 
Cooper ,, Gunsmith ,, 
Copperplate printer * Hack driver 
Coppersmith ,, Hairdresser ,, 
Cordwainer ,, Harness maker ;:. 
Coroner ~:- Hatter * 
Cotton mfr. * Hauler 
Cotton thread mfr. ,, Hotel keeper 
Crier Huckster 
Currier * Importer 
Customs official Innkeeper 
Dealer Inspector 
Dentist Instrument maker * 
Doctor Insurer 
Dressmaker ,. Intelligence office 
Drover Iron founder ,, 
Druggist Ironmonger 
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Japanner ~:- Milliner * 
Jeweller * Millstone maker ,, 
Joiner * Millwright <· 
Laborer Miner * 
Last maker * Morocco dresser * 
Laundress Musician * 
Lawyer Nail mfr. * 
Leather mfr. <· Nailer * 
Letter carrier Naval officer 
Letter cutter * Notary public 
Letterer ::- ()bservatory keeper 
Limner ,, ()fficials 
Livery stable keeper ()rnamenter * 
Locksmith ,, ()yster house keeper 
Looking glass mfr. * Painters & glaziers <· 
Lottery & exch. ofc. Paperhanger * 
Machine maker :} Paver <· 
Magistrate Pedlar 
Mahogany sawyer ,, Penitentiary keeper 
Maltster * Perfumer * 
Mantua maker ,, Pewterer * 
Marble cutter * Piano maker ,, 
Mariner Pile driver ,, 
Marshal Pilot ,, 
Mason },'- Plane maker ,, 
Mattress maker ,, Plasterer <· 
Meal seller Plater * 
Measurer Plough maker <· 
Merchant Plumber * 
Merchant, dry goods Porter 
Merchant, lumber Porter bottler ,, 
Midwife * Potter * 
Miller ,, Printer * 
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Prison guard Stage owner 
Pump maker * Starch mfr. * 
Quarrier ~:- Stationer 
Rectifyer Stay maker * 
Reed maker ,, Stevedore 
Rigger * Stonecutter ~:-
Rope maker ,, Storekeeper 
Saddler ~:- Sugar refiner * 
Saddletree maker * Surveyor 
Sail maker },'- Tailor * 
Salesman Tanner * 
Sash maker * Tavern keeper 
Sawyer ~:- Teacher 
Scourer ~:- Tin man * 
Scow owner Tin painter ,;. 
Seamstress ,, Tinplate worker ,, 
Shingle dresser ,, Tobacco mfr. ,, 
Shipbuilder * Trunk maker * 
Ship carpenter ,, Turner ':-
Shopkeeper Turpentine distiller * 
Silk button mfr. ~- Type founder * 
Silk dyer * Umbrella mfr. ,, 
Silk maker ,, Veterinarian 
Silverplater * Victualler 
Silversmith ,, Waiter/servant 
Skinner ,, Warehouse keeper 
Slater * Watchman 
Soap & candle maker ,, Watch & clockmaker * 
Soldier Wax worker * 
Spectacle maker * Weaver 
,, 
Spinning wheel maker * Weigh master * 
Spinster Well digger * 
Stage driver Wharf builder * 
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Wheelwright * Wire weaver * 
Whip & glue mfr. ,, Wood corder 
Whitewasher <· Woolen manufacturer ,, 
Widow 
APPENDIX C 
SALE PRICES OF TERM SLAVES 
AND SLAVES FOR LIFE 
These charts compare prices of slaves sold for a term of years with 
those sold for life, controlled by age, sex, and time period. The column 
on the right shows the difference expressed as a percentage. 
1787-1809 
Sales of Female Slaves 
Age Term Slaves Slaves for Life 
Group No. Sold/ Avg.Price No. Sold/ Avg. Price %Discount 
0-4 0 0 
5-9 2/ $80 4/$132 39 
10-14 8/$107 9/$200 46 
15-19 4/$190 14/$207 8 
20-29 7/$122 10/$246 50 
30+ 2/$165 6/$262 37 
Unknown 11/ $97 35/$141 31 
Sales of Male Slaves 
Age Term Slaves Slaves for Life 
Group No. Sold/ Avg.Price No. Sold/ Avg. Price %Discount 
0-4 11 $40 1/$120 67 
5-9 2/$155 4/$115 -35 
10-14 6/$194 9/$203 5 
15-19 6/$193 9/$302 36 
20-29 5/$236 11/$293 19 
30+ 4/$208 7/$276 25 
Unknown 17/$201 39/$235 17 
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1810-1818 
Sales of Female Slaves 
Age Term Slaves Slaves for Life 
Group No. Sold/ Avg.Price No. Sold/ Avg. Price % Discount 
0-4 1/$100 2/$125 20 
5-9 3/$90 6/$125 28 
10-14 4/$188 12/$196 4 
15-19 9/$153 18/$245 38 
20-29 5/$143 17/$278 49 
30+ 4/$158 7/$208 24 
Unknown 6/$122 15/$205 40 
Sales of Male Slaves 
Age Term Slaves Slaves for Life 
Group No. Sold/ Avg.Price No. Sold/ Avg. Price %Discount 
0-4 0 0 
5-9 7/$84 5/$106 21 
10-14 12/$213 10/$194 -10 
15-19 5/$230 14/$380 39 
20-29 6/$290 15/$384 24 
30+ 4/$212 9/$321 34 
Unknown 10/$245 14/$320 23 
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1819-1830 
Sales of Female Slaves 
Age Term Slaves Slaves for Life 
Group No. Sold/ Avg.Price No. Sold/ Avg. Price %Discount 
0-4 11$10 51$40 75 
5-9 6/$122 10/ $98 -24 
10-14 13/$102 16/$165 38 
15-19 21/$122 43/$226 46 
20-29 14/$112 20/$220 49 
30+ 6/$72 17/$172 58 
Unknown 23/$114 22/$190 40 
Sales of Male Slaves 
Age Term Slaves Slaves for Life 
Group No. Sold/ Avg.Price No. Sold/ Avg. Price %Discount 
0-4 4/$40 8/ $61 34 
5-9 5/$110 7/$125 12 
10-14 14/$128 14/$215 40 
15-19 17/$176 20/$264 33 
20-29 30/$162 44/$342 53 
30+ 2/$225 12/$304 26 
Unknown 21/$171 30/$282 39 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. See Greene, Pursuits of Happiness, esp. 190-93. 
2. See Davis, Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, and Davis, Prob-
lem of Slavery in Western Culture. 
3. Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery: The Caribbean, (1944; reprint, Lon-
don, 1964). 
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5. Chaplin, "Slavery and the Principle of Humanity." 
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Independent, and Graham Hodges, Slavery & Freedom in the Rural North: African 
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1. SLAVERY IN EARLY NATIONAL BALTIMORE AND RURAL MARYLAND 
1. In Baltimore County outside the city, the number of slaves increased by 12 
percent between 1790 and 1810, while city numbers more than tripled. Statewide 
over the same period the slave population increased 8 percent to approximately 
111,000. See table 1. 
2. See J. Wright, Free Negro in Maryland, 86-88 (tables). 
3. Some 2,000 original bills of sale for the period 1785-1830 provide a sample 
of transactions. Official chattel records for Baltimore County between 1785 and 
1850 survive only for 1813-14. These records include 126 slave bills of sale and 
78 manumissions. By comparison, the original documents for this period describe 
58 sales (46 percent of the transactions officially recorded) and 64 manumissions 
( 82 percent of the official entries.) The original documents are representative of 
the larger official group by sex and age. 
For the years 1790-1810, eighty bills of sale show a city dweller buying a 
slave from a resident out in the county; another 73 record a purchase from a 
master living outside the county. Only 16 sales of slaves from the city to elsewhere 
survive for the same time period. The 153 sales of slaves to city owners represent 
27 per cent of all slave sales that identify buyer's and seller's place of residence. 
Compiled from Slave Bills of Sale, 1790-1810, Baltimore County Court, Mary-
land State Archives (hereafter MSA) and from Chattel Records, 1813-1814, Balti-
more County Court. 
4. See L.S. Walsh, "Rural African Americans," and Russo, "A Model Planter," 
for discussions of the reconfiguration of slave labor in late-eighteenth-century and 
early-nineteenth-century Maryland. Also see Paul Clemens, The Atlantic Economy 
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& Colonial Maryland's Eastern Shore: From Tobacco to Grain, Ithaca, NY, 1980 
passim, for a comprehensive discussion of the agricultural restructuring of the 
late-eighteenth-century Eastern Shore. For the economic dislocations of the 1780s, 
see Maganzin, "Economic Depression in Maryland and Virginia." 
5. See Declarations of Slaves, 1793-1800, Baltimore County Court. 
6. See Laws of Maryland, 1792, chap. 56; 1797, chap. 75, MSA. 
7. See Declarations of Slaves, 1793-1820, Baltimore County Court. One of 
Baltimore's largest slaveholders was Mme. Jean de Volunbrunn, a former resident 
of New York City whose departure with her slaves had provoked a riot there. See 
White, Somewhat More Independent, 144-45. 
8. More than four hundred such private bills were legislated in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. In 1821 Baltimore's John Pendleton Kennedy sought a 
revision of the importation ban to regularize existing practice, prompted by the 
legislature's passage of seventeen private bills granting exemptions from the im-
portation ban in 1820 and fourteen more the next year. See the Baltimore Morn-
ing Chronicle of Jan. 30, 1821, for Kennedy's remarks before the House of Dele-
gates. For the bills, see Session Laws, 1800-1850, Laws of Maryland. 
9. Names of all the slaveholders in the town or city of Baltimore for the 
first four federal censuses, as well as those on the city tax lists in 1804 and 1813, 
were matched against city directories to create occupational profiles. The directo-
ries used were Thompson and Walker's Baltimore Town and Fell's Point Directory 
of 1796, Warner and Hanna's New Baltimore Directory and Annual Register for 
1800-1801, Fry's Baltimore City Directory for 1810, and The Baltimore Direc-
tory, compiled by Jackson and printed by Richard Matchett, for 1819-20. Occu-
pational data for the 1790 census was augmented by searches of newspaper adver-
tisements. For the 1813 tax records, I used the Baltimore Directory and Register 
of 1814, by Lakin, printed by J.C. O'Reilly, and for the 1804 tax list, The Balti-
more Directory for 1803, by Stafford. 
10. Of fifty-seven craft occupations appearing in city directories between 
1790 and 1820, thirty-six (63 percent) showed the greatest concentration of 
slaveholders in 1810. Fifteen occupations (36 percent) had the highest proportion 
of slaveholding craftsmen in 1800, four (7 percent) in 1810, and only two (4 
percent) in 1820. See appendix A for a chart of all the occupations. 
11. Name matching with city directories identified about three-fifths (24 7 of 
390) of slaveholders, who held about two-thirds of the slaves living in Baltimore 
town in 1790. Of those slaveholders, 60 worked in crafts or manufacturing and 
held 154 slaves. There were 188 other slaveholders with definable occupations, 
who owned 508 slaves. For 1800 645 of the 991 slaveholders were matched. Of 
these, 210 worked in crafts or manufacturing; they held 522 slaves. Other occupa-
tions together accounted for 435 slaveholders with 1,357 slaves. In all, just under 
two-thirds of the slaveholders, holding just over two-thirds of the slaves in the 
city, could be identified. In 1810 name matching defined 325 slaveholders (with 
776 slaves) as in the crafts or manufacturing; 612 slaveholders, with 1,792 slaves, 
were in other identifiable occupations. Again, slaveholders with known occupa-
tions accounted for three-fifths to two-thirds of all slaveholders and slaves held. 
In 1820 name matches found 299 workers in crafts and 1,069 other slaveholders, 
holding 720 and 2, 717 slaves, respectively. These made up three-fourths of 
slaveholders and nearly four-fifths of all slaves. 
12. Between 1773 and 1800, 50 of 214 male runaways from masters in Anne 
Arundel and Prince George's Counties were advertised in the Annapolis Maryland 
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Gazette as possessing a craft skill, a proportion of 23 percent. From 1800 to 1815 
only 8 of 102 (8 percent) were so advertised. 
13. See Marks, "Skilled Blacks," 550. 
14. A sample of 286 indentures from Talbot and Prince George's Counties 
between 179 5 and 1830 showed that whereas 56 percent of all indentures regis-
tered before 1815 promised craft training, only 41 percent of those registered 
after 1815 did so. The annual volume of craft apprenticeships declined by roughly 
a third after 1815, from an average of twenty-four per year in the two counties 
combined, to an average of about sixteen. Data from Indentures, 1795-1828, Prince 
George's County Orphans' Court, MSA; Indentures, 1800-1830, Talbot County 
Orphans' Court, MSA. 
15. See Temperley, "Capitalism, Slavery, and Ideology," esp. 96, for an idea 
of manumission as a device to attract free laborers. Temperley's frame of reference 
was the abolition of quasi-slavery among Scottish colliers in the late eighteenth 
century. 
16. Account books that record slave hires and rentals include the Despeaux 
Account Book, MS. 294, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore (hereafter MHS), 
for Joseph Despeaux, a shipbuilder in Baltimore ca. 1802-20, and the Allbright 
Account Book, MS. 12, MHS, for John Allbright, a brick maker, ca. 1790-1810. 
Also see Steffen, "Changes in the Organization of Artisan Production," 105-7. 
The Baltimore County Register of Wills (Petitions) and Guardian Accounts, both 
in the MSA, also contains references to the hiring of slaves to craftsmen. 
17. See Hughes, "Slaves for Hire"; Starobin, Industrial Slavery, 128-37. 
18. Of 1,078 slave sale or purchase advertisements, 178 (16.5 percent) indi-
cated a desire to hire or hire out a slave. Advertisements tabulated from the Mary-
land Journal and Baltimore Commercial Advertiser, 1773-95; the Federal Ga-
zette, 1796-1820, and the Baltimore American and Commercial Daily Advertiser 
(hereafter American), 1799-1820. 
Of 492 runaway advertisements between 1790 and 1820 that identified the 
slave in any way other than appearance, 48 (9.7 percent) remarked on the slave's 
hired status. 
19. See the American of Jan. 28 and Mar. 26, 1813. By 1821 the "General 
Intelligence Office" offered to find servants and replace them on request. See the 
Sept. 12, 1821, American. 
20. See Laws of Maryland, 1817, chap. 104. 
21. Data from Assessment Record, 1813, Baltimore City Commissioners of 
the Tax, MSA. Other similarly circumstanced women typically owned one to three 
slaves, but Rachel Nelson owned 9, Sarah Goldsmith 8, Isabella Hall6, and Martha 
Coffield 5. Each of these women held over 70 percent of her wealth in slaves. 
Given their moderate means (all four were assessed at under six hundred dollars), 
their in-town residence, and the number of slaves each owned, it is hard to believe 
that they were not hiring out at least some of their chattels. Some widows may 
have been employing their slaves directly in the crafts in which their husbands had 
worked. Baltimore city directories virtually never listed women as craft practitio-
ners; the lone exception, proving that such women existed, as might be expected, 
is Cornelius W. Stafford's Baltimore Directory for 1803. 
22. See Sheller, "Artisans, Manufacturing, and the Rise of a Manufacturing 
Interest," 52-53, citing the Cox Account Book, MS. 262, MHS. 
23. Winkle was one of thirteen inn, tavern, or boardinghouse keepers for 
whom slaves composed a majority of taxable wealth. 
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24. The pay book of the Maryland Chemical Works records payments to 
Madame DeLozier in 1828 and Simon Wilmer in 1830 for "the use of ... hands." 
McKim had also bought slaves from innkeepers-James Renshaw and Enoch 
Churchman-in 1826 and 1827. See the Maryland Chemical Works Account Books, 
MS. 547, MHS. 
25. The balance of this group came from the ranks of teachers, government 
officials, and gentlemen. 
26. Hay's claim stressed the importance of the loss of Perry's hiring in her 
family's economy. She appears on the rolls of the Federal Direct Tax of 1798 as an 
owner of two taxable slaves and in the census of 1800 with four slaves. The city 
directory of 1800 lists her as a seamstress. See Miscellaneous Papers, 1798, Balti-
more County Court. 
27. There are no slaveholders named "Conner" or "Connor" who could 
have been sea captains in either the 1798 Federal Direct Tax List or the 1800 
census. 
28. The assessment of 1813 was part of a statewide revaluation of taxable 
property, causing the assessors to be unusually thorough in their listing of assets. 
See Laws of Maryland, 1812, chap. 191. City assessors recorded real property 
owned, as well as animals, furniture, silver, and the name, sex, age, and assessed 
value of any slaves held by taxpayers. See Assessment Record, 1813, Baltimore 
City, Commissioners of the Tax. 
29. Although this represents an undercounting of slaves, the distribution of 
occupations among slaveholders, the sex and age distribution of slaves, and the 
average size of holdings are similar to those of the 1820 census. The assessors' lists 
are sufficiently complete and consistent to warrant their use as a survey of slave 
ownership in Baltimore in 1813. 
According to law, most property was assessed at market value, but slaves 
were rated on fixed scales; a maximum valuation of $125 applied to men between 
the ages of fourteen and forty-five, with values ranging down to $20 for children 
and slaves over forty-five. Slave bills of sale and valuations for the decade 1810-
19 suggest an average market value of more than $250 for an adult female slave 
and roughly $350 for an adult male slave. See Miscellaneous Court Papers, Balti-
more County Court; Proceedings, Orphans' Court, Baltimore County Court. The 
statutory limits effectively granted tax relief for about two-thirds of the slaves' 
real market value, hardly surprising in a legislature dominated by slaveholding 
planters from southern Maryland's tobacco counties and the Eastern Shore. 
30. Name matching with city directories identified occupations of 2,045 per-
sons, just under 61 percent of the 3,367 wealth holders. See appendix B for a full 
listing of the occupations encountered and an explanation of craft/noncraft break-
downs in this and other tables. 
31. Slaveholders in the lowest wealth quintile had less wealth than the $125 
assessed value of an adult male slave and owned an adult female slave or a child. 
32. For craftsmen, the decadal averages were 2.6 in 1790, 2.5 in 1800, and 
2.4 in 1810 and 1820. For merchants and other nonartisanal or manufacturing 
slaveholders, the mean holding remained unchanged at 2. 7 slaves for 1790, 1800, 
and 1810 and then dropped to 2.4 in 1820. 
33. The number of slaveholders listed in the 1790 census was 390, of whom 
113 appeared in the 1800 census. That census listed 991 Baltimore slaveholders, 
of whom 231 held slaves in the city in 1810. Of 1,360 slaveholders on the 1810 
census rolls, 314 could be found in the 1820 census. 
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34. Michael B. Katz's study of Hamilton, Ontario, The People of Hamilton, 
Canada West: Family and Class in a Mid-Nineteenth-Century City (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1975), 122-31, found that no more than 35 percent of heads of household 
appeared in two city censuses ten years apart in the period 1851-61; thus, 
Baltimore's rates are not unusually low. 
35. Persistence data do not include slaveholders who owned slaves in two 
successive censuses but who ceased to work in the crafts. Since far more slaveholders 
moved out of craft occupations into higher-status occupations of the day, such as 
"merchant" or "gentleman," than the reverse, the higher persistence rate of craft 
slaveholding before 1810 is even more remarkable. 
36. Surviving bills of sale for the period 1785-1830 show only slightly more 
women (1,031) than men (953) being sold. See Slave Bills of Sale, Miscellaneous 
Papers, Baltimore County Court. 
37. The ratios are based on 815 manumissions and 191 declarations of slaves. 
See Manumissions and Declarations of Slaves, Miscellaneous Court Papers, Balti-
more County Court. 
38. See Buckingham's Journey through the Slave States, passim. Also see 
Green, "Urban Industry, Black Resistance, and Racial Restriction," 314ff., for 
tables relating to the participation of male and female slaves in tobacco manufac-
ture and other industries. 
39. Thirteen of seventeen brick makers found in the 1813 tax list lived in 
ward 1 or ward 2, which then covered the southwest quarter of the city. Baltimore 
newspapers reported fires on an almost daily basis in the first two decades of the 
nineteenth century. As early as 1805, the city council passed fire prevention ordi-
nances, and by 1826 it banned new construction in wood. See the Baltimore Ameri-
can of Apr. 17, 1805, and Ordinances of the Baltimore City Council, 1826, no. 
57, Baltimore City Archives, MSA. 
40. See Nelson, "Brickmaking in Baltimore." 
41. Slaveholding shipbuilders included William Price, owner of twenty-five 
slaves, James Biays, who owned twenty-one slaves, and Joseph Despeaux, an emi-
grant from Saint Domingue who owned eleven slaves in 1813. In the 1800 census 
David Stoddert, builder of the U.S. frigate the Constellation, appeared as the owner 
of seventeen slaves. 
42. Keith Aufhauser has pointed out that if technologies of work allow for 
its simplification into discrete, low-skilled activities, they contain nothing anti-
thetical to efficient production with slave labor, unless the technology also reduces 
skill and strength requirements to the point where even cheaper forms of labor-
such as women and children--can do the work. See Aufhauser, "Slavery and Tech-
nological Change." Shipyards of the early nineteenth century present an example 
supportive of these views. 
43. Citywide, ten of twenty-nine wealth-holding blacksmiths owned slaves. 
44. For Chenowith's advertisements, see the American of Jan. 1, 1814. See 
Jackson's Baltimore Directory, 1819, for Chenowith's new occupational title. The 
1820 census shows him with two adult male slaves under forty-five and a boy 
under fourteen. 
45. Adam Smith argued that bondmen were unproductive workers with no 
incentive but to "work as little and consume as much as possible." But in writing 
about the impact of divided labor on workers, Smith also worried about the dull-
ing mental effect of segmented, repetitive work. The use of slaves by Baltimore 
concerns whose scale facilitated a division of labor suggests an alternative point of 
Notes to Pages 21-24 183 
view. Slaveholders may have regarded the use of slaves in mentally numbing jobs 
as an advantage, providing a better fit between those jobs and the supposed men-
tal limitations of the black worker and allowing white craftsmen to be employed 
at more demanding jobs. See A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, 80, 363-67. 
46. Seven nail makers appeared on the 1813 tax rolls, of whom three owned 
slaves, including Enoch Betts with slaves assessed at $825, 86 percent of his tax-
able wealth. 
47. The data for coppersmiths and brass founders follow a similar pattern: 
four of five in the top two quintiles of wealth held slaves, but only one of six in the 
lower three groupings. 
48. Three of five bakers in the fourth quintile of wealth held slaves; overall 
54 percent (15 of 28) did so. Four of sixteen carpenters in the lowest wealth 
quintile held slaves, a rate virtually identical to the 26 percent (25 of 96) that 
prevailed for all carpenters. Only four of twenty-two painters held slaves, and 
three of them were in the lowest wealth quintile, as was the only slaveholding 
potter among four who appeared in the 1813 tax list. Four of six soap and candle 
manufacturers owned slaves-the two with the most and the two with the least 
wealth. 
49. Of ninety-six carpenters with taxable wealth, twenty-five held slaves (26 
percent). Bricklayers (24 percent) and painters (18 percent) were still farther be-
low the 38 percent average of slaveholding among craftsmen and manufacturers. 
50. In 1808 a writer to the Baltimore American noted that a leather-making 
entrepreneur "pays nothing for labor but what feeds and clothes his apprentices, 
slaves, horses, &c." See the American, Jan. 20, 1808. 
51. Nine of fifteen tanners and curriers owned slaves, including ten adult 
men. By contrast, only sixteen of sixty-two boot makers, cordwainers, and glov-
ers did so, a rate of 26 percent compared to the 60 percent of their leather suppli-
ers. Charles Ridgely's Northampton Furnace, just north of the city, operated with 
a mixed slave-free workforce of considerable extent-he manumitted more than 
eighty slaves at his death in 1828. See Baltimore County Certificates of Freedom 
for 1828-31, MSA. 
52. Over 80 percent of De Volunbrunn's assessed wealth lay in the ten men, 
nine women, and three children she owned. 
53. Sampling one-fifth of Baltimore newspapers between 1790 and 1830 
yielded 1,025 advertisements for the sale of slaves, exclusive of repetitions. Of 
these, 324 (32 percent) identified the slave to be sold as entitled to freedom in the 
future. 
Over the same time period, 410 of 1,984 slave bills of sale (21 percent) regis-
tered with the Baltimore County Court involved a slave entitled to freedom. See 
Miscellaneous Papers, 1790-1830, Baltimore County Court. 
54. James Winchell, a Baltimore baker, purchased Harry Gray in November 
1811 for $250, Harry then having a fourteen-year term to serve. Eight months 
later, Winchell sold Harry to the bakers Lovell and Saltzer, for the same price. See 
Slave Bills of Sale, Miscellaneous Court Papers, 1811 and 1812, Baltimore County 
Court. David McKim of the Maryland Chemical Works owned James Jacobs, 
whose term had fifteen years to run at the time of purchase, for about fifteen 
months; he sold Jacobs in 1828 for the same $200 he had paid for him. See Mary-
land Chemical Works Account Books, MHS. 
55. Price ranges for slaves are based on approximately 2,100 bills of sale 
recorded with the Baltimore County Court between 1790 and 1830. Sales involving 
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two or more slaves or sales that did not reflect market values were not considered. 
The latter category included sales among heirs of deceased slaveholders, sales be-
tween white parents and children, and conditional sales between borrowers and 
lenders as a form of collateral loan security. There remained nearly 900 sales of 
individual slaves, of which 312 were sales for a term of years. 
Baltimore sales were grouped into three time periods: pre-181 0, 1810-18, 
and 1819-30. In the first period slave prices rose slowly. In the next, slave prices 
rose again, but in the 1820s prices flattened or fell slightly. 
Slaves were divided into seven age groupings: 0-4,5-9, 10-14, 15-19,20-29, 
30 or older, and unspecified, and subdivided by sex for each age bracket. The 
resulting 42 pairs of cells exhibit a fairly uniform pattern of price differentials 
between slaves for life and for a term of years. 
Purchase of a slave for an average term, ranging from five to twenty years 
depending on the slave's age, generally cost from 30 to 50 percent less than pur-
chase of a comparably aged slave for life. Eighteen of the 42 paired cells showed 
price differentials in this range; 6 more revealed price reductions of more than 50 
percent in favor of term slaves, and a further 6 showed savings in the 20 to 30 
percent range. Five more cells showed savings of less than 20 percent; 5 showed 
no savings, and 2 cells had no sales for comparison. 
Seventeen of the 20 sex and age pairs for female slaves showed term slaves to 
be more than 20 percent cheaper than slaves for life; for men this threshold was 
reached in only 13 of 20 cases. Given the relatively small numbers of cases in each 
cell (typically fewer than 40), these findings must be regarded as tentative indica-
tors. 
The matrix appears in appendix A. 
56. Apprenticeship contracts stipulated the child's age, the maintenance, 
wages, education, and freedom dues he or she was to receive, and the craft to be 
taught. I examined each indenture recorded in thirteen sample years between 1800 
and 1830: 1800, 1802, 1805, 1808, 1810, 1813, 1816, 1818, 1820, 1823, 1826, 
1828, and 1830. During the sample years from 1800 to 1818, 2,432 boys were 
bound out, 304 per year, at a median age of fifteen; 1,571 (65 percent) were bound 
out between the ages of thirteen and seventeen. With an average term of service of 
six or seven years, about 1,800 to 2,000 boys were serving apprenticeships at any 
one time. 
See Steffen's The Mechanics of Baltimore, 27-50, and Tina Sheller's "Arti-
sans, Manufacturing, and the Rise of a Manufacturing Interest," 3-17, for discus-
sions of apprenticeship in Baltimore. 
57. The ensuing discussion relies on data from apprenticeships recorded in 
the eight sample years before 1820. 
58. Occupational profiles for the extent of apprenticeship rely on the com-
parison of three indices. Estimates of the number of practitioners of each craft 
derive from counting city directory occupational entries. Tallies were also made of 
the number of masters binding apprentices by craft and, finally, of the total num-
ber of apprentices bound in those crafts. 
By comparing the number of apprentices bound with the number of adult 
practitioners, we can gain a sense of the importance of apprentice labor in each 
trade. The ratio of apprentices bound to the number of binding masters generates 
a crude index of scale of operation, with a high ratio suggesting that the trade was 
being carried on in large shops, and vice versa. Finally, by comparing the propen-
sity of masters to bind apprentices to their propensity to hold slaves by craft, we 
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can speculate whether slave labor and apprentice labor competed with or comple-
mented each other. 
59. Across all crafts, the number of binding masters in a decade averages just 
over four-fifths of the number of craft participants (84 percent). The number of 
apprentices bound slightly exceeds the number of craft participants, in a ratio of 
123:100. The ratio of apprentices to binding masters, across all the crafts, is just 
under three to two, at 148:100. Departing from this general pattern, it appears 
that ship carpenters and joiners rarely resorted to apprentice labor: in the 1810-19 
decade, only 7 percent of them bound an apprentice, and the apprentice-to-prac-
titioner ratio was a microscopic 10:100. Sail makers, on the other hand, were 
more likely than the average to use apprentices, with an apprentice-to-practitio-
ner ratio of 160:100. 
60. For brick makers, the apprentice-to-practitioner ratio was about half the 
average, at 56:100, as was the ratio of binding masters to practitioners, at 45:100. 
Bakers, though less well off than brick makers in general, were equally uncom-
mon users of apprentice workers, with an apprentice-to-practitioner ratio of 63:100 
and a master-to-practitioner ratio of 46:100. Only three boys were bound out as 
soap and candle makers in all the sample years between 1800 and 1820, for an 
apprentice-to-practitioner ratio of 12:100. 
61. Camp bound seventeen boys in an eight-year sample of indentures with 
the Baltimore County Orphans' Court. With an average indenture length of six 
years, this works out to twelve or thirteen apprentices serving him at any one 
time. Camp was assessed in 1813 at $1,856, making him the second wealthiest 
cabinetmaker in Baltimore. For Camp's purchase of Ashberry, see Miscellaneous 
Papers, 1815, Baltimore County Court. 
62. Examples include Joseph Cox, a hatter, who bound twelve apprentices 
before 1820 and owned two adult male slaves in 1813; he purchased a twenty-
one-year-old man, Charles Wilson, in 1817. Cox participated in the Census of 
Manufactures of 1820 and at that time employed eight men, three women, and 
twelve boys. Cox also owned women slaves who may, too, have been making 
hats. William Branson, hatter, bound five apprentices before 1820 and owned two 
adult male slaves in 1813. John Oldham, chair maker, bound five apprentices and 
owned three slaves. Peter Hoffman, Jr., bound five apprentices as paper makers 
and owned six slaves, including three adult men, in 1813. Robert Quail, a cooper, 
had seven white boys and men of ages ten to twenty-five in his household in 1810, 
plus two slaves. James Sloan, cordwainer and merchant, owned five adult male 
slaves in 1813 and had seven apprentice-age boys in his household in 1810. Rich-
ard K. Heath, tanner, bound seven apprentices out before 1820 and also pur-
chased two male slaves, Prince and Ignatius, for $500 in 1813. 
63. See indentures of Joseph Wood to Joseph Cox, hatter, in 1816; Charles 
Ruckel to Richard K. Heath, in 1813; and James Maydwell to James Sloan, in 
1813. For examples of apprentices promised training in only part of the cordwaining 
or hatting trades, see indentures of Frisby Robbins, 1816, or Charles Bowers, 
1813. These all are found in Baltimore County Indentures, MSA. 
64. See the indenture of Negro Juliet, Baltimore County Indentures, 1805. 
65. See Indenture of Charles Brown, Baltimore County Indentures, 1810. 
66. See Indenture of Jacques Zacharie, Baltimore County Indentures, 1805. 
67. See Indenture of Negro Joseph, 1811, and Indenture of Negro Ann, Bal-
timore County Indentures, 1809. 
68. See Indenture of John Richardson, Baltimore County Indentures, 1805. 
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69. Edwards manumitted all her slaves prospectively on June 30, 1812; the 
bindings of George, Morris, and John occurred on the same day. The boys' free-
dom dates were set to coincide with their twenty-first birthdays. See Miscella-
neous Court Papers, 1812, Baltimore County Court, and Indentures of Negro 
George, Negro John, and Negro Morris, 1812, Baltimore County Indentures. 
70. Certificates of Freedom recorded in Baltimore between 1805 and 1830 
identify about one-fifth of the bearers as having been born outside Baltimore County. 
Certificates from Dorchester and Prince George's Counties show virtually no in-
migration of free blacks. Deeds of manumission and slave bills of sale that note 
the slaveholder's residence often indicate that a slave's point of origin was outside 
Baltimore. 
71. For Talbot County, sampling all indentures registered at five-year inter-
vals from 1800 to 1830, 38 of 147 indentures, or 26 percent, involved free black 
children. This roughly matched free blacks' 28 percent share of the free popula-
tion of the county in 1830. In Prince George's County, following the same method, 
free blacks accounted for 2 7 of 141 indentures, or 19 percent, despite represent-
ing less than 14 percent of the free population in 1830. For another Eastern Shore 
county, see Daniels, "Alternative Workers in a Slave Economy." 
72. Between 1800 and 1830 the free black population of Baltimore City 
more than quintupled. By comparison, free black populations increased only 30 
to 50 percent during those years in Dorchester, Kent, and Talbot Counties, with 
white numbers in these counties declining or showing nominal growth at most. 
Eight Maryland counties, including Calvert, Caroline, Charles, Harford, Kent, 
Queen Anne's, St. Mary's, and Talbot, had lower white populations in 1830 than 
in 1790 or 1800. 
73. The apprenticeship law was modified in 1808 to empower the orphans' 
court to bind out the children of "lazy, indolent, and worthless free negroes"; it 
was changed again in 1818, to permit the binding of any free black child "not at 
service or learning a trade." See Laws of Maryland, 1808, chap. 54, and 1818, 
chap. 189. 
74. See Laws of Maryland, 1796, chap. 67, for the bar on free black fran-
chise. Maryland established a nearly universal white male suffrage in 1802. 
75. Ibid., 1801, chap. 109. 
76. Ibid., 1818, chap. 197, and 1825, chap. 93. The 1818law allowed courts 
to order corporal punishment or banishment for free blacks convicted of a wide 
variety of felonies for which whites would be sent to the penitentiary. The 1825 
law went further and allowed re-enslavement as a punishment, but it was repealed 
in 1826. The corporal punishment law remained in effect throughout the antebel-
lum period. 
77. Between 1798 and 1830 some 480 masters bound two or more boys, the 
maximum number seventeen by William Camp, cabinetmaker. Four percent of all 
craft bindings in this sample were of free blacks. Given that masters who bound 
more than one apprentice averaged about four bindings, one would expect to find 
about 84 percent of the multiple groupings to be all white (.96 x .96 x .96 x .96 = 
.8435). In fact, 468 of the 480 cases, or 97.5 percent, involved only white boys, an 
underrepresentation of free blacks statistically significant at the .02 level. 
Even masters who employed very large numbers of apprentices, and who 
appear to have used slave labor as well, had no free black apprentices. The cabi-
netmaker William Camp, the sail maker Benjamin Buck, hatters Jacob Rogers and 
Joseph Cox, and the chair maker Jacob Daley each bound ten or more apprentices 
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in the indenture years sampled, and all owned slaves; none of them bound any free 
black apprentices. 
78. In Talbot and Prince George's Counties, free blacks were bound in num-
bers matching or exceeding their population share. But of those thirty-two mas-
ters who had bound two or more boys, only one apprenticed both whites and 
blacks. A random distribution of black and white apprentices in these counties 
would have yielded eleven masters who apprenticed both black and white boys; 
the shortfall shows a significant correlation between disinclination to bind blacks 
and the presence of white apprentices. 
79. See Laws of Maryland, 1818, chap. 189. See Berlin, Slaves without Mas-
ters, 226-27, and Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground, 35, for 
arguments that apprenticeship laws were used to control the labor of free black 
children against their parents' will. 
80. In the years sampled, 57 percent of 3,148 bindings of white boys and 50 
percent of 208 bindings of black boys were voluntary. Although the white rate is 
higher, the degree of significance fails to meet even the weakly correlated .1 0 level 
on a chi-square test. For girls the voluntary binding rate over the same period was 
40 percent for whites in 538 cases and 34 percent for blacks in 98 cases, again a 
distinction without statistical significance. 
For a discussion of the attitudes of free blacks toward apprenticeship, see 
Matthews, "Race, Sex, and the Dimensions of Liberty," 284-86. 
81. In 1810 388 indentures of apprentice boys were recorded by the Balti-
more courts, a rate of 9 per 1,000 of the city's population. At that time apprentices 
may have equaled about 10 percent of the city's male population of approximately 
24,000. 
In 1830 the 215 bindings entered represent an indenture rate of 2.7 per 1,000 
and a total apprentice population equal to about 3 percent of the city's roughly 
41,000 male residents. 
82. The Union Manufacturing Company got under way in 1810 and bound 
more than 60 boys before 1815 to learn "cotton manufacturing, including card-
ing, spinning, and weaving, or any of those trades." See the indenture of David 
Stinchcomb to the Union Manufacturing Company, Baltimore County Court In-
dentures, 1810. Other cloth makers also engaged apprentices: the Baltimore Manu-
facturing Company's agent Nathan Levering indentured 41 boys, Edward Gray 
and Company 19, and the Washington Cotton Manufacturing Company 13. All 
of these indentures occurred between 1808 and 1817 and are recorded in the 
Baltimore County Indenture records. 
83. The Union Manufacturing Company had 104 girls tending its bobbins 
but only 16 boys and 10 men; the Baltimore Steam Works engaged 50 girls and no 
boys at all. Edward Gray's Patapsco Cotton Factory employed boys and girls in 
equal numbers, 35 of each, but had not indentured any children in the previous 
four years. Likewise, Nathan Levering, then acting as proprietor of both the 
Powhatan Cotton Mills and the Washington Cotton Factory, was no longer inden-
turing new apprentices; he had a large proportion of girls in his mills. These data 
are drawn from the 1820 Census of Manufactures for Baltimore City and Balti-
more County; U.S. Census Office. Fourth Census, 1820, Records of the 1820 
Census of Manufactures, Schedules for Maryland (Washington, D.C., 1821.). 
84. Prior to 1820 an average of 53 girls were indentured per year. Over nine-
tenths of them were to be taught housekeeping, with or without specific instruc-
tion in sewing or needlework. See Baltimore County Indentures. 
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2. INDUSTRIAL SLAVERY IN BALTIMORE 
1. Starobin, Industrial Slavery, 115. 
2. Wade, Slavery in the Cities, chaps. 4, 6. Wade did not assume that indus-
trial slavery was by definition urban, but the conditions that, in his view, fatally 
eroded the master's control of the urban slave-especially slave hiring-applied to 
industrial slavery whether urban or rural. 
3. Ibid., 230. 
4. Goldin, Urban Slavery in the South, 51-75, 123-26. 
5. Fred Bateman and Thomas Weiss, A Deplorable Scarcity: The Failure of 
Industrialization in the Slave Economy (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981), 157-63. See 
also their article, coauthored with Foust, "Participation of Planters in Manufac-
turing." 
6. See Dew, "Slavery and Technology," 107-26 (quotation on 113). 
7. The Baltimore County Land Records, book 178, folios 392 and 393, 
Nov. 23, 1825, record Sims's assignment of his interest in the factory buildings 
and leased land to John McKim, Jr., to secure a forty-thousand-dollar loan. The 
McKim sons formed McKim, Sims, and Company with Howard Sims after the 
loan came due. The McKims assumed majority ownership and direction of the 
company; Sims was to control production, while the McKims managed procure-
ment, sales, and accounting. See the Articles of Agreement of McKim, Sims, and 
Co., McKim Collection, MS. 547, MHS. 
8. McKim, Sims, and Company incorporated by an act of the legislature in 
1827. See Laws of Maryland, 1826, chap. 195. The McKims squeezed Howard 
Sims out of the partnership within two years. By early 1828 Sims had ceased to be 
a partner and had become a salaried plant manager; by late 1828 he was gone 
altogether. The Baltimore American of Jan. 3, 1828, reported that the Maryland 
Chemical Works had won a silver medal for high-quality alum and an honorable 
mention for its magnesium sulfate (Epsom salts), in a competition sponsored by 
the Franklin Institute. For early chemical production in America, see Haynes, 
American Chemical Industry, vol. 1, Background and Beginnings, 179, 184; also 
see Niles' Weekly Register of Jan. 6, 1816, 9:329-30, and Griffith, Annals of Bal-
timore, 228. For a general account of early manufacturing in Maryland, see Griffin's 
"Industrial Revolution in Maryland." For a contemporary description of the uses 
of alum, see Muspratt, Chemistry, 1:149-76, article on alum. 
9. The Maryland Chemical Works (MCW) journal, or general ledger, item-
ized slave expenses for the year 1828 and recorded the price of each slave bought 
by the firm. The pay book denotes days worked, absences, overtime worked, earn-
ings, and tasks undertaken for both slave and free workers from 1827 to 1832. 
The MCS journal and pay book are in the Maryland Chemical Works Account 
Books collection, MS. 547.2, MHS. 
10. See the MCW journal for January 1828. 
11. A ground plan of the MCW shows forty structures, including furnaces, 
mills, drying rooms, and production rooms for alum, Epsom salts, Prussian blue, 
calomel, and other chemicals, as well as a dwelling for the plant manager, the 
Negro house, a stable, an office, and a variety of packing and storing rooms. A 
contract of June 26, 1827, engaged Watchman and Bratt to "put up a first rate 
low pressure Steam Engine of twenty-four horse power on the Bolton and Watt 
principle," at a cost of six thousand dollars. McKim Collection, MHS. Edward 
Stewart was paid $250 and $227 for time and materials on the Negro House. 
MCW journal, February and May, 1828. 
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12. American, Dec. 20, 1827. McKim's reference to a year-long contract sig-
naled his desire to obtain slave workers. Free workers, white or black, had no 
promise of employment beyond week-to-week. 
13. The MCW pay book for January 1828 shows seventy employees "at 
work on the Merchandise," comprising forty-two free workers and twenty-eight 
slaves. 
14. Medicines produced included calomel, tartar emetic, and Epsom salts. 
Pigments included Prussian blue, chrome yellow and green, and copperas. In addi-
tion to alum, the firm manufactured producer goods such as bleaching powder, 
muriatic acid, and sulfuric acid. See "Maryland Chemical Works Prices Current," 
undated, McKim Collection. 
15. The MCW journal lists agents in Boston, Providence, New York, Phila-
delphia, Richmond, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, and Pittsburgh. 
Local customers of the firm included chair makers, paperhangers, morocco leather 
dressers, bookbinders, paint manufacturers, cordwainers, white lead manufactur-
ers, glass makers, and distillers, as well as retail merchants. Local business was 
also transacted through a company store near the wharves of the Basin (today's 
Inner Harbor). See the MCW journal for January of each year, 1828-33. 
16. The chemical works remained tightly linked to J.K. McKim and Sons, 
which monopolized procurement and long-distance sales of the firm. Most of the 
book value of the Maryland Chemical Works continued to be capital advanced by, 
and drawing interest fot; the firm of J.K. McKim and Sons, secured by mortgages 
held by John K. McKim, Jr. Baltimore County Land Records, book 189, folio 205, 
Nov. 15, 1827, MSA. 
17. Muspratt's Chemistry was used to enlarge upon and clarify the marginalia 
in the MCW pay book referring to production methods. 
18. Alum generated the greatest sales for the company. See the MCW jour-
nal for 1828, pp. 11-80, and the annual summary for 1828 appearing in January 
1829, p. 81. 
19. Muspratt, Chemistry, 149-76, vol. 1, notes that lixiviation may be speeded 
by heat; the MCW plant diagram shows a long room labeled "furnaces" situated 
next to a room for "cylinders." It is likely that waste heat from the furnaces was 
employed to keep warm the cylinders or steeping cisterns for alum. The MCW 
pay book indicates that slaves were paid "extras" for night work in alum produc-
tion. The process resembled the churning of butter; an illustration in Muspratt 
shows a covered steeping cistern with a large hole in the center of the cover. A 
worker stands on the cover and is plunging or stirring a long rod through the hole 
into the cistern. 
20. The works diagram identifies the single largest room in the plant as the 
"alum room." Muspratt emphasizes the large amounts of space needed to allow 
alum to dry in long, shallow beds; the plant's alum room was in all likelihood a 
covered drying shed. See Muspratt, Chemistry, 160, 163, vol. 1. 
21. The MCW journal lists soap and candle makers as suppliers to the firm. 
See account summaries for January of 1829, 1830, and 1831. 
22. Residual mother liquor was reused in intermediate steps of alum mak-
ing, or in the manufacture of Epsom salts if the silica of the clay had contained 
magnesium. See Muspratt, Chemistry, 169-71, vol. 1. 
23. Many antebellum industrial concerns operated intermittently. Factories 
relying on water power shut down when streams froze and water wheels iced up. 
Difficulties in transporting or stockpiling raw materials in winter also hampered 
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year-round operations; iron production in particular was constrained by seasonal 
limitations on making and storing charcoal. But the Maryland Chemical Works' 
steam engine and wood fires were not affected by the seasons, and many raw 
materials were obtained locally from Baltimore butchers, tanners, and soap mak-
ers. The costs of factory construction, some of which could be attributed to facili-
tating a year-round production environment, exceeded fifty thousand dollars; the 
value of raw material inventories at the plant ranged from five thousand to eight 
thousand dollars. See the MCW journal, January entries for 1828 and 1829. 
24. See Starobin, Industrial Slavery, 28-29, 293-95. 
25. MCW pay book, January and February of 1828. 
26. Slaves figured prominently in late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-
century production of iron, another capital-intensive, heat-powered industry. See 
Lewis, Coal, Iron, and Slaves, chap. 1. 
27. Matchett's city directories for Baltimore in the 1820s and the U.S. Cen-
sus of Manufactures for 1820 for the city and county of Baltimore list manufac-
turers in these lines. See also Griffith's Annals of Baltimore and Vade's Baltimore. 
28. The MCW pay book lists 299 persons earning wages, many of whom 
worked two, three, or four separate stints at the plant. In all, 363 hiring actions 
occurred in order to keep an average of thirty-eight positions filled, an average of 
eighty-three employees per year for thirty-eight jobs, and a turnover rate of 118 
percent per year. 
29. The slave pay records also accounted for a few free black workers, mainly 
carpenters or coopers. MCW pay book, 1827-32. 
30. Marginalia separate from the employee's hours and wage rate entry de-
note payments for specified additional tasks. Maintenance of two sets of incentive 
pay records suggest that two different measures of employee effort, time worked 
and items produced, were in use. A further point in favor of regarding the "extra" 
as a unit of time is that much labor, especially in the nearly interminable alum-
making process, had no easily measurable product and could be compensated 
only by payments geared to time worked. See the MCW pay book, 1827-32. 
31. Table 5 shows high turnover for free workers; table 6 shows that this 
turnover took place in a free workforce of relatively stable size. Taken together, 
these facts support the view that turnover represented voluntary resignations and 
not firing of casual labor. A week-by-week review of free-worker records further 
substantiates this point. The chemical works did have a real and persistent free-
worker turnover from 1827 onward. It seems reasonable to posit that this prob-
lem had also existed in 1825 and 1826 and played a part in McKim's decision to 
obtain slave labor. 
32. This preference for owned slaves was atypical. See, for example, Starobin, 
Industrial Slavery, 28-37, and Lewis, Coal, Iron, and Slaves, 82-103. 
33. The MCW journal lists fifteen slaves purchased for the firm in 1826 or 
1827. Baltimore County manumission deeds show that David McKim freed two 
slaves who were not among the original fifteen, at dates subsequent to his sale of 
the plant. My assumption is that these seventeen slaves are all the firm ever owned. 
Pay book margin notes identify some other slaves on board in 1828-30 as hires. 
After 1830 all of the slaves at the plant were owned by David McKim. Sales and 
manumissions for slaves in Baltimore County are found among Miscellaneous 
Papers, 1785-184 7, Baltimore County Court. 
34. McKim paid a total $2,950 for ten slaves for life in 1826 and 1827. He 
obtained the other five slaves for less because they were slaves for a stipulated 
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term of years pending manumission. Average prices for male slaves for life be-
tween ages eighteen and thirty-five were $347 in 1828, $295 in 1829, $310 in 
1830, and $317 in 1831; they averaged $320 for the four-year period. Prices for 
female and juvenile male slaves exhibit the same flatness for these years. Data 
drawn from Miscellaneous Papers, 1828-31, Baltimore County Court. 
35. Although this point may seem entirely unremarkable, it is worth stating 
that McKim focused his attention not only on slave prices and total slave produc-
tion but on individual slave productivity as well. 
36. McKim may not have been surprised by the absenteeism of the wage 
workers if they displayed the typical "pre-industrial" disdain for regularity. See 
Herbert G. Gutman, Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America: Es-
says in American Working-Class and Social History (New York, 1976), 15-32; 
Alan Dawley and Paul Faler, "Working-Class Culture and Politics in the Industrial 
Revolution: Sources of Loyalism and Rebellion," ]SH 9 (June 1976): 466-68; Bruce 
Laurie, Artisans into Workers: Labor in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, 
1989), 37-46. For study showing that significant cultural transformation was not 
necessarily required to generate reliable factory hands, see Sisson, "From Farm to 
Factory." 
37. Slaves were scheduled to work a total of 20,604 days; days worked to-
taled 18,671; absences equaled 1,933, 9.4 percent. Free workers were slated for 
51,198 days of work, and had 4,893 absences, or 9.6 percent of their scheduled 
work days. MCW pay book, 1827-32. 
38. Three slaves employed by the plant hired their own time. The pay book 
noted a weekly salary for these men, as for free workers, but it listed them in the 
slaves' column. MCW pay book, 1828-32. 
39. Ibid., 1827-32. 
40. The pay book notes one-time payments to slaveholders "for the use of 
their hands," suggesting that McKim was paying by the day for short-term re-
placements for slaves. See MCW pay book, 1827-31. 
41. A slave's median weekly likelihood of being absent one or more days was 
19 percent. Eleven of fourteen slaves who stayed at the firm more than eighteen 
months had absentee rates lower than the median; nineteen of thirty slaves who 
worked less than eighteen months had above-median rates. MCW pay book, 1827-32. 
42. William Adams missed more than eight months of work consecutively in 
1831 because of sickness; Perry Tilghman missed thirteen weeks in 1830 because 
of a scalded leg. Neither Adams nor Tilghman tended to have frequent one-or 
two-day absences. MCW pay book, 1830-31. 
43. The lead linings of the cisterns and evaporating pans needed constant 
repair; William Adams's skill as a lead caster no doubt counted for a great deal in 
McKim's decision to retain him. See Muspratt, Chemistry, 1:159-62, for discus-
sions of replacing lead linings in maintaining equipment. 
44. Thomas Hawthorn, who worked more than four years in the Epsom 
salts room, rose from the standard $4.50 a week in 1827 to $8.00 by 1831. Per-
haps Hawthorn assumed status as "first hand" or "foreman" of the Epsom salts 
room. John McCoy, who worked more than three years at the plant in the evapo-
rating chamber of the alum room, earned $6.00 a week by 1831. MCW pay book, 
1827-31. 
45. John Sewell had made chrome yellow, then worked in the alum room, 
then burned magnesium, and in 1831 was calcining alum. Scipio Freeman had 
moved from the Epsom salts room to the alum furnace and had then been assigned 
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to burn alum clay; he also earned extra pay by digging clay. Nelson Farewell made 
blue vitriol, evaporated alum, and burned magnesium, holding each of these jobs 
at two different intervals in his four-and-one-half years at the plant. See the MCW 
pay book for Sept. 15, 22, Dec. 8, 1827; July 18, 1829; May 8, June 5, Aug. 7, 
1830; Jan. 1, 1831; see also marginal notes throughout the 1827-32 run of the 
pay book. 
46. Dew's examination of the Buffalo Iron Forge found that daily iron pro-
duction quotas remained at the same level over a forty-year period. He attributed 
this phenomenon to successful slave resistance to demands for greater production. 
Dew, "Slavery and Technology," 121. 
47. McKim purchased Jacobs for two hundred dollars on March 22, 1827, 
from Caleb Dougherty, for a term of fifteen years, Jacobs then being twenty-five 
years old. Jacobs's bill of sale stipulated his manumission at the age of forty, in 
1842. See the MCW journal, loose documents. 
48. On November 21, 1828, David McKim sold James Jacobs to John Caton 
for two hundred dollars. Miscellaneous Papers, Nov. 21, 1828, Baltimore County 
Court. 
49. The pay book does not indicate what James Jacobs did between March 
and November of 1828. David McKim may have hired him out on a short-term 
basis. 
50. Winder's age is described in his bill of sale to David McKim of Jan. 9, 
1827, found as a loose paper in the MCW journal. 
51. The MCW pay book contains the entry "Run" to explain Winder's day-
and-a-half absence in the week of February 7, 1829. 
52. Austin Woolfolk, a slave dealer, sold a man named James Winder, age 
about twenty-five, in August of 1830 to a Kentucky buyer. See Miscellaneous 
Papers, 1830, Baltimore County Court. See· Calderhead, "Professional Slave 
Trader," for more on Woolfolk. Also see Bancroft, Slave-Trading in the Old South, 
37-44; and Dillon, Benjamin Lundy, 118-20. 
53. David McKim sold at least three other slaves besides James Winder. All 
but Winder were sold to Baltimoreans, including the other recaptured runaway, 
Allen Henson. Slave bills of sale from David T. McKim to John Caton, 1828, and 
David T. McKim to Edward Spedden, 1829, Miscellaneous Papers, Baltimore 
County Court. 
54. Henson ran off in August 1828, was caught within a week, and earned 
extras for months thereafter, before he too was sold off by McKim in July 1829. 
MCW pay book for August 1828 to July 1829. 
55. George Boardly and Scipio Freeman, for example, earned extras in forty-
nine weeks of 1829. MCW pay book, 1829. 
56. McKim employed four plant managers in five years, beginning with 
Howard Sims. The second and third managers lasted less than a year altogether. 
The fourth manager confessed to "pilfering more than $250.00 of goods by his 
own account" in 1832. Given this experience, McKim was probably not eager to 
search for another supervisor to watch over the nighttime activities of the slaves. 
See the MCW pay book, 1827-1832. See Starobin, Industrial Slavery, 105-9 and 
169-73, for slaves as supervisors or managers. 
57. The plant diagram identifies a dwelling other than the Negro House, 
which may have housed the manager, and the pay book shows occasional pur-
chases of food for him. See the MCW pay book, Mar. 15, 1828, or Nov. 26, 1831. 
The "At What Employed" lists give no hint that the plant retained a nighttime 
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supervisor. Given the frequency and volume of slave extras, it is most likely that 
the slaves worked their extra time without white supervision. 
58. See Starobin, Industrial Slavery, 100-103; Lewis, Coal, Iron, and Slaves, 
118-27; and Dew, "Disciplining Slave Ironworkers," esp. 406-9. 
59. Extras were calculated in wholes, halves, and quarters. Free workers 
earned pay for whole, half, and quarter days worked; extras most likely repre-
sented the same units of time. 
60. See Lewis, Coal, Iron, and Slaves, 117-26; Dew, "Sam Williams, 
Forgeman." 
61. McKim expended about fifty to fifty-five cents per day for each day of 
slave labor performed. Extras brought him more labor at a much lower incremen-
tal cost. 
62. Among slaves, the median propensity to work one or more extras in a 
week was 66 percent. Ten of fourteen (71 percent) of slaves who worked more 
than eighteen months exceeded this level; only twelve of thirty (40 percent) who 
stayed less than eighteen months did so. Six slaves bought by David McKim in 
1826 and 1827 worked for the full fifty-six months recorded in the pay book; all 
six missed work less often and worked more extras than most other slaves. See 
MCW pay book, 1827-32. 
63. Lewis, in Coal, Iron, and Slaves, 82-103, cites numerous examples of 
such strategies. 
64. See Dew, "Slavery and Technology," 118-21. 
65. See MCW pay book of 1828 for records on Stephen Dorsey; MCW pay 
book of 1828-29 for records on Fender and Murphy. 
66. The MCW pay book for July 18, 1829, shows seven slaves getting sev-
enty-five cents for two extras "at Tub in Alum Room" and later documents the 
higher rate for work at the magnesium furnace and for casting lead. See MCW 
pay book, 1829. 
67. Extra pay rates and comments are all from the MCW pay book, 1829-
32. The daily labor rate for white workers remained at seventy-five cents a day 
from 1827 through 1832. 
68. One may wonder why McKim clung to a policy of cheap or underpaid 
extras. First, he may have felt uncomfortable paying full white wage rates to slaves 
in the absence of a visible output measure to assure him of their hard work. His 
willingness to pay slaves by the task for digging alum clay and casting lead indi-
cates that he had may have preferred output-oriented compensation, when fea-
sible. Second, McKim did get some positive responses to his cheap extras; many 
slaves worked extras almost every week and did not fall sick or run away. 
69. No year-long hires were made after January 1830. See MCW pay book, 
1831-32. 
70. MCW pay book, Jan. 21 to Apr. 28, 1832. 
71. Slaves receiving the fifty-cents-per-week "wage" also earned pay for ex-
tras in 90 percent of the pay book entries made on or after Jan. 21, 1832. 
72. At twenty-five cents per extra, the average cash income of a slave at the 
Maryland Chemical Works was $.52 per week in 1831. Taking into account ex-
tras paid at $.375 each, the actual average pay for extras was about $.55. MCW 
pay book, 1831-32. 
73. See the MCW journal, loose papers. 
74. Freeman earned three or more extras 84 out of 235 weeks on the pay 
books, or 36 percent of the time. MCW pay book, 1827-32. 
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75. Freeman began earning extra money digging or hauling clay in late 1829. 
By early 1831 he was hauling $1.50 worth of clay per week, over and above his 
other labor. From January 8, 1831, onward Freeman received a base payment of 
$3.00 a week, $1.50 for the clay and $1.50 for boarding himself. MCW pay book, 
September 1829 to April, 1832. 
76. Matchett's Baltimore City Directory for 1833. Maryland law treated 
manumission as a deed of gift rather than as a contract and thus did not insist on 
any statement of the terms thereof other than the date on which freedom was 
conferred. 
77. MCW pay book, 1830-32. On September 4, 1830, the firm began pay-
ing Philip Payne boarding money "for his wife to board servants." Freeman started 
to get his $1.50 a week on September 11. 
78. Prices for slaves for a term of years ranged between those of slaves for 
life and the annual hire price for slaves of similar sex, age, and condition. Free-
man, twenty-nine years old in 1833, would have commanded perhaps $60 a year 
as a hire. With two years to serve in 1833, Freeman's price would in all likelihood 
be just under his hire price of $120 for those two years. Price data derived from 
Miscellaneous Papers, 1785-1835, Baltimore County Court. 
79. Self-purchasing slaves sometimes paid as much as 50 to 100 percent more 
than normal prices for slaves of their age and sex. Miscellaneous Papers, 1785-
1830, Baltimore County Court. 
80. Freeman earned $118.75 for extras from 1827 to 1832 and $128.44 for 
digging clay. He boarded himself for eighty-five weeks, receiving $127.50. Alto-
gether, he obtained $374.69; a purchase price of $100 is 27 percent of that amount, 
and $120 is 32 percent. Earnings figures from the MCW pay book, 1827-32. 
81. At $4.50 per week, a white laborer working fifty weeks a year would 
have cost McKim $1,350 for six years. McKim would have expended another 
$468 for the two extras per week, or $1,818 for all work time over six years. 
When the $120 Freeman earned for clay digging is added in, McKim's total ex-
penditure to buy Freeman's labor on the market would have been $1,938. For 
Freeman, McKim spent $374.69 in actual payments for extras, self-boarding, and 
clay digging, plus $588.72 for six years of direct maintenance costs at $98.12 a 
year. Add a further $200 for Freeman's purchase price, plus capital opportunity 
costs of $12 (6 percent) a year, totaling $83 over six years, compounded. Subtract 
the $100 realized by selling Freeman's remaining time, and McKim's net cost for 
Freeman's labor was $1,146, a savings of 40 percent, or nearly $800, compared to 
the cost of free labor. Cost figures drawn from the MCW journal's slave expense 
accounts for 1828, and earnings from the pay book, 1827-32. 
82. The worth of slave labor is calculated on the assumption that a slave for 
life would actually work forty-seven weeks a year-the average annual absentee 
rate for slaves at the works being five weeks-at a value of 4.50 per week, for a 
total of $1,269. Direct costs for maintaining a slave for six years would have been 
about $588. Had Freeman been a slave for life, McKim would have expended 
perhaps $320 to obtain him, with opportunity costs over six years of $133, for a 
total cost of $1,041. A slave for life could have been sold for perhaps $200, in 
which case the cost of six years of labor by a slave for life would be $841, 66 
percent of $1,269, and about $400 less than the cost of free white labor. 
83. He spent $136.75 for shoes and $289.45 for two sets of drawers, shirts, 
and stockings per man. MCW journal, slave expense account, January and Febru-
ary, 1828. 
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84. All cost data in this discussion are drawn either from the MCW journal 
for 1828, slave expense account, or from the 1828 MCW pay book entries. 
85. By the 1820s and 1830s, owners commonly and successfully insisted 
that hirers of slaves provide medical care. See Starobin, Industrial Slavery, 62-70, 
and Lewis, Coal, Iron, and Slaves, 154-55. Also see Savitt, "Slave Life Insurance." 
86. Average costs of $200 for slaves for a term of years, $350 for a slave for 
life, and $55 for a slave hired for one year were derived from the firm's experience, 
as was the 6 percent interest rate, used in the journal for all interest calculations, 
whether for interest-bearing stock, notes held by creditors, accounts receivable, or 
unpaid obligations. 
87. For term slaves I assumed an average term of eight years; for slaves for 
life an average working span of twenty-five years. The former is based on Balti-
more County deeds of manumission and bills of sale. The latter assumes that 
slaves could not be expected to be fully productive after the age of forty-five. 
Maryland's manumission laws forbade the manumission of slaves over this age, 
on the assumption that such freedmen would be unable to work and maintain 
themselves (see Laws of Maryland, 1796, chap. 67). Depreciation is assumed to 
occur in equal decrements. An argument could be made for using a depreciation-
by-age curve with little or no year-by-year loss of value for adult slaves in their 
twenties and a gradually steepening dropoff in value thereafter; for the illustrative 
purposes of these tables, a straight line depreciation is sufficiently accurate. 
88. For contemporary estimates of the cost of slave labor, see the Baltimore 
Genius of Universal Emancipation, Sept. 15, 29, Oct. 6, Nov. 24, 1827. These 
issues discuss tax rates and assume, as does table 8, that the hirer of a slave paid 
the taxes thereon. 
89. Wage laborers were paid only for days actually worked; their absences 
had no impact on labor costs. 
90. These figures apply only to adults. McKim did hire boys, who commonly 
earned $1.50 a week. MCW pay book, 1827-32. McKim never employed any 
slave boys, implying that the cost advantage for slaves disappeared when compar-
ing purchase and maintenance costs with a $1.50 a week free labor cost. 
91. Henson was sold along with Edward Norris in 1829 for $200, $125 less 
than their combined purchase prices in 1827. See David T. McKim to Edward 
Spedden, July 1829, Miscellaneous Papers, Baltimore County Court. Both men 
were slaves for a term of years, but the shortening of their terms by two years each 
would not normally account for a 40 percent drop in value. It is plausible that 
Henson lost value disproportionately if the purchaser knew of his escape attempt. 
92. See Hungerford, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 26, vol. 1. For the value 
of J.K. McKim's estate, see Baltimore County Wills, folio 487, book 18, and see 
his inventory in Baltimore County Inventories, folios 51, 60, 482, book 52. 
93. The MCW pay book provides at least one example of McKim's cost 
consciousness. After boarding the sick William Adams in the city infirmary for 
nine weeks (cost $27.86) McKim arranged to have Adams sent to the Eastern 
Shore, where he could be boarded for $1.00 a week. Adams remained there for a 
further seven weeks and then came back to Baltimore (passage $1.50) to resume 
work. McKim may have believed that Adams would recover faster away from the 
heat and contagion of the city and its infirmary; the pay book notes only the 
$11.00 McKim saved by shipping the sick man back and forth across the Chesa-
peake Bay to cheaper lodgings. 
94. Henson ran the week of August 23, during which he had worked four 
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and a quarter days and earned one extra. Rea received a reward of $2.625 in early 
September. The pay book records expenses for locks and fetters in September and 
October. MCW pay book, Aug. 23, Sept. 13, 20, Oct. 4, 1828. 
95. Hall Brittain had been hired to the plant for all of 1828 and rehired in 
1829. Nicolas Ford had come to the plant in the second week of February and had 
been there five weeks when he ran. The pay book for the week of March 21 lists 
Brittain's name just above Ford's; given the pattern of pay book entries, they prob-
ably worked at the same task. Brittain was "discharged" the same week Ford ran 
off, a usage that connotes a dismissal for unsatisfactory behavior. MCW pay book, 
1828-29. 
96. Smith was purchased for $275 from James Renshaw on November 14, 
1826, as recorded in a loose bill of sale in the MCW journal. 
97. No record indicates whether McKim reimbursed Ford's owner. Only if 
McKim could demonstrate that he had taken reasonable care to prevent Ford 
from running off and had made prompt and reasonable efforts to recover Ford 
would he avoid having to reimburse Ford's owner for the loss of the slave. See 
judgment of the court in Hay v. Conner, Miscellaneous Papers, 1798, Baltimore 
County Court, for a discussion of this subject. 
98. Winkelman earned fees of $10.00 and $10.50 for two visits to the Negro 
House in July of 1829. The final entry in the pay book regarding Sewell records 
$7.50 spent for his "coffin, grave, bearers, and Minister." The other slaves at the 
plant received a half holiday to attend Sewell's funeral. MCW pay book, July and 
August 1829. 
99. MCW pay book, 1829-30. The number of slaves at work never rose 
above fourteen for more than a week or two at a time after Sewell's death. 
100. A doubling of slave prices would have doubled capital opportunity and 
depreciation costs but would have left maintenance costs untouched. Under those 
conditions, slave labor in 1828 would still have been about 20 percent, or a dollar 
a week cheaper, than free labor. 
3. THE BLACK DRIVE FOR AUTONOMY AND MASTERS' RESPONSES 
1. See the Maryland Journal and Baltimore Commercial Advertiser, July 
24, 1794. 
2. See Jones, Born a Child of Freedom, yet a Slave, 37-64. Jones concludes 
that "the threat of sale was the most effective long-term mechanism of control" 
(p. 63). 
3. Carville Earle has argued that the slowness of the shift from slavery to 
free labor in Chesapeake areas switching from tobacco to wheat culture can be 
attributed to fairly close marginal costs of maintaining slaves year round as op-
posed to hiring free labor for seasonal work. Planters might have avoided com-
plete dissociation from slavery lest unforeseen rises in free labor costs make sla-
very once again the cheapest system. See Earle, Geographical Inquiry, 226-57. 
4. See the October 4, 1796, advertisement of Solomon Etting in the Federal 
Gazette, concerning the runaway Darkey. 
5. Between 1777 and 1783, Maryland newspapers carried twenty-seven run-
away advertisements that declared a slave had fled "to the British" or "to the 
Army." The earliest ads appeared in conjunction with the passage of a British fleet 
up the Chesapeake in 1777 in preparation for a march on Philadelphia; thereafter 
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there were repeated British raids throughout the region. Compiled from Windley, 
Runaway Slaves. 
6. Rochambeau's troops marched north along Maryland's Western Shore in 
the summer and fall of 1782. During this period eight runaway ads speculated 
that a slave had fled "to the French." Compiled from Windley, Runaway Slaves. 
7. See Hoffman, "The 'Disaffected' in the Revolutionary South," for a dis-
cussion of Maryland's Eastern Shore during the Revolution. 
8. See Laws of Maryland, 1663, chap. 30. 
9. Ibid., 1681, chap.4. 
10. See Butler v. Boarman, September 1770, Harris and McHenry, Mary-
land Reports. 
11. Butler lived in Saint Mary's County, where a courthouse fire had de-
stroyed all records from the relevant period. 
12. See Harris and McHenry, Maryland Reports, 1787, 2:214. 
13. See Harris and McHenry, Maryland Reports, 4:295. For a recent and 
thorough examination of this case, see Papenfuse, "From Recompense to Revolu-
tion." Papenfuse contends that reactions to the Saint Domingue revolt keyed a 
reaction against freedom petitions that worked against the Mahoneys. 
14. This practice was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1813. See 
Helen Caterall, Judicial Cases concerning Slavery, 4:45. 
15. See the Annapolis Maryland Gazette of Jan. 19, 1792, advertisement of 
G.R. Brown for the runaway Jemima. Nine runaway advertisers of the 1790s 
noted that an escapee would try to pass for free "as a Butler." Compiled from 
Baltimore newspapers and the Annapolis Maryland Gazette. 
16. The society was founded in 1789. See Berlin, Slaves without Masters, 28, 
for an occupational breakdown of the society's original members. See Finnie, "Anti-
Slavery Movement in the Upper South," 322-25, for a discussion of the society. 
17. See "Report of a meeting of the Maryland Society for Promoting the 
Abolition of Slavery." 
18. See Laws of Maryland, 1796, chap. 67, sees. 21-27. The law also re-
stricted petition filings to county courts, likely to provide a cheape·r and friendlier 
venue for slaveholders than the appellate courts. 
19. See Caterall, Judicial Cases concerning Slavery, vol. 4, passim. 
20. The Maryland Gazette carried ads for eighteen runaways in conjunction 
with a pending or unsuccessful freedom petition, between 1791 and 1800. 
Rawlings's ads appeared in issues of July 1797 and October 1800, respectively. 
21. See Manumissions, Anne Arundel County, MSA. Carroll's manumission 
of five Mahoney brothers and two other slaves occurred in 1808, that of John 
Joice in 1802. Ashton manumitted Daniel Mahoney in 1806. See also Papenfuse, 
"From Recompense to Revolution," 53-54, for Carroll's interest in the Ashton-
Mahoney case. 
22. See Manumission of James Chaplain to Negro Job, Dorchester County 
Land Records, 1823, MSA. 
23. The society appears to have ceased operations by 1798. See Guy, "Mary-
land Abolition Society." 
24. For the ban on manumission by will see Laws of Maryland, 1752, chap. 
1; for the repeal statute passed in 1790, chap. 9. For Pennsylvania's post-nati law, 
see Nash and Soderlund, Freedom by Degrees, 74-99. 
25. Speech of William Pinkney in the Maryland House of Delegates, of Nov. 
1, 1789, in the Anti-Slavery Collection, Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore. 
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26. By 1820 Pinkney, then a U.S. senator, favored Missouri's entrance as a 
slave state, endorsing the "diffusion" argument as his state's best hope for draw-
ing down its numbers of slaves and free blacks. 
27. The legislature never made the ban permanent. For renewals, see Laws 
of Maryland, 1755,chap. 12, 1758,chap. 9, 1766,chap. 1, 1786,chap. 35,and 
1789, chap. 61. For the repeal statute, see 1790, chap. 9. 
28. See Negro Peter and Others v. John Elliott's Executors, Harris and 
McHenry, Maryland Reports, 1793, vol. 2. 
29. See Laws of Maryland, 1796, chap. 67. 
30. Ibid., sec. 13. 
31. See Burrough's Administrator v. Negro Anna, in Cases in the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, June 1817, MSA. Burroughs had left his slave woman Anna 
"her liberty ... , a young bay mare, ... four barrels of Indian corn, and three 
hundred weight of pork." The appeals court ruled her still a slave. 
32. See Harris and Johnson, Maryland Reports, 1820, 5:59. In this case a 
Mr. Goslee freed his slaves at specified ages and identified certain of them to serve 
his widow during their remaining years of servitude. The widow claimed her thirds 
and revoked this bequest. 
33. See "Opinion of Francis Scott Key on the Manumission Deed of George 
Calvert," June 24, 1825, Scharf Papers, MSA. 
34. The principal sources are newspaper advertisements from 1773 to 1830, 
as they relate both to the purchase, sale, hiring, and flight of slaves and to appren-
tices, indentured servants from Europe, sailors, and convicts. Additional material 
has been drawn from runaway dockets, court cases, and occasional newspaper 
articles. Runaway ads have been mined heavily to establish runaway typologies (a 
young adult male who runs away alone, for example), and as "witnesses in spite 
of themselves" about the lives of slaves (references to physical and psychological 
scars have been catalogued and analyzed). Historians of the slave family have 
noted that runaways frequently sought to reunite with kinfolk. Recently, cultural 
historians have focused on runaways' clothes, hair, speech, and mannerisms in 
order to understand contemporary cultural attitudes of and toward African Ameri-
cans. For a comprehensive discussion see G. Mullin, Flight and Rebellion. Re-
gional studies touching on runaways include Nash, Forging Freedom, 136-54; 
White, Somewhat More Independent, 114-49; Wood, "Female Resistance to Chattel 
Slavery." Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground, principally deals 
with the demise of slavery in Maryland post-1850, but see chap. 1, esp. 16-17. 
Prude, "To Look upon the 'Lower Sort,"' focuses on perceptions of runaways 
revealed through physical descriptions. Collections of runaway ads include Smith 
and Wojtowica's Blacks Who Stole Themselves and Windley, Runaway Slaves. 
35. Ebbing runaway rates from Baltimore during 1800-1810 coincided with 
declining growth in the free black population of Philadelphia, as depicted by Nash 
in Forging Freedom, 137, table 4. The correlation between fewer Maryland run-
aways being reported headed for Philadelphia and lower free black growth rates 
in Philadelphia lends support to the hypothesis of Baltimore slaveholders that 
more runaways were hiding out in Baltimore and its environs. 
36. Between 1791 and 1820, 237 of 525 male runaways (45 percent) were 
identified by advertisers as possessing a skill. Most numerous were brick makers 
(25), sailors (24), forge and furnace hands (22), and shoemakers (11). Others in-
cluded bakers (8), blacksmiths (8), ship carpenters (7), rope makers (5), carpenters 
(5), cigar makers (5), nailers (5), barbers (4), tailors (4), caulkers (4), and watermen (4). 
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37. See the Baltimore American of June 27, 1811. 
38. Ibid., Feb. 9, 1818. 
39. Total black population in Baltimore in 1810 was 10,591 and in 1820, 
14,615. Cited from U.S. Census Office, Third Census, 1810, Population Sched-
ules of the Third Census of the U.S., 1810, Maryland (Washington, D.C. 1810), 
and Fourth Census, 1820, Population Schedulees of the Fourth Census of the 
U.S., 1820, Maryland, (Washington, D.C. 1820). 
40. See the American, July 12, 1817, ad for Mary Brown. 
41. See Nash and Soderlund, Freedom by Degrees, esp. chaps. 1, 2. 
42. See advertisement of William Norris, Jr., in the American of June 24, 
1818. For jailed runaways, see the Baltimore City Gaol, Runaway Docket, 1831, 
MSA. The docket lists more than 150 Negroes jailed as suspected runaways; slightly 
less than half were released to local owners. 
43. The rural runaways were taken from a sample of 615 advertisements in 
the Annapolis Maryland Gazette from 1773 to 1815. The Baltimore sample of 
721 advertisements was drawn from 1773 to 1820, from the Maryland Journal 
and Baltimore Commercial Advertiser (1773-95), the Federal Gazette (1796-99 
and 1801-4), and the American (1799-1801 and 1804-20). 
44. The maximum sliding-scale reward offered for male runaways from Bal-
timore between 1811 and 1820 averaged $73, based on a sample of 241 advertise-
ments in the American. This maximum figure would typically be paid for a slave 
recaptured more than fifty miles from Baltimore, or "out of the state of Maryland." 
45. See advertisement of Anthony Mann for the recovery of John Davis, in 
the American of July 16, 1808. 
46. See advertisement of Christopher Hughes in the May 4, 1798, edition of 
the Baltimore Federal Gazette. 
4 7. See Petition of James Hughes, Petitions, 1791, Baltimore County Or-
phans' Court, MSA. 
48. For examples, see the Petition of Helen Burk (October 1797), of Eliza-
beth Hayes (November 1807), or of John Gorham (November 1816), Petitions, 
Baltimore County Orphans' Court. 
49. See Petition of Negroes Basil and Philip, Pardon Papers, 1794, Maryland 
Governor and Council, MSA. 
50. See the advertisement of Alexander Lawson of Jan. 29, 1796, in the Fed-
eral Gazette and that of Joseph Biays of Mar. 23, 1792, in the Maryland Journal 
and Baltimore Commercial Advertiser. 
51. See the American of Feb. 11, 1820. 
52. See Bancroft, Slave Trading in the Old South, 28-42. Most of Bancroft's 
evidence came from the 1830s and later. 
53. Other interpretations of what advertisers meant by a desire to avoid 
"trouble" are unconvincing. Because slaves were generally sold for cash, ascer-
taining creditworthiness would not normally be at issue. Nor did Maryland law 
impose special fees or documentary requirements on out-of-state sales of slaves. 
54. Woolfolk and Anderson advertised in Baltimore newspapers during the 
period 1816-18. See the American of Mar. 7 or Oct. 12, 1818. 
55. Slave population declined 7 percent in Baltimore from 1810 to 1820; the 
flat numbers of sale ads do indicate an unchanging overall frequency of slave sale. 
56. Of 523 male runaways advertised between 1791 and 1820, 259 (49 per-
cent) were said to be between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. In the years 
1816-18 that proportion increased to 52 of 90 (58 percent). 
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57. See Laws of Maryland, 1817, chap. 112. 
58. Records checked include those of the Baltimore city and county courts 
for 1818-30 and the Prisoner Records of the Maryland Penitentiary. Seven per-
sons served time for the offense of kidnapping, that is, the attempt to transport a 
term slave. See Prisoner Records, 1811-30, Maryland Penitentiary, MSA. Pardon 
petitions reveal six cases in which a convicted kidnapper avoided imprisonment 
through the governor's intervention but no cases indicative of any prosecution of 
the original seller of a term slave. See Pardon Papers, 1818-30, Governor and 
Council. 
59. Report of the Grand Jury of Baltimore County, July term, 1816, printed 
in the Federal Gazette of Oct. 29, 1816. 
60. See Laws of Maryland, 1817, chap. 112, and 1818, chap. 208. 
61. The Woolfolks sold slaves to Georgia and Louisiana from 1816 to 1830. 
David Anderson, of Tennessee, traded in slaves well into the 1820s. In an 1822 
runaway advertisement he sought to recover eight bondmen who had escaped 
from the Baltimore City Jail. See the American of Sept. 5 and Sept. 20, 1822. 
62. See Laws of Maryland, 1817, chap. 112, sec. 6. For the debate, see the 
Federal Gazette of Sept. 13, 1810. 
63. See the American, Nov. 30, 1816. 
64. Ibid. 
65. See the American, July 18, 1818. 
66. Kidnapping flared up again in the 1820s, leading to an unsuccessful pro-
posal to allow slaves and free blacks to testify against whites in kidnapping cases. 
See the American of Aug. 9, 1822. Also see "A Further Supplement to the Act 
entitled, an Act Relating to Servants and Slaves," pamphlet 2708, MHS. 
67. Of the 197 advertisements for runaway women, only 19 (10 percent) 
indicate that a fugitive took children with her. 
68. The 1813 tax rolls listed 825 slave children under the age of fourteen 
and 962 women over that age. See Baltimore City, Commissioners of the Tax, 
Assessment Record, 1813, MSA. The 1820 census reported 1,552 slave women 
age fourteen and older and 1,562 slave children below that age. That census showed 
859 slave women (55 percent) living in households with a total of 989 slave chil-
dren under fourteen and 693 slave women (45 percent) in households with no 
children under fourteen. The census data show 573 of 1,552 slave children (37 
percent) living in households with no black woman. Compiled from the Baltimore 
city census, Fourth Census of the United States, 1820. 
69. See the American, Sept. 26, 1809; Dec. 12, 1812; Oct. 3, 24, 1806; Fed-
eral Gazette, June 17, 1796; American, Nov. 29, 1816. 
70. See ad of F.B. Brunelot in the American, Oct. 15, 1814. 
71. See the American, Jan. 3, 1818, ad to sell a hostler. 
72. See the case of Ridout, ]ubarre, et al., vs. Richard Caton, Robert Oliver, 
John Oliver, the Cape Sable Co., et al., in Maryland Chancery Papers, case 17898-
9015, MSA. The first quotation is from a letter of Apr. 24, 1816, from Thomas H. 
Dorsey to Gerrard Troost. The second quotation is from a deposition of Margaret 
Troost, of Apr. 9, 1817. 
73. See the complaint of Job Garretson in Garretson v. Hollis, Maryland 
Chancery Papers, case 17898-2064, filed Jan. 3, 1802. 
74. See the American, Jan. 7, 1810, concerning an eighteen-year-old wag-
oner; May 23, 1809, concerning a twenty-one-year-old Negro man with nine years 
to serve; and July 31, 1811, concerning a Negro woman skilled in gardening. 
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75. See the American, Sept. 8, 1818, an advertisement regarding a woman, a 
cook, and a man who was a driver, on board the Two Brothers. 
76. See the American, Jan. 10, 1812, advertisement of Thomas Shaw and 
John Murray, executors of William Weatherly's estate. 
77. See the Federal Gazette of Dec. 29, 1797. 
78. See Duvall's notice of Pitt in the American, June 20, 1817. 
79. See Maryland Journal and Baltimore Commercial Advertiser, September 
1785, for Gough's advertisement to recover "Will," a blacksmith. 
80. Ibid., May 3, 1791. The median reward offered in 158 runaway adver-
tisements from the 1790s was twenty dollars. Gough promised Will Bates's captor 
twice as much as all but one other reward offered in the decade. 
81. See the Laws of Maryland, 1804, chap. 90, and 1833, chap. 224. 
82. See W. Green, Life of William Green. 
83. I have found no successful freedom petitions that turned on a master's 
failure to manumit a term slave on schedule. See Caterall, Judicial Cases concern-
ing Slavery, 4:49-71, for Maryland cases involving freedom petitions. 
84. See Gibson Readle v. Ninian Willett, Maryland Chancery Papers, Feb. 
21, 1810. Also see Hood v. Weems, Maryland Chancery Papers, 1816. Hester 
Hood alleged that she had sold her slave Harry to John C. Weems in 1807 on 
condition that he free Harry in three years. In 1816 Harry was still not free, and 
Hood contended that Weems was planning to sell Harry out of the state. 
85. Keith Hopkins sees gradual self-purchase as a form of insurance against 
the death of a slave. See Conquerors and Slaves, 127-29. The logic fits well for 
small slaveholders in the upper South. 
86. See the American, Mar. 9, 1815, ad of Joseph Hart, offering a one-hun-
dred-dollar reward for the capture of Moses Lemmon. 
87. See Lewis, "The Darkest Abode of Man;" Lewis, "Slave Families at an 
Early Chesapeake Ironworks." Also see Dew, "David Ross and the Oxford Iron 
Works," and Dew, "Disciplining Slave Ironworkers," for examples in Virginia 
and Maryland. 
88. See the American of Dec. 4, 1813. 
89. I have found no cases in the court reports for Maryland in which a 
slaveholder recovered damages from an unauthorized employer of a slave. 
90. Self-hiring did entail risks, especially the threat of kidnapping. The Pro-
tection Society of Baltimore, formed in 1816, noted that kidnappers preyed on 
slaves as well as on free blacks, particularly by luring them to secluded locales 
with offers of work chopping wood, mowing, or picking fruit. See the American 
of Sept. 26, 1816. 
91. The 1790 census data for Baltimore town show .6 percent of 1,255 slaves 
living in all-black households; for 1800 the proportion is 1.7 percent of 2,843 
slaves, for 1810 1.3 percent of 4,657 slaves, and for 1820 5.5 percent of 4,289 
slaves. 
92. See Laws of Maryland, 1796, chap. 67. This law lowered the upper age 
limit on emancipations from fifty to forty-five. 
93. See Laws of Maryland, 1796, chap. 68, sec. 17, and 1817, chap. 112. 
94. The twenty cases derive from a review of 2,331 wills filed with the Balti-
more County Court between 1790 and 1825. Of these, 597 specifically disposed 
of slave property. 
9 5. See the will of John Battee, registered in 1800, in Baltimore County Wills, 
1797-1802,p. 259,MSA. 
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96. See Frederick Douglass, The Life and Times of Frederick Douglass (1892; 
reprint, New York, 1967), 99. 
97. See Niles' Weekly Register, Dec. 2, 1815, 9:231. 
98. See Petition of Negro Rachel, Petitions, 1820, Baltimore County Or-
phans' Court. 
99. See the American, Sept. 12, 1818, ad of Joshua Barney. 
100. Ibid., Apr. 14, 1819. 
4. MANUMISSION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SLAVERY 
1. The literature on manumission in the ancient world and in Latin America 
is voluminous. For Roman society, see W.D. Phillips, Slavery from Roman Times, 
25-39, and Bradley, Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire, 81-112. Garlan 
discusses manumission in Attic Greece in Slavery and Ancient Greece, 73-84. For 
an urban setting in Latin America, see Karasch, Slave Life in Rio de janeiro, esp. 
335-68. Descriptions relating to other parts of Latin America include Klein, Sla-
very in the Americas, 62-65, 196-200; Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba, passim, 
esp. 149-57; Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru, 273-301; Schwartz, Sugar 
Plantations in Brazilian Society, 439-65; Sharp, Slavery on the Spanish Frontier, 
127-47. Cooper, Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa, 243-68, discusses 
manumission in nineteenth-century Zanzibar. For a theoretical treatment, see 
Patterson, Slavery and Social Death, 209-39. 
2. Berlin, in Slaves without Masters, 30, argues that "equalitarian ideals 
motivated most manumitters in the years following the Revolution," whereas nine-
teenth-century emancipators were "motivated more by cold utility than by liber-
tarian ideals" (p. 150). See pp. 15-50, 138-160. Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman, 
in "Philanthropy at Bargain Basement Prices," 377-401, focus on northern gradual 
emancipation laws and conclude that freeing slaves at age twenty-six or older 
provided full compensation to slaveholders for the loss of ownership of the slave's 
labor power. Matison notes this distinction in motivation ("Manumission by will 
was an act of charity; manumission by deed often meant self-purchase.") in "Manu-
mission by Purchase," 164. 
For manumission in New York and Philadelphia, see White, Somewhat More 
Independent, esp. chaps. 1 and 2; Nash and Soderlund, Freedom by Degrees, esp. 
chaps. 2 and 4. K. Carroll states in "Religious Influences on the Manumission of 
Slaves" that in Eastern Shore Maryland, manumission "received its start and gained 
its main strength from religion." He discusses Quakers, Methodists, and Nicholites, 
whose sects had opposed perpetual slavery. 
3. Frank Tannenbaum, Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas (New 
York, 1946). See pages 50-71 for his discussion of manumission. 
4. The 14,800 free blacks residing in Baltimore in 1830 far exceeded the 
roughly 3,000 manumissions by deed and will registered for the city and county, 
during the years 1789-1830. 
Place-of-birth data on certificates of freedom suggest that fewer than one 
Baltimore free black in ten had been born and raised in the city itself. See the 
Register of Certificates, Clerk of Baltimore County, 1806-1816, microfilmed un-
der the title "Negroes Manumitted and Born Free, 1806-1864," Baltimore City 
Archives. This list of certificates of freedom identifies place of birth for 195 people. 
Of these, 176 were raised outside Baltimore County; only 19 persons are listed as 
having been raised in Baltimore City. 
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5. Residents of Baltimore city manumitted 1,080 slaves by will and deed 
over the first three decades of the nineteenth century, an annual average of 36, or 
a rate of 9 per 1,000 per year. For Prince George's County, all recorded 
manumissions equaled 543, or 18 per year, a rate of less than 2 per 1,000 over the 
years 1800-1830. Dorchester County's 1,186 manumissions, or 39 per year, begin 
to approach the city's level, at 7 per 1,000. The Maryland State Colonization 
Society noted 2,342 manumissions throughout the state in the decade 1831-41, a 
statewide rate of 2 slaves per 1,000 per year. See the Maryland Colonization Jour-
nal, June 1841, p. 11, MHS. 
6. See Zilversmit's The First Emancipation. Also see Berlin, Slaves without 
Masters, 15-50, for a discussion of the First Emancipation in both northern and 
southern states. See pp. 137-38 for subsequent southern efforts to restrict emanci-
pation. 
7. Of 9,606 manumissions by deed recorded in eight Maryland counties 
between 1770 and 1830,4,835 (50.3 percent) freed female slaves and 4,771 (49.7 
percent) liberated males. Those who found that outside the United States about 
two-thirds of manumittees were women include Brana-Shute, "Approaching Free-
dom"; Karasch, Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro, 336; L.L. Johnson, "Manumission in 
Colonial Buenos Aires," 262; Handler, The Unappropriated People; Cox, The 
Free Coloreds in the Slave Societies of St. Kitts and Grenada; Klein, African Sla-
very in Latin America and the Caribbean. Klein claims that "all recent studies" 
support the two-thirds ratio (p. 227). Also see Ingersoll, "Free Blacks in a Slave 
Society," and Kotlikoff and Rupert, "The Manumission of Slaves in New Orleans." 
8. Many studies of manumission in Latin America and the Caribbean have 
found that people of mixed race were more likely to become free than darker-
skinned slaves. According to Stephen Small, this pattern is also to be found in 
North America but has been overlooked by earlier investigators. He cites manu-
mission records from Georgia and planter records from Virginia as support. See 
his "Racial Group Boundaries and Identities." 
9. About 29 percent of 1,044 free people of color and term slaves sentenced 
to the state penitentiary before 1830 were categorized by their keepers as mulatto 
or yellow, and 24 percent of 83 slaves for life were so described, showing a differ-
ence not statistically significant. There is no guarantee that these populations were 
representative samples of their larger groups, of course, but the hypothesis that 
lighter skin color worked in favor of one's gaining freedom is certainly not sup-
ported by these data, as compiled from Prisoner Records, 1811-30, Maryland 
Penitentiary. 
10. Of 7,549 manumissions by deed in seven rural counties, 2,744 (36 per-
cent) took effect immediately and 4,805 (64 percent) required a term of servitude 
pending emancipation. 
11. From 1800 to 1814, 442 of 844 Baltimore manumissions by deed (52 
percent) were immediate. From 1815 to 1830,768 of 1,195 Baltimore manumissions 
(67 percent) were immediate. 
12. Overall, about 7 percent of manumitters noted reasons of conscience in 
deeds granting freedom (694 of 9,606). With the exception of eighteenth-century 
Talbot County, where about 40 percent of manumitters evinced such reasons (357 
of 891), no more than 10 to 15 percent of any county's manumitters expressed 
opposition to slavery while liberating slaves. 
13. The firm of Warner and Hanna printed one-page manumission forms as 
early as 1789. By the early 1800s, a majority of original manumissions were filed 
on forms. 
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14. See American Methodist Episcopal church class membership lists for Bal-
timore City Station, and East Baltimore (Fell's Point) for the years 1799-1825. For 
the Friends' Society (Quakers), see the records of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting. 
Both are in the microfilm collections, MSA. The manumission lists are from those 
deeds found in the Miscellaneous Papers, Baltimore County Court, for the years 
1785-1830. Of over 2,000 manumission deeds, only 156 manumissions could 
positively be attributed to a Quaker or a Methodist. 
15. See Baltimore Yearly Meeting for Sufferings, Minutes on Negroes and 
Slaves, and the Slave Trade, Etc., microfilm reel1401, MSA, pp. 360-75. 
16. For changes in the Methodist discipline on slavery, see Daniel Hitt and 
Thomas Ware, eds., Minutes of the Methodist Conference Annually Held in America 
from 1773 to 1813, Inclusive (New York, 1813 ). See also Mathews, Slavery and 
Methodism. 
17. Summarized from the Journal of the Baltimore Annual Conference, Meth-
odist Episcopal Church, vols. 1 and 2, 1817 and 1844, dealing with the period 
1800-1833. For bringing slaves forward to "have their time judged," see Balti-
more Circuit of the Methodist Episcopal Church, Quarterly Conference Minutes, 
for the period 1799-1816. Both items are at the United Methodist Historical Soci-
ety, Lovely Lane Museum, Baltimore. 
18. Name matching between church membership records and Baltimore 
slaveholders in the second and third censuses revealed 44 of 990 slaveholders in 
1800 to be Methodists (4.4 percent) and 59 of 1,362 in 1810 (4.3 percent). In 
1820 there were 145 Methodists out of 1,777 slaveholders in the city (8.2 per-
cent). Considering the emphasis of the Methodist discipline on recording 
manumissions, it is not likely that surviving records significantly underrepresent 
Methodist action. 
19. This number derives from name matching of congregation members listed 
in the City Station and East Baltimore class lists to manumitters in Baltimore 
county. Matching efforts revealed 108 sales and 104 purchases of slaves by Meth-
odists over the same time span, suggesting that compliance with nonslaveholding 
rules was imperfect. 
20. The first president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Philip Evans 
Thomas, and its first chief construction engineer, Caspar Wever, were both Quak-
ers, who barred the use of slave labor in constructing the road. See Hungerford, 
Bal#more and Ohio Railroad. The Ellicott brothers operated forges, foundries, 
mills, and naileries; they neither owned nor hired slaves in Maryland. 
21. See Manumission of Denwood Jones to Negro Kit, Dorchester County 
Land Records, 1821. 
22. See Laws of Maryland, 1832, chap. 296. The willingness to "grandfa-
ther" the right of those buying liberty in installments to remain suggests that gradual 
self-purchase was widespread. 
23. Matison, in "Manumission by Purchase," noted that only Delaware, Ten-
nessee, and Louisiana characterized self-purchase as a contract between master 
and slave. 
24. Slaves over the age of forty-five could not be freed, and any slave manu-
mitted had to be "capable by labour ... to procure sufficient food and raiment." 
See Laws of Maryland, 1796, chap. 67, sec. 29. 
25. Miscellaneous Papers, 1820, Baltimore County Court. 
26. Ibid., 1817. 
27. Ibid., 1819. 
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28. Manumission of Robert Tilley to Negro William Carroll, Chattel Records, 
1802, Prince George's County, MSA. 
29. Manumission of Michael Lucas to Thomas Perry, Land Records, 1801, 
Dorchester County. 
30. See Manumission of Edward Griffith to Sundry Negroes, Land Records, 
1823, Dorchester County. 
3 L Manumission of Edward Wrotten to Negro David, Land Records, 1800, 
Dorchester County. 
32. Manumission of Richard Mackall to Sundry Negroes, Miscellaneous Pa-
pers, 1808, Baltimore County Court. See also manumissions by Mackall to James 
Byas (1809) and Bigs Butler (1809) and of Isaac (1811) for shortening of terms. 
33. Manumission of Edward Griffith to Sundry Negroes, Land Records, 1824, 
Dorchester County, manumission of James Chaplain to Negro Job, Laud Records, 
Dorchester County, 1823. 
34. Of 429 female and 370 male slaves manumitted immediately by deed in 
Baltimore city and County between 1789 and 1830, for whom an age was speci-
fied, 225 women (52 percent) were thirty or older, as were 234 men (63 percent). 
The modal age of forty defined 36 women and 33 men. 
35. See Laws of Maryland, 1817, chap. 112. 
36. See the supplement to the Baltimore Yearly Meeting Records, Baltimore 
Yearly Meeting for Sufferings, Minutes on Negroes and Slaves, 1816, microfilm 
reel 1401, MSA. 
37. The Act concerning Negroes of 1715 decreed that children born of white 
mothers and black fathers be bound to service until the age of thirty-one. It was in 
effect until 1796. 
38. See Miscellaneous Papers, 1804, Baltimore County Court. Turnbull set 
terms of service as long as forty-two years. 
39. See Manumission of Charles Goldsborough to Negro Benjamin Jackson, 
Land Records, 1822, Dorchester County. Goldsborough also sold at least two 
other elderly female slaves to their kin, although neither of these transactions 
were formally linked to manumissions of the purchasers. 
40. See Manumission by Henry Darden, William Vanderford, and Henry 
Downes of Negro Benjamin, Land Records, 1811, Queen Anne's County, MSA. 
41. See Laws of Maryland, 1796, chap.67. Regarding reregistration or tardy 
registration of manumissions, see Manumission by Elizabeth Hutchings of Sundry 
Negroes, Land Records, 1807, Queen Anne's County, for a typical example. At 
least one hundred of the manumissions in the eight counties surveyed in this work 
represented "perfections" of previous deeds that were defective because they had 
been registered too late or not at all. 
42. See Manumission by William Browne of Negro Phill, Land Records, 1800, 
Queen Anne's County. 
43. See Manumission by Joseph Blackiston of Negro John, Land Records, 
1805, Kent County, MSA. Also see manumissions by Thomas Granger of Sundry 
Negroes, 1785 and 1790, and of Milcah, 1814, Land Records, Kent County. 
44. See Douglass, Life and Times, 95-97, regarding division and redivision 
of slaves. The Baltimore County Orphans' Court Proceedings bulge with slave 
valuations filed by court-appointed appraisers as a prelude to the sale of slaves to 
divide an estate. See Proceedings, Baltimore County Orphans Court. This discus-
sion relies on a study of these records from 1790 to 1830. 
45. Guardian Accounts filed with the Baltimore County Orphans' Court 
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between 1800 and 1825 yielded 130 notations of annual hire rates for slaves. The 
median value was $60, the mean value $59. Hire rates of as much as $240 per 
year were obtained for a few slave blacksmiths and shipwrights. See Guardian 
Accounts, 1800-25, Baltimore County Register of Wills. 
46. See Mortgages, 1800-30, Miscellaneous Papers, Baltimore County Court. 
In a sample of one hundred mortgages, interest of 6 percent was charged more 
than 90 percent of the time. 
47. For income-generating slaves, also see William Gwynn's guardianship of 
Bridget Tull, from 1807 through 1812; Zachary Miles for the grandchildren of 
William Preston, between 1800 and 1811, Edward Pannell for heirs of]ohn Pannell, 
from 1801 to 1810, Benjamin Ricaud for Mary Ann Hyatt from 1806 to 1815, 
and John Wooden for the heirs of Joseph Bowen, from 1808 to 1822, in Guardian 
Accounts, 1800-22, Baltimore County Orphans' Court. 
48. See Baltimore County Wills, 1797-1802, p. 552. Also see Guardian Ac-
counts, 1803-09, Baltimore County Orphans' Court, for the value of 
DeRochebrune's slaves and their earnings as hirees. 
49. For Hewitt, see Baltimore County Wills, 1802-5, p. 356. Hopkinson's 
account is in Guardian Accounts, 1812, Baltimore County Orphans' Court. 
50. See Baltimore County Wills, 1802-5, p. 99. For Piper as a Methodist, see 
class lists of Baltimore City Station, Methodist Episcopal Church, 1799 and 1800, 
microfilm rolls M408-11. 
51. Wills filed in Baltimore between 1791 and 1820 record 189 promises of 
manumission, of which 29 (15 percent) granted freedom at the testator's death. 
Of 821 deeds of manumission granted between 1790 and 1830, 486 (59 percent) 
granted freedom immediately. See Baltimore County Wills, 1791-1820, and Mis-
cellaneous Papers, 1790-1830, Baltimore County Court. 
52. Residents of Baltimore city granted 23 percent of their manumissions by 
will, compared to 29 percent in Dorchester County, 38 percent in Prince George's 
County, and 44 percent in outlying Baltimore County, during the period 1790-
1830. See Baltimore County, Dorchester County, Prince George's County Wills, 
MSA. Chi-square tests reveal the lower ratio of manumissions by will in Baltimore 
city to be significant at the .01 level. 
53. Other indicators of concern about slave flight include injunctions against 
selling slaves out of Maryland and allowing favored slaves to choose a master 
from among several heirs. 
54. The 1790, 1800, 1810, and 1820 censuses list a total of 4,844 heads of 
household in which a slave resided in Baltimore. This figure does not eliminate 
duplicate listings of the same slaveholding person in successive censuses. Nor can 
it include those who held slaves for a few years but were never recorded in a 
decennial census. The 277 households with 7 or more slaves represent 5.7 percent 
of all slaveholding households. In calculating manumission rates, I presumed that 
each census listing indicated holding each slave for ten years, as an average. Alto-
gether, large holders owned 2,504 slaves, for whom 85 recorded manumissions 
survive, over the entire time span 1790-1830, a rate of 3.4 manumissions per 
1,000 slaves per year. 
I constructed a sample of 170 small slaveholders, defined as those owning 
three or fewer slaves, stratified across the first four censuses but selected ran-
domly from within each census roll. 
The small slaveholders displayed a manumission rate of 8.6 per 1,000 slaves 
per year. 
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55. In 1790 27 of 390 slaveholders listed for Baltimore town (6.9 percent) 
were women; they owned 6.8 percent of the city's slaves. For 1800, women were 
10.5 percent of the slaveholders and owned 10.3 percent of the slaves; for 1810 
they made up 11.7 percent of the slaveholders and owned 10.9 percent of the 
slaves. By 1820, women were 13.2 percent of all slaveholders (234 of 1,777) and 
owned 13 percent of the slaves (556 of 4,289). Data compiled from microfilm 
copies of the first through fourth censuses of the United States for Baltimore City. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Heads of Families at the First Census of the U.S. Taken 
in the Year 1790: Maryland (Baltimore, 1965; originally published Washington, 
D.C., 1907). For information on third and fourth U.S. censuses, see note 39 above. 
Regarding manumissions, women freed 247 of 1,080 slaves between 1790 
and 1830, comprising both deeds and wills in which the manumitter could posi-
tively be identified as living in Baltimore city. Data derived from Miscellaneous 
Papers, Baltimore County Court, and Baltimore County Wills, 1790-1830. 
56. The percentages quoted represent the proportion of taxable wealth in 
slaves held by the median woman or man on lists of taxables rank-ordered by the 
percentage of wealth so held. The 1813 tax list identifies 123 women and 974 
men who resided in Baltimore city and who were assessed taxes on slaves. Data 
compiled from the Assessment Records, 1813, Baltimore City Commissioners of 
the Tax. 
57. The male average was $1,429 and the female average, $654. 
58. The first four censuses for Baltimore list 62 white female heads of house-
hold owning five or more slaves. These women collectively constitute 11.7 per-
cent of the 533 women listed in the first four censuses for Baltimore. The 496 
slaves they held make up 31 percent of the 1,481 slaves residing in households 
headed by white women. 
59. Slaves were assumed to have been held an average of ten years by a 
woman who lived throughout the period 1790-1830 and who appeared once on 
the census list. Women whose death dates were known and who disposed of slaves 
in their wills were assumed to have held slaves for the period between their first 
appearance in the census and their death, plus a period of five years before their 
first appearance. 
The sample of women owning three or fewer slaves was drawn at random 
from each of the first four censuses, after stratifying the number to be taken from 
each roll with a view to obtaining a 20 percent sample of all "smallholding" fe-
male masters. 
60. See Miscellaneous Papers, 1811, Baltimore County Court, regarding the 
sale of the slave Jerry by Stephen Hill, for an example. Phrases like "whom I 
formerly purchased from Jacob Myers" or "who was raised by William Price" 
occur in perhaps a third of the Baltimore County bills of sale. 
61. See Douglass, Life and Times, 78. 
62. See Proceedings, Jan. 1, 1827, Baltimore County Orphans' Court. Court-
appointed estate appraisers reported, "We have appraised them two ways, for a 
term of years and for life." Here are their figures: For life: Elisha, 32, $300; Joshua, 
30, $300; Catherine, 5, $100. For a term of years: Elisha, 32, to serve 5 years, 
$150; Joshua, 30, to serve 5 years, $150; Catherine, 5, to serve 25 years, $75. 
63. See the MCW journal. 
64. See the Federal Gazette of Jan. 7, 1802; the woman was advertised as 
"about 30, with seven years to serve." The second ad appeared in the Baltimore 
American of Sept. 8, 1818, and was placed by the captain of the schooner The 
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Two Brothers. Advertisements to sell slaves placed by Baltimore masters frequently 
mentioned a desire to find a local buyer, in order to accommodate the slave's wish 
to stay in the city. 
65. Total black population in Baltimore in 1810 was 10,591; for 1820 it was 
14,615. Cited from the third and fourth federal censuses. 
66. An analysis of runaway skills also suggests that gradual manumission or 
self-purchase did not fully forestall slave flight. Slaves in the crafts had greater 
opportunities to earn cash and buy themselves than most, but although no more 
than 37 percent of the slave population were ever owned by persons in the crafts, 
craft workers made up 45 percent of runaways with a specified skill. 
67. Letter of Judge Nicholas Brice, dated Dec. 11, 1827, and reprinted in 
Genius of Universal Emancipation, Baltimore, Mar. 1, 1828. 
68. Ibid. 
69. See Laws of Maryland, 1833, chap. 224, sees. 1, 4, 6. After 1817, when 
the ban on was first imposed, concern was expressed repeatedly that the freedom 
of term slaves sold out of state was inadequately protected. For a comprehensive 
argument on the matter, see the Genius of Universal Emancipation, ed. Benjamin 
Lundy, of Jan. 20, 1827, and Feb. 10, 1827. 
70. See Laws of Maryland, 1833, chap. 224, sec. 2. The records of the Balti-
more County Orphans' Court for the 1830s and 1840s contain many cases in 
which estate administrators or guardians petitioned the court to extend terms or 
sell term slaves out of state; in these cases the court called in outside witnesses to 
speak concerning either the slave's behavior or the slaveholders' claims to have 
notified slaves of their possible sale out of state, or both matters. 
71. This account follows that of Klein in Slavery in the Americas, 196-200. 
For coartaci6n in New Orleans, see Ingersoll, "Free Blacks in a Slave Society." 
72. See Bradley, Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire, 81-112, esp. 108-
1 0 on the peculium. 
73. See Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba, 74-77, on age restrictions for 
coartados and Bradley, Slavery and Society at Rome, 154-65, on restrictions on 
the number and proportion of a master's slaves who could be freed by will in 
imperial Rome. 
74. See Bradley, Slavery and Society at Rome, 156-57. 
75. In Baltimore County, 1789-1830, 410 of 1,984 surviving sales records 
were for a term of years. In Dorchester County 74 of 1,515 sales and in Prince 
George's County 22 of 1,004 sales were for a term of years. 
76. See Miscellaneous Papers, Baltimore County Court. Manumissions filed. 
from 1789 to 1825 and bills of sale filed from 1789 to 1830 were examined to 
provide at least a five-year period of search for later purchases after each manu-
mission. 
77. Deeds of manumission identify 46 grantors as free people of color, virtu-
ally all of whom were manumitting spouses or children. About one-quarter of all 
manumitters were women, of whom only 4 percent reacquired slaves; very few of 
them practiced a traditionally male craft; employment of bound labor in the crafts 
was a male preserve. 
78. Imagine a universe of 200 manumitters and 200 purchases of slaves, 
which includes 20 manumissions followed by repurchases, a 10 percent repur-
chase rate. If 100 records of each set become lost, a search of surviving records 
would find, on average, 10 of the 20 manumissions that could be paired with 
repurchases. Since half the bills of sale would also be missing, only 5 of 10 possible 
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pairs would be found, on average. The researcher working with these smaller data 
sets could conclude that only 5 percent-S of 100-of manumitters repurchased. 
Significant proportions of Baltimore's slave records have failed to survive. 
Most official court copies of slave sales and manumissions were destroyed many 
years ago; what survives are random original records preserved as miscellaneous 
court papers. Comparison of these originals with a rare surviving volume of chat-
tel records for 1813-14 revealed that only 55 percent of the bills of sale recorded 
in the chattel records and about 80 percent of the manumissions could be found in 
extant miscellaneous original papers. 
79. In Dorchester county, where large proportions of manumissions were 
inspired by religious principles, the reacquisition rate of 12 percent for white males 
nonetheless matches that found in Baltimore, even without excluding Quaker 
manumissions. In Prince George's County, a rural tobacco county where masters' 
labor needs varied less than those of urban employers, 16 percent, or one in six 
men, bought more slaves after a grant of freedom, again a higher rate than in 
Baltimore. If rates in these counties exceed those for Baltimore, it seems quite 
likely that the Baltimore rates may be artificially low because of lost or unre-
corded transactions. 
80. For the law, see Laws of Maryland, 1817, chap. 112. In 1817 51 bills of 
sale were recorded with the Baltimore County Court; in 1818, 77. The number of 
gradual manumissions recorded in 1818 also jumped from 27 to 43 in 1818. 
81. Cook's manumission and all three bills of sale are in the Miscellaneous 
Papers, Baltimore County Court, in their respective years. 
82. John Kelso appears as a class member on the City Station member lists 
of Baltimore's Methodist church for the years 1810, 1813, and 1820. 
83. The Woodard and Hill sales of Jerry are in the Miscellaneous Papers for 
the Baltimore County Court, for 1807 and 1811. If Jerry was in fact over fifty by 
1811, as the Woodard sale of 1807 suggests, then Hill lied to evade the law ban-
ning manumissions of slaves over forty-five. Such cases may not have been un-
common: in addition to hundreds of manumissions that did not state the slave's 
age, an average of one or two a year in Baltimore followed Hill's formula of sim-
ply asserting that the slave was "under 45" or "about 45." Baltimore editor 
Hezekiah Niles claimed that many "overage" slaves were manumitted. See Niles' 
Weekly Register, Jan. 16, 1825, vol. 27. 
84. See William Haslett's manumission and sale of James. The buyer, James 
Pannell of Baltimore City, paid $275 for the right to command James for a term of 
twelve years. Miscellaneous Papers, 1814, Baltimore County Court. 
85. The Baltimore Conference kept its rules against selling slaves for life at 
least as late as 1820. See Armstrong, History of the Old Baltimore Conference, 199. 
86. Soper bought Margaret in 1813 from John Pool. Pool commuted 
Margaret's servitude from life to six years as part of the transaction and received 
$180 from Soper. See Miscellaneous Papers, 1813, Baltimore County Court. 
5. FREE BLACK FAMILY STRATEGIES FOR GAINING FREEDOM 
1. Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994), pro-
vides a first-rate overview of family-based economic activity in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century New England, as well as a good review of the extensive litera-
ture on this subject. 
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2. See Manumission by Robert Goldsborough of Negro Chloe, Land 
Records, 1806, Queen Anne's County. The accounting of Sam Stewart's payments 
for Chloe's freedom are recorded on the back of the manumission deed. 
3. See Manumission by George Gilbert of Sundry Negroes, Land Records, 
1801, Queen Anne's County. Also see Manumission by Free Negro Isaac Bellows 
of Negro Lydia, Manumissions, 1793, Anne Arundel County. 
4. See Manumission by Jesse Higgins of Jane Gibbs et a!., Land Records, 
1799, Kent County. See Manumission by Phill Howard of Mary and Mary Ann 
Howard, Manumissions, 1817, Ann Arundel County, and Manumission by Phil! 
Howard of George and Rachel Howard, Manumissions, 1818, Ann Arundel 
County. 
5. See Manumission by Free Negro Peter Porter to Harry, Land Records, 
1797, Talbot County, MSA. 
6. Affidavits regarding Negro Jane, Miscellaneous Papers, 1815, Baltimore 
County Court. 
7. See Laws of Maryland, 1809, chap. 171. 
8. Of 641 prospective manumissions of women that determined the condi-
tion of unborn children, only 60 (9 percent) freed such children at birth. The 
median term length for unborn children was 25-29 years for males and 20-24 
years for females. Seventy-four manumitters (11 percent) stated that the terms 
applied to children would also apply to grandchildren. Data drawn from eight 
Maryland counties over the period 1770-1830 (Anne Arundel, Baltimore, 
Dorchester, Harford, Kent, Prince George's, Queen Anne's, and Talbot). For an 
example, see Jurningham Drury, Manumission of Negro Sarah, Manumissions, 
1820, Anne Arundel County. 
9. See Manumission of John Jones to Negro Dafney, Land Records, 1824, 
Dorchester County. For a similar transaction, see the assignment by Joseph Bowzer 
of his children to Letitia Pierce, in which Bowzer acknowledges that Pierce or her 
heirs could claim his children without "any charge for keeping the children." The 
assignment, dated 1831, is in the Gorsuch Family Papers, MHS. 
10. See Harris and Johnson, Maryland Reports, 1823, Hamilton v. Cragg, 
for a challenge to a manumission of minor children as violating the self-mainte-
nance requirements for freed persons. 
11. These data derive from manumissions of 2,598 male and 2,663 female 
slaves whose age was specified in a deed filed between 1770 and 1830. For men, 
1,237 (48 percent) were over thirty, and 1,872 (72 percent) were over twenty-five. 
For women, 1,042 (39 percent) were over thirty, and 1,608 (60 percent) were over 
twenty-five. Data from the eight Maryland counties cited in note 8 above. 
12. J.E.K Walker, in Free Frank, 38-42, describes how Frank spent over 
$14,000 to purchase freedom for himself, his wife, and his descendants to the 
fourth generation. 
13. See U.S. House, Annals of Congress, 20th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 7, 1829, 
182-83. 
14. See Manumission of Fielder Dorsett to Negro Jones, Chattel Records, 
1803, Prince George's County, MSA. 
15. See Manumissions, 1802, Anne Arundel County. 
16. See Manumission by Isaac Hackett of Negro Delia, Manumissions, 1793, 
Kent County, and Manumission by Thomas Sluby of Negro Delia, Manumissions, 
179 5, Kent County, MSA. 
17. See Manumission by James Carey of Negro Moses, Miscellaneous Pa-
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pers, 1789, Baltimore County Court. See Manumission by Morgan Brown to Negro 
William Berry, Manumissions, 1783, Kent County. 
18. Philip Fiddeman registered manumissions in the Queen Anne's County 
Land Records in 1790, 1796, 1799, 1801, 1803, 1808, 1809, 1811, 1813, 1814, 
and 1816. 
19. Thomas's statement appears in Petition for Pardon of Free Negro Henry 
Toomey, Pardon Papers, Governor and Council of Maryland, box 17, folder 2. 
20. See Manumission by Thomas Burgess of Sundry Negroes, Land Records, 
1808, Queen Anne's County, and Mortgage by George Garnet to Joseph Blake 
and Richard Rochester, 1810, Land Records, 1810, Queen Anne's County. 
21. Petition of John Dubernat, February 1819, Petitions to the Judges, Balti-
more County Orphans' Court. 
22. Data for the next three tables were drawn from Baltimore manumission 
records and these rural counties: Anne Arundel, Dorchester, Harford, Kent, Prince 
George's, Queen Anne's, and Talbot. They represent manumissions surviving in 
these counties' land or manumission records from 1770 to 1820. All cases are 
included in which a child's sex was specified, as well as his or her age at the time 
the deed was recorded. 
23. An examination of bills of sale for slaves in Baltimore County between 
1787 and 1830 reveals 23 cases in which children under five years of age were 
sold for a discrete price (as opposed to group sales with their mother and siblings). 
Boys were more likely than girls thus to be purchased, by a margin of 14 to 9, and 
sold for about 50 percent more, that is, an average price of $61 compared to $40 
for girls. Data from Bills of Sale, Miscellaneous Papers, Baltimore County Court. 
24. See the last will and testament of Thomas Pitt, Baltimore County Wills, 
1819. 
25. See the will of Don Carlos Hall, 1823; of Frank Armstrong, 1816; and of 
Amy Scoggins, 1820, all in Baltimore County Wills. 
26. Grantors of 384 manumissions by deed were positively identified as free 
people of color. Of these manumissions, 83 (22 percent) postponed freedom until 
after completion of a term of servitude. 
27. See Manumission by David Polk of Negroes David and Benjamin, Mis-
cellaneous Papers, 1816, Baltimore County Court. 
28. There were 54 cases in which free black men manumitted males identi-
fied as age nineteen or under at the time of the recording of the deed. Of these, 2 7 
(50 percent) became term slaves before obtaining free status. 
29. The data are: Baltimore, 7 of 68 black manumissions of children de-
layed; other Maryland counties, 73 of 316; Kent County, 31 of 99. Regarding the 
proportion of African Americans indentured by the courts, Baltimore blacks never 
composed as much as 10 percent of those bound out before 1830, as discussed in 
chapter 1. In Dorchester and Prince George's Counties, by contrast, over one-
quarter of all indentures were of black children. For Kent County, see Daniels, 
"Alternative Workers in a Slave Economy," passim. 
30. See Petition of Thomas Winston, Petitions, 1846, Baltimore County Or-
phans' Court. 
31. SeeM. Johnson and Roark, "Strategies of Survival." 
32. Of 1,581 bills of sale for slaves in Baltimore County between 1790 and 
1830, only 32 involved identifiable free people of color as purchasers; of these, 26 
specified a familial relationship with the slave being bought. See Miscellaneous 
Papers, Baltimore County Court. 
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6. POLITICAL-ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND FREE BLACKS 
1. For a sample of southern attitudes toward free black labor after the Civil 
War, see Roark, Masters without Slaves, esp. 111-56. For Cuba, see Scott, Slave 
Emancipation in Cuba. For a good overview of the literature, also see Scott, "Ex-
ploring the Meaning of Freedom." 
2. Free day laborers earned $4.50 for a six-day week. Self-purchase for 
$350, a midrange price for a healthy adult male slave, would require a laborer to 
save fifteen to twenty-one months' full-time earnings. In 1813 the median wealth 
of Baltimore's taxable households was $342. Price data derived from slave bills of 
sale and manumissions in Miscellaneous Papers, 1790-1830, Baltimore County 
Court. Tax data from Assessment Record, 1813, Baltimore City Commissioners 
of the Tax. 
3. See Raymond, Elements of Political Economy, 2:415. Raymond was born 
and educated in Connecticut and moved to Baltimore around 1814. His opposi-
tion to the unrestricted admission of Missouri appeared in a pamphlet entitled 
The Missouri Question. Also see Paul Conkin, Prophets of Prosperity, 77-111. 
The second quote is from Hezekiah Niles, Niles' Weekly Register, May 22, 1819. 
4. See Annapolis Maryland Gazette, Nov. 12, 1790. Bettye Gardner has 
tentatively identified "A Freeman" as Ezekiel Cooper, a Methodist preacher. See 
her "The Free Blacks of Baltimore," Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 
1973. 
5. See Annapolis Maryland Gazette of Nov. 26, 1790. 
6. Ibid., Dec. 2, 16, 1790. 
7. Ibid., Jan. 13, 20, 1791. 
8. See American Museum, May 10, 23, 1788,414-17 and 509-12. "Othello" 
signed himself as being "of Baltimore." 
9. See Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian 
America (Williamsburg, 1980), esp. 13-47. 
10. The 1790 census listed 8,043 free blacks in the entire state of Maryland, 
7 percent of the black population of the state. 
11. See Laws of Maryland, 1801, chap. 109; 1805, chap. 66, 80; 1808, chap. 
81. 
12. See Laws of Maryland, 1806, chap. 56; for tumultuous meetings and the 
gun ban, see Laws of Maryland, 1806, chap. 81. 
13. See Pardon Papers, 1782-1829, Governor and Council of Maryland. The 
foregoing comments are based on an examination of 1,371 petitions for pardon, 
including 1,151 for whites, 156 for slaves, and 64 for free persons of color. 
14. Gary Nash's examination of free blacks in Philadelphia notes that falling 
real wages after the year 1800 may have contributed to similar negative percep-
tions there of free blacks. See his Forging Freedom, 144-45. 
15. See Harper, "Letter from General Harper," 8-9. 
16. Niles' Weekly Register, May 22, 1819. 
17. For Raymond's comments on the respective roles of production and con-
sumption, see Elements of Political Economy, 2:108-57. 
18. See Niles' Weekly Register, May 15, 1819, 16:193. 
19. For the outline of his demographic argument, see Raymond, The Mis-
souri Question, 8-20. Earlier antislavery writers had also compared northern growth 
to southern stagnation. See Dillon, Slavery Attacked, 120-22. 
20. See Raymond, Missouri Question, 26-29. 
21. See Learned, "A View," 7-8, 13-18. 
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22. Ibid., 24-25. 
23. See Harper, "Letter from General Harper." 
24. Ibid., 6-7. Harper had in his youth endorsed more optimistic sentiments. 
In an address made in his native South Carolina in 1788, Harper stated, "Can we 
imagine one being more superior to another than a Franklin a Witherspoon, or a 
Jefferson, to a negro just landed from the Coast of Africa? Yet these creatures are 
of the same species; they came into the world in all respects alike, except in the 
colour of their skin, and the difference between them, great as it appears, arises 
wholly from education." Cited from "A discourse on Learning," Mar. 15, 1788, 
Ms. Caroline T. Fisher Collection of Robert Goodloe Harper Papers, Special Col-
lections 2360, MSA. 
25. Harper, "Letter from General Harper," 8-9. 
26. Ibid., 9-11. 
27. Ibid., 8, 13-14. 
28. Ibid., 25. 
29. See Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind, 3-22, and Finnie, 
"Anti-Slavery Movement in the Upper South," 324, for more extensive discus-
sions of colonization. 
30. See "Emancipation of the Blacks," in Niles' Weekly Register, Aug. 1, 
1818, 14:382. 
31. See Harper, "Letter from General Harper," 7. 
32. "Mitigation of Slavery" appeared in eight parts in Niles' Weekly Regis-
ter, between May and August of 1819. See Niles' Weekly Register, vol. 16. Niles, 
born in 1777, had been raised as a Quaker in Wilmington, Delaware. He edited a 
Federalist-sponsored newspaper in Baltimore, Baltimore Evening Post, from 1806 
to 1811, leaving it to found the Weekly Register, a nationally circulated newspa-
per that he edited until his death in 1839. In politics Niles moved from Federalism 
to support for National Republican and Whig measures, especially the develop-
ment of home markets and domestic manufacturing. See Stone, Hezekiah Niles as 
an Economist. Niles was a moderate antislaveryite whose strongest attacks were 
launched against the slave trade. See the Weekly Register of 1817-18, 12:287, 
323; 13:80, 332, 377; 14:280; and 15:267-68, 384, for examples. 
33. See Niles' Weekly Register, June 26 and May 15, 1819. 
34. Ibid., May 15, 1819 and May 22, 1819. 
35. Ibid., Mar. 30, 1822, Mar. 11, 1826. See also African Repository, July 
1826, 2:152-54. During the first twenty years of its existence, 1,130 of the 2,270 
incarcerations (49.8 percent) in the Maryland Penitentiary involved prisoners iden-
tified as black, mulatto, or "yellow." Data compiled from Prisoner Records, 1811-
1830, Maryland Penitentiary. 
36. See Laws of Maryland, 1818, chap. 197. For the debate, see the Ameri-
can, Feb. 1, 1819, and the Annapolis Maryland Republican, Jan. 9, 1819. 
37. See Raymond, Elements of Political Economy, esp. 406, vol. 2. 
38. Ibid., 413-18, vol. 2. 
39. See Niles's Weekly Register, May 22, 1819. 
40. Niles claimed that removal of twelve thousand slave girls per year from 
the southern states would "eliminate" the slave population over time, or so re-
duce black numbers as to eliminate fears of insurrection. See the Weekly Register 
of July 17, 1819, for Niles's statistical analysis, predicated on the dubious as-
sumption that each slave woman bore an average of ten surviving children. 
41. See Niles' Weekly Register, May 8, 1819, 16:13, Aug. 14, 1819, 16:401, 
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and July 17, 1819. For a discussion of early-nineteenth-century views of the im-
pact of climate and environment on skin color, see Stanton, The Leopard's Spots, 
esp. 3-23. 
42. See Niles' Weekly Register, Aug. 14, 1819. 
43. For an exposition of early-nineteenth-century attitudes toward women 
as inculcators of republican virtues, see Linda K. Kerber's Women of the Republic: 
Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill, 1980), esp. 283-
87. 
44. Raymond, Elements of Political Economy, 2:413-21. These views were 
not simply a mask for race prejudice; Raymond also opposed lotteries, because 
instant wealth "demoralized" winners. Raymond's visceral distaste for rapid change 
slanted his analysis of manumission: over four-fifths of manumissions recorded in 
Baltimore city and county wills between 1790 and 1825 required a term of service 
before granting freedom, as did a majority of manumissions by deed. 
45. Kennedy spoke on a bill designed to compel slaves manumitted by will in 
the future to leave the state. Kennedy successfully opposed banishment, urging 
voluntary colonization as a more humane alternative. See the Baltimore American 
of Jan. 23 and 30, 1821. 
46. See the Baltimore Genius of Universal Emancipation, Jan. 12, 1828. The 
author was probably William Watkins, then an emerging leader of the free black 
community in Baltimore. 
47. E. Tyson, "Farewell Address to the Free People of Color," 8-9. Also see 
J.S. Tyson, Life of Elisha Tyson, and Graham, Baltimore, 35-92. 
48. See the Baltimore Genius of Universal Emancipation, Sept. 12, 1825. 
49. Ibid., Aug. 12, 1826. 
50. Ibid., July 7, 1827. 
51. See Laws of Maryland, 1833, chap. 224, which modified the law of 1817, 
chap. 112. The new law allowed courts to consider owners' petitions to sell un-
governable or absconding term slaves. 
52. For the petition and its defeat, see Genius of Universal Emancipation, 
Jan. 12, Apr. 26, 1828. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. See Niles' Weekly Register of July 12, 1828, 34:316-25, for a description 
of the parade and groundbreaking ceremonies for the railroad. 
2. Carroll's father had been one of the founders of the Baltimore Iron Com-
pany. SeeK. Johnson, "Genesis of the Baltimore Iron Company." 
3. Carroll was part owner of the Cape Sable Company, an alum manufac-
turing concern. He supplied the company with slaves as his contribution to the 
company's working capital. See Maryland Chancery Papers, Cape Sable Co., case 
17,898-9015. 
4. See Niles' Weekly Register, vol. 40, July 16, 1831. 
5. See Steffen, The Mechanics of Baltimore; Laurie, Artisans into Workers; 
or Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the Working 
Class, 1788-1850 (New York, 1984 ), for treatments of workers that give passing 
attention at best to African Americans. 
6. Berlin's Slaves without Masters devotes one of eleven chapters to eman-
cipation; Fields's Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground deals with the eman-
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cipation struggle in Maryland during the Civil War as a central theme, but her 
chapter on Baltimore is largely a justification of ignoring early emancipation there, 
in order to focus on events of the 1850s and 1860s. 
7. Certificates of freedom show that over 60 percent of Baltimore regis-
trants had been raised elsewhere. Prisoner records of the Maryland Penitentiary 
for 1811-30 show that just under two-thirds of free black felons resident in Balti-
more City when convicted had been born elsewhere. See Certificates of Freedom, 
1805-1832, Baltimore County Court, and Prisoner Records, 1811-40, Maryland 
State Penitentiary. 
8. See G. Wright, Political Economy of the Cotton South, esp. 128-57. 
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